

The Challenges of Post-Genocide Unity Creation in Rwanda

Charles Gasarasi*

Abstract

This article examines the way the post-genocide political system in Rwanda has been designed to promote conflict resolution and build national unity. The article provides an assessment of the multi-faceted attempts to bring about national reconciliation including legal efforts like the traditional 'gacaca' courts, conventional courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Political mechanisms to strengthen unity including the Constitution and electoral laws together with the Consultative Forum of Political Organizations (FORUM) and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) are also examined. The article concludes with a description of the positive effect of economic development policies for building a new post-genocide society. The article stresses that the logic of national unity runs through nearly every aspect of the country's legal, political, and economic life such as the Constitution, laws, and sectoral policies.

Introduction

Post-genocide creation of unity in Rwanda has posed several challenges and has necessitated a multi-dimensional approach to tackling the profound breach of the social contract that began in 1959 when it was under the Belgian colonial administration and later continued under the first and second Republics (1962-1994). Over the years, erosion of national unity took many forms. These included state-sponsored killings of Rwandan Tutsi since 1959, forcing many Tutsi into exile; turning those who stayed into second-class citizens or labelling them as aliens; destruction of property belonging to this persecuted group; relocating some to inhospitable parts of the country; killing or imprisonment of opposition politicians; extermination of some 1,050,000 Tutsi during the 1994 genocide; maiming, raping, and the destruction or appropriation of the victims' property; and even individually motivated revenge killings by some Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) combatants. Attempts to bring about national reconciliation, which was a prerequisite for national unity, took a variety of forms. These included the introduction of a traditional form of justice 'gacaca'; parallel use of conventional courts and the

*Research Professor, National University of Rwanda

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to try genocide suspects; introduction of various political mechanisms to strengthen unity; enhancement of national security; and the mobilization of resources for development and reconstruction. This article examines the achievements and persisting challenges in the long and difficult, but promising, process of building peace and national unity in post-genocide Rwanda. The logic of national unity runs practically through every aspect of the country's life such as the Constitution, laws, and sectoral policies.

National Reconciliation

According to Rutayisire, Rwanda's Vice-President of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC):

Reconciliation is not just one of the many other options for us Rwandese, it is rather a non-negotiable obligation. An obligation to give ourselves hope for our old age; an obligation to leave to our children a better Rwanda to grow and live in. (NURC, <http://www.nurc.gov.rw>)

The subjects in this non-negotiable obligation are often defined as: perpetrators, victims and bystanders as the genocide process unfolded. However, Habyarimana, NURC's President, emphasizes that the success of the reconciliation policy, "... is above all a challenge for all political leaders, the various leaders and the Rwandan intellectuals." (NURC, <http://www.nurc.gov.rw>).

The prerequisites of national reconciliation are often cited as:

- Admission of the truth and assuming moral responsibility for what happened and the role played by each and everyone
- Collective ownership of the genocide tragedy by Rwandans
- Progress in eradicating denial of the genocide and the genocide ideology
- Re-humanizing Rwandans through justice for genocide victims and perpetrators alike (as even perpetrators have been dehumanised).

There is a general consensus among different observers that fourteen years since the genocide was stopped, national reconciliation in Rwanda has made satisfactory progress. For example, in its words of praise for the NURC and its achievements in bringing about reconciliation in the country, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), which carried out a comprehensive evaluation and impact assessment of the Commission's work since its inception in 1999, remarked:

During its seven-year lifetime, the NURC has registered an impressive record of achievements. Most importantly, it has transferred reconciliation concepts and practices to communities and created innovative tools and institutions based on the integration of ancient Rwandese cultural practices and modern tools. (IJR, 2005: 20)

As this positive growth in national reconciliation did not spontaneously come about, we need to explore the mechanisms that have helped put the country back on the rails of national unity through reconciliation after years of institutionalized discrimination, and waves of genocidal killings that entrenched fear, hatred and suspicion in the population.

'Gacaca' as a Mechanism of National Unity and Reconciliation

'Gacaca' is a traditional mode of resolving neighbourhood conflicts. It is the name given to the home-grown people's jurisdictions responsible for judging genocide-related crimes. Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001 first introduced it. Until now, this law has undergone four amendments and its application has been accompanied by several occasional instructions from the National Service for Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ). Such frequent amendments of the law and accompanying instructions have been necessitated by the dynamism inherent in the practice of such an innovative legislation, coupled with the very complex nature of the genocide phenomenon itself. The sheer number of the suspects involved may illustrate just one aspect of this complexity. According to NSGJ figures, some 818,564 persons have been prosecuted as genocide suspects (NSGJ, <http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw>).

Gacaca was designed to combine punishment with reconciliation, fighting against impunity, and establishment of the truth. Until 2008, *Gacaca* jurisdictions had competence to judge people accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity classified in categories 2 and 3. Today, that competence has been extended to judging people in category 1. These categories simply refer to the gravity of the alleged crimes ranging from planning and organization of the genocide (category 1) to perpetrating lethal violence (category 2) and to offences against property (category 3) and intermediate offences.

According to Penal Reform International, "... as of May 31st, 2007, 108,732 persons had been judged for the crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity; of these 100,507 (92%) of the national case load was handled by *Gacaca* jurisdictions. Also, by October 1st 2007, 90% category 2 persons had been judged and 10% appealed" (PRI, 2008: 15-16). This relatively high rate of

judging cases has been possible because since March 2007 the number of jurisdictions was considerably increased: "3,348 Gacaca jurisdictions at sector level and 1,957 appeal jurisdictions have been functioning" (PRI, 2008: 15).

In its own assessment of *Gacaca*, the National Service for *Gacaca* Jurisdictions has listed some of its benefits as:

- Removing suspicion by denouncing the guilty party
- Helping to eradicate the culture of impunity
- Enabling people to live in peace and harmony again
- Enhancing collaboration among the inhabitants in disclosing the truth about the genocide events
- Helping the survivors of genocide to know where their loved ones were thrown so that they can bury them in dignity.

In its actual implementation, *Gacaca* has facilitated reconciliation, particularly on the side of those accused of having committed genocide-related offences, in two major ways. The first has been the conditional release of old age suspects decreed by the President of the Republic. The second has been the introduction of a lenient punishment given to convicts of genocide-related crimes, popularly known as TIG (Community Service as an Alternative Penalty to Imprisonment), which came into effect in 2005. According to the Ministry of Justice:

The Government introduced a new punishment called Community Service as an Alternative Penalty to Imprisonment (TIG) to strengthen the justice sector and introduce laws that embrace economic development taking into account respect for human rights. The TIG arrangement follows decree N10/01 of 2001 in which the President effectively gave Gacaca courts the jurisdiction to sentence convicts to do community work. Those former Genocide suspects who don't fall in the first category that is, those who intended to kill their fellows but did not succeed, those who engaged in looting during the Genocide and those who adamantly refused to testify against the perpetrators or knowingly lied during Gacaca Sessions, serve the sentence. Today, this punishment has contributed immensely to the social and economic development of the country. Those convicted to do community service work on government and private projects that contribute to the development of the country... Most Genocide suspects who have since confessed their deeds have been convicted to do community service. Today, community service has become a symbol for curbing the culture of impunity and at the same time building social bonds between Rwandans. Community service activities are focused on construction of housing units for Genocide survivors, quarrying stones for public road construction, swamp drainage and other activities that focus on national development (MINIJUST, <http://www.minijust.gov.rw>).

The NSGJ also admits that there are a number of challenges, including:

- Refusing to tell the truth
- Refusal to confess or making partial confessions
- Threatening, harassing and killing of survivors of the genocide, witnesses and some judges
- Some 'inyangamugayo' (*Gacaca* judges) being also the ones who committed genocide crimes
- Corrupt arrangements among the accused, between the accused and survivors, and between the accused or survivors and 'inyangamugayo'.
- Inadequate exploitation of testimonies by some judges
- Persistence of the genocide ideology
- Persistence of false alarms.

Although it is not easy to measure how much reconciliation and unity *Gacaca* has so far helped to bring among the Rwandan population, the participatory nature of the process has had some healing effects. The fact that all Rwandans (perpetrators, victims, survivors, witnesses, the general public) come together to testify about what they did, suffered, saw or seen, must have had some positive effects. The confessions and asking for forgiveness, combined with the punishment given to the convicted perpetrators, seem to have softened the hearts of some victims, while at the same time liberating the perpetrators from the pains of personal or even collective guilt. For many observers, these processes point to some intuitive acknowledgment that there is already some tissue regeneration taking place in the ossified fabric of Rwandan society. However, it should be noted that it is not uncommon to hear of cases of hardliners among the perpetrators of genocide who openly say that they are not at all repentant, and of genocide survivors who refuse to forgive. Such attitudes inevitably result in a lingering climate of mutual suspicion between the predators and the prey of the genocide period.

Other Judicial Mechanisms: Conventional Courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

The purpose of the *Gacaca* process, the national judicial system and the Arusha-based ICTR is to facilitate the establishment of the truth and, therefore, the criminal guilt or innocence of the suspects. The introduction of *Gacaca* did not oust the competence of conventional courts in trying genocide cases. Conventional courts have continued to deal with cases involving category 1 suspects.

The Challenges of Post-Genocide Unity Creation in Rwanda

The ICTR was set up in 1994, but became operational in January 1997. Questions are often asked about its status, acceptability and impact on internal reconciliation in Rwanda. Generally speaking, its status is not questioned in Rwanda because Rwandans themselves wanted it to be created and its mandate is well-defined. It is generally accepted in Rwanda for catching and trying some of the most senior figures among the genocidaires. The Rwandan government also acknowledges it as having made remarkable improvements over time, and has cooperated by providing classified information, referral of witnesses to the tribunal, and facilitating the tribunal's work in Rwanda.

The tribunal's impact on national reconciliation is arguably modest but significant in that despite its very slow pace of judging cases, genocide victims recognize that, at least, about 82 indictments were raised as of 2004; and about 67 people were arrested, including 13 members of the 19-member interim government at the time of the genocide.

Issues of concern regarding the ICTR's activities include: (i) ICTR's limited ability to conceal witness identities and protect witnesses when they return to their homes; (ii) some victims do not understand why the accused enjoy better living conditions in detention and, therefore, better human rights than the victims themselves; and gender issues, especially the harassment of rape victims stemming from the adversarial court process (EuropeAid, 2004: 24-25).

ICTR had planned to complete all cases by 2008, and complete all its work, including appeals, by 2010. According to ICTR (ICTR, 2008: 18-22), the achievements to date and the remaining work load are as follows:

- Status of judgments delivered, as of 3 November 2008: 37 accused in 31 judgments
- Cases where judgment delivery is awaited: 8 accused in 5 cases
- Cases where trial is closed but closing arguments are yet to be heard: 5 accused in 2 cases
- On-going trials: 15 accused in 5 cases
- Awaiting trials: 5 accused (cases to commence shortly); retrial - 1 case
- Four detainees and one fugitive for whom referral of the case has been requested (three referrals to Rwandan courts already denied)
- 13 fugitives.

Whether the ICTR will be able to complete the remaining cases by the extended period granted remains to be seen. However, many Rwandans, including some genocide convicts, would like to have leftover cases, when ICTR's renewed mandate expires, referred to Rwanda. This would add to the healing of wounds, particularly among the genocide survivors. It would also add to the credibility of the ICTR among many Rwandans. However, given the ICTR's record so far of denying referrals of cases requested by the government of Rwanda, the chances that this trend might be reversed in the future are very slim.

Other Legal and Political Mechanisms

Several legal and political mechanisms have been introduced to promote national unity and reconciliation in the country. These mechanisms seem to be working. We will discuss only a few, just by way of illustration.

Legal Mechanisms

National unity is the bedrock of the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda. Under its Fundamental Principles, Article 9, paragraph 2, it calls for "... eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity." Elsewhere in the Constitution, 'national unity' is mentioned as a requirement for certain actions. This phrase is used in the following Articles:

- Article 77, which governs the compilation of the list to be used in the distribution of seats that remain after the allocation of parliamentary seats to political organizations, according to the system of the highest surplus.
- Article 82 instructing the organs responsible for the nomination of senators.
- Article 85 guiding the President of the Republic in his nomination of senators.

Other constitutional provisions and laws prohibit sectarian or sub-cultural group representation. Article 33 of the Constitution stipulates that: "Propagation of ethnic, regional, racial or any other form of division is punishable by law." Article 54 states that: "Political organizations are prohibited from basing themselves on race, ethnic group, tribe, clan, region, sex, religion or any other division which may give rise to discrimination." There is even a law (Law No.47/2001) instituting punishment for offences of discrimination and sectarianism. This principle of national unity is echoed in many other laws such as those governing the formation of political organizations, and the electoral law.

In actual political practice, national unity is promoted by the power sharing arrangements that have been deliberately adopted to do away with the past politics of exclusion. Several provisions in the Constitution address the issue of power sharing. For example:

- Article 58 stipulates that the President and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies shall belong to different political organizations.
- Article 76 defines the composition of the Chamber of Deputies and allows for the sharing of power among political parties and designated groups, namely women, the youth and the disabled.
- Article 82 determines the composition of the Senate, provides for power sharing among provinces, historically marginalized communities, women, political parties and universities and institutions of higher learning.
- Article 116 states that members of cabinet should be selected from "... political organizations on the basis of their seats in the Chamber of Deputies without excluding the possibility of appointing to Cabinet other competent people who do not belong to any political organizations. However, a political organization holding the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies may not exceed 50 per cent of all the members of the Cabinet."

The electoral practices that have been developed over time also promote power sharing, which in turn gradually translates into national unity. A tradition has been built whereby weak political parties that have no prospects of winning a single parliamentary seat enter into a coalition with the strongest party, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), thus being assured of being awarded at least one seat in parliament. For example, in the 2003 parliamentary elections, there were 8 registered political parties. Only three small parties (PL, PSD and PPC) presented their own lists of candidates, while the others (PDC, PDI, PSR and UDPR) joined the RPF in a coalition. The results gave the RPF coalition 40 seats, 7 seats for PSD, and 6 seats for PL. This means that all but one small party that did not opt for the coalition were represented in parliament. In the parliamentary elections of 2008, there were 9 political parties, and of these, 6 small parties (PDC, PDI, PSR, UDPR, PPC and PSP) entered into a coalition with the RPF. Only PSD and PL stood on their own. The results were more or less the same as in 2003. The RPF coalition won 42 seats, PSD won 7 seats, and PL won 4 seats. This time each party has at least 1 seat in the parliament. The rest of parliamentary seats went to women, the youth and the disabled. Thus, when no party is completely outside the legislature, a political climate conducive to national unity prevails.

The Consultative Forum of Political Organizations (FORUM) and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)

Several political mechanisms have been put in place to strengthen national unity and reconciliation. To illustrate the innovative instruments put at the service of building unity in Rwanda today, let us examine the Consultative Forum of Political Organizations (FORUM) and the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC).

The Forum is a home-grown political mechanism introduced by the post-genocide transitional government of national unity, and later given legal force by Article 56 of the 2003 Constitution. According to this Article, the Forum is mainly responsible for:

1. Facilitating exchange of ideas by political organizations on major issues facing the country
2. Consolidating national unity
3. Advising on national policy
4. Acting as mediators in conflicts arising between political organizations
5. Assisting in resolving internal conflicts within a political organization upon request by that political organization.

The Forum's decisions are always taken by the consensus of the constituent organizations. Its functioning is based on a code of ethics that all the parties formally signed in February 2005. The code spells out the manner in which leaders and followers of political parties must behave; collaboration and partnership among parties; and the relationship between political parties and state institutions. All 9 political parties signed a document entitled "Criteria for Evaluation of the Behaviour of Political Organizations and their Members." This document was adopted by the general assembly of the Forum in March 2007. The parties further decided in favour of the creation of a Permanent Ethics Commission to closely monitor the performance of political parties and their members, and to monitor the behaviour of individual party members who hold responsible offices in public institutions. Since its inception, the Forum has increasingly become an instrument that promotes peaceful cooperation among political parties. It has become the ultimate mechanism for regulating divisive behaviour of political parties.

Besides the advantages of creating an ethical, regulated political environment that favours consensus over adversarial politics, the Forum was also credited

for creating political space for parties outside Parliament to express their ideas to their peers instead of remaining in total political isolation. Such ideas can be adopted into the mainstream of national politics.

On the other hand, the Forum approach has been subjected to criticism by various political observers. One major criticism has been that the regulatory function of the Forum may be inhibiting the competition of ideas. For example, the African Peer Review Mechanism Country Review Mission stated, "... political pluralism has been made subject to strict guidelines for political competition and the spread of ideas." The government's response to such criticisms has always been that "... a conscious decision had been reached that the quest for national reconciliation and reconstruction in the aftermath of genocide did not allow for 'traditional competitive' politics" (APRM, 2006:41-41).

For objective observers of the Rwandan political scene, there is no doubt that the Forum is a needed conflict prevention mechanism that strengthens political stability, without which no form of democracy can thrive. However, the Forum and its functions need to be known and appreciated by ordinary Rwandans, and this does not seem to be the case at present. According to a recent survey,

Only about 54% of our respondents know about the Forum of Political Parties in Rwanda and about 46% of them have not even heard about it. Only 34% of all respondents said they knew its functions well and among respondents who affirm to know the Forum, 64% are happy with it, while 36% are not. (Gasarasi & Shyaka, forthcoming: 121)

Focus group discussion data of the same study reveal:

60% consider the Forum to be a good initiative that allows for the smooth functioning of political parties; provides a framework for party leaders to interact; and helps build consensus for the good of those the parties represent. However, about a fifth of the participants said that the Forum was unknown at the grassroots level and that it was against party freedom. Some participants who criticized the Forum described it as 'not having the potential to give any positive results because it limits debate and is simply a tool for the ruling party to prescribe the ideal conduct of political parties against their will and to discourage opposition'. There was also some confusion on what the Forum is and does. A few participants confused it with the RPF party and some stated that one of its roles was to 'help people to decide which party to belong to'. Other opinions about the Forum of Political Parties included the idea that even if political parties

functioned under one umbrella, this does not take away the spirit of competition during elections. According to the proponents of this idea, the Forum serves as some form of control mechanism to prevent political parties from straying into activities such as those which lead to the 1994 war and genocide. Others described it as 'a place to learn the principles of multi-party politics.' (*op. cit*)

Although NURC was established in 1999, it was given constitutional status under Chapter III Article 178 of the 2003 Constitution. The NURC is an independent national institution. Its responsibilities include the following:

1. Preparing and coordinating the national programme for the promotion of national unity and reconciliation.
2. Putting in place and developing the ways and means to restore and consolidate unity and reconciliation among Rwandans.
3. Educating and mobilizing the population on matters relating to national unity and reconciliation.
4. Carrying out research, organizing debates, disseminating ideas and making publications relating to peace, national unity and reconciliation.
5. Making proposals for measures to eradicate divisions among Rwandans and to reinforce national unity and reconciliation.
6. Denouncing and fighting against acts, writings and utterances which are intended to promote any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia.
7. Making an annual report and such other reports as may be necessary on the situation of national unity and reconciliation.

In the execution of its mandate, NURC has over the years developed the following reconciliation tools:

- *Itorero* (a traditional institution for political and other forms of socialization particularly of young men).
- *Ingando* (a traditional institution that called upon Rwandans to halt normal activities to reflect on, and find solutions to, national challenges).
- SCUR (Students Clubs for Unity and Reconciliation).
- Community based initiatives.
- National summit.
- Home-grown approaches.

According to NURC, when it was established:

It formally developed *Ingando* as a tool to build coexistence within communities. The first beneficiaries were ex-combatants from the DRC. The programme later expanded to include school going youth and students at secondary and tertiary levels. By 2002, the training was extended to informal traders, and other social groups including survivors, prisoners, community leaders, women and youth. Today, *Ingandos* are carried out countrywide and most are co-facilitated with communities. The provincial and local administrations provide assistance with logistics. The NURC and its partners provide accommodation and meals and transportation is usually covered by the participants. *Ingandos* entail residential camps, bringing together between 300 and 400 people per programme for between 3 weeks to 2 months depending on time available and focus of the sessions. The numbers also vary, although at each prison release, 1000 prisoners undergo *Ingando*. Topics are covered under five central themes: analysis of Rwanda's problems; history of Rwanda; political and socio-economic issues in Rwanda and Africa; rights, obligations and duties; and leadership... Approximately 3000 pre-University students undergo *Ingando* each year. (NURC, <http://www.nurc.gov.rw>)

Other innovative approaches to unity and reconciliation include community-based associations, creation of reconciliation clubs and an annual summit. According to NURC (<http://www.nurc.gov.rw>), community-based associations are organized around common economic activities involving such diverse groups as survivors, perpetrators, and people with family members in prison. Such cooperation is considered by NURC to be an indicator that reconciliation is taking place at the community level.

Over 60 community-based associations have received grants from the NURC since 2001 through advocacy to the donor community; in 2006 there are over 360 community self-help initiatives established and functioning all over the country. Most of them comprise perpetrators and survivors and their activities range from promoting reconciliation in communities to income generating activities. (NURC, <http://www.nurc.gov.rw>)

On the creation of reconciliation clubs, NURC explains that:

The idea of forming NURC Clubs in schools and institutions of higher learning was one of the outcomes of the *Ingando*. Initially, the NURC took the lead in creating them. In time, however, students formed reconciliation clubs on their own. The clubs provide a space where students from different backgrounds get together to promote reconciliation in places of learning. In this way, their teaching does not just end at the *Ingando* but is carried forward constructively. (NURC, <http://www.nurc.gov.rw>)

The National Summit is an annual event chaired by the President of the Republic. It brings together leaders of the country at all levels to carry out an evaluation of the progress made in the implementation of unity and reconciliation programmes:

It reviews progress and accomplishments in regard to unity and reconciliation and adopts recommendations in relation to people's wishes. The recommendations so adopted are made public in the same forum and stakeholders commit themselves to undertake the responsibility and accountability of those recommendations relating to their various mandates. The first summit was held in October 2000, which was followed by another summit in October 2002. In April 2004, there was a children summit, whose views were discussed at the April 2004 reconciliation national summit. (NURC, <http://www.nurc.gov.rw>)

It seems that the efforts described above have produced some unity and reconciliation dividends. As early as 2001, NURC (2001:1) was already reporting on good results, pointing out the following indicators as evidence of improved relations among Rwandans:

- Most of Rwandan people have understood that they are accountable for their own security. They disassociated themselves from divisionist acts and ideologies, particularly in areas where ex-FAR and Interahamwe operations were conducted.
- Social relationship improved considerably: slanderous, perfidious and divisionist speeches have been replaced by more 'civilised' speeches, and mutual tolerance took roots. This is noticed in constructive exchanges in which conclusions and decisions are taken by mutual agreement.
- The genocide orphans were integrated in families regardless of their ethnic background or their origins.
- Associations between the genocide survivors, women whose husbands are currently held in prison suspected of genocide and child-headed families have been created in various areas of the country. All these associations work hand in hand without suspicion.

This self-evaluation of NURC is quite valid because even any casual observer can testify to the veracity of these socio-political developments. Besides, IJR also acknowledges NURC's achievements. In its concluding evaluation remarks, IJR (2005) points out that:

During its seven-year lifetime, the NURC has registered an impressive record of achievements. Most importantly, it has transferred reconciliation concepts and practices to communities and created innovative tools and institutions based on the integration of ancient Rwandese cultural practices and modern tools. (p.19)

Such widely acknowledged achievement on the part of NURC and well-deserved compliments do not mean that the national unity and reconciliation process is anywhere near being consummated. Far from that! Indeed, as shall be pointed out in the concluding remarks, there are still areas of concern as regards matters of social affiliation, particularly in the area of ethnic identity.

Sound Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development: A Tool for National Unity and Reconciliation

The Government of Rwanda has worked hard to sustain a sound performance in matters of socio-economic reconstruction and development in the belief that it would be a catalyst for national unity and reconciliation. Such resolve may have stemmed from the general belief that widespread poverty and ignorance among the population may have been one of the many factors that made the genocide possible in the first place. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the "Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2008-2012" document mentions national unity and reconciliation many times. It calls for "providing material and financial support to local and community initiatives promoting the culture of peace and reconciliation through achieving higher standards of living" (EDPRS, 2007: 87).

Such provision of material and financial support can be illustrated by two practical examples. Programme 'Girinka' (own a cow), which was initiated by a cabinet decision of April 2006, stipulated that every poor household must own at least one cow. Ministerial Order No. 001/2008, which stipulates that the programme must be completed in 2009, spells out the modalities of implementation for this policy. It envisages a multi-pronged approach to realize this goal, including government supply of the cows, obtaining the cows through bank credits and micro-finance institutions, but more importantly through traditional ways of propagating ownership of cattle (e.g., gifts, lease and gift reciprocation). The logic underlying this policy is that traditionally cows elevated people out of poverty while at the same time weaving strong and genuine bonds of friendship between the parties to such an arrangement. A second example is community-level associations supported through micro-finance institutions. According to the IJR, "It is clear that communities across Rwanda view reconciliation in terms of 'living together'... and that there are now several community based reconciliation associations based on activities such as income generation, saving, etc. and not ethnicity." (IJR, 2005:43).

Bearing in mind that the 1994 genocide left the country's socio-economic infrastructure in total ruin, Table 1 shows that socio-economic indicators testify to an astounding reconstruction and development rate within a short period of just ten years. The indicators for 2005-2006 are certainly comparable to those posted by other developing countries on the continent, which did not experience the collapse caused by the scourge of genocide. It is also apparent that the 2012 targets are quite progressive and ambitious, but potentially achievable at the performance rate demonstrated so far.

Table 1: EDPRS Strategic Outcome Indicators and EDPRS Intermediate Indicators (merged tables)

Indicators	Base 2005-06	Target 2012	Data source	Frequency
GDP growth rate (% per annum)	6.5	8.1	National accounts; macro- projections; EDPRS	Annual
Employment in agriculture (% reporting as main occupation)	80	70	EICV	Every 5 years
Share of population living in poverty (%)	56.9	46.0	EICV	Every 5 years
Share of population living in extreme poverty (%)	36.9	24.0	EICV	Every 5 years
Poverty incidence among people living in female-headed households (%)	60.0	48.8	EICV	Every 5 years
Economic inequality (Gini coefficient of consumption)	0.51	0.40	EICV	Every 5 years
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	86	70	DHS	Every 5 years
IMR in bottom wealth quintile	114	99	DHS	Every 5 years
Incidence of stunting (height for age) (%)	45.0	27.2	DHS	Every 5 years
Maternal Mortality Rate	750	600	DHS	Every 5 years
Total fertility rate	6.1	4.5	DHS	Every 5 years
% of households having access to clean drinking water	64	86	EICV	Every 5 years
Malaria prevalence (% of adults in Eastern province)	35	28	Malaria Metrical Survey; Malaria Prevalence Household Survey	Annual
HIV incidence (% of adults aged 15-24)	1.0	0.5	DHS	Every 5 years
Percentage of pupils sitting national exams in primary year 6 who obtain an average mark of at least 50/100 (% of examinees)	8.9	20	National Examination Council	Annual
Share of population expressing satisfaction/confidence in decentralised governance (%)	85	100	Select source	
Proportion of corruption cases involving public funds on file which have been resolved through prosecution or otherwise (%)	70	95		Annual
Forestry coverage (%)	20	23.5		Annual
Gross fixed investment (% GDP)	16.3	24.4	MINECOFIN	Annual
Private Sector credit (% of GDP)	10	15	MINECOFIN, BNR	Annual

% of agricultural land protected against soil erosion	40	100	Annual reports of MINAGRI and MINITERE	
Area under irrigation (has)	15,000	24,000	Annual reports of RADA/REMA/MI NAGRI	
% of farm households using ➤ Inorganic mineral fertilisers ➤ Organic fertilisers ➤ Improved seeds ➤ Insecticides	10.8 6.8 3.0 23.9	40.0 25.0 20.0 45.0	Annual reports of RADA/ISAR/MIN AGRI	Annual
% of livestock in intensive systems	16	60		
Number of farm households per extensionist	1:3,000	1:1,500		
% of classified road network in good condition	11	31	MININFRA	
Number of households with access to electricity	70,000	200,000	Electrogaz, MININFRA, NEDA	
ICT composite network coverage	75	100	RITA	
Primary completion rate	52	125	EMIS	
Pupil/teacher ratio in primary schools	70:1	47:1		
Gross secondary school enrolment	10	30		
Pupil/teacher ratio in secondary schools	30:1	32:1		
% of TVET students absorbed in industry	25	75		
% of women aged 15-49 years using modern contraceptive techniques	10	70	DHS ; HMIS	
% of women giving birth in health centres	28.2	75		
% of rural households within 500 metres of an improved water source	61	86	Water Sector Strategy Development Report	Annual
% of urban households within 200 metres of an improved water source	69	100		
% of population living within 5km of a functioning health centre	58	70	HMIS	Annual
% of population covered by health insurance bodies	70	95	HMIS, MOH and private insurance bodies	
Average number of days to deal with licences World Bank Doing Business reports	130	70	World Bank Doing Business reports	

Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), EDPRS, 2007, pp. 145-146

The picture that emerges from the above statistics is that reconstruction and development have been impressive. According to James Musoni, Rwandan Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, the overarching goal of these efforts is "... a happier and more prosperous nation for all of us." (EDPRS, 2007: 1). However, since much of the development and reconstruction realized has heavily depended on grants from foreign donors and borrowing, reaching the results projected for 2012 may be impossible if the Foreign Development Assistance (FDA) climate changes for the worst.

The Issue of the Rwandan Diaspora: Effect on National Unity and Reconciliation

Some observers of the process of national unity and reconciliation in Rwanda often ask themselves about the extent to which the activities of the Rwandan diaspora may be affecting the internal dynamics of the process itself. Since this diaspora is not homogeneous, its effect on national unity and reconciliation may be either positive or negative depending on the specific group one is referring to. In the main, the Rwandan diaspora consists of both 'positive' and 'negative' forces. Positive forces are those individuals who are either friendly, or at least non-antagonistic, to the regime in power, and who do not harbour the guilt of having been actively involved in the genocide. These have a positive effect on Rwanda's internal politics (money remittance, investment, good publicity for the country, etc.). These normally maintain close links with their folks back in Rwanda, and some attend the annual reconciliation summit referred to above.

On the other hand, negative forces consist mainly of fugitives from prosecution for the crime of genocide and members of political groups opposed to the current regime in Rwanda. Such elements have had a limited negative effect on Rwanda's internal politics, but a significant negative effect on the country's relations with some foreign countries. From 1995 to date, some 17 diaspora political organizations of Rwandans and 7 alliances were formed. The most dominant of these have been Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Forces Démocratiques Unifiées (FDU-Inkingi), Partenariat-Intwari, Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie (RUD) and Party for Democracy in Rwanda (PDR-Ihumure) (Musabyimana, <http://www.Iwacu1.com/>, 29/2/2008).

Of these, FDLR (an organization in the past estimated to have a strong armed wing of 8,000-10,000 people) has been the most negative force of all. It

is mainly based in the DRC, but with a presence in several other countries such as Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Kenya and Central African Republic. In the past, FDLR sent infiltrators who mobilized and recruited the local population to fight the current regime and pursue the objective of completing the 'unfinished' genocide against the Tutsi. However, the negative diaspora political organizations do not seem to have had much influence or popularity inside the country. According to an upcoming study (Gasarasi & Shyaka, 2009), when asked to name diaspora political organizations they knew about, 63.6% of focus group discussion participants were able to name at least one (mostly FDLR), while 36.4% were unable to name even one. Of those who named at least one political organization, 95.4% were unable to say anything positive about them. There are signs that the life of FDLR is hanging in the balance since December 5th, 2008 when Rwanda and DR Congo decided to embark on joint military operations against it.

Conclusion

On all the issues examined, Rwanda comes through like the mythological phoenix that rose from the ashes. Its post-genocide performance is impressive, albeit much vulnerability still remains. Sustainability of those achievements cannot be taken for granted, as many challenges to national unity and reconciliation continue to linger. For example, Gasarasi and Shyaka have shown in their upcoming study that:

Although ethnic discrimination in its various manifestations is disapproved by 85.3% of respondents, the 14.7% who still believe that social problems would best be resolved within the ethnic group is great cause for concern after so much effort at all levels of government has been put in teaching the importance of the primacy of Rwandan identity over the ethnic. This concern becomes even more serious when we consider that these exclusionist tendencies based on ethnicity are more pronounced among students at the rate of 50%. Another serious issue is the exclusion of ethnic Batwa that is perceived by 28.6% of our respondents as a real problem persisting to our days. (ibid: 9)

However, such few remnants of Rwanda's dark past are nowhere comparable in magnitude to the bulk of achievements realized so far, and these too will be overcome through the country's proven innovativeness in conflict resolution methods and its iron will to succeed.

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Tanzania's Controlled Social Pluralism in National Politics: Challenges and Implications for Democratic Growth

Samuel Stephen Mushi*

Abstract

After independence, the Tanzanian state tightly controlled the expression of social pluralism in the political realm. After providing an overview of controlled social pluralism during single-party rule, this article examines the extent to which efforts to control social pluralism have survived into the era of a liberal ideology and multipartyism. The main argument advanced is that some aspects of controlled social pluralism served a useful purpose in facilitating peace and democratic growth in Tanzania. However, the article points out that political parties need to link up with civil society organizations to make them better able to aggregate societal interests or political and administrative systems will be overwhelmed by the demands from diverse groups. In line with this finding, the state must endeavour to build a strong demand response capacity to address the increasing demands associated with the democratic transition as some social control measures whither.

Introduction

Social pluralism refers to diverse groups with identifiable labels in a given country or society. These groups may identify themselves in terms of language, tribal origin or culture, religion, race, status, or class position in the society; and may use their identities when making demands on public authorities and in influencing public policies. They may also use their identities to organize formal civil society organizations, or even political parties. Some African countries have been more prone to this tendency than others.¹

In the First Phase Government of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere (1961 to 1985), Tanzania made a deliberate effort to dampen sub-national identities so as to reduce the effects of social pluralism on national politics. This was the nation-building (or state-building) agenda, which preoccupied the leaders during the first two decades of independence. This effort played a part in the peace and national unity that Tanzania has enjoyed for nearly half a century. The nation-building effort was undertaken within a framework of a one-party system and the *ujamaa* ideology.

* Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam.