Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union in the Midst of the Cold War: Internal and International Factors

Ethan R. Sanders*

Abstract

To what extent was international pressure placed on Nyerere and Karume to unify their two states in April 1964? The argument made is that even though Americans were initially very pleased with the outcome of the Union—because they thought it would help stem the spread of communism in the region—this was not a Western-initiated plan forced upon East African leaders. Indeed, the evidence shows that Americans were largely in the dark and in fact very frustrated by their lack of influence on the situation. Instead, the Union merely served as a confluence of African and American interests. The internal factors are inspected by highlighting African concerns over outside interference, worries about domestic stability, and a desire by Karume to consolidate his power. Finally, the traditional conceptualization of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union as being either a product of the Cold War or an example of Pan-African idealism will be re-examined.

Introduction

On 20 April 1964 the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was agreed upon in principal by Abeid Karume and Julius Nyerere in a closed door meeting in Dar es Salaam attended by only a small handful of high-level ministers. Two days later across the Zanzibar Channel the two heads of state signed the Articles of Union, binding the states together in a political merger. The question that historians and other commentators are still trying to straighten out fifty years later is why, exactly? The standard reply for years has been that the Union was a shining example of the ideals of Pan-

* Assistant Professor, Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts, E-mail: ethan.sanders@bridgew.edu. The author would like to thank James R. Brennan for his helpful insights on the role of Oscar Kambona in helping to establish the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
Africanism and served as the model which proved that there could be political unity between African nations. However, in 1989 author and activist Amrit Wilson came out with the provocative thesis that the Union was not an African initiative, but was engineered and orchestrated by the Americans and British in order to stop the spread of communism in eastern Africa. In her view the United Republic of Tanzania was an American and British creation through the means of manipulation and subterfuge. This interpretation seemed feasible in light of the revelations about the CIA’s involvement in the Congo just prior to the Zanzibar Revolution that demonstrated the obvious lengths Americans were willing to go in order to engender regime change in Africa. As tensions have risen between the mainland and the islands in the last few years, this debate over the role of foreigners in engineering the Union has been discussed by prominent academics Issa Shivji and Haroub Othman, writer Godfrey Mwakikagile, as well as a host of commentators in the Tanzanian media and the East African blogosphere.

A close reading of recently released American National Security files, CIA documents and interviews with the Tanganyikan Attorney General who drafted the Articles of Union, reveals that while the Americans were initially very pleased with the outcome of the Union—because they thought it would help minimize the influence of the “radical elements” in the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and stem the spread of communism in the region—this was not an American or British initiated plan forced upon East African leaders. Indeed, the evidence shows that the Americans were largely in the dark and in fact very frustrated by their lack of influence on the situation with regional leaders. The idea of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar was clearly an African one, an idea which had its own long and complicated history stretching back to the 1940s well before Anglo-American concerns over the Zanzibar Revolution. The actualization of the union agreement in April of 1964, however, was principally the responsibility of two individuals, Julius Nyerere and Abeid Karume, and was built out of both their longtime interests and desires as well as their complex concerns over the evolving situation in the early months of 1964. Therefore the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar served as a confluence of interests. It helped meet the needs of the principle African leaders involved and was also an outcome that the Americans were temporarily pleased with as they thought it would be beneficial to their own geopolitical interests. However, neither the Americans nor the British were the prime movers or significant shapers of this plan. Instead, the Union was conceived by Africans and largely
fashioned by Nyerere and Karume’s key advisers, Tanganyikan Minister of External Affairs, Oscar Kambona, and Zanzibari Vice President Abdulla Kassim Hanga. It was the agendas of the two heads of state and the initiative shown by a few of their top ministers that guided the unification process. The merger was not a plan cooked up by British or American agents and diplomats and then forced upon the leaders of these two nascent post-colonial states.

This paper is not concerned with the legality or legacy of the Union, but will focus on the narrower question of what was the extent of the international pressure placed on Karume and Nyerere, and is there any evidence that the Union was conceived by the CIA, the American State Department or the British Foreign Office? This paper will retrace the days and events just after the Zanzibar Revolution in January 1964 through the mid part of 1964, after the Union had been implemented, in order to try and untangle who knew what and when. What then follows is a brief examination of the historical background of the African idea of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the connection of Karume and Nyerere to those discussions of African unity from the mid-1940s continuing through discussions of federation in the late 1950s and 1960s. This historical perspective, which is often missing in the debates about the Union, will be used to help give a fuller picture of the internal, or East African, factors going into the decision to unite politically.

Zanzibar: East Africa’s Guinea?
Much has been said about the American and British concerns that post-revolutionary Zanzibar would become “an African Cuba,” serving as a bridgehead for the spread of communism into the African continent. Certainly in the hours immediately following the Revolution this had already developed into a principal concern of American diplomats in East Africa such as the American Ambassador to Tanganyika, William Leonhart, who along with the Western media would repeatedly use this phrase over the next several months. (Somewhat ironically, however, the first use of the term may have been introduced by President Nyerere himself who suggested in a conversation with Leonhart on the night of the Revolution that the former Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)-led government was “far more likely to produce an ‘east African Cuba,’” than any government led by Abeid Karume.) Nonetheless, the American concern was very real as seen in the statement put out the day after the Revolution by the US State Department’s Director of Intelligence and Research entitled, “The Communist Spectre Looms in Zanzibar.” The central concern from the start was to try and
E. R. Sanders

distinguish who in the new revolutionary government was a “moderate” or a “genuinely African nationalist,” and who was a communist-inspired radical. This was in line with an emerging belief in the American government that all true African nationalists were by definition non-aligned because they wanted their nations to be sovereign and not dependent on any other non-African state—whether capitalist or communist in orientation. Despite this oversimplified view, American policy since the Kennedy years had been to show goodwill to any African nationalists who favoured a non-aligned foreign policy, because this was deemed the most realistic and safest play in Cold War geo-politics.

From the start the Americans believed that Abdulrahman Babu was the most dangerous and potentially subversive member in the new Zanzibar government, the Revolutionary Council (RC). They believed he was a committed “communist, Chinese variety” who was loyal to Beijing. In fact, they felt certain the Chinese had supported Babu in the past and would back his bid to take control of the government if the opportunity arose. Other leaders initially seen as communist threats included Abdulla Kassim Hanga, who was believed to be Soviet-trained but whose primary orientation was towards African nationalism; and finally the Americans believed (incorrectly through bad MI-5 information) that self-styled Field Marshall John Okello—the military commander of the insurrection—and his armed thugs were all Cuban-trained. Towards the other end of the spectrum was Karume who was credited as being a “genuine African nationalist” and was clearly seen as the most popular politician in the islands and therefore deserving of Western support, even if he was viewed as “ignorant and inept.”

Just three days after the Revolution the US State Department was already concerned that no “concrete efforts” were being pursued by East African governments or the United Kingdom to keep Zanzibar from being drawn into the communist camp. Over the coming weeks the Americans began contemplating a myriad of different plans for influencing the situation. All of these various strategies were discussed via a flurry of telegrams and face to face meetings between American diplomats and their British counterparts. Few, however, were ever implemented—to the great frustration of a number of American and British officials.

Already by 17 January the CIA was reporting that they believed a “power struggle seem[ed] likely between African nationalist and pro-communist elements” in the Revolutionary Council. William Leonhart thought the first
step in helping shore up support for Karume and the moderates would be to give American diplomatic recognition to the Revolutionary Council.\textsuperscript{13} The ambassador believed that this would give substance to the new government’s profession of non-alignment, help prove America’s friendly disposition towards the regime, and bolster the “African nationalist” character of the Revolutionary Council. But this early plan was foiled because the British were balking on the issue of recognition until they felt the situation became more settled. Their inaction tied American hands because US policy since the Eisenhower administration was that America would let Britain take the lead when it came to issues in their former African colonies.\textsuperscript{14} Thus they would not recognize the new government until the British did so first. This entangling policy of relying on the British would continue to muddle the Anglo-American response to the Zanzibar situation in the following weeks.

A new East African crisis, however, would momentarily draw Anglo-American attention away from the events in Zanzibar. Between January 19 and 24 army battalions in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya all mutinied over issues of pay. To the dismay and shame of Nyerere, Ugandan Prime Minister Milton Obote and Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, all three had to ask their former colonial masters to send military assistance to help restore order in their countries.\textsuperscript{15} The British military intervention in these East African states did more than just distract the Americans and British from the developments in Zanzibar, it also provided the inspiration for a new course of action across the Zanzibar Channel. The use of British soldiers to pacify the situations on the mainland prompted Leonhart to wonder if a precedent had now been made for British intervention in Zanzibar. Recognizing that British warships were already in the vicinity and that the new mood in the region might now be more favourable to British military action, Leonhart recommended that the East African leaders persuade Karume to request British assistance in disarming some of the gun-slinging bands roaming Zanzibar’s alleyways and remove any undesirable individuals that Karume might want gone. By this time a couple of hundred Tanganyikan police officers had already been requested by Karume to restore order in the islands, and the idea was that the Brits would not have to land troops, but just show sufficient force off Zanzibari shores to allow the Tanganyikans to collect arms under the shadows of British warships. One interesting aspect of this plan was to try and reach Karume through Jomo Kenyatta, whom they viewed as the best channel to contact Karume, and get him to ask the British to intervene. Indeed, over the next three months numerous British and
American diplomats saw Kenyatta as the key to fixing the Zanzibar conundrum. It was thought that Kenyatta would be more receptive to doing this favor for the Western powers and that, according to Leonhart, Nyerere was seen as having too much “on his plate,” and was too indulgent of Babu.\(^{16}\)

Upon receiving Leonhart’s message, American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and Under Secretary of State, George Ball, became greatly concerned about the situation and were “anxious to compare notes with the British,” and consult the highest levels of the British government to see what their response was to such a plan. They made clear that the US would let the British take the lead, that they “would not provide any military support,” but that they were assessing non-military forms of assistance. In response, the British were willing to approach Karume and offer military assistance, but made it clear that they would only go in on one of two conditions: that Karume made his request for assistance in writing, or that they had solid evidence that British lives were in danger. But by 1 February it was clear that neither of these two conditions existed and that the plan could not be implemented. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that the British High Commissioner to Zanzibar, Timothy Crosthwait, felt he had no leverage with Karume and that it would be difficult to even find a way to approach Karume on such a topic. Even if he had broken through to Karume, British intervention was probably the last thing Karume wanted to see due to his fears of a Western-led counter-revolution.\(^ {17}\)

British and American discussions of intervention were soon redirected to the more immediate crisis of what to do over the impending exile of their diplomatic staffs owing to their continued delay of granting political recognition of the new government in Zanzibar. Tensions were only cooled towards the end of February after the British finally decided to grant recognition. The Americans followed immediately afterwards that same day. To American minds, however, British dithering cost them a certain amount of favor and creditability because their recognition came a full month after the Cubans, and several weeks after the Soviets, Chinese and several other socialist countries. But at least the belated recognition enabled both diplomatic missions to be allowed to return to the islands and reopen their consulates.\(^ {18}\)

By early March, though, American Secretary of State Rusk was growing impatient with waiting to hear what the British “action plan” was to stop the
Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

spread of communism. Rusk was considering plans for educational and economic aid, but he wanted to gather together the opinions of all American diplomats in the region to come up with talking points to send over to the UK Foreign Office. The first item for consideration was to find a way to eliminate the influence they believed Babu held over Karume. Rusk again returned to the idea of approaching East African leaders to explain the dangers of communism to Karume since the British and Americans' influence on the Zanzibar government was deemed “negligible” and they were in no position to reach Karume. Rusk hoped the other three leaders would be able to talk to Karume without Babu present. Rusk also toyed with the idea of returning the volatile Field Marshall Okello to Zanzibar who had been sidelined by Karume and forced to leave the islands. He now believed Okello to be an opponent of Babu and might serve to “slow down Babu’s” perceived rapid rise to power. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail below, Rusk also suggested one “long-range solution might lie in some form of federation.”

The same day Rusk sent out his talking points memo, British High Commissioner Crosthwait had finally received a meeting with Karume whose “reception was quite cool.” Far from applying any pressure on Karume, Crosthwait was not even able to get Karume to extend an invitation for a routine meeting with the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys, who was currently touring East Africa. Karume did not see the point when he felt “he no particular business to discuss” with Sandys. Regardless, Sandys met with Karume two days later, but Leonhart disappointingly noted that only “non-substantive matters were discussed.” Leonhart took the opportunity to meet with Sandys and his British counterpart in Dar es Salaam to brainstorm future plans for Zanzibar. The newly appointed American chargé d’affairs for Zanzibar, Frank Carlucci, and William Atwood, the American Ambassador to Kenya, were also present and the group agreed that Anglo-American political and economic leverage in Zanzibar was “slight” and they still believed getting Kenyatta to act was the key to success. Sandys did talk with Kenyatta during his East Africa trip and encouraged him to meet with Karume, but Mzee was “cool to the idea” and appeared to have no intention of going. When Sandys responded to Rusk’s query over a British action plan, he reiterated that the British would only intervene with an invitation from Karume, and now added the stipulation that all three East African leaders had to give their approval as well. After his meetings in Zanzibar and Nairobi he knew this was not going to happen anytime soon.
Because of the growing conviction that the Americans and British had very little influence with Karume directly, between mid-March and mid-April the most ubiquitous plan that continued to emanate from London and Washington D. C. was to encourage Kenyatta to get the other East African leaders to see Babu as a communist and a threat, and then to get them to approach Karume and encourage him to take the necessary steps to force out the left-leaning elements of his government. Again, Nyerere was seen as too “weak” and that Tanganyika was an “unlikely channel” to get to Karume. On the ground in East Africa though, Anglo-American diplomats were coming to believe that this approach was unworkable and would have no effect. In Nairobi, American chargé Laurence Vass made strong appeals to Kenyatta to act, but Kenyatta made no promises and it was felt that he was not actually going to follow through with anything. In Zanzibar, Crosthwait and Carlucci agreed that even if Kenyatta did make a “strong approach” towards Karume that it would be ineffective. Certainly their own attempts to reach Karume met with no success. Crosswaith complained that he had “no chance” of meeting alone with Karume, and when Carlucci scored a visit with Karume later in April and tried to subtly bring up the issue of “Eastern imperialism,” Karume appears to have shut the conversation down due his unwillingness to listen to American opinion on the topic. Leonhart would receive a similar rebuff in Dar es Salaam. Despite Leonhart’s earlier suggestion to Rusk that the Americans “not make another direct approach [to] Nyerere on Zanzibar but let Kenyatta take the initiative,” he changed his mind after a March 25th Zanzibar cabinet reshuffle which allegedly entrenched pro-communists in all the key ministries prompted him to pluck up the courage to discuss Zanzibar with Nyerere on his next meeting. Leonhart received a gentle rebuke from Nyerere who blamed America’s lack of influence with Karume on taking too long to recognize his government and told Leonhart that Tanganyika would not intervene on behalf of Americans any more than they had.

Since it became clear to Leonhart and Carlucci that none of the East African governments were willing to get involved and attempt to sway Karume, they both began to consider all sorts of alternate scenarios which they shared with the State Department between mid-March and mid-April. Carlucci’s ideas ran the entire gambit from learning to live with Babu and hoping that one day he would see the “value of true non-alignment,” to creating a local incident that would serve as a pretext for intervention. Carlucci also considered a high-impact personal item like giving Karume his own helicopter and pilot. Leonhart’s plans were more diplomatic in nature. If
Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were unwilling to talk to Karume about the perils of communism, maybe Americans could encourage other African leaders such as Sékou Touré and Hastings Banda, or other Commonwealth leaders to create positive relations with Zanzibar. He considered getting other international organizations to send special missions, as well as buying a large amount of cloves from Zanzibar that the Soviets had just reneged on. The State Department liked the idea of encouraging allies to make a presence in Zanzibar and in early April began asking a number of American Ambassadors in Africa, Europe, Asia and Australia to approach foreign governments on establishing a mission or presence in Zanzibar. The response to this plea to friends seems negligible, but one interesting development came in a meeting with Visiting Indian High Commissioner Tandon who suggested to Carlucci that the Americans intervene directly and that the Indian government, concerned over the treatment of Indians in Zanzibar, might be willing to assist and send a warship. David Bruce, American Ambassador to the UK, was the first to respond that this plan was out of the question, pointing out that “overt American intervention was not feasible.” This was quickly followed by a message from Tandon’s superiors in Delhi distancing the government of India from Tandon’s plan and confirming there would be no naval support from India.

By mid-April all American hope in East African leaders reversing the course of events in Zanzibar had “vanished” and the thought of a Karume-invited British-led military intervention was still seen as out of the question. Therefore, Thomas Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, drew up a major internal memorandum on US policy alternatives for Zanzibar (no foreign dissemination) and submitted it to the Secretary of State on 15 April. The memo estimated that Zanzibar would soon become the first fully communist-aligned state in Africa. It was believed that Zanzibar would indeed become an African Cuba, serving as a showcase of socialist economic development and an entrepôt for communist propaganda in Africa. Hughes commented that the best America could hope for at this point was that Zanzibar would instead one day develop into an East African Guinea—a reference to the fact that even though post-colonial Guinea initially became closely aligned with communist countries in order to receive aid, that after a while they adopted a “genuinely neutralist posture.” Thus, taking a somewhat defeatist attitude and focusing now on long-term strategies, Hughes suggested that America had only two options: a) try to quarantine the island or b) maintain a light Western presence and hope to take advantage of future opportunities that might materialize. (Hughes did
concede that uninvited military intervention was a third theoretical option but argued it was not worth exploring as it would be counterproductive.) It was thought that quarantining, using the standard Cold War weapons of blockades, boycotts and embargoes on a struggling Zanzibar economy was bound to come across as mean spirited and would be resented everywhere on the African mainland and beyond. Therefore, since isolating Zanzibar was believed to be ineffective in this case, it was recommended that the best course of action was to keep lines open, maintain a small presence, and hope that mainland states would not succumb to Zanzibar’s temptations, but in time serve as a counter-influence for softening Zanzibar’s leaders. And maybe, if they were fortunate, tensions arising from the Sino-Soviet rivalry on the islands would allow for an opening for Americans to return to a position of influence.35

The comments in the British and American communications during the preceding month and the tone of this memorandum were clearly born out of frustration over a lack of Western influence. The Americans obviously believed that hope was presently lost and they were disappointed that their East African friends were unwilling to take action. There was one line, however, in the Hughes memorandum that has gained attention in light of the events that transpired in the days following its release. In a section lamenting that the time had almost certainly passed when mainland African states could reverse the trends in Zanzibar, Hughes wrote glumly that the “prospects for outflanking Zanzibar’s radicals by drawing the island into East African regional arrangements also seem unpromising.”36 In the following days something very similar to this unfolded as it was announced that Tanganyika and Zanzibar were going to unite. This process eventually even led to a neutralizing of Babu and other “radicals” like Salim Rashid and Ali Mafoudh. This has led commentators to question whether Americans had any foreknowledge of this plan. Was it indeed an idea conceived by Americans? Were Karume and Nyerere, who signed the Articles of Union between the two countries, pressured into a decision by Westerners pushing this plan of federation? We turn to these questions presently.

The Idea of a Union
The very first record in the American files of any discussion about federating or uniting Tanganyika and Zanzibar came just days after the Revolution when Oscar Kambona requested a meeting with William Leonhart to discuss the arrest of Americans in Zanzibar. Meeting at Kambona’s house on January 16, Kambona mentioned that Karume, Hanga and Babu had come to see
Nyerere to ask him for police advisers and help. During this initial meeting the Zanzibar delegation “said they would like to discuss union or federal relationship with Tanganyika in [the] near future.” This piece of information must not have initially struck Leonhart as too important because he made no comment on it in his report nor did he bring it up with Nyerere at his next meeting with the Tanganyikan president. This exchange at Kambona’s house was reported by the CIA a couple of days later. (Most CIA reports at this time were commentaries based on gleanings from State Department telegrams as they did not have any agents on the ground in Zanzibar during the weeks following the Revolution.) This first mention of some sort of union or federation is illuminating because it indicates several things. First, the very idea of some sort of federation or union was first brought up by Kambona, and not the Americans. Moreover, American understanding (and misunderstanding) of such a plan was always based on the information they received from Africans. Second, it shows that Babu was privy to the early discussions of federation. Finally, it demonstrates that there may be some evidence that the idea was first suggested by Karume and not Nyerere, although there is quite a bit of disagreement on this point as various parties involved have told different versions.

A little over a week later Kambona again mentioned to Leonhart that “the new GOZ [Government of Zanzibar] leaders continued to press for early EA Federation including Zanzibar.” Kambona’s response to the Zanzibaris was that it was still too controversial to be undertaken quickly because the Afro-Shirazi Party, the political party that made up the bulk of the Revolutionary Council, had long been accused of being mainland agents. He told the visitors that he felt Zanzibar should exist as an independent state for some months before discussions on federation resumed. Whether or not this is exactly how the discussion between Kambona and the Zanzibar leaders unfolded, or instead just how Kambona wanted Leonhart to think they unfolded, cannot be ascertained. However, it does speak to the fact that Tanganyikan-Zanzibar discussions on federation or union began almost immediately after the Revolution and that initially the discussions were focused on a larger East African Federation and not just a partnership between the two countries.

After Kambona’s second mention of high level discussions about federation, Leonhart and the State Department took more notice of this idea and wondered if it was worth further exploration to see if some sort of federal solution could possibly help alleviate the communist threat in the islands.
E. R. Sanders

Coming just after the mainland mutinies when the US was contemplating a number of actions including a British military intervention and approaching East African leaders to do more to help, Secretary of State Rusk asked Leonhart to arrange a meeting to discuss the Zanzibar situation with Nyerere. He gave Leonhart a list of twelve questions to ask Nyerere which were mostly focused on obtaining Nyerere’s assessment on the situation and various Zanzibar actors, but also to see if Tanganyikan or Kenyan police could do more to support Karume and disarm the communist elements. The very last question was, “What are Nyerere’s views on possible federation Zanzibar with Tanganyika”? Nyerere’s answer to Leonhart the next day was that even though he was much closer with the current government of Zanzibar than the previous one, that, “there was not practical possibility of Federation Zanzibar and Tanganyika alone and EA Federation ‘very distant prospect.’” Nothing was made of this at the time, but it did alter American perception that Nyerere was unwilling to have a federation between the two countries, and that if anything was to happen it needed to be a regional federation in which Kenyatta was again believed to be the key.

The next mention of a federation in the American correspondence was not until a month later when there were a flurry of meetings and discussions to devise a new action plan. In Rusk’s talking points memo sent out to the various American diplomats involved (mentioned above), he noted that one “long-range solution might lie in some form of federation.” He observed the government of Zanzibar’s possible interest in a federation from Leonhart’s earlier reports and wondered if Nyerere might be asked again about this issue despite his “previous objections [to the] idea.” However, because Nyerere was viewed as unwilling to go it alone, and because it was believed Kenyatta was more concerned over Babu than Nyerere was, Rusk thought it best to seek Kenyatta out first to see if the Kenyan prime minister would not raise the issue with Nyerere in a discussion about a larger East African federation. But the consensus that March at the meeting between Sandys, Leonhart, Carlucci and the others in Dar es Salaam was that the Americans “nor the British believe Tanganyika-Zanzibar Federation practical possibility.” They suggested the only “outside chance Nyerere might consider” some form of federation was if Kenyatta was willing to bring Kenya into a regional federation. Once again the idea was dropped and it would be another month before there was any revival of British or American interest in this outcome.
The next brief mention of a potential federal arrangement was only in a passing comment in early April when a distressed Nyerere approached Leonhart and shared his grave concerns over a rumor about a 2500-strong Arab force training to prepare to invade Zanzibar and retake it for the Sultan. Nyerere asked both the American and German ambassadors if they had any intelligence about this counter-revolutionary force. Leonhart obviously did not and in fact wondered if this frantic plea was not some sort of political cover by Nyerere to send more Tanganyikan troops to Pemba, or possibly some form of incorporation “by Kenya or Tanganyika or both.” More substantially, American interests were again raised a couple of days later in light of the impending East African Federation talks between Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote to be held in Nairobi on 10 April. The day before on their way to this conference a Zanzibar delegation stopped in Dar es Salaam to have a meeting with Tanganyikan officials. Hanga, Babu and Twala were at this meeting but Karume was not present due to the illness of his wife. Mbwambo, the Tanganyika Chief of Protocol, informed Leonhart that the major topic was whether or not Zanzibar would seek membership in the East African Federation. Mbwambo would not elaborate any further, but he revived American interests in such an arrangement. Babu and Hanga attended the meeting in Nairobi as spectators as “the big three” tried to hammer out a plan. According to Kenyan minister Murumbi this meeting went poorly. The climax came when Nyerere gave the emotional plea, “We want federation now!” Kenyatta instantly agreed, but Obote went silent. It is questionable whether Kenyatta was truly eager for federation, but the result of these talks made it clear that there would be no East African Federation, or at least not anytime soon. It was the following week that Hughes put out his major memorandum on US alternatives sombly stating that any hopes of minimizing radicals through a regional federation were extremely doubtful.

It was the day after Hughes’ memo was written that Leonhart first discovered that there were serious talks scheduled to take place to discuss some sort of political arrangement between Zanzibar and Tanganyika without Kenya or Uganda. Reporting on a private meeting he had with Kambona on 16 April, Leonhart explained that Kambona had come to him in “the strictest confidence” that secret talks had begun with certain Zanzibar leaders regarding a Tanganyika-Zanzibar federation after the breakdown of the East African Federation talks in Nairobi. He mentioned specifically working with Abdulla Hanga, his long-time friend since their university days in London in the 1950s, as well as Saleh Saadalla, but specifically
E. R. Sanders

pointed out that cutting Babu down to size was an intended outcome of the federation—a sentiment obviously pleasing to American ears. In his report to the State Department, William Leonhart questioned whether Nyerere would support such an initiative, but promised he would keep an eye on developments with the “Kambona project.”

Two days later Leonhart received a call from Kambona stating that if the plan was going to work then the best opportunity would be the upcoming weekend—a reference to Babu’s absence from Zanzibar on a trip to Asia. He noted that he had brought other Zanzibar leaders in on the talks, Abdul Twala who was the acting Foreign Minister while Babu was abroad and Yusuf Himidi. Kambona had to travel to Tabora that weekend but he had recruited Harue Tambwe, a TANU stalwart who had strong connections to Zanzibar, to go talk to Hanga to see what he needed so that the deal could be sealed within the week. Importantly, Kambona mentioned that Karume had already “given tentative agreement” to an association and reconfirmed that the project had Nyerere’s support as well. Believing the plan may actually have the consent of the two critical players needed to pull off such a project certainly piqued Leonhart’s attention, but his initial response was still somewhat cool. Leonhart obviously wanted Babu out of the picture, but the prospect of a Zanzibar dominated instead by Hanga and Twala was also unpleasant. In fact, in classic Cold War paranoia style, Leonhart warned Washington that the Soviets might be behind this plan to unite Tanganyika and Zanzibar in order to counteract Chinese influence (via Babu) in the islands, have their man Hanga installed instead and then expand their influence on the mainland. Leonhart recommended that the US needed to proceed cautiously and gain more information before they considered giving full US support to what was still being referred to as Kambona’s plan. When Leonhart informed Carlucci of the secret talks the next day, the Zanzibar chargé agreed that Hanga was preferable to Babu, but that he too would hopefully be removed at a later date.

The response from the State Department was to wait and see what this “Tanganyikan initiative” for some sort of federation or incorporation would entail. They thought since it was an “African initiative”—something they were originally hoping would come through Kenyatta—that this was the best and maybe even “the only possibility of reversing [the] present critical situation in Zanzibar.” But they were also wary of stepping in and risking precipitating Soviet or Chinese involvement, and thus Leonhart was told to wait for Kambona to come to him before any offers of US assistance were
made. But certainly the US was willing to give its “blessing” if the plan would exclude Babu and his clique from power.51

The nature of these American cables indicates that the idea of a Tanganyika-Zanzibar union was clearly conceived by Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris and not American diplomats, who even initially suspected the Soviets of being behind it. When the Articles of Union were signed by Nyerere and Karume the only Western officials that had any clue of what was happening were Leonhart, Carlucci and the State Department higher ups back in Washington like George Ball who had read Leonhart’s incoming telegrams. Subsequent cables indicate that the American Embassies in Nairobi and Kampala were still in the dark, as were all of the British officials who as of the 22nd of April were still talking about putting pressure on Kenyatta to talk to Karume.52 Moreover, in the following days it became clear that the Americans and British were anxious over the feasibility of what was now being referred to as Nyerere’s evolving strategy or the “African solution.”53 The African formula brought with it the possibility of reactionary violence or, maybe worse, conniving counter-plans by Babu and his followers to use the larger mainland platform to spread their radical influence even wider. Less than a week after the Union the British and Americans were complaining that little had been done to reduce communist influence in the islands and they once again began considering alternative courses of action to bring “outside forces” to bear on the situation. Again, this hand-wringing and strategizing happened mostly at the level of internal discussions between Americans and their British allies and there was little direct action taken. Different kinds of support for Nyerere and Karume were considered, both “quiet support” as well as gifts of aid and other assistance. Previous strategies were dragged back out such as getting other African leaders to persuade Karume or Nyerere to cement the union and the non-aligned character of the new Union government. There were also contingency plans for military intervention and sending in emergency forces.54 It was not until the very end of June that the Americans felt they could breathe a little easier and that they were “at [the] end this overheated period.” For the foreseeable future it looked as if the Union would last and that the African plan had gone a long way to reduce the threat of Zanzibar becoming a communist bastion in Africa.55

Internal Motivations behind the Union
The Union was not an Anglo-American idea and the process of political unification was not pushed through due to direct pressure from the Americans, British or any other outside forces promoting such a plan. But if
E. R. Sanders

Karume and Nyerere did not give in to “irresistible pressure from Western powers,” it remains to be asked what factors compelled these two African leaders to take this extraordinary step? The answer to this question has usually been formulated in an either/or construct, it was either Pan-Africanism or a product of Cold War. But in order to fully answer this question, one must understand the complicated local power dynamics, the inter-personal relationships that were at play, and importantly, understand that the aims of Pan-Africanism cannot be extracted from the problems of decolonization and the Cold War from which it was born.

The first thing to point out was that many of the players involved had a certain amount of idealism regarding African unity, what one might call the more romantic side of Pan-Africanism. Many of the Afro-Shirazi and TANU politicians had cut their political teeth in the African Association in the 1940s, a group declaring that all Africans were one and whose motto was “Umoja ni Nguvu” (Unity is Strength). As early as 1947 the members of this trans-territorial organization explicitly declared at an Association-wide conference that they were willing to see the political federation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. At this time both Karume and Nyerere were heavily involved in the Association and Karume was undoubtedly at the conference and among those that passed the resolution supporting federation while Nyerere, if not in attendance himself, would have certainly read about the resolution through the organization’s highly-organized communication network. The desirability of such a federation was again confirmed in 1958 when leaders of the ASP and TANU agreed that they wanted to amalgamate the countries into one republic after independence had been achieved. The general atmosphere throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s was very pro-unity, to the point where declaring loyalty to the ideals of Pan-Africanism was widespread. This genuine, if not surface-level, desire for political unification is likely part of the reason why Babu had been interested in unifying some of the countries in East Africa as seen in his participation in a number of discussions on federation and his later assent to the “idea of unity.”

But as the case in the rest of Africa has seemed to prove over the years, the ideals of unity and the discussions of Pan-Africanism rarely translated into transfers of power or political unification or federation. Thus other factors must have helped precipitate the unification of these two states. In the case of
post-Revolutionary Zanzibar and Tanganyika it seems to have been a concern over outside intervention, a mutual reliance on the outcome of each state for purposes of domestic stability, and a desire by Karume and those loyal to him to consolidate his position and power.

From the standpoint of Karume and the Revolutionary Council, they very clearly relied on the help and support of the Tanganyikans after the unexpected Revolution. The new leaders had been thrust into the position of having to first calm the situation and then start providing for the people of the islands in this post-crisis period. Zanzibaris immediately turned to long-time allies and friends in Dar es Salaam for assistance. In the week following the Revolution there were multiple trips to the Tanganyikan capital by Hanga and Babu and even a trip by Karume himself to request various support from the Tanganyikan government. They needed medical experts and supplies, technicians to restore essential services, help in organizing a police force and basic food items. Nyerere sent a Tanganyikan police force to help restore order along with medical supplies, sugar and other food stuffs in aid. Karume also turned to Nyerere for guidance in how to deal with political liabilities, ex-government ministers he wanted removed from the scene, and the problematic John Okello who had given Karume his position, but who could not be trusted in the new cabinet.61

From the record it appears that it was during these initial talks about Okello and assistance that the idea of unifying the two states was specifically discussed in light of Karume’s political concerns. Karume not only saw the mainland as a place where he could get rid of his political adversaries, but it seems likely that he felt Tanganyika’s assistance could help stave off foreign intervention from a number of directions. From the beginning Karume was deeply concerned about a counter-revolution. He was highly suspicious of both the Americans and the British whom he felt had supported the outgoing regime, and at several points over the early months of 1964 he appeared concerned they would try to reinstate the old order. They had shored up the other post-independence East African regimes after the mutinies, why would they not help the ZNP government as well? He even arrested four American journalists he believed to be “CIA Counter Revolutionaries.” This deep mistrust explains in part his coolness towards the Americans and British throughout the period.62 But Karume also apparently feared a number of Arab Gulf monarchies whom he believed wanted to reinstall the Sultan.63
In the months following the Revolution Karume’s growing concern centered on the rising power of Abdulrahman Babu and other non-Afro-Shirazi Party members of the Revolutionary Council like Ali Mafoudh who had become the defacto commander of Zanzibar’s armed forces after the removal of Okello. Karume and Babu had been thrust into their positions by Okello who intentionally wanted members from both the ASP and the recently banned Umma Party of Babu to serve in the Revolutionary Council after he overthrew the ZNP-led government. Even though Karume worked with Babu out of necessity at first, inside sources indicate that there were always real fault lines between those RC members who were leaders of the ASP before the Revolution and those who were not. Indeed, there was deep mistrust and opposition towards Babu by some ASP leaders. Certainly, the progression of events and the way in which the Union was pushed through clearly indicate that sidelining Babu and consolidating Karume’s power and influence in the islands was a central motivation on the Zanzibar side.

Babu had been involved in early talks regarding some form of federation in January and again in early April, but the timing of the final agreement was intentionally arranged to align with his trip to Asia. There had been previous private meetings between Karume and Nyerere, but events sped up rapidly once it was clear that a larger East African federation was not going to happen and Babu was going to be away from Zanzibar. In the week leading up to the signing and ratification of the Articles of Union, when messages were going back and forth between Kambona and Hanga, Kambona made it clear that if anything was going to happen it needed to be within the next week and the reason must have been to avoid any efforts by Babu to block the agreement. This is corroborated by the Tanganyikan Attorney General, Roland Brown, who had been secretly brought into knowledge about the potential union by Nyerere who wanted him to draft a legal document laying out how a union agreement would work. With Babu’s temporary absence, tremendous pressure was put on Brown to finish the Articles of Union quickly so that Nyerere and Karume could sign them before Babu’s return.

After secretly meeting in Dar es Salaam on 18, 19 and 20 April, Karume and Nyerere finally came to an agreement. The last touches to the Articles were completed and brought to Zanzibar by Nyerere, Kambona, Job Lusinde, the Minister of Home Affairs, and three other Tanganyikans. The signing between Karume and Nyerere was also witnessed by some of Karume’s top advisers including Abdulla Kassim Hanga and Abdul Twala who had both been in on the secret talks. The Articles were then whisked away by
Kambona and Roland Brown to be shown to Kenyatta and Obote in Nairobi and Kampala, respectively, who had both been excluded from any knowledge about the talks. (There were concerns they would be upset for not previously being made aware of the secret talks.) After giving Karume and Hanga a couple of days to politic for the Union, the Articles were then returned to Zanzibar with Kambona, Lusinde and Brown for their ratification by the Revolutionary Council on the evening of 25 April. Brown was sent to the ratification to answer any legal questions which were raised, but was asked to sit outside the meeting. Salim Rashid had tried to stall the meeting until Babu’s return (which ended up being later that night) by bringing in a lawyer from Uganda to raise legal objections with Karume. Karume was undeterred by his meeting with the lawyer earlier that afternoon, and the ratification meeting went ahead even without the presence of several Revolutionary Council members, including Rashid who was possibly on his way to pick up Babu from the airport. A passionate plea was given by Hanga that the Union was necessary and that the Articles must be approved. Hanga was clearly Karume’s closest ally who had stuck by the Sheikh during an earlier period of division within the ASP, he had a long-time personal relationship with Kambona, and being Karume’s number two he also stood to gain the most by having Babu’s power checked. The ratification by the Revolutionary Council took longer than expected, but Karume received the endorsement of enough members, with several others abstaining. With the approval of the RC, Kambona, Lusinde and Brown immediately headed back to Dar es Salaam where the Tanganyika National Assembly was waiting on their return to start the process for Tanganyikan approval. This was a much smoother process with nothing but positive speeches led by Nyerere himself.

The manoeuvre was complete, but Kambona was still concerned about how Babu would react to the news, telling Leonhart that “If Babu agrees, he will be a fool, but he may do so.” Babu finally met with Karume the next day and the president reportedly told him in front of other ministers that the Revolutionary Council had “voted unanimously in favor of Union,” (only if one did not count the abstentions) and that “he could either agree or resign.” The extremely bright Babu must have recognized that something subversive was afoot and decided not to challenge Karume at that moment but carefully responded that “he agreed with the idea of Union.” When the new Union cabinet was announced the following day Babu was given a high position, but one in Dar es Salaam directly under Nyerere and away from the
Zanzibar scene. Babu was the first casualty of Karume’s use of the Union arrangement to clip the wings of political threats in the island.

Nyerere, Kambona and Lusinde also wanted to see Babu’s influence diminished, although not for reasons of securing personal power, but due to a desire to avoid external interference in African affairs. For them, Babu was just one part of a larger concern over foreign intervention. Similar to the Americans, the Tanganyikans too were concerned about too much communist influence in Zanzibar, but for slightly different reasons. Nyerere and Lusinde both thought a prosperous communist-backed Zanzibar would serve to destabilize the domestic scene within Tanganyika. If the small islands were turned into a showcase of the financial fruits of aligning with the socialist powers, Nyerere was afraid it would undermine all his claims that remaining non-aligned held out the best solution for Tanganyikans.

Lusinde too was worried about potential contrasts between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, noting that it was the urban poor who were involved in acts of mob violence during the mutiny and who were the most likely to cause problems for the government. They needed no new inspiration from Zanzibar social revolutions.

Direct intervention from outsiders, be it the West, the Soviets or the Chinese, was something that needed to be avoided according to the minds of Nyerere and Kambona. Kambona was concerned that Karume was making the mistake of relying too heavily on the various communist groups that were promising aid and giving military assistance. He was concerned that they were “trying to smother Karume with advisers and aid, never giving him time or room to stand off and see what’s happening,” and Kambona was also offended that the Soviets and Chinese were acting like Africans could not think for themselves. Kambona noted that the union was a “gamble” but that something had to be done before the “Easterners” took over the island. He felt it was the mainland African states’ responsibility to help keep Zanzibari Africans from such a fate.

On the other hand, Nyerere was also concerned over a possible Western military intervention in Zanzibar. Even though Nyerere never received any direct pressure from the West to unite Tanganyika and Zanzibar, (as demonstrated above and confirmed by Roland Brown) he was aware of discussions over British military intervention which created a type of indirect burden to do something to find an African solution to the problem before there was another embarrassing show of force by the ex-colonial powers.
Nyerere did not want either side in the Cold War meddling in the affairs of East Africa. This is seen in part through his constant rebuffs of US and British assistance when it was offered in the early months of 1964. This concern also played into his reasoning for why he was willing to take on the risk of merging with Zanzibar without the other East African states. Even though some form of union between Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands had long been discussed, it was still only second best to Nyerere’s larger vision of an East African Federation. Nonetheless, the exigencies of the situation compelled Nyerere to act.

So was this Pan-African idealism? The answer can only be yes if one recognizes the strong utilitarian strand in the Pan-African Movement of the 1950s and early 1960s. The desire for African unity was born out of the desire to fight imperialism in all of its forms and was imbued by the Spirit of Bandung which sought a way out of the binary world of the Cold War. The Pan-African Manifesto and the All-African People’s Congress promoted a united and strong Africa which would not tolerate interference from any of the big powers and which hoped to solve its own problems and become a significant player on the world stage. Thus the Union was not founded solely on some abstract or romantic notion of unity, but it was forged through a process shaped by both Karume’s concerns over losing power and Nyerere’s utilitarian Pan-Africanism that desired to protect Zanzibaris, and ultimately Tanganyikans, from non-African intervention into East African affairs.

Notes

1. Wilson’s writing was supported by Abdulrahman Babu who lost the most politically in the move to unify the two countries, see below. Wilson (1989) 1, 8-9; Wilson (2013) 3, 8, 52.

2. Although these allegations have been around for a long time, for a more recent and thorough examination of the CIA in Congo see, De Witte (2001).

3. I previously reviewed the work of Shivji on this topic several years ago. While I stick by much of my critique of Shivji’s analysis of the Union, after re-reading the work I now admit that many of Shivji’s
arguments were more nuanced and subtle than I originally gave him credit for in that review.


6. This phrase was used constantly in American communications. For a few examples see LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables and Memos Vol. I - Outgoing Telegram Department of State to US Embassy, Dar es Salaam, 15 January 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 20 January 1964; NARA CIA Central Intelligence Agency Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 24 January 1964.


18. Mapuri (1996), 58; Petterson (2002), 99-102, 157-158; American Chargé d’Affaires Frederick Piccard was still persona non grata in Zanzibar,
and was replaced with a new chargé, Frank Carlucci, when the Americans were allowed to return.


20. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 6 March 1964.

21. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 8 March 1964.

22. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 8 March 1964, 8pm; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Attwood, 9 March 1964.


Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

26. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 2 April 1964.

27. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 31 March 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 12 April 1964.


29. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 17 March 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 31 March 1964; This may have been related to what Dean Rusk was referring to in an opaque message talking about “a complex contingency plan for covert action.” LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Memos and Misc. Vol. II - Memorandum to Colonel Connell from Bundy for the President, 29 March 1964.


31. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 29 March 1964.

32. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Memos and Misc. Vol. II - Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, 6 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Outgoing Telegram Department of State from Ball, 13 April 1964.

33. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 12 April 1964.
E. R. Sanders

34. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Bruce, 13 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from New Delhi, 16 April 1964; Other American diplomats discouraged the idea, but again pointed out that such an intervention could only follow after the lead of the British at the request of Karume and Kenyatta. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 15 April 1964 and LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Kampala, 21 April 1964.


39. Larry Devlin, the CIA branch chief for East Africa later stated, “We had no information, no knowledge [of the situation there], no CIA presence," when speaking of post-revolutionary Zanzibar. Quote from Gleijeses (2002), 57; Don Petterson, the acting American Chargé d’Affairs in Zanzibar for a short while after the Revolution confirms this. Petterson tells the story of one American researcher who did have CIA connections, but who became deathly ill with malaria the day before the Revolution and had to be evacuated to a hospital in Dar es Salaam just after the Revolution and never returned, leaving
the CIA with no one to give them reports on the situation. Petterson (2002), 55-85.

40. Brown, Kambona and Lusinde said that it was Karume who came to Nyerere and asked to unite because, according to Lusinde, Karume felt “he wasn’t holding any power.” Interview with Lusinde; Brown, “Jammed Gatling”; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables and Memos Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Dar es Salaam, 17 January 1964; Othman, Mwakikagile and Shivji said that it was Nyerere who first posed the question. However, Shivji notes his doubts about the veracity of this version. Shivji (2008), 77; Othman (1995), 173; Mwakikagile (2008), 36.

41. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 30 January 1964.

42. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Outgoing Telegram Department of State from Rusk to US Embassy, Dar es Salaam, 2 February 1964.

43. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 3 February 1964.

44. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Outgoing Telegram Department of State from Rusk to American Embassies in Dar es Salaam, London, and Nairobi, 6 March 1964.

45. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 8 March 1964.

46. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 6 April 1964.

47. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 9 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Rutchi [US Embassy, Nairobi], 10 April 1964.
E. R. Sanders

48. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 17 April 1964.

49. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 18 April 1964.

50. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 19 April 1964.

51. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Outgoing Telegram Department of State from Ball, 18 April 1964.

52. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I-Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 22 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Bruce, 22 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 23 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 24 April 1964; This is confirmed by Tanganyikan Attorney General of the time Roland Brown. Brown was a British lawyer, but was invited by Nyerere to come to Tanganyika after independence to take up the post. He was not an ex-member of the colonial civil service. Interview, Roland Brown.

53. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 22 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 23 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Outgoing Telegram Department of State from Rusk to various American embassies, 20 May 1964.

54. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Outgoing Telegram Department of State from Rusk, 23 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram State Department from Carlucci, 26 April 1964;
Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union


55. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 30 June 1964; However, concerns continued to exist for several years. See for instance, LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Outgoing Telegram Department of State from Rusk to US Embassy in Dar es Salaam, 4 August 1964; NARA CIA Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, “Tanzania Taking the Left Turn,” 21 May 1965; NARA CIA Intelligence Memorandum: Review of Insurgency Problems, 16 June 1965.

56. Shivji (2008), xviii.

57. Interestingly, the delegates felt that the two countries should not be amalgamated with Kenya or Uganda. Soon after this conference held in Zanzibar, however, the organization would split along territorial lines with the Tanganyikan chapters breaking away from the Zanzibar chapters to form the Tanganyika African Association which
later took a sharply nationalist direction and became the Tanganyika African National Union. For more on the African Association see Sanders (2012); For the 1947 Conference minutes, see Tanzania National Archives 19325/II/67a [Minutes of the 5th East African Conference of the African Association held at Zanzibar on the 4th-7th April, 1947]; Job Lusinde also tells a story about how the first time he met Nyerere was in 1948 when the future president was taking part in a debate in a secondary school in Tabora where he gave arguments in support of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Interview with Job Lusinde.


59. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable, 26 April 1964.


63. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 17 April 1964.

64. On Mafoudh see Petterson (2002) and Shivji (2008).

65. Okello (1967), 147-149.
Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union


67. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 17 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 18 April 1964.

68. Brown recollects being told, “get on with it please, can we have the final draft, Babu is on his way. . . .” Brown was permitted to bring in his aid Paul Fifoot, the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman, to help him in drafting the document because of the short timeframe. Brown states that basing the structure of the Union on the relationship between Northern Ireland and Great Britain was actually Fifoot’s idea. He did not share any information regarding the potential union with anyone other than Fifoot, and he denies the suggestion that Paul Bomani played a role as would later be suggested by Shivji (2008). Interview, Roland Brown; Roland Brown, “Jammed Gatling.”

69. One controversial point surrounding these meetings was whether or not Karume was pressured into making a decision through Tanganyikan threats to pull their police forces from the islands if Karume did not act. Whether or not such an ultimatum was made or how it was worded is not clear, but certainly American observers mentioned that East African Airways had scheduled flights to remove the police from Zanzibar, but that this order was then withdrawn on April 19. Later Kambona told Leonhart that it was indeed meant to serve as a wakeup call for Karume to consider what the situation would be like without Tanganyikan support. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 20 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 23 April 1964.
70. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 22 April 1964; Shivji (2008), 81-82.

71. Interview with Brown; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 24 April 1964.

72. Roland Brown notes that his Attorney General counterpart in Zanzibar, Wolf Dourado, had no foreknowledge of the Union and had not seen the Articles until the ratification meeting, and thus he did not give Karume legal advice on the Union. The reason Dourado was kept out of the discussions was that he had previously served as Babu’s personal secretary and it was feared he might leak information to Babu. Interview with Brown. Ironically, Dourado seems to have been feeding information to Carlucci, informing the American chargé that Rashid had come to his office frantically looking for the resolutions of the Revolutionary Council to try and find a loophole or something to stall the ratification process. Wolf Dourado’s name is protected in the cable, but given the context and details it seems certain that he was the “reliable GOZ source” who had been talking to Carlucci after the American heard about the Union project. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram State Department from Zanzibar [Carlucci], 25 April 1964; Shivji has a slightly different account of these events, (2008), 79-80.

73. Rashid told Shivji he was not at the meeting and that it did not take place. However, there seems to be plenty of corroborating evidence that a meeting did take place, (see below) and Brown is quite certain that neither Rashid nor Babu were there. We also know from a US report that Rashid was one of only two people to greet Babu at the airport that night at around the same time, and this could explain his absence from the meeting. Interview with Brown; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I Incoming Telegram State Department from Carlucci, 25 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram State Department from Zanzibar [Carlucci], 25 April 1964.
74. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 17 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Carlucci, 19 April 1964; NARA CIA Central Intelligence Bulletin Daily Brief, 24 April 1964; On Hanga’s speech, see Othman (1995), 172.


76. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 24 April 1964; Shivji (2008), 83-84.

77. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 25 April 1964, 11:50pm.

78. Emphasis added. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable, 27 April 1964.

79. NARA CIA Central Intelligence Bulletin Daily Brief, 24 April 1964; Shivji (2008), 83-84.


81. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 22 February 1964.

82. Petterson (2002), 199.

83. LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 17 April 1964.
E. R. Sanders

84. Interview with Roland Brown.

85. Interview with Roland Brown; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 20 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 22 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 100, United Republic Tanganyika/Zanzibar, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 23 April 1964.

86. As early as the one week after the Revolution Nyerere had already made known to Leonhart that he wanted to hold non-East African involvement to a minimum. LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables and Memos Vol. I - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Dar es Salaam, 20 January 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Box 103, Zanzibar, Cables Vol. II - Incoming Telegram Department of State from Leonhart, 28 March 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 17 April 1964; LBJ NSF Country Files, Tanganyika, Box 100, Cables Vol. I - Incoming Telegram, Department of State from Leonhart, 22 April 1964.


References

Brown, R. “Jammed Gatling” (unpublished memoirs, mss. in author’s possession).


Conceiving the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union


LBJ NSF- National Security Files held at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, USA.


NARA- National Archives and Records Administration of the United States in College Park, Maryland, USA

NARA CIA- Central Intelligence Agency files accessed via the CREST system at the National Archives and Records Administration of the United States in College Park, Maryland.


