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Abstract

This article provides an introduction to four studies on local level security governance in the urban areas of four East African countries: Nairobi in Kenya, Kigali in Rwanda, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Kampala in Uganda. The studies are principally concerned with community-led, multi-actor, and networked governance of security in poor urban neighbourhoods using the analytical framework of nodal governance theory. This framework suggests that the pre-eminent position of the state in security has changed and security is now produced, managed and governed through a network of actors or nodes. In this form of governance, the line between the public and private police and security actors is blurred with each of the actors influencing and shaping each other to produce security outcomes. The studies in this special issue present four cases of such local level governance of security as way of contributing to better theoretical understanding of security governance as well as policy conversations.

Keywords: Security governance, community-led, nodal governance

Introduction

Until recently, the dominant thinking on the governance of security in the state has been the Hobbesian idea of a centralized authority- the Leviathan (Wood and Shearing, 2007: 8, 9). This Leviathan presides over the imposition of order and authority over the chaos and brutality of the state of nature and exercises a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. This view explains the traditional approach to security of exclusive pre-occupation in studying state security institutions such as the police and militaries. However, as private actors such as multinational companies have grown in strength and as conflicts have led to the fragmentation of authority, particularly in the

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developing world, scholars and policy experts have come to recognize the transformation in the nature and architecture of security within nation states.

In many African states, even in those states not afflicted by conflicts from the beginning, in reality, the state never managed to impose a monopoly on security (Clapham, 1999). Moreover, in many cases the African states never developed ‘public’ security systems to protect all citizens without discrimination. The public police remained largely in the service of the elite in power (Baker, 2004; Hills, 2009; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Akech, 2005). Consequently, the private-public demarcation remains largely superficial as even the ‘public’ security systems were largely in the service of those in power (Baker, 2004: 170).

The changing fortunes of the state in the area of security and the pluralization of actors has emerged as the subject of intense studies by scholars and experts in the fields of development, human rights, politics, international relations and criminology among others. Scholars in the field of criminology and security studies have in particular pioneered the call for a critical examination of this loss of centrality in security. These experts point out that security production, regulation, authorization is now hybrid (Black, 2002), polycentric (Wood and Shearing, 2007) and networked (Castells, 2000). In thinking about security therefore, we are at a juncture where its governance, in terms of production and authorization needs to be reimagined (Wood and Shearing, 2007). This is largely because security outcomes now depend on a plurality of actors, both formal and informal. These actors range from formal security institutions such as the police and militaries, to private companies like G4S, informal ones like militias, gangs and vigilantes, as well as community-level neighbourhood watches and street committees.

Way back in the 1980s, two leading criminologists had pointed out what they saw as a ‘quiet revolution’ that had taken place in policing in the West, with the provision and authorization of security within the state no longer the monopoly of state police (Stenning and Shearing, 1980). In their view, the traditional vision of public police as the sole providers of security was fragmenting, giving way to a multiplicity of providers and even authorizers of policing functions. The private sector was leading in this transformation of policing, taking over roles that had traditionally been reserved for public police. As one leading theorist on policing noted in a 2000 study of private policing, “it is now almost impossible to identify any function or
responsibility of the public police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in democratic societies” (Stenning, 2000: 328).

Clifford Shearing with many of his collaborators has elaborated this way of looking at security through what he has referred to as a “nodal governance” framework (Wood and Shearing, 2007; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005; Shearing and Froestad, 2010). In this perspective, governance in general and in extension the governance of security is now polycentric. Wood and Shearing further elaborate on this:

Governing nodes are organisational sites (institutional settings that bring together and harness ways of thinking and acting) where attempts are made to intentionally shape the flow of events. Nodes govern under a variety of circumstances, operate in a variety of ways, are subject to a variety of objectives and concerns, and engage in a variety of different actions to shape the flow of events. Nodes relate to one another, and attempt to mobilise and resist one another, in a variety of ways so as to shape matters in ways that promote their objectives and concerns. Nodal governance is diverse and complex. (Wood and Shearing, 2007: 149).

The view that the role of the state in security has been receding has however been challenged by many scholars. In particular the assumptions of the nodal governance approach have been criticized by Loader and Walker who argue that the state and in extension, public police, cannot be seen as just one of many actors (Loader and Walker, 2006). Rather, even in the kind of multi-actor governance that nodal governance presents, the police play a leading role (Loader and Walker, 2006: 177). Loader and Walker speak of the concept of “anchored pluralism” that explains the role that the state plays in these kinds of plural security settings (Loader and Walker, 2006: 194). The state is key in providing the symbolic power and authority necessary to anchor these forms of partnerships. State policing is a social good and in exercising that role the state provides a form of social reassurance to its citizens that they are included whether they can pay or not pay. This view of security is one that Loader and Walker see as not sufficiently appreciated by the nodal governance theories of Shearing and Johnson. In any event, it should be remembered that public police, even where they are part of this networked governance of security, still retain and reserve the power of coercion as a last
result (Loader and Walker 2007: 192). This is in concurrence with Braithwaite’s view that these forms of multi-actor governance should be seen as form of “regulatory pyramid” with the state “speaking softly and carrying big sticks” (Braithwaite, 1997). Cooperation at lower levels is possible only because the possibility of coercive by the state is at the very tip of the pyramid.

Of concern with regard to nodal governance theories also is the fate accountability if the state is seen as marginal in these arrangements. Without the states the rights of the poor become even more vulnerable in a governance arrangement that is often driven by interests and one where normative considerations may not be pre- eminent. The state and public police, even where they do not function very well after all, still present a normative vision of the society.

In many African countries, struggling with the problems of civil wars, or with the proliferation of criminal gangs and militias, the assumed monopoly of force and violence was really never achieved since their emergence as independence states. In some places, states have been hollowed out with criminal groups exercising effective control over social order (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This is what has been called the emergence of “shadow states” or “phantom states” within weak nation states. Africa therefore presents a very good case of plural governance structures over a variety of security actors. Bruce Baker, a leading expert on African policing, has pointed out that from the perspective of people’s experiences in Africa, there is a multiplicity of policing options available – state and non-state – “offering localised protection of various levels of legality, effectiveness, availability, methods and services” (Baker, 2004: 171). These include Informal Organized Security Groups or Vigilantes whose emphasis is on punishment. He also identifies, Religious Police- largely concerned with the policing of morality and in most cases linked to Sharia codes. There are also Ethnic/Clan Militias, which in many cases may operate as vigilantes but draw their authority from the ethnic group or clan from which their membership is drawn. He also identifies Political Party Militia Groups that work for the interests of political parties in the same way the ethnic/clan militias work for the ethnic groups.

Civil Defence Forces on the other hand emerge in contexts of armed conflicts, typically to support the weakened state military forces. A good example of Civil Defence Forces is the Kamajors of Sierra Leone. Informal Commercial Security Groups are usually semi-voluntary although they may enjoy the
patronage of politicians or commercial interests. For instance, the Bakassi Boys of Nigeria have enjoyed the support of state governors while in South Africa, the Mapogo a Matamaga, formed in 1996 in the Northern Province has been supported by large commercial interests. There are also Formal Commercial Security Groups or formal private security companies that often use trained and full time guards. Baker also identifies Traditional Courts and Restorative Justice Committees as some of the other mechanisms providing security in the pluralized African context.

For the wealthy in East Africa, private security companies have emerged as an important provider of security that is not otherwise available through the public police. In Kenya, it is estimated that private security is a Ksh 2 billion industry with five times more private security guards than public police officers (Mkutu and Sabala, 2007: 392). While precise figures are not readily available in some cases, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda have also experienced a rapid expansion of private security companies in the recent past (Mkutu and Sabala, 2007). In the case of Uganda, records at the Department of Private Securities and Firearms at the police headquarters showed that by 2002 there were 69 registered private security companies in the country (Mkutu and Sabala, 2007: 394).

In some cases, the wealthy in East Africa, as in other parts of the world, have also enrolled the public police into their private security to either provide sentry guard outside their compounds, to patrol their neighbourhoods or to accompany the private security companies. This enrolment of the public police into tending to the security priorities of the affluent has further tilted the balance of the provisioning of public security to the disadvantage of the residents of low income urban neighbourhoods. In a number of cities, the phenomenon of gated communities for the affluent has also emerged as a response to insecurity. Gated communities have offered those who can afford to pay the means to create zones of exclusion where safety is guaranteed by razor wires, concrete walls, trained guard dogs, barricaded roads, at times use of metal detectors on cars and restricted access to only the residents.

For the majority of the residents of low income urban neighbourhoods of East Africa, securing themselves through the public police is often a losing competition with the affluent who are often able to exercise more influence over police deployments and resource allocations. In any event, even where the public police have been available to police low income neighbourhoods, their presence has tended not to improve the security of the residents. Police
interventions in poor urban areas globally, often leaves the residents feeling more insecure than before with many allegations of excessive use of violence raised against the police.\textsuperscript{2}

Beyond engagements with the public police, more interesting developments in securing the citizens have emerged in low-income urban neighbourhoods. These have been in the form of community-organized or community-led security mechanisms in the form of neighbourhood watches or street committees; neighbourhood associations with security functions; and peace or dispute resolution committees. These three mechanisms for securing communities incorporate aspects of voluntarism and involve fewer costs and are therefore more attractive to the residents of low-income neighbourhoods. They also attempt to incorporate a significant measure of democratic ethos-in the form of broader inclusion of different community sectors in decision-making; some procedural rules in decision-making as well as accountability aspects.\textsuperscript{3} Such initiatives/mechanisms need to be distinguished from community policing as classically understood in the literature on policing. Community policing as a technology of policing that gained popularity in the 1980s in the United States, was essentially a state-led mechanism for dealing with crime and insecurity.\textsuperscript{4} Many variants of community policing have found their way into East Africa over the years (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003).

With the exception of South Africa however, scholarly and policy studies and literature on these community-led security mechanisms in Africa has remained scanty. The poverty of systematic and comprehensive studies on community-led security mechanisms has led to both policy and theoretical gaps in our understanding of the security for the residents of low-income urban neighbourhoods, and the gender dimensions of these security arrangements. Moreover, it has led to a failure to understand what works and what does not in promoting public security through non-state led arrangements.

In the next sections, this article expands on the theoretical arguments and sets out the theoretical and policy gaps that the studies in this collection seek to address. The paper then sets out and clarifies on the conceptual framework of nodal governance that is the analytical framework on which the studies are predicated. The article then elaborates on the criteria for the selection of the four case studies, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Finally, the paper presents an overview of the findings from each of the four cases.
Governing Security from Below in Urban East Africa

Theoretical and Policy Gaps
The papers in this special collection seek to address two critical gaps with regard to the governance of security among low-income urban neighbourhoods in East Africa. The first gap has to do with the continued treatment of security as the preserve of the state and state actors. Although from its very foundation, the African state never enjoyed much dominance over security, the allure of the Western Leviathan exercising a monopoly of force has dominated both the scholarship and policy work on African security. The bulk of scholarly and policy treatment of security governance continues to miss the biggest story on the plural nature of security provisioning in African states and the ongoing transformation of security governance by the continuing fracturing of the state’s dominance and the increasing prominence of non-state mechanisms in public security in Africa.

Much of the scholarship and policy conversations continue to treat non-state led security governance as “informal”, with the “informal” being seen as inferior and deficient. What is not state-led is seen as a problem to be solved either by inserting state security mechanisms into the spaces where they are absent or by handing over any existing non-state mechanisms to state actors. Such an approach consequently fails to appreciate how local knowledge and capacities contribute to community security. It also misses out on an understanding of what resources exist that can be mobilized to promote the security of the residents in low-income urban neighbourhoods. Such studies overlook the essence of what political scientist Claude Ake termed as the need to “build on the indigenous” by taking African societies seriously as they are rather than as they ought to be in terms of a decontextualized ideal (Ake, 1990). The fact many of the spaces occupied by the residents of these low-income neighbourhoods have not yet disintegrated into Hobbesian violence is a call for theoretical exploration on what could be holding them together. For in spite of the many accounts of insecurity as well as conflict in many of the East African states, liveable communities continue to flourish.

The second gap that these papers speak to is a policy one. At the policy level, the limited understanding of the effectiveness of community-led security mechanisms has contributed to the preoccupation with the need to increase the presence and numbers of the public police in low-income urban neighbourhoods as the only measure of securing the residents. This is in spite of the fact that in many instances, the public police are themselves the source of insecurity, given their poor relations with the residents as well as the
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policing models that see the residents of low income urban neighbourhoods as predisposed to crime and therefore legitimate subjects for surveillance, restriction and punishment.

In addition, the absence of adequate policy-relevant research has meant that little is known on what models of community security are effective in responding to the security needs and situation of women and men. For those working on policing policy reforms, the lack of evidence of workable local models of securing the citizens has left their advocacy operating with limited tools. Instead, what is grafted on to the reform agendas are “ideal” models of security drawn from frameworks of knowledge and “best practices” of what seems to work best in the West. Reform projects, in both content and approaches, therefore begin to resemble the invalidation of what is local (even where it is effective) and the restructuring along the lines of external expertise and “best practices” (Marks, 2005; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011).

The lack of adequate attention to community-led security mechanisms has also meant that policy interventions and resources have continued to favour state-based and state-led mechanisms such as the police. In spite of accompanying efforts to increase the accountability of state-led security mechanisms, this policy and resource-focus on state mechanisms has often served to reinforce the “sole ownership of security” mentalities of state security actors (Wood and Shearing, 2007).

Conceptual Framework
The four country cases (Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) presented here are located within what is known as “nodal governance” perspective in security governance (Burris, Drahos and Shearing, 2005). Nodal governance provides the language for expressing and an analytic framework for thinking about the pluralized and polycentric forms of security governance that are now the empirical reality within the African state. A “node” is another way of referring to an auspice (e.g. state, civil society, private) under which security is governed.6 Nodes should be understood as “a site where knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilized to shape the flow of events” (Burris et al, 2005). Four characteristics are essential to a node:

i. A way of thinking (mentalities) about governance (these are the narratives on how we see the world)

ii. A set of methods (technologies) for exerting influence over the flow of events (these are the means of intervention)
iii. Resources to support a node’s operations, and
iv. Institutional structure that enables the directed mobilization of resources, mentalities and technologies over time (here there are different levels of formality).

These characteristics provide us with the analytical tools for better understanding how security mechanisms in low income urban neighbourhoods are organized. Each of the initiatives presented here is analyzed through these tools.

**Mentalities or Thinking about Governance**
The studies under this collection are interested in the mentalities - narratives on how they see the world - which the communities under study have about the governance or security. Scott Burris sees a “mentality” as “the culture of the node, its way of thinking about itself, its objects of governance and the world around it (operating) to bring coherence and thus enable longevity and collective action within a node (Burris, 2004). Such a culture is not a blueprint for specific action, but a narrative of the world that guides the ongoing processes of adaptive improvisation in a node” (Burris, 2004: 341).

The studies therefore seek to understand how communities see the governance of their security as organized and how they see themselves as positioned in that governance. They are interested in understanding what communities see as their role in that governance of security- in other words, what they perceive as their power and capacity to shape that governance. To this end, they seek to identify the narratives on governance of security that residents of the various sites have. It is through these narratives that we can better understand how the residents of these neighbourhoods understand the governability of their world- how they perceive its possibilities and limitations.

**Technologies**
By technologies, we are referring to the means of intervention by which mentalities are to be implemented; in other words, the methods for influencing governance. As Shearing and Froestad have noted, technologies have distinct significance and sometimes, “the technologies that seek to operate on activities and processes may produce their own difficulties, fail to function as intended or intersect poorly with the emerging mentalities in term of which their role is conceived” (Shearing and Froestad, 2010:17). The studies in this collection therefore seek to understand what technologies the
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communities under study, have employed to secure themselves. In other words, they look at the approaches that communities use to secure their neighbourhoods.

On Resources
Here the focus is on the resources available- and mobilized to support the operations of the security mechanism. Resources, Shearing and Foerstad note, “come in many forms, quantities and combinations” and they often drive the node (or community mechanism’s) participation with other actors or nodes (Shearing and Froestad, 2010:17). Resources may be financial- in the form of budgets or even informational- it could be the information access that one has. Resources could also be in the form of positions that actors have- for example, official position that gives them access to power. We are therefore interested in understanding how resources shape the nature of cooperation between the various actors- for instance, the cooperation between private businesses and the organized community security initiative.

Institutional structure
Here the interest is in understanding how the community security mechanism is structured. How formal is it for instance? Is it formally registered or not? Institutional arrangements have different degrees of formality and informality. Resources considerably structure the levels of formality and informality.

Low-income urban neighbourhoods
Literature on development and urbanization recognizes that the differentiation in incomes of different urban neighbourhoods has implications for governance. Low income neighbourhoods suffer disproportionately from urban violence and the proliferation of crime in much of the developing world (World Bank, 2011; Mutahi, 2011). The low-income urban space is therefore an important subject for study by those interested in the governance of cities and urban space in general. Because the state presence in the form of police and other security agencies is often linked to difficult interactions with the residents, it is in these low-income neighbourhoods that citizen-led security interventions are most likely to be most matured.

It is important to note that there are many low-income neighbourhoods that already have a high level of public police penetration and presence—particularly where you have aggressive and intensified surveillance and
policing. While interesting, this is not the overall focus of these studies. Rather, the interest is in those neighbourhoods where with regard to security as in most of the other services, the residents are already dependent to a considerable extent on a measure of self-help. Such neighbourhoods are to a large extent not part of the formal planning of the city government. In some literature these neighbourhoods have been called “informal settlements” while others have referred to them as “slums”.

In addition to their informality in settlements, these neighbourhoods are also largely regarded as epicenters of insecurity in the urban areas, precipitated by neglect as well as the many deprivations that are characteristic of low urban neighbourhoods. Here public police- even when present, have difficult relationships with the residents. Communities in these neighbourhoods rely on alternative measures, including in securing themselves, to make life liveable. Consequently, these low-income neighbourhoods are ideal sites for the study of the alternatives that have emerged as a means of securing people. It seems that alternative security governance practices and structures have been tried in these communities longest and over time.

*Alternative Community-Led Security Mechanisms*

These studies are primarily concerned with the non-state security mechanisms or options. Nevertheless, it should be understood that the suggestion here is not that these security mechanisms are divorced from or isolated from state security mechanisms in the form of public police. On the contrary, the evidence from the existing literature as well as from the empirical research undertaken in the four cases is that these mechanisms do interact with formal state security mechanisms (Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing, 2003).

These studies do not seek to study private security companies. Whereas private security- or for profit security firms- could be said to be “alternative” security mechanisms, they were excluded. The researchers’ interest was in those institutional community led security mechanisms that carry with them a considerable measure of voluntariness. The kind of “community-led mechanisms” where the community takes the lead and that are driven less by a profit motive than a form of self-help to ensure safety and security in their neighbourhoods.7

Of course, there is a genre of community mobilizations against crime that pose serious challenges to the idea of “community leadership” to the extent
that they sometimes use vigilante measures that often use brutal and violent approaches to dealing with security. In terms of leadership, these studies were interested in mechanisms that enjoy a measure of "consent" from the community they purport to serve. In other words, leadership is subject to a form of "election" or "nomination" or "legitimation" by the community membership.

The idea of "community" adopted in this study is at first level, spatial. Thus the focus was on urban neighbourhoods where a sense of community is also defined by shared interest in problem solving. The spatial expanse is more than a single residential building or Single Street but rather a cluster of households and possibly several streets. Imprecision is unavoidable here, and the studies proceeded while conscious of the contested nature of the concept of "community".

Comparative Perspectives and Case Selection
The studies under this collection were guided by an appreciation that theory should be built on and tested in diverse settings. To this end, the studies sought to include case studies from four East African countries Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. The four countries selected for the study are experimenting democratization. Though they might be at different stages, the ideas of democratic participation and democratic institutions are being tested and consolidated in all countries. Additionally, all four countries are facing some challenges in their management of security including the insufficient reach of security forces. Rwanda and Uganda are post-conflict countries while Kenya and Tanzania have latent conflicts that complicate their security management.

Other than Kenya which is ranked as medium human development under the United Nations Human Development index, the rest as classified as low human development. In the 2015, Human Development Index, Kenya is ranked at number 146 with a score of 0.555 with Rwanda at number 159 with a score of 0.498 and Uganda at number 163 with a score of 0.493 and Tanzania at number 151 with a score of 0.531 (UNDP, 2016). All these are therefore relatively poor with sections of urban areas that are largely underserved by state security as well as other services. These are often described as informal settlements or slums. In these settlements, where large numbers of poor people live, the presence and penetration of state police is significantly low. In this study, this is presumed to be the environment that facilitates the emergence of community-led security mechanisms.
The four case studies under this project present a critical examination of emerging community security infrastructure in the East African region. Comparatively, all the four countries are states that face a range of challenges in securing their citizens. As post-colonial states, established as a result of 19th century colonization, they all share in the legacies of colonialism. They are states stitched together by the force and logic of European imperial adventures and consequently continue to be confronted with the challenges of nation building. In each of the countries however, colonization took a different hue and nuance, which left its unique imprint on each of these country’s political economy. Rwanda was a Belgian colony under the League of Nations Mandate while Tanzania was initially a German colony before it became a trusteeship under the British after Germany lost its colonies after its defeat after World War I. Uganda and Kenya were part of the British East African Protectorate established in 1895. Unlike Uganda however, Kenya was a settler colony.

Security in the colonies was of course governed for the benefit of the colonists with the Africans largely seen as a security threat to the colonial state and the white colonists. This logic shaped the establishment of the initial security services such as the police and coursed through the logic and practice of security governance and management.

Different post-colonial histories shaped the nature, patterns and forms of governance in each of the countries. Post-colonial transformation of the state in each of the countries took a different trajectory and security governance was no an exception either. Of the four countries, Tanzania was the most radical in its reconstitution of the state, its politics and governance. Tanzania’s post-colonial governance was significantly shaped by the *Ujamaa* policy, a brand of social democracy championed by its founding father, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. Ujamaa’s principles of self-reliance and community solidarity significantly shaped the experimentation with a community form of policing known as the *Sungu Sungu* approach (Heald, 2002). Post-independence Uganda on the other hand tragically found itself caught in a cycle of civil wars and military rule. The take-over of the state by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni in 1986 through the National Resistance Movement restored stability and relative peace in the country. Museveni and the NRM embarked on a project of transformation of local governance that in the late 1980s introduced new aspects of local level security governance (Saxena and Goel, 2010). Rwanda has undertaken comprehensive social reforms following
the 1994 genocide and the penetration of its public security institutions to local levels is higher than in any of the other three states. Kenya’s post-colonial state was mildly reformist and the logic, organization and management of its security sector remained regime-centric, with security largely seen as the security of those in power rather than a service to all (Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003; Hills, 2009).

These studies are essentially located in the urban space. They are interested in community security governance in the urban setting. They are predicated on the argument that the urban setting is the best location from which to view the interesting developments in community security governance. Scholarship on state formation and state building supports this conclusion. In his widely influential 1996 article on urban research, the social historian Charles Tilly has argued that cities and urban settlements are historically linked to the emergence of the modern nation state. Cities, Tilly notes, “offer privileged sites for study of the interaction between large social processes and routines of local life” and are the best laboratories for investigation of “the way that social action in a given time and place constrains what will happen next there and in adjacent places” (Tilly 1996: 704, 715). While historically cities and urban areas have been the crucible of state formation, in much of the developing world, urban centres have also been primary sites of state erosion even as they have also remained the sites of concentration of wealth and state organization. As Jo Beall, Tom Goodfellow and Dennis Rogers argue, studying the urban areas provides an important opportunity “for understanding present day state making in fragile situations” (Beall and Rodgers, 2011: 3).

To better understand how security is governed in low-income urban neighbourhoods of the cities of East Africa, we do not restrict ourselves to the traditional state institutions that are presumed to provide or “own” security. Low income urban neighbourhoods of the different cities of East Africa represent the plural form of security governance that nodal governance literatures speak to. Security in these places is provided by both private as well as public actors (Mutahi, 2011; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Ruteere, 2009; World Bank, 2011). There are also many other important community-led initiatives-designed around the various community formations-residential as well as interests. These initiatives may have been initially constituted around provision or management of security. With time however, the initiatives in this auspice often tend to go beyond the narrow interest in physical security to incorporate other interventions aimed at
improving the whole community. For instance, many of the residential security committees often undertake dispute resolution. In a sense, the approach in these initiatives seems more like the fixing of the broken communities rather than the fixing of the broken character of individuals. They are much more than preventing individual incident of insecurity such as burglary. Because of its localized nature, security governance under this auspice enjoys high legitimacy with the community (Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing, 2003). Locating our focus on security in local civil communities allows us to explore questions of linkages between legitimacy and accountability. It is also an opportunity to examine the micro-level governance of security that has implications for broader local and national level governance.

Findings from the Case Studies
The Tanzania study traces the study of community security mechanisms from the days of Sungu Sungu in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Tanzania. Sungu Sungu became popular and operated in about half of the country. The Sungu Sungu for a long time operated outside the formal police and judicial system but were eventually accommodated by the law through enactment of the People’s Militia Act of 1989 (Walwa, 2017).

The study specifically focuses on two security initiatives in Dar es Salaam: Jirani Tujilinde (JITU) (neighbourhood watch) and Ulinzi Shirikishi (participatory security). Both were established in response to increasing crime in Dar es Salaam. JITU was in operation in Changanyikeni sub-ward (mtaa), Kinondoni district from 2000 to 2007 before switching to ulinzi shirikishi in 2008. In Kigezi Chini in Ilala district, ulinzi shirikishi was adopted in 2008. JITU was initially conceived and established by about five heads of households before it expanded to include the rest of the community. It was a structure for addressing the neighbourhood’s security needs and was not connected to the police. The leadership was elected by the community. JITU kept security in the neighbourhood through use of night patrols by young men who reported to the committee. Those arrested would be handed over to the police. The study notes that JITU was inclusive in its membership and contributed in building community solidarity. Government officials participated in JITU activities as equals rather than superiors. The initiative appeared to work well with a small population where people and close interaction and as population grew, its effectiveness became weaker and the decision to transition to Ulinzi Shirikishi was made. Nevertheless, the study
notes that JITU won the support of the government as well as the United Nations through the United Nations (UN) Habitat Safe City Program (SCP).

Ulinzi Shirikishi, which means participatory security, also uses night patrols by young people in the neighborhoods. The study notes that ulinzi shirikishi emerged in 2006 as a response to growing crime rates and the apparent police inability to address them. Ulinzi Shirikishi emerged after the election of President Jakaya Kikwete in 2005 whose government prioritized security. The initiative was part of the state-led security reforms measures and “needs to be understood as one of the initiatives within the community policing program emanating from the police reforms starting in 2006” (Walwa, 2017). As the study notes, “ulinzi shirikishi was established to compliment the traditional state-centric security system by building partnerships between the public and the police in finding solutions to alarming cases of crimes” (Walwa, 2017).

Security under ulinzi shirikishi is provided through night patrols by the community. However, the community has a major say on the nature of the structure as well as the amount of money to be contributed to support the patrols. Police are partners providing training to the patrols and playing an advisory role. The authority of ulinzi shirikishi is located in elected sub-wards (mtaa) assemblies and the chairpersons of those assemblies.

The Uganda study looks at two neighbourhoods of Kampala, Yowana Maria Muzeei in Rubaga-Division and Kifumbira, which is astride Kampala Central and Kawempe Divisions. The study examines the evolution of community security from the post-Idi Amin period in the form of Mayumba Kumi (ten cell system) and the Local Defence Units (LDUs) and Crime Preventers under the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government of Yoweri Museveni.

The mayumba kumi community security system was introduced after the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, by the liberators who came through Tanzania where the system was already in operation. The mayumba kumi was a neighbourhood watch system, which became an important complement to the weak post-war state. The system was however short-lived “as the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) government which took over power in 1980 favoured the traditional state formal administrative structure of appointed Chiefs, UPC party leaders and vigilantes as security enforcers” (Asiimwe and Kamukama, 2017). When Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over in 1986, it sought to dismantle the institution of the chiefs that had a history of
repression. In its place, the NRM government created “created hierarchical community based Resistance Council (RC) administrative systems, which were later transformed into Local Councils (LCs) with increased mandate to the communities” (Asiimwe and Kamukama, 2017) The LC structures began from village level and went up to the district level. Security was part of the mandate of this structure at local levels with one of the LC members detailed to work with a Local Defence Unit (LDU) team.

The LDU was a patrol unit made up of volunteers from the village approved by the LC Security Committee. They conducted night patrols but worked closely with the state, which provided them with arms. Given the security fluidity of the post-war Uganda, the state could not grant complete autonomy to such a structure. The police still remained at the apex of authorizing security in poor neighbourhoods where the LDU’s were most prevalent and preferred as a mechanism for provision of security. While state directed, the LC system was not owned by the state. The officials were not paid by the state but rather from “unofficial community levies” (Asiimwe and Kamukama, 2017).

The study follows the change from this system in 2016 with the state transforming the LDUs to Crime Preventers that are expected to supplement the police. In places like Yowana Maria Mezeei, and Kifumbira, the Security Committee established under the Local Council (LC) provides a form of oversight over Crime Preventers. The Security Committee is headed by the LC chairperson who works with volunteer elders. They are also a dispute resolution mechanism and only refer most serious matters that they cannot resolve to the police. In Yowana Maria Mezeei, disputes are resolved by the community’s “court mbagirawo” (express court) and the community prefers to even mobilize their own “force” through the LC structures rather than the police (Asiimwe and Kamukama, 2017). The study notes that in Kifumbira, Crime Preventers were seen as reinforcing the Security Committee’s work and as important as they brought in important linkages with the police.

In Rwanda, contemporary politics and governance are largely shaped by the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. The post-genocide Rwanda is a highly bureaucratized society and that bureaucratization permeates the governance of security. The Rwanda case therefore presents a unique study of community governance in context where such organizing is assumed not to exist. In Kigali, the study was located in two areas: Nyabugogo suburb of
Nyarugenge District as well as Batsinda suburb in Gasabo District (Barihuta, 2017).

Since 2001, Rwanda has established a decentralized system of government with more powers now vested in the local government. This has allowed for some space for community initiative and leadership on various areas. The 2006-2010 phase was also a period of consolidating decentralization in Rwanda. Security in Rwanda is managed and coordinate by the the Security Committee, an organ mandated under the country’s constitution to take decisions on regarding security of the city. The Security Committee is a state security mechanism. In addition to this Committee, citizens supplement state security through their own mechanism referred to as Irondo. Through the “Irondo”, citizens organize themselves, raise funds and conduct night patrols to keep their neighbourhoods secure in Kigali. In a sense, the “Irondo” is also an alternative to the state security. The “Irondo” actually predates the 1994 genocide. Pre-genocide Rwanda state however exploited the “Irondo” to mete out genocidal violence against the Tutsi. After the genocide, the Rwanda Patriotic Front government found that community organizing in the form of “Irondo” still very important to restore security in a state that had been devastated by war. Security agencies thus encouraged communities to provide security within their own neighbourhoods. The post-genocide state encouraged what is referred to as Irondo ry’Umwuga-Professional Night Patrol” (Barihuta, 2017).

Security is considered a responsibility of the state by most of those interviewed for the Kigali study. Volunteerism brought its own challenges however, and the communities opted for financial contribution rather than commitment of time to patrols. This allowed the communities to pay young men who could undertake the patrols. These initiatives are known as the “Irondo ry’Umwuga, which translates into Professional Night Patrol”.

For the Rwanda National Police (RNP) the “Irondo ry’umwuga” are an important complement to the security provision by the state police. The RNP therefore works closely with this community initiative to provide training on crime prevention and detection and also works to strengthen partnerships with the night patrollers.

The Night Patrollers are led at the village level by a Village Commander who is a member of the military Reserve Force. Higher up at the Sector level (which is the subject of this research) the patrollers are led by a Coordinator
who is a Commandant of RF. At the Sector level, the activities of the security patrollers are coordinated by a “Security Advisory Committee-SAC” made up of the Coordinator, a representative of citizens, a representative of the leadership and an official in charge of contributions.

Unsurprisingly, in Rwanda the community initiatives on security are much more closely intertwined with state security. Not surprisingly, even the leadership of community neighbourhood patrols is in the hands of reserve military officers. Nevertheless, the state recognized very soon after the end of the genocidal war that it was important that communities have a measure of autonomy to organize and mobilize themselves to secure their own neighbourhoods.

In Kenya, the study focused on two low income neighbourhoods of Nairobi: Mlango Kubwa in Mathare and Kawangware (Ayiera, 2017). In Mlango Kubwa it studied the Mlango Kubwa Landlords and Tenants Association (MLATA) which was created and registered as a Community Based Organization in October 2013. In Kawangware, the study focused on the Dagoretti Landowners Association. Poor urban neighbourhoods of Nairobi have historically been neglected in the provision of security by state police or treated as havens of crime necessitating repressive forms of policing by state agencies. The neglect of these areas has led to the emergence of self-help security initiatives that seek to plug the gaps left by the absence or ineffectiveness of the state security mechanisms.

In Mlango Kubwa-Mathare, the Mlango Kubwa Landlords and Tenants Association (MLATA) bringing together landlords and tenants has tried to provide security in the neighbourhood through night patrols. Although residents of Mlango Kubwa see the police as central and ultimately responsible for the provision of security, the community recognizes the limits of state police and seeks to supplement their efforts. The Association raises contributions from among the landlords and tenants and then uses those to finance support to the youth that patrol at night to provide security for the neighbourhoods. The association is led by elected leaders and the youth patrols are responsible and answerable to the leadership of the association. However, the study notes that the relationship with the state has not been harmonious as the state decided to deregister the association in 2014. Informally however, the association has found ways of working closely with individual police officers to address crime and insecurity in the area.
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In Kawangware, the Dagoretti Land Owners Association presents an initiative that is less inclusive than that in Mlango Kubwa as it is only made up of landowners and landlords and excludes the tenants. The association in this neighbourhood provides support to patrols by young men and also works very closely with the police. In this neighbourhood, landlords leverage their economic muscle to ensure that police respond when needed. Tenants are seen as transient and are expected to report security concerns to landlords and land owners who can address them more effectively.

Conclusion
The studies from the four countries no doubt deal with local contexts that are markedly different from each other in a number of issues and also national contexts and histories that have important differences. Nevertheless, the study was also motivated by an appreciation that there are important areas of comparable and mutually comprehensible experiences and practice that can be generated for a better understanding of local level governance of security in East Africa and hopefully beyond. The four studies highlight six key cross-cutting issues.

First, is that community ownership and leadership on local security governance is present and exists in all the four cases and countries studied. In all the four countries, the cases and mechanism studied present credible people-led security mechanisms. The leadership and operation of those mechanisms are subject to the consent of the community that they serve. The level of the autonomy as well as the degree of inclusivity of the residents of the communities differs. Some, like the Dagoretti Land Owners Association in Kawangware in Nairobi exclude some categories of residents (tenants) whereas others such as those studied in Kigali, Rwanda operate under the close scrutiny of the state and indeed the leadership tends to be somehow linked to the state security mechanisms (Reserve Force in the case of Kigali).

Second, in all the cases, it is clear that community organization, mobilization and production of security in no way substitutes nor delegitimizes state security. In all the four cases, those interviewed still see the state as a legitimate provider and guarantor of security for all. Residents in poor urban areas may be dissatisfied with the ineffective state security but they work closely with the police and seek to supplement the state where it falls short. The state-community relations may not be the most harmonious in all cases but there is a recognition and acceptance that the state security agencies are legitimate actors and ideally the best placed to respond and deal with certain
forms of crime (such as homicide) while the community deals with the less violent crimes.

Third, communities in poor urban neighbourhoods are not destitute cases that have no resources to bring to the table. In all the four cases, community do mobilize financial resources to provide support to young people detailed to undertake night patrols in the community. Communities also hold informational resources as well as local knowledge of the security situation that state actors do not have. Fourth, community security mechanisms come in different forms of organization and formality. Some are well formalized and even recognized by the state, such as the Ulinzi Shirikishi in Tanzania and Irondo in Rwanda, whereas others such as Mlango Kubwa Landlords and Tenants Association in Kenya do not even currently have a valid registration. It is, therefore, not useful to prescribe what form any of the community initiative should take as context is what is definitive.

Fifth, patrols appear to be a common approach to maintenance of security in all the four cities that were studied. This certainly speaks to the limited presence, reach and effectiveness of the few state police that are detailed to provide security in these poor neighbourhoods. In a sense therefore, these patrols, authorized and regulated by the community security initiatives, serve as a complement to state police. Not surprisingly, therefore, in all the cases, even in Mlango Kubwa where the local association has been deregistered, the police find these patrols important in keeping the neighbourhoods safe.

Sixth, the groups in many cases, go beyond the mere provision of security. They are also about disputes resolution and in some cases, such as in Nairobi, work to promote youth engagement in livelihoods improvements. They are also about building community solidarity as we see in Uganda and in Tanzania.

Notes

1. In these “phantom states” criminal syndicates and racketeers perform the functions previously reserved to the state. They impersonate the state and as John and Jean Comaroff note, “the official edifice becomes the counterfeit, predation the reality” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006: 16).
2. A study by the World Bank on Korogocho in Nairobi Kenya in 2010 revealed that the majority of residents trusted the police less than neighborhood security groups. This is only one view and should therefore be treated with some nuance as (other surveys in Kenya have revealed that the public in low-income urban neighborhoods preferred the police over neighborhood gangs in security provision. The nature of the neighborhood security group may be key here- the police are likely to be preferred over gangs, while community-led or community-organized initiatives are likely to enjoy greater acceptance and legitimacy (World Bank, 2011).

3. The democratic credentials of many of these initiatives are far from perfect. However it is this attempt to be accountable to the community as well as to be inclusive of community diversity and secure local legitimacy that separates these community-led or community-organized security initiatives from gangs and militias.

4. The concept of community policing, largely popularized in the United States and in the United Kingdom from the 1980s onwards, is based on the principle of co-ordination and consultation between the police and the policed, on the definition of security needs and on the implementation of ways of preventing and curbing crimes and of enhancing safety. The concept is often said to have its origins in an article, ‘Broken Windows’, published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1982 by two American scholars, James Q. Wilson, a political scientist, and George Kelling, a criminologist (Kelling and Wilson, 1982).

5. As an Institute of Development Studies paper rightly notes that, “instead of viewing informal arrangements as a major part of the governance problem, they could also be part of the solution.” (Institute of Development Studies, 2010: 2 http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/AnUpside-downViewofGovernance.pdf (Accessed: 23 May 2017).

6. Benoit Dupont, Peter Grabosky and Clifford Shearing point out that auspices “are groups (and sometimes individuals) that explicitly and self-consciously take upon themselves the responsibility for organizing their own protection”(Dupont, Grabosky and Shearing, 2003: 331).

7. Private security mechanisms are distinguished by their profit motive. This alone is a factor significant enough to shape them. What may be of significant interest is that without a direct profit benefit to any one individual, is that members of the community come to protect their common interest. Here, it is not the view that profit is not a good
thing or that this “self-help” is better than other values. Rather, we are interested in this “self-help” precisely because we want to understand the generation of security outcomes at the community level by the community itself without the drive of the profit motive.

8. Terry Cannon has pointed out that “community” remains a slippery concept. There is a moral association with it- an assumption of sorts that a community is a good thing. In some literature it refers to people who will cooperate with each other. Cannon points out that community should not be idealized as a place devoid of the usual problems of power, greed, competition, deceit among others (Cannon, 2008).

9. Of course, Kenya experienced serious ethnic violence in 2007. Some have characterized that as a conflict and argued that Kenya should be considered a post-conflict country (Kimokoti, Matanga, and Ododa, 2014; Kanyinga and Walker, 2013).

References


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