FROM SINGLE PARTYISM TO MULTIPARTYISM IN TANZANIA: REALITY, CHALLENGES AND LESSONS*

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Abstract
This study attempts to examine the challenges that Tanzania has encountered since the introduction of a multiparty system in 1992. It also seeks to discern major lessons that could be learned from that experience. The study argues that contextually (socio-economic and political), Tanzania distinguishes itself from its two East African neighbours (Kenya and Uganda). The article posits that contextual differences constitute one of the major factors shaping patterns of transition. Among the major contextual factors include a different model of one-party authoritarian rule characterised by an extensive degree of party penetration in society, as well as a high degree of politicisation and indoctrination of the bureaucracy and military establishments - institutions that are behaviourally yet to be reformed so as to be in conformity with the spirit of multiparty politics. Among the formidable challenges confronting multiparty politics in Tanzania include the legal and behavioural transformation of the civil service, and defence and security establishments, dealing with the rising religious tensions as well as finding a viable solution to the stateness problem pertaining to the contested structure of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

1. Introduction
For most of the African countries which were either under a single party system or military junta, it is now more than a decade since they reverted to multipartyism after three decades of authoritarianism. Reasons for the reversion for those countries which had already experienced multipartyism prior to and after independence, and the first inception for those which had never before experienced a multiparty system were basically similar in Africa and elsewhere. The socio-economic and political realities and hence, challenges these countries have been facing and will continue to face, however, are somewhat different. Thus, there are different lessons to be learned from these diverse experiences. It has been hypothesised and studies have been undertaken to illustrate the proposition that different patterns of transition are expected to evolve largely as a result of differences in the prevailing socio-economic and political realities including the nature of the regime under transition (Linz and Stepan 1996).

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The socio-economic and political realities of the three East African countries of both pre-and post-independence periods were remarkably different. Although all the three countries were under the same colonial master, they had different levels of economic development, and different patterns of property ownership and class stratification, different patterns of ethno-regional configuration, and thus different forms of nationalist struggles. Again, at independence, these three countries adopted remarkably different political ideologies, different economic policies, and different political structures, as well as somewhat different leadership systems.

However, apart from all these diversities, some important common characteristics could be discerned including the fact that they all invariably practised authoritarianism under either a single party system in the case of Tanzania and Kenya and for most of the time military rule in Uganda. Whereas Kenya and Tanzania reintroduced a multiparty system in 1992, Uganda is still under movementocracy (a system incorporating both features of a military regime and a single party system). It is now more than a decade since Tanzania and Kenya reverted to multipartyism. This is long enough for making a preliminary appraisal. The purpose of this article, however, is not to give a detailed account of how the process of political succession from a single party to multipartyism has been going on in Tanzania based on empirical research, but rather is to briefly sketch the realities and peculiarities of the specific context, challenges that have been encountered and finally lessons that could be learned therefrom.

2. The Political Context
Tanzania's impressive record of relative political stability, lack of serious ethnic, regional and religious strife for a long time since independence gives it some advantages over its East African neighbours. However, this record of relative peace and stability if not properly nurtured could also degenerate into fatalism or apathy. If today, Kenya fares better than Tanzania in the process of political succession from a single party to a multiparty system, it is not simply because of the exceptionally favourable structural context of the former, but instead it is essentially because of political engineering. Apart from the conscious decisions and actions by political leaders and the masses, the historical and structural factors do play an important role in shaping the transition process. In the case of Tanzania, one of the crucial starting points of the discussion on political succession is the legacy of its one party authoritarian system. In this section, therefore, we shall briefly explain how the single party legacy has impacted on the democratization processes in Tanzania.

The ruling party in Tanzania, TANU and later CCM, was certainly one of the most successful African parties in establishing an elaborate nation-wide structure from the centre to the grassroots. It was able to perform such basic functions of political parties such as leadership recruitment, policy making, and legitimation of the political system through regular intra-party elections. In spite of its phenomenal success in various respects compared to other African political parties, it was clear right from its inception that the system was suffering from inherent weaknesses of a monolithic party system.
Consequently, its legitimacy was consistently but invariably contested as Baregu aptly puts it:

The demands for multipartyism and democracy in Tanzania are the culmination of a long and cumulative (albeit uneven) struggle against authoritarian rule. At the time of independence in 1961, The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), led by Julius Nyerere, arrogated power to itself and forcefully imposed one-party rule. The move was resisted right from the start and continued to be resisted until 1992. Thus the political legitimacy of the one-party state has been contested throughout this period (Baregu 1994: 159).

As pointed out earlier, the single party system in Tanzania remarkably distinguished itself from most African political parties in terms of party penetration in society and a hegemonic position it occupied. The evolution of a single party rule in Tanzania reached a point whereby one could hardly distinguish between the party and the state. Party posts were held concurrently with government posts. District Commissioners and Regional Commissioners, for example, were also District Party Secretaries and Regional Party Secretaries, respectively. It was estimated that about 90 per cent of the party funds were provided by the government. The party was also at liberty to enjoy the services of government personnel and other resources including information and expertise (McHenry 1994: 57). The pronounced lack of dichotomy between the state and the party prompted some scholars (eg., Issa Shivji 1986) to question the identity of CCM as a political party, and instead, it was considered as a state-party or a party-state, for it was not fitting in the conventional model of a political party, which is ideally based on voluntary membership, that derives its legitimacy and resources from the people, and does not excessively rely on state coercion and the use of public resources for its operations and survival.

Ideologically, the ruling party in Tanzania was identifying itself with the workers and peasants. This ideological appeal started basically with the Arusha Declaration in 1967. Under the Arusha Declaration and subsequently the Party Guidelines (1971), party and government leaders were required to abstain from capitalist activities. In 1991, however, following the Zanzibar Declaration, the Arusha Declaration and Party Guidelines were practically abandoned. There are now increasing reports of corrupt deals between politicians and bureaucrats who collude with businessmen and investors, both local and foreign, in swindling public resources (see Warioba Report on Corruption). It is now widely believed that politicians and government officials in strategic resourceful positions are getting richer at the expense of the majority poor, whose standards of living are consistently on the decline. Unlike Kenya at independence, where the state was controlled by a sizeable section of the petty bourgeoisie - rich farmers, traders, in addition to urban based intelligentsia, which had established itself to have a strong foothold in the colonial economy, in Tanzania the state class was relatively poor and its first initiatives to accumulate were aborted by the Arusha Declaration in 1967.
With the liberalization of the economy from the mid-1980s, and subsequent abandonment of the Arusha Declaration, politicians and bureaucrats in Tanzania seem to have a relatively free hand for wealth accumulation. Unlike their counterparts in Kenya, where they were allowed to accumulate right from the start, in Tanzania they are now obsessed with property accumulation (ulimbukeni) using all means available including swindling of public resources. Because they have just started, they seem to be more aggressive. In addition to other factors, these developments have contributed to the declining legitimacy of the ruling party in Tanzania.

Initially, it was claiming to represent popular interests but with economic liberalization, they seem to be getting richer at the expense of the majority poor. At one time in the late 1980s, the late J. K. Nyerere, then a retired president but still the party chairman, raised a concern that the party leaders had alienated themselves from the people. This suggests that the traditional basis of legitimacy and support for the ruling party is now shaky.

Until now, the ruling party is grappling with the ideological crisis. There is a wide rift between what is officially stated and the actual practice. The Zanzibar Declaration of 1991 certainly scrapped off the Arusha Declaration. Funny, however, CCM still claims that it continues to build socialism and self-reliance. Again, even the country's constitution (Article 3 (1) states that Tanzania is a democratic socialist state.

3. The Mode of Transition in Tanzania
Following the dramatic political events in Eastern Europe from the late 1980s, people in various countries engaged themselves in political and academic discussions about the future of authoritarian regimes under single party systems or military rule. The national political debate in Tanzania started almost immediately following the remarks by the then Chairman of the ruling party and retired president, Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere. In February 1990, Nyerere publicly stated that it was no longer treasonous to talk about multipartyism in Tanzania. In his remarks, he stated that: “When you see your neighbour being shaved, wet your head to avoid a dry shave” (Daily News, Dar, February 22, 1990). A month later, the then president, Ali H. Mwinyi, overtly expressed his reservation with multipartyism claiming that Tanzania was not ripe for multiparty politics and that the system would instigate tribal, regional and other forms of conflicts and destroy the long cherished peace and stability.

However, because of the mounting domestic and external pressure as well as the influential role of Nyerere, not only as a party chairman but also an influential personality in his own right, the debate on multipartyism started with vigour. The role of an individual personality in the person of Nyerere needs to be underlined not as a primary factor, but as one of the influential factors. From the Tanzania’s experience, we could observe that the influence of a great political personality may facilitate or hinder political succession. In the case of Tanzania, Nyerere played both a facilitating and constraining roles. Yet he was the first national leader in the country to open up a
national debate on multipartyism at a time President Daniel arap Moi had issued a directive that whoever showed up two fingers (a symbol of multiparty advocacy) should have his fingers mutilated.

On the one hand, Nyerere in some ways helped to obstruct political succession. In 1993, he successfully aborted an already approved parliamentary bill directing the government to form the Tanganyika government within the Union arrangement. It is also believed that Nyerere significantly influenced the nomination of a CCM presidential candidate in 1995. Thus, to some observers, the presence of Nyerere's personality and his unwavering support for the ruling party helped to undermine the democratization process in Tanzania, including the discrediting of the opposition as he effectively participated in the 1995 election campaigns on the side of the ruling party. Again, when Zanzibar was plunged into political impasse after the 1995 general elections, Nyerere was incapable or unwilling to intervene and resolutely use his revered personality to help resolve the crisis.

Likewise, it is also claimed that the arrogance of the ruling party in Tanzania to resist genuine political reforms was in part attributed to the presence of the Father of the Nation, who could have employed his charisma to rescue the country under crisis as he did in 1993, when he successfully aborted the restructuring of the Union into a clear federal structure of three governments. From the foregoing, therefore, it could be asserted that the personality factor in Tanzania played both positive and negative roles as far as political succession is concerned. This is probably one of the peculiar experiences of Tanzania which could not be found in Kenya or Uganda.

Prior to the introduction of multipartyism in Tanzania, a presidential commission was appointed charged with the task of collecting people's views regarding their preference to a single party or multiparty system. This commission, which was named after its Chairman, the late Judge Francis Nyalali held 1061 meetings all over the country and received 36,299 verbal and written submissions, which produced 77.2 per cent of responses in favour of the continuation of a one party system and 21.5 per cent in favour of a multiparty system (United Republic of Tanzania 1992: 7-8). Yet, the Nyalali Commission recommended the establishment of a multiparty system. What is instructive here is that the Commission's recommendation was not based on statistical justification, but political prudence and rational judgement.

Relatedly, it is also instructive to note that these statistics of people's preferences ought to be interpreted with caution. The inquiry was perceived by most independent analysts as a government/party exercise in that the people were not free to express their views, and that the methodology which was used was not scientific - it was neither based on random sampling nor stratified sampling. Thus, the statistical findings of the Nyalali Commission were not valid, as the election results of 1995 (under unlevelled ground) indicated that only 61.8 per cent of the popular vote was in favour of the ruling party's presidential candidate. Since the interpretation of the Commission was not confined
with quantitative data, the Commission was able to make prudent recommendations, including:

i) the restructuring of the Union into a truly federal structure of three governments;

ii) the formation of a Constitutional Commission which would draft a constitution to be presented to the public for discussion, and approval;

iii) repealing or amending laws that restrict freedom of association - about forty laws were singled out for the exercise;

iv) the formation of political parties;

v) the provision of civic education;

vi) the establishment of three independent electoral commissions, one for the Union government, one for the mainland and one for Zanzibar;

vii) A mixed electoral system - PR using the additional member system, etc.

Almost all these recommendations were rejected by the government and the ruling party, with the exception of recommendation (iv).

Since most of the important recommendations of the Nyalali Commission have not been implemented to date, political succession in Tanzania from a single party to multiparty politics is fraught with formidable challenges which are not likely to be overcome in the near future. The challenges that beset the democratization process in Tanzania could be classified into two categories. The first category involves those directly emanating from the structural context such as underdevelopment, poverty, poor infrastructure, illiteracy, ethnic, regional and religious diversities, legacies of the single party system, etc.

The second category, which is also in various ways related and influenced by the first category involves proximate/contingent factors such as the structure of the political system, rules and regulations, decisions and actions by the political leadership as well as the various strategies and means employed to manage and control the democratization processes. Whereas it is quite difficult to deal with the first set of challenges, it is relatively easier to deal with the second set if there is a serious commitment on the part of the regime and vigilance on the part of the people organised through political parties, civil organizations, the media, etc. Besides, it is assumed that if the contingent challenges are properly addressed, the structural challenges could also be simultaneously tackled. For the sake of discussion, we shall mention a few challenges in the following section.
4.1 Challenges to Political Succession in Tanzania

For about three decades, Tanzania was pursuing developmental policies - political, economic, educational and cultural, aimed at forging a secular national identity transcending diverse social groups under the banner of Ujamaa na Kujitengemea (socialism and self-reliance, a brand of African socialism).

The economic liberalisation and later political reforms, however, posed serious challenges to the process of national integration in Tanzania. Initially, national integration was based on a monolithic and incompetent system, whereby the state was omni provider and manager of virtually everything. Thus, with the advent of multiparty politics, and market economy, Tanzania which had by regional comparisons achieved a relatively impressed degree of national integration, is now worried about the prospects of not only developing further its national identity but even sustaining the level of national integration achieved prior to economic and political reforms.

Whereas ethnic and regional are yet to be pronounced, there are already indications that religious fractures are widening (Campbell 1999:105-25, REDET Religious Study, forthcoming). These fractures have not yet assumed a clear form of Muslim-Christian conflict, but there are already quite convincing indicators to suggest the relations between the state and the Muslim community are not as cordial as they used to be prior to economic and political reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. The resurgence of religious ferment, however, should not be explained as simply an outcome of economic and political reforms; these factors were more of catalysts, rather than basic causal factors. To be sure, there was some feeling of relative deprivation among the Muslim community immediately after independence.

Essentially, what economic liberalization did was to create a bigger stratum of people deriving their livelihood independently from the state, enrichment of the section of the people, increasing unemployment and deterioration of living standards particularly among the urban wage labourers. Political reforms, on the other hand, provided avenues through which grievances could be vented. Political parties, the press, religious institutions and civic institutions could reach out people and mobilise them for whatever causes appealing to them. Thus, under conditions of economic liberalization and political reforms, sentiments hidden underground were ignited and resurfaced.

Islamic resurgence in Tanzania seems to be more political inclined in terms of influencing national politics rather than the motivation to establish a religious based state. It is essentially an outcome of the perceived political, education and economic marginalization rather than a struggle aimed at maintaining religio-cultural purity of the Muslim community in the country. That is why even the highly secularised among Muslims (including some belonging to the ruling clique or those aspiring to join the system) seem to join or sympathise with the Islamic cause for a better representation and treatment in the public domain.
At present, there is resurgence of religion as a significant factor in political realignment in Tanzania. This trend is not overtly acknowledged by the ruling party. However, time and again the main opposition party, CUF has been branded by the ruling party and some intellectuals as religious based. It appears however that even within the ruling party there are indications that political realignments are now increasingly informed of religious and ethno-regional cleavages. This is likely to affect Tanzania's politics particularly the the mainland. In the case of a predominantly Muslim Zanzibar, this does not seem to be a serious problem between the two main contending parties, although the general trend in the country may have also an impact on Zanzibar.

One of the best approaches to deal with this challenge is to consciously and devotedly develop a civic and public culture, create an accountable government, which is free from discrimination - legal, structural and behavioural. Forging of a national identity out of diverse religious, ethnic and regional interests needs a prudent leadership and a political will. This undertaking is possible under good governance with accountability, openness, transparency, effective representation and participation. However, the current 'seemingly' suspicious attitude of the state towards Muslims in Tanzania which is fuelled by the US led global war on terror is unlikely to positively change the Muslim-state relations in Tanzania. This situation might therefore pose a serious challenge to national integration as well as leadership succession.

Another structural challenge that has been negatively affecting political succession in Tanzania relates to the level of development, i.e., the state of underdevelopment with its attendant effects such as poverty, poor infrastructure, illiteracy, a relatively weak middle class, etc. This largely determines the extent and manner in which people organize themselves to exercise control over the state, influence public policy and challenge the ruling party.

Partly as a result of such factors, opposition parties have not been able to penetrate the rural hinterland where the majority of the electorate is located. Because of the poor infrastructure, lack of resources, weak organizational structures and skills, and lack of a unified opposition front, opposition parties have not been effective in reaching out the electorate. There are certainly some government restrictions in some cases where opposition parties have been restricted by government authorities and the police force to conduct their political activities, eg., during election campaigns (TEMCO Reports 1995, 2000). But the main obstacle to political mobilization is due to the weaknesses of the opposition parties themselves. This structural challenge is very difficult to address in the short term, because it is tied to the status of socio-economic development.

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1 It is believed by some analysts, for example, that the defeat of Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete in the CCM presidential nomination in 1995 was to a considerable degree due to his religious identity as a Muslim who would succeed President Mwinyi, also a Muslim. During the Mwinyi administration, there were frequent overt accusations by the church against the government including claims of favouring Muslims in the country. Whether the accusations were true or false, the bottomline is that there was some suspicion over a Muslim president.
Another prominent challenge that is presumably peculiar to Tanzania under multipartyism is the role of the bureaucracy, the army and the police force. It is quite obvious that the legacy of a single party authoritarian regime is much more felt in Tanzania than in any other country in East Africa. These institutions were highly indoctrinated and politicised under a single party system. In the case of the civil servants or public servants, these were not allowed to engage in active politics. In case they want to do so, they are required to resign from their posts. Formally and legally, civil servants have disengaged from active politics. However, because of the legacy of the single party system, they are still partisan in favour of the ruling party.

As for the military, after the dissolution of the Tanganyika Rifles in 1964 and its replacement by the Tanzania People's Defence Forces, the army recruits came from TANU Youth League and ASP Youth League. Thus, since 1964, TPDF was a politically committed army, and party branches were introduced in the army. Political commissioners were appointed and given honourary military commissions to work in the army. In fact, the political commissioners were even more powerful than professional officers. Military training included a heavy dose of political education, and promotion partly depended on passing political education examinations. As a further development to entrench the army in politics, in 1987, the army constituted a region within the central party organs just like any other administrative regions in the country. As a result of extensive politicisation of the army, many soldiers are serving in the top civilian posts. There are soldiers among MPs, ministers and deputy ministers, regional/district commissioners, ambassadors, judges in the court of appeal, executives in public institutions, etc.

Thus, given this background, the army and other security and defence establishments have not been able to practically disengage themselves from politics in the advent of multiparty politics as required by law - and they are conspicuously in favour of the ruling party and maintenance of the status quo. The January 26/27, 2001 killings in Zanzibar and most of the election flaws are reported as some of the indicators of the excessive partisanship of the defence and security as well as the civil service in Tanzania. Again, in East Africa, this is a peculiar challenge to Tanzania.

According to the Commonwealth observers, the 1995 general elections were characterised by incidents of election materials' shortage and cheating, all over the country. Government officials had openly supported the ruling party in some constituencies, and the report concluded that the election was not free and fair (Guardian, Dar es Salaam, November 3. See also TEMCO Report, 1995, 2000, and mainland by-elections in May 2003). None of these reports shows a clear record of election management in Tanzania. There are limits to what one does to make an election 'fair' if a long incumbency has produced a bureaucracy in the party's image and a system of patronage that makes key groups and individuals reluctant to change sides.
Related to this challenge is the very danger of the patronage system. In the case of Tanzania, as pointed out earlier, the ruling party continues to enjoy solid support from bureaucrats, technocrats, the army and the police force. With the advent of multipartyism, these segments of the state have remained unquestionably loyal to the ruling party. It is not clear whether this was due to a generous treatment by the state, heavy indoctrination by the ruling party or it is due to the absence of credible opposition parties to which they could shift loyalty.

The use of patronage has both short and long-term negative consequences for a political party. In fact, patronage can reduce a party's ability to get votes, influence on policy choice and output, share of patronage resources, control over its own members and activists, cohesion, pool of loyal activists, and ability to change strategy. Besides, an administration staffed by patronage appointees may not efficiently implement programs from which the sponsoring party could be reaping electoral advantages.

Voters are not to be trusted under a patronage system: if you can no longer provide, they will shift to the highest bidder - (my words). If a party falls out of power, if it latter comes to power it may find that a ministry has been packed by a rival party loyalists and some of them are not removable. When its supply of divisible resources shrinks, it cannot survive or it remains a weakened party. It does not have other sources of legitimacy.

4.2 Stateness Challenge

During the transition from a single party to multipartyism, Tanzania unlike her neighbours, is facing a unique crisis of stateness. The controversy over the status of the Union - whether it is unitary state or federal state envisaged by the founders has been a persistent political factor. This controversy is probably as old as the Union itself, but it has gained a great impetus with the introduction of multiparty politics.

Some lawyers and political analysts are now worried that in case one political party happens to rule in Zanzibar and another controls the Union government, this eventuality is likely to create a constitutional crisis. The constitutional amendments made so far have not yet adequately resolved that likely crisis. Thus, as of necessity, if two different parties will be in power, one for the Zanzibar government and the other for the Union government, then we should expect major constitutional changes. The spirit of the constitutional amendments made thus far was that CCM will remain in power for a long time in both parts of the Union. The separation of the Zanzibar President from the Union Vice President, for example, is presumably going to create an administrative and even political crisis if a Zanzibar president comes from a different party from that of the Union President. The experience of law making in Tanzania is that laws are made with the spirit and purpose of serving the interests of the ruling party and not for a long term application and relevance.
4.3 Other Challenges

1. How to penetrate the rural hinterland where the majority of constituencies lie - poor infrastructure, lack of resources, weak organizational structures of the parties, lack of a unified front - pooling resources together, government restrictions - how these people would be treated by the authorities - eg during campaigns people are denied fuel and accommodation in guest houses (see TEMCO Reports, 1995; 2000; By-elections, May 2003). In Kenya, this challenge has been dealt with as a result of relatively strong ethnic blocs which integrate urban based elites and prominent tribal personalities and rural based communities. This simplifies the problem of communication and mobilization. In Tanzania, there is no such kind of strong ethnic and regional affinity which could be easily tapped for political mobilization.

2. How to depoliticise the highly indoctrinated and patronised bureaucracy. This is one of the most serious problems confronting political succession in Tanzania.

3. How to depoliticise the defence and security establishments which were groomed and excessively indoctrinated under the single party system.

4. How to forge a unified front against the ruling party between two religious communities which are clearly suspicious of each other, i.e., Muslims and Christians.

5. How to form a unified front between the relatively weak political parties, whose level of penetration into society is very low.

5.1 Leadership Succession Under Multipartyism in Tanzania

Under multiparty politics, there are two levels of competition. The first level is intra-party competition for nomination. In the case of Tanzania, intra-party competition is only practiced if the incumbent president is not aspiring for re-election. In 1995, when President Salmin of Zanzibar stood for re-election, nobody was allowed to vie for the post. Whereas, in the case of the Union presidential election, when Mwinyi had finished his two five-year terms and hence barred from recontesting, there was a fierce intra-party duel for nomination. The two leading contenders were Ben Mkapa and Jakaya Kikwete. The nomination process, though presided by Nyerere, the charismatic party chairman, was fraught with elite factionalism and novel forms of alliances among politicians. Interesting to note was that the Zanzibar block within NEC is believed to cast a decisive vote for Mkapa. It was widely believed that the Zanzibar block voting for Mkapa was in exchange for the latter's support for the Zanzibar faction in their wrestling with the opposition. President Mkapa apparently kept his commitment - he persistently claimed that the political crisis in Zanzibar was an internal affair of the Zanzibaris themselves. Hence, President Salmin enjoyed a free hand in repressing the opposition in Zanzibar and the Union government was readily accessible in providing adequate support for the purpose.
For the 2000 presidential elections, the nomination tussle shifted to the Zanzibar presidency as the incumbent president had finished his two five-year terms. It has to be recalled that the 1984 Constitutional Amendments limited the presidential term to two five-year terms. As early as 1999, there was an attempt in Zanzibar to change a constitutional provision, setting a limit to the presidential tenure to two five-year terms. The then Zanzibar Attorney General (AG) had already prepared a bill to that effect and submitted it to the Minister for Constitutional Affairs, Iddi Pandu Hassan who was supposed to table it to the House of Representatives. Interestingly, the AG clearly stated that he (AG) had not seen any other leader who could be better than Dr. Salmin (Nipashe, Sept. 14, 1999). As a follow-up to that pronouncement, the Government Spokesman, Hafidh Ali appealed to citizens to kindly request Dr. Salmin to recontest. (Mtanzania, October 27, 1999). Again, the Presidential Adviser on Pemba Affairs and a group of Pemba elders echoed the same request.

While all this was happening, Dr. Salmin was silent. When the issue was becoming hotter, some of the senior leaders within CCM picked it up and clearly stated their objection to the envisaged constitutional amendment to extend the tenure to allow Dr. Salmin to recontest for a third term. Hassan Nassor Moyo (former minister) was among the first senior CCM leaders to publicly oppose such a move when he said, “Salmin is tied by the Constitution” (Rai, March 25 - 31, 1999). Ultimately, because of pressure within the party as well as external pressure, the ploy had to be dropped. Whether Dr. Salmin really intended to recontest, it is not difficult to tell. His silence on the issue, and the fact that the bill had already been prepared to that effect are clear indicators that he had a strong desire to recontest.

Having failed to change the Constitution and extend his presidential term, Dr. Salmin in a brinkmanship style of politics sought to prepare a successor of his choice. He put all his weight behind his Chief Minister, Dr. Mohammed Bilal. Since the incumbent was not standing, six aspirants took the forms. These were the Union Deputy Minister for Finance, Abdisalaam Issa Khatib; Minister for Transport and son of the first president of Zanzibar, Amani Karume; Ambassador Ahmed Hassan Diria (later withdrew); Chief Minister, Dr. Mohammed Bilal; businessman and sports adviser to the Zanzibar President, Mohammed Raza (who was 39 years old although the minimum age for the post is 40), and Zanzibar Minister for Finance, Ms. Amina Salum Ali.

The inter-party competition for nomination was fierce to the extent of raising divisive issues of dirty campaign. The citizenship of Ambassador Diria, for example was questioned. Amani Karume, whose father was the first president of Zanzibar was not spared either. A highly placed party functionary raised an allegation that his father (Karume) was a dealer who sold Zanzibar out. In the preferential vote cast by the Zanzibar CCM special committee of NEC, Dr. Bilal won by far. Amani emerged third. Thereafter, NEC met in Dodoma to nominate the presidential candidates. To the surprise of many, Amani emerged victorious. Before the NEC meeting there were widespread rumours that the Salmin block had threatened to defect from the party.
and/or break the Union if their candidate Dr. Bilal would not be nominated. Dr. Bilal was not nominated and the Salmin camp went back to Zanzibar quietly.

Instructive to note is that Amani, who was not popular within CCM - Zanzibar defeated Dr. Bilal who had a very strong support of CCM-Zanzibar. The victory of Amani versus Bilal was not an easy struggle. It was quite obvious that the national intelligence, the media both public and private as well as external forces backed Amani's campaign.

An interesting question is why there was such a fierce struggle for power within the ruling party? That was the situation in 1985 in the nomination of both the Union and Zanzibar presidential candidates. It was the situation regarding the Union presidential candidate in 1995. The problem repeated itself in 2000 with respect to the Zanzibar presidential candidate. The fact that such a problem happened even under a single party system, and that it has recurred in all cases when the incumbent president in not recontesting, then it would be safe to draw a conclusion that when the incumbent is not standing for re-election, there is room for intra-party struggle for power. After the 1995 election, President Mkapa accommodated some of his contenders. Kikwete, for example, was appointed Foreign Minister. After the 2000 election, by contrast, Amani seems to have isolated the pro-Salmin forces. Among other factors, the intra-party struggle for power is caused by the patronage system, a typical feature of the neopatrimonial state.

Another dimension of the crisis of leadership succession under a multiparty system is the possibility of power transfer to the opposition party if it wins. The ruling party and its governments acceded to multiparty politics not because of the commitment to democracy but because of the inevitable outcome due to pressure exerted by external and domestic forces. The way the transition process has been managed, the rules of the electoral game, the formation of electoral management bodies, the Constitution in place and the various laws enacted attest to the fact that the ruling class in Tanzania is not yet prepared to accept an impartial verdict of a democratic game. The management of elections and its outcomes particularly in Zanzibar in both 1995 and 2000 elections, the massive deployment of security and defence forces, the grabbing of ballot boxes by the police when the counting was going on clearly pre-empted the possibility of transfer of power to an opposition party through a democratic means. In the case of Zanzibar, it appears that the ruling stratum still clings to the revolution as a source of their legitimacy instead of democratic elections, Karume's prediction in the late 1960s might be correct:

Nearly 30 years ago (i.e., 1967), as a young and naïve journalist I asked the late Zanzibar President, Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume, when there would be elections in (multiparty was implied but not used as an expression in those days) Zanzibar including Pemba. He was clearly irritated by my question and replied that there would be no such elections for 50 years. The following year I interviewed him again and posed a similar question. I could add another ten years to what he had told me the previous year, he replied (Martin 1997:1).
According to Karume's prediction in 1967/68, multiparty elections could be held in Zanzibar around 2010 and 2020. But multiparty politics was introduced earlier in 1992 and the first multiparty election was held in 1995, i.e., about 15 years earlier according to Karume's prediction. But this hardly nullifies Karume's prediction. The two multiparty general elections of 1995 and 2000 were seriously flawed, a situation which led to political stalemate. That is to say, the challenge of leadership succession in Zanzibar has to be viewed from the historical perspective as a result of the 1964 Revolution. The prevailing attitude among the revolutionaries in Zanzibar and which seems to be supported by the Union government is that the Zanzibar government derives its legitimacy for the 1964 Revolution and therefore power cannot be transferred to an opposition party which is perceived to despise the “holy” Revolution and which is suspected of intending to break the Union.\(^2\)

From this account of the crisis of leadership succession in Tanzania, we can summarize some of the determinant factors of the possibility of power transfer. These include:

(i) **Modality of accession to power:** This is clearly illustrated by the fear of power transfer in Zanzibar. Since the ruling party associates itself with the revolution, it is not inclined to transfer or even share it with opposition parties. This is not to suggest that those nationalist parties that won independence through a constitutional means (like TANU/CCM) are willing to transfer power to opposition parties. They also tend to cling to power as they regard themselves as custodians of independence because of their historical role during the nationalist struggles.

(ii) **Record of use/misuse of power:** In the case of Zanzibar, there is a clear record of abuse of power not only during the early days of the Revolution but even after the 2000 general elections. This raises fear of prosecution. No wonder that in 1999, there was an attempt by the Salmin government to enact a special constitutional provision giving the President immunity from prosecution when he finishes his tenure.

(iii) **Strength of the opposition:** When the opposition is relatively strong and when it enjoys support from some of the strategic state apparatuses such as the military, the police, the judiciary, etc - the regime in power may be compelled to think twice when it comes to the critical decision of whether to cling to power or concede defeat through a democratic election.

(iv) **Loyalty of state apparatuses:** When the incumbent authoritarian regime enjoys unwavering support from the state apparatuses particularly the coercive ones -

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\(^2\) This position was clearly stated by President Mkapa while addressing a campaign rally at Micheweni, Pemba, October 2000. He said that power could not be surrendered to the people who despise the Revolution and who intended to break the Union. He further stated that there were people who had sworn in to defend the Constitution.
the army, the police, the intelligence, and the judiciary there can be less inclination to concede defeat through a democratic election. The regime in Tanzania is well placed to enjoy such privileges. Added to that it enjoys strong support from the civil service.

(v) **Support from strategic groups of the civil society:** In Tanzania, the intellectuals, the church, the big business and the media are conspicuously inclined to the ruling party. These are important sections of society for legitimation purposes. The support from these sections may be either out by political conviction or opportunism. Whatever form, such support is important for the survival of the regime.

(vi) **Cohesion of the party:** In Tanzania, the ruling party is impressively cohesive and it has an extensive organizational network from the national level to the grassroots. It cannot be compared with the then the ruling party in Kenya, KANU. The latter was seriously undermined by ethno-regional cleavages.

(vii) **External factors:** The extent of external pressure is a very important factor in regime's calculations. The Tanzanian regime is generally in good terms with Western donors and the latter are not predisposed to exert strong pressure on the regime to accept the verdict of a democratic game.

(viii) **Form of Government:** There is a widely accepted assumption that in majoritarian presidential systems, the stake is relatively higher and hence fiercer competition for the highest office unlike in the PR - parliamentary forms of government.

5.2 **Lessons From Tanzania**

1. The problem of piecemeal constitutional changes and the way democratisation process could be slowed down. Several Presidential Commissions have been formed to study the situation and make recommendations for constitutional reforms but the ruling party has been reluctant to adopt those changes.

2. Disallowing access to resources to opposition parties: businessmen can only help opposition parties at their own risk. The same applies to government employees. Senior government officials are barred from active participation in politics and all government employees can only contest in elections after they have resigned from their jobs. There is no assurance that they can go back to their jobs after the elections, whether they win or they are defeated.

3. Politicisation, indoctrination and patronage of the civil service and the army, and the police force have made such institutions hostile to political reforms in Tanzania. Instead of playing a facilitating role, such institutions are still afflicted with the legacies of a single party authoritarian system.
4. Personality factor might be very influential in facilitating or obstructing political succession. The retired president, the late Julius Nyerere played an instrumental role in both facilitating and obstructing the democratisation process in Tanzania. One variant of the theories of statesmanship posits that a strong statesmanship is incompatible with democratic governance, i.e., democratic governance is supposed to rely on the legal system and institutions and not on an individual.

5. A smaller constituent party of a given polity may have an impact on the entire political system. The political crisis of Zanzibar has had a great impact on the politics of the entire United Republic of Tanzania.

6. Political succession becomes very difficult when there is a serious contest on the form of the state - whether it should be unitary or federal in the case of Tanzania. This increases the degree of uncertainty and apprehension on the part of the ruling party, that should an opposition party win the general election, the structure of the state would be fundamentally altered.

7. Unless the opposition forms a united front against a long standing ruling party, chances of ousting it from power or even of winning a large number of parliamentary seats and providing a serious challenge in parliament are very slim.

8. International interests are much more interested in political stability rather than democratization per se. The exceptionally cordial relationship between the Tanzanian state and Western donors today bears testimony to the above assertion. It is only when peace and stability are seriously at stake as was the case with Zanzibar particularly after the January 2001 killings, when the Western interests would strive to flex their muscles to press for political change. It may also be recalled that the Western interests adopted a tougher position against the Moi regime pressing for the introduction of a multiparty system only after the killings at Kamukunji in 1991.

6.0 Two Contrasting Scenarios: Tanzania and Kenya

In both Tanzania and Kenya the democratization process was seriously blocked right from its inception. In the case of Tanzania, it is still seriously blocked. In the case of Kenya, a critical point has already been crossed over, i.e., power has been transferred from the long standing authoritarian regime to a democratically elected coalition of opposition parties. Among the arguments advanced to comparatively explain the democratization processes in the two countries is that democratization is largely determined by the balance of power among the contending groups or parties. In other words, Tanzania has not managed to cross the critical point of political succession because it has a relatively weak opposition. By contrast, Kenya has managed to cross over the critical point because of its relatively strong opposition. This argument could
not be simply cast out as baseless. It constitutes one of the two important sets of explanations.

Tanzanian opposition parties had few obvious starting points unlike Zanzibar and Kenya. Some of the obvious sources of opposition: business people, the urban poor, regions with a sense of relative deprivation or neglected areas, and disgruntled former leaders and members of the ruling party, and dissident intellectuals. When the ruling coalition splits, avenue for political succession appear. Kenya experienced serious political split a few months before the general election. Massive defections - such experience has not happened in Tanzania. The ruling coalition bonded by patronage had collapsed in Kenya.

There is a good number of dissident intellectuals in Kenya, and very few in Tanzania. Chances for political succession are not so bright. Opposition parties have been left to people without organizational skills and resources needed to manage political parties. In Tanzania, intellectuals shy away from opposition politics. There is now a noticeable trend of intellectuals joining the ruling party in anticipation of securing parliamentary seats and enjoy the 20 millions, Tshs gratuity after every five-year term, the amount which is higher than a pension of a university professor who has served in the teaching profession for about 40 years.

In principle, there is nothing inherently wrong with the same ruling party winning each and every general election. But given the attitude of the political leadership in Tanzania, and from the hindsight of the manner in which the transition has been managed, there is no likelihood in the near future of a breakthrough from a single party heritage to multiparty politics with its necessary ingredients. I am therefore tempted to postulate that Tanzania (mainland) may probably be the last in East Africa (preceded by Kenya, possibly Zanzibar and perhaps Uganda, which is yet start the transition process) to cross the red line of genuine political succession from a single authoritarian regime to a multiparty democratic political system.

7.0 Conclusions: What is to be done?

In the spirit of East African co-operation, politics of individual states cannot be relegated to a back seat. It is very unlikely for nation states with fundamental differences in their political systems to be able to harmoniously and productively cooperate in the form of a regional arrangement. The demise of the East African Community in 1977 was in part due to the fact that the three member states had fundamentally different political systems. The current initiative of East African cooperation envisages not only close economic co-operation but also strong political relations. This is only possible, if these countries would learn from their common and diverse experiences in the process of democratization and institutionalization of good governance. In the past years, it was claimed that Tanzanian politicians used to send a team of experts to Kenya, and presumably vice versa, to learn the best tactics of rigging
elections. It is now high time that such teams were dispatched to a neighbouring country to learn the best rules and tactics of conducting free and fair elections. Democracy should be “the only game in town”.

There should be a concerted effort to develop the civil society. This institution is credited with key roles as far as good governance is concerned. First, it creates channels other than political parties for the articulation, aggregation and representation of interests. Secondly and related to the foregoing, it monitors and restrains the exercise of power by democratic states. In the case of authoritarian states, it helps to democratise them (Diamond 1996: 230). My conclusion, however, would differ from those who consider civil society as the single most important and urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy. Countries just emerging from long periods of reactionary authoritarianism lack the legal and bureaucratic means to curb corruption. It is therefore incumbent upon a free press, civic groups as well as political parties to press for institutional reform that could help curb corruption.

The most urgent factor in the consolidation of democracy is political institutionalization. This involves institutional and behavioral changes that ultimately make democracy entrenched and thus unlikely to break down. The promotion of democratic citizenship and culture, inclusion and representation of the important sections of society are necessary. Yet what is most urgently required now is political institutionalization. Though there is obviously an impressive progress in democratic citizenship and culture, particularly among the ordinary people, the process, efforts and initiatives towards political institutionalization, in terms of both legal and institutional set up, are dishearteningly very slow. This in turn contributes to slow down the process of building civic competence.

References


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