

Elections and the Prospects Of Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania

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Introduction

After the onset of democracy's "third wave", one of the current central concerns is whether democracy is taking root in those societies that it was meant to grow. Over the past ten years or so, most of the newly democratising countries have held two or more multi-party competitive elections. Some elements of constitutionalism and rule of law have been introduced through various constitution reviews.¹ Society has been, albeit only formally in some instances, given room to organise and participate in the governance process.

One such country where democratic changes have been taking place is Tanzania.² Since the reintroduction of multi-party competitive politics in July 1992, the country has had two general elections, in 1995 and in 2000. Like in some other African countries, besides previous amendments to its constitution in 1998/99, a constitutional review—long-demanded by the opposition parties and emerging pro-democracy groups—was initiated selectively via a government White Paper, leading to the 13th amendment of the constitution which coincided with the general elections in 2000. As a corollary, the electoral laws were also subsequently amended to accommodate the revisions of the constitution.

As a result of the 1992 constitutional amendments that re-introduced multi-party competitive political system, and the subsequent elections of 1995 and 2000, Tanzania would seem to present most of the features that would be associated with a democratic system. There are 15 fully registered political parties. There is a multi-party parliament. A judicial system is also in place, as are numerous independent civil society groups. With all these institutions and practices in place, the basic question is: what can be said about the progress of democratic consolidation in the country? This question arises because democratic consolidation is a deep and enduring

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process. To talk about consolidation of democracy in countries that have just reintroduced elements of democracy in their political systems may appear absurd because, by all definitions and criteria, the indicators of consolidated democracy may still be invisible in these countries.

While conscious of this important consideration, there is still restlessness and genuine anxiety about whether any progress has been made towards what was envisaged with the re-introduction of democracy.³ This article, therefore, makes an interim assessment of the extent to which democracy is taking root or growing, with Tanzania as the case study. The assessment will revolve around the *conduct* and *result* of elections, one of the central institutions in the democratisation process, and which is a key measure of the consolidation of democracy.

The purpose of conducting the interim assessment is twofold. First, like in all interim assessments, we hope that the findings will help identify the positive trends that can be reinforced and negative ones that can be reversed as well as helping to distinguish challenges that should be addressed in the course of democratisation. Secondly, the findings will form the basis of a more comprehensive assessment over time: an aggregate of interim assessments plots a path along which the entire process has traversed, pointing out reasons of success and failure in implementation. Thirdly, and arising from the foregoing, such an assessment will help in forging better strategies to realise the intended goals.

The paper begins by presenting a summary of the discourse on democratic consolidation in political science literature, and a treatise of the centrality of elections in the democratisation process. This will be followed by an empirical review of the elections in Tanzania: how they have been carried out, and what their results point to.

Consolidation of Democracy: A Theoretical Debate.

The debate on consolidation of democracy is wide and varied. Analysts, however, agree that there are some conditions which are basic to democratic consolidation. Linz and Stephan (1996), for example, argue that there are three minimal conditions for consolidation of democracy. These are: existence of a state or an authoritative institution that has legitimate claim over a population in a territory; completion of the democratic transition, and constitutionalism (rule via law). Their second

condition, that is, completion of the democratic transition is defined as the stage at which free and contested elections are held.

Similarly, Solinger (2001) identifies "six significant structural factors", which, according to her, explain the process leading to the ending of one-party dominance. The six structural factors are:

- (a) A long history of elections
- (b) The presence of at least one opposition party
- (c) A charismatic opposition candidate
- (d) Electoral reforms
- (e) Corruption and fraud in the ruling party
- (f) Split-offs in the dominant party

Presumably items (a) and (c) are vehicles of the democratic transition and consolidation; while item (e) is the agent which results in the split-off of the dominant party, thereby leading to fairly equal-sized competing parties.

In these six factors Solinger makes an important contribution to this discourse in that beyond the mere recognition of the criteria for democratic consolidation, implicit in her presentation is the recognition of the intricate agencies that interact in the process that (a) leads to completion of the transition to democracy and the inauguration of the a new government; and (b) the isolation of the factor that leads to self-sustaining progression to fully-fledged democracy. According to Linz and Stephan, as well as Beetham (1994), this is the long history of elections that has turned into a habitual practice on how rulers are obtained, such that a procedure outside one of elections becomes unthinkable.

Beetham is in agreement with Linz and Stephan that consolidation "begins where the transition to democracy ends." Beetham elaborates that this stage involves "the inauguration of a new government at the first free and fair elections since the end of the pre-democratic regime" (1994: 159). Secondly, he identifies three election related criteria as measures that can help one to recognise the consolidation of democracy. One criterion is the "two elections test" whereby "a government that has itself been elected in a free and fair contest is defeated at a subsequent election and accepts the results." This criterion is referred to as the second elections or "power transfer test" in so far as "powerful players and their backers are prepared

to put respect for the rules of the game above their mere continuation in power." The second criterion is the "generation test" whereby the respective society has a long experience with elections such that even if it is the same party is getting elected to office every time, the length of electoral practices leads to a habituation of the electoral process such that any alternative method of appointing rulers becomes unthinkable. The third criterion is the capacity of "withstanding shocks". This refers to the capacity of the system to survive substantial upheavals in the functioning of the system without abandoning the democratic principles upon which it stands. This, for the dominant party, may include the shock of transferring power.

One can therefore conclude from the above that consolidation of democracy should address issues related to, at least, the *conditions* necessary for democracy to take root (Linz & Stephan, 1996); the process leading to democratic consolidation (Solinger, 2001); and the identification marks of a consolidated democracy (Beetham, 1994).

Elections and the Consolidation of Democracy

The choice to single out elections as a means to determine the trend towards democratic consolidation is rooted in the fact that elections are central in gauging the direction towards which democracy is moving. The centrality of elections arises from the fact that any significant measure of a consolidated democracy involves, first, the process of "power transfer", a situation that only happens as an outcome of elections. Secondly, democratic consolidation is also measured by the degree at which *democratic practices, behaviour, and norms are regularised and institutionalised*, again a condition that results from the holding of elections regularly and over a long time. Thirdly, elections are perceived as a *threshold* that separates the end of the transition, and inaugurates the era of sustained practices of democracy. It is in this regard that any assessment of the process of democratic consolidation must revolve around the critical analysis of the way elections have been handled, and how the results have been received by major stakeholders.

This article examines elections in Tanzania from the perspectives of: (a) how they have been played out in the two multiparty general elections; and (b) how they have been received on both occasions in order to comment meaningfully on the prospects for democratisation in the country. Before we delve into that, it is important to define the two issues.

In looking at *how the elections have been played out*—or the process of elections—we are going to examine the extent to which the elections were “free” and “fair”. For elections to be free and fair, they have to be genuinely competitive. There are three interrelated features of a genuinely competitive election:

- (a) Wide participation—i.e., the eligibility of citizens to vote, and the turn-out of contesting parties and individual contestants.
- (b) Absence of constraining factors such as those related to the rules of the game and the conduct of key institutions such as state organs and the Election Management Body (EMB).
- (c) Longevity of elections. This involves the frequency (number of times) and regularity of elections. It also involves the coverage (both horizontally across the country, and vertically from as low as local government elections for councillors to parliamentary and presidential elections). In other words, it must be a holistic coverage of the elections, rather selective in terms of space.

With regard to the *results and how they are received*, we are going to address the following four interrelated factors:

- (a) Election results leading to a noticeable trend towards transfer of power as indicated by increased popular support, and at least alteration of power, demonstrated by dominant—or merely incremental—degrees of victory for parliamentary, presidential, and council seats.
- (b) “Powerful players and their backers”, i.e., the party in power and the state bureaucracy being able to respect the rules of the game amid the temptation of holding on to power where the opposition have made gains.
- (c) An attitudinal change in the belief and trust that elections are the only viable (not the last resort) means of getting leaders into position, and that rule of law should prevail.
- (d) Constitutional and electoral reforms that rule out any constraining factor to free participation and the unfair treatment of the opposition and other pro-reform groups.

Participation in Competitive Elections in Tanzania

Participation of the Electorate

Most scholars agree that for democracy to be considered as taking root, “virtually all the adult population must be eligible” to take part in elections. Additionally, “candidates should be free to compete.”

With regard to the eligibility to take part in the elections in Tanzania for both the 1995 and 2000 general elections, the constitution of the country and the respective electoral laws underline the right and obligation of the citizens not only to register and vote, but also to stand for the various positions to be contested. Accordingly, every citizen who is 18 years and above has the right to vote. To contest for the position of Member of Parliament, a citizen has to be at least 21 years old; and at least 40 years old to contest for the position of the presidency. A citizen must however be a member, and be nominated by a fully registered political party, to contest for council, parliamentary, or presidential positions.

As such in the 1995 elections 81 percent of the estimated voters were registered. In the 2000 elections, 97 percent of the estimated voters were registered. The voters were fairly well represented in terms of gender: of the 10,088,484 registered voters in the 2000 elections, 5,149,125 (51%) were male, and 4,939,359 (49%) were female. In both cases, over 75 percent of the registered voters came out and voted. From the standpoint of the scale of participation of eligible voters in the two elections, the above figures are impressive.

Participation of Political Parties

Besides the participation of citizens, all the fully registered political parties⁴ participated in both the 1995 and 2000 elections in varied ways, depending on their capability to field candidates. For the 1995 Union presidential office, four political parties fielded candidates. These were CCM, NCCR-Mageuzi, the United Democratic Party (UDP), and the Civic United Front (CUF). During the 2000 elections, four parties fielded their candidates for the presidential seat: CCM, UDP, CUF, and the TLP which was now led by the previous NCCR-Mageuzi candidate, Mr. Agustino Mrema, who had crossed to this party. For the parliamentary elections, all the 13 political parties fielded candidates as presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Number of Parliamentary Candidates by Political Party

	2000 Elections		1995 Elections		Position in 1995
	Number	%	Number	%	
CCM	231	100.0	232	100	1
CUF	138	59.7	171	73.7	3
TLP	112	48.5	55	23.7	8
NCCR-M	93	40.3	191	82.3	2
CHADEMA	66	28.6	153	65.9	4
UDP	66	28.6	119	51.3	6
TADEA	42	18.2	144	62.1	5
PONA	37	16.0	34	14.7	12
UPDP	32	13.9	34	14.7	12
UMD	24	10.4	47	20.3	9
TPP	13	5.6	36	15.5	11
NLD	6	2.6	44	18.9	10
NRA	2	0.9	78	33.3	7
TOTAL	862	100.0	1338	100.0	

NB: The Number of constituencies was reduced from 232 in 1995 to 231 in 2000. Each party was eligible to present one candidate for each constituency.

Several highlights related to the subject of democratic consolidation can be seen from Table 1. First, while all parties took part in fielding candidates for union parliamentary seats, more candidates were presented in 1995 (a total of 1338) than in 2000 (a total of 862 candidates). Second—and related to the first—while CCM fielded candidates in all constituencies during both the 1995 and 2000 elections, the rest of the political parties—with the exception of the CUF in Zanzibar—could hardly field candidates in half of the union constituencies. During the 2000 elections, it was only the CUF that fielded candidates in about 60 percent of the mainland constituencies. During the 1995 elections, there were at least five new political parties that fielded candidates in over 50 percent of the constituencies.

There are various reasons that account for this, including the break up and loss of legitimacy of the new parties following the unimpressive performance in the 1995 elections and leadership crisis in the new parties.

A more plausible explanation is the lack of funds for these young political parties to finance their full participation in the elections. In 1995 each participating political party was given a subsidy to meet election expenses for each candidate they fielded. This kind of subsidy was subsequently withdrawn for the 2000 elections, and was given based on qualifications other than fielding a candidate, as we shall see later.

It is also worth noting in Table 1 that the four promising new political parties⁵ changed positions in respect to their capacity to field candidates from the 1995 to the 2000 elections. NCCR-M, which was second after CCM in 1995 took the fourth position in the 2000 elections. Its position was taken by the CUF which came third in the 1995 elections. A significant leap was made by the TLP which moved from an eighth position in 1995 to third in the 2000 elections. This jump of course affected the other previously promising political parties by pushing CHADEMA to the fifth position (4th in 1995) and UDP remained in the sixth position as was the case in 1995. This alteration of positions is believed to have been influenced by the crisis that took place in the NCCR-Mageuzi following the 1995 elections when the charismatic leader, Mr. Mrema, defected to TLP, an almost unknown party, taking many of his followers with him. Despite complaints that electoral competition was biased in favour of CCM the opposition political parties did not stay away from the elections, although at times it seemed they were close towards boycotting elections.

It is also important to note here that besides party participation, there was a fairly high number of candidates who turned out to contest for party nominations for the various elective offices. For example, within the CCM in the 1995 elections, there were as many as 17 candidates who sought nomination for the union presidential position. For the parliamentary seats, CCM ran preferential votes for numerous candidates that sought nomination in their respective constituencies. None of the new parties, however, enjoyed such internal democracy.

Independent candidacy was barred by the electoral rule that requires that a candidate must be nominated by a political party. This requirement was constrained by two factors: democracy within the party, particularly the procedures laid down for the nomination of candidates within a particular party; and the party's capability to put up a candidate for each available position.

Generally, party-based nomination is seen as restraining candidate self-presentation. In a majority of the new parties' nomination of candidates were decided only by party officials, usually the top leadership. In such cases, individuals not known to the party officials, or who had fallen out with the leadership were not likely to be considered. Secondly, citizens who did not belong to any political party were denied their right to stand for any position.

Freedom to Compete

Despite the positive aspects of trends in terms of citizen and parties participation, one must admit that the 1995 and 2000 general elections in Tanzania were conducted amid several constraints that may have restrained the freedom to compete. Freedom to compete refers to the extent to which the constitutional and legal framework facilitates free and fair contestation for elective office. It also involves the extent to which different and essential organs that deal with elections accord equal treatment to the contending parties and their candidates. Such organs and institutions include the election management body—in this case the National Electoral Commission (NEC), state organs such as state security, the police, and regional as well district government authorities. Furthermore, freedom to compete should mean the absence of institutional and structural constraints and intimidation.

The Constitutional and Legal Framework

In Tanzania—as is probably the case elsewhere in societies in transition towards a plural and competitive democracy—the debate on the constitution is essentially about the demand by the pro-reform groups for a consensus between them and the ruling party on the regime⁶ that should guide the transition process to democracy, as well as enshrine the rules that should be observed by all players in the political system, including those related to elections. In Tanzania, the new parties have demanded that the existing constitutions (Union and Zanzibar) be discarded completely (or at most serve only as referal documents in the preparation of new ones), and be replaced by new ones if elections are to be free and fair.

The new parties argue that the existing constitutions and the laws that emanate from them, including the electoral laws that governed the elections in 1995 and 2000 are founded on specific assumptions, underlined in their various provisions by the dominance of a single-party system, and *ujamaa*

(socialism) as Tanzania's development blueprint. They further argue that to simply amend the various provisions, as argued by the ruling party, would be the equivalent of writing on the assumptions of those provisions. The opposition parties argue that since the democratic governance that is now being sought is founded on different assumptions that include competitive politics and a liberal political and economic system, the appropriate way of achieving a constitution that has democratic content is to begin afresh with basic and new assumptions.

Besides the claimed non-democratic provisions in the constitutions, another limitation is claimed to be a one-sided application of the provisions of its laws. Reference here is made to a variety of provisions that deal with basic rights and freedoms. It is suggested that when it comes to the expression of one's rights and freedom—such as the freedom to organise and the right of assembly, the ruling party is usually accorded the right to enjoy these fully, say, in holding campaign rallies or demonstrations. On the contrary, it has been claimed that when the new parties (opposition) want to exercise these rights and freedoms, usually the state organs obstruct this by delaying, calling off, or even outlawing them. Where such freedoms and rights have been denied to the opposition, the new parties have resorted to confrontations with the state organs leading to dire consequences, such as what happened on January 26–27th, 2001 in both Zanzibar and some parts of Mainland Tanzania.

Before the 1995 and 2000 elections, the debate on the constitution and the electoral laws revolved around several issues, but basically centred on the subject of freedom to compete: whether or not, once the parties have presented their candidates, the constitutions and electoral laws facilitate or hinder the candidates in free and fair competition for presidential, parliamentary, and council positions. Reference here is especially in respect to the right and opportunity for the political parties and individual candidates to present themselves to the electorate without constitutional and legal constraints. More specifically the debate has revolved around the:

- (a) electoral system and its potential to treat the contestants equally and fairly;
- (b) powers and behaviour of the state organs, particularly the police as well as regional and district level administrators;

- (c) structure and composition of the election management body, the National Electoral Commission (NEC);
- (d) right and freedom to present the new parties and individual candidates to the electorate through organised public campaign meetings and/or use of the public media.

Besides the claimed lop-sidedness of the constitutions, another area of concern with regard to freedom to compete involves the electoral laws. Like the case with the constitutions, it is claimed that the electoral laws are not evenly applied to the ruling party and the opposition, thereby obstructing the freedom of the opposition parties to compete. The laws concerned with the electoral process that are often cited as unevenly applied are those that relate to holding of rallies. Previous to the 1995 elections, a political party that wanted to organise a rally or public meeting had to apply for permission from the police. In practice, while the new political parties were strictly required to follow this rule - and often denied permission - the party in office (CCM) held many such rallies in every part of the country unilaterally, and under the protection of the police. As a result of pressure from the opposition and other pro-reform groups, towards the 2000 elections all that was required of a political party that wanted to hold a rally was a notification to the police of that intent. Again, while this was smoothly applicable to the party in power, for the new parties, it was just an indirect application of the previous provision, and often the police discretionally did not grant the permission.

The Election Management Body (EMB)

An election management body is an important institution that can facilitate or hinder the freedom to compete. In the general literature, and specifically for the case of Tanzania, there are at least two interrelated issues at hand: the purely managerial capacity of such a body to undertake its tasks of running an election efficiently; and the relationship between that body and the key stakeholders in the elections process, particularly how the body treats the new parties and the ruling party and its government.

In the case of Tanzania, the limitations in the management capability of the NEC have long been recognised. Consequently, international organisations have always been handy in assisting these institutions in terms of supplying materials, logistical support, and training of officials in various activities. In fact, having had the experience of 1995, and with

capacity enhancement from the donor community, the NEC managed the 2000 elections more efficiently than was the case in 1995.

The most difficult issue has been how the body relates to the stakeholders, particularly the new parties. There has been a feeling of mistrust on the part of the new parties and their supporters toward the NEC. The new parties argue that from the way the body is formed and constituted, it is likely to favour the incumbent party. NEC is appointed by the president. This very fact, argue the new parties, makes the Commission suspect as there is the likelihood that it will extend favours in gratitude to the appointing authority, who is also a contestant in the elections. Secondly, NEC's constitution excludes party representation ostensibly on the grounds of maintaining institutional impartiality, and accordingly, it is argued that such a body can only be made out of non-partisan individuals. The opposition questions this non-partisanship since the body is constituted by an partial person - the president - who is the chairperson of the ruling party, and a contestant in the elections.

While above cry of the opposition parties and their supporters cannot be dismissed, it is more of a perception than a reality. In practice there exists elaborate legal provisions restraining NEC from operating unilaterally or discretionally. First, the electoral laws provide that at every stage in the electoral process all key players have the right to witness all that takes place, and where necessary intervene. I perceive that such provisions preclude misconduct on the part of the NEC, as it will be detected and arrested.

A second deterrent mechanism is again provided by the elections act which provides that election officials who mishandle elections face the possibility of a fine, jail sentence or both. This is not to suggest that the members of the NEC cannot behave contrary to the provisions of the law. Rather, there is great potential for pre-empting such moves if the various stakeholders, and especially the political parties, undertake their role appropriately. There are, thus, many and effective safeguards that cannot allow NEC to behave unilaterally.

One must hasten to add, however, that the legal provisions apart, the new parties have such limited resources that they cannot finance agents to monitor the NEC at every stage of the elections, and in every constituency

they field candidates. Where this occurs, irresponsible NEC officials may decide to tamper with the conduct of the elections one way or the other.

In addition to the legal enforcements, there have also been noticeable steps towards striking an amicable working relationship between the NEC and the contending parties. During the 2000 elections, there were consultative meetings at every level between the various political parties, NEC, and the government aimed at ironing out any differences. At least six similar consultative meetings were held during the 1995 elections (Mushi & Mukandala, 1997: 48-49).

State Organs and Elections

Besides the problem of the rules of the game, and the accusation that NEC is biased in favour of the party in power, it has also been suggested that the state organs - notably the police and the regional and sub-regional state officials - support the party in power, and suppress the new parties and other emerging interest groups, e.g., pro-reform civil society groups. It is pointed out, for example, that regional commissioners - who are members of the ruling party's political committees within their regions - naturally support the incumbent party, and suppress the opposition. The police are accused of disrupting the emerging democratic political framework by denying the opposition the right of association and recruitment of members by imposing regular bans on rallies and demonstrations. They also argue that the new parties are denied access to the public mass media. Indeed, there have been cases where the concerns of the new parties have been established (TEMCO, 2000).

Other Restraining Factors: Party Funding

CCM's popular strength is complimented by its command of huge resources that range from its position as an incumbent party, thereby suggesting that it has access to state power, financial and other material resources—such as office accommodation and equipment.

Ideally, the larger the number of supporters a party has, the more likely that the respective party will have the potential to mobilise the necessary resources to pay for its activities. Considering the number of supporters different parties have in Tanzania, the incumbent party CCM appears to have this potential, and as such more resources as compared to all the opposition parties put together.

However, another factor that enhances the financial opportunities of the incumbent party to the disadvantage of the opposition parties is the policy of "qualified" funding of political parties.

The issue of funding the activities of political parties in Tanzania has had twists and turns since the inception of multi-party competitive politics in 1992. Article 13 of the Political Parties Act No. 5 of 1992, spells out the sources from which a political party can obtain funds to finance its activities. These are internal sources (13(1)), which include subventions from the government. In addition to internal sources, the Act (13-(2)) provides that political parties can also receive funds from sources outside the United Republic of Tanzania, or from foreign organisations and individuals based in the United Republic of Tanzania, so long as these funds are disclosed to the Registrar of Political Parties.

Based on Article 13(1) (d) of the Act, during the 1995 elections, political parties received government subventions to finance presidential, parliamentary and council elections throughout the electoral process. After the elections, however, there was an outcry from both the general public and some members of the donor community that huge expenditures were incurred from the taxpayers, as well as donor funds, for activities whose primary responsibility was that of the political parties. From this outcry, and still retaining the basic provision of Article 13(1) (d), the criteria for subvention was revised, and was now to be based on the acquired seats in the parliament. According to the revised criteria, parties with representation in the parliament were entitled to a government subvention paid in proportion to the size of their representation in the House. This of course has meant that since then, only four or five of the 13 political parties were eligible to receive a government subvention, with the party in power taking the lion's share due to its dominant position. This practice has generated a new reaction: that not only are the much smaller parties being denied a necessary resource for their growth, but also that the party in power has been given an unprecedented advantage over all the opposition parties through its disproportionate access to taxpayers and donor funds.

Longevity of Elections: Time Span, Frequency and Scale

A third general measure of the consolidation of democracy is the longevity of elections. As elaborated earlier, longevity should include not only the

frequency of competitive elections, but that also sustained periodic elections should lead to new values that cultivate trust in elections as the only institution through which leadership can be obtained. A generational period of 20 years of regular elections is considered to be the minimal time-span that may lead to the building of habit and trust in the efficacy of elections as the only means to select leaders. Secondly, longevity should also include the coverage, both horizontally to include all geographic areas of the country; and vertically to include from local government elections for councillors, to national parliamentary and presidential elections. Otherwise elections can be restricted only to accessible areas or involve the elites only.

Since the reintroduction of competitive multi-party politics in 1992, Tanzania has had several elections. First, there was a series of by-elections for parliamentary candidates starting in 1993 eventually leading towards the pan-territorial elections of parliamentary and presidential candidates in October 1995. In 1994, the first pan-territorial elections for village, ward, district, and municipal councils were held throughout mainland Tanzania. Following the 1995 general election there was a series of by-elections in several constituencies for parliamentary candidates both in Zanzibar and on Mainland Tanzania. In 1999 local government elections were held on the Mainland with the next general elections taking place in October 2000 and were held together with local government elections.

It is, therefore, only about 10 years since Tanzania reintroduced multi-party competitive politics in the country; a period that is only half of the usually estimated time needed for institutional devices for democracy to be consolidated.⁷ However, one must note that within this time-span Tanzania had several different types of elections. First, there were two pan-territorial elections for the more fiercely contested positions of parliamentary/house of representatives and presidential seats. Second, were the two pan-territorial local government elections for Mainland Tanzania and for Zanzibar. Within the same time-span, several (but fairly numerous) sporadic by-elections for parliamentary/house of representatives seats were held. Thus, within the otherwise short span of 10 years of competitive politics, Tanzania's had an intense experience of electoral practices. These elections had a wide coverage encompassing the entire country both on the mainland and in Zanzibar and the elections were held from the grassroots (village level) to the top national political office.

Elections in Tanzania: Election Results

As indicated earlier, the discussion on the consolidation of democracy in connection with election results is premised on the assumption that election results will help consolidate democratic practices.

Noticeable Trends towards the Transfer of Power

As indicated earlier, one of the measures of democratic consolidation is the extent to which one can identify noticeable trends relating to the transfer of power. The transfer can overtly be indicated by the extent to which alternative political party contestants are gaining political support, as indicated, at least, by the number of votes obtained. Looking at both the presidential and parliamentary elections during both the 1995 and 2000 general elections, one can witness both gains and reversals as detailed below.

Popular Support: Presidential Elections

In the 1995 elections, the combined total of opposition party Union presidential votes was 2,486,323 or 37.8. This means that the candidate from the incumbent party secured 4,026,422 or 61.8 percent of the votes. This score was a very significant starting point for the new parties at the inauguration of multiparty elections, and under conditions where the opposition was just being "tolerated" by both the state and the electorate. In fact, the results for the opposition candidates were quite impressive considering that among the contestants, one candidate emerged with an impressive 27.8 percent of all the votes. In Solinger's views, this was suggestive of the scenario where one opposition party emerges with a charismatic leader around whom alternative leadership possibilities can be organised and power transferred to in the future.

To the contrary, however, the impressive showing of the opposition in 1995 with regard to the presidential contest plummeted during the 2000 elections. In these elections, the incumbent presidential candidate enhanced his total to 71.7 percent of the all the votes. The combined opposition candidates' votes plummeted to a mere 29.3 percent, slightly higher than what the charismatic opposition candidate got in 1995. Moreover, the leadership among the opposition parties shifted from one candidate to another, thereby suggesting that the expected role which a lead party and opposition leader was to play was yet to find anchorage in the new political parties.

Popular Support: Parliamentary Elections

Popular support for the parliamentary elections in the 1995 and 2000 elections for each party is indicated in Table 2.

Table 2: Number and Percentage of individuals that Voted for each Party

Party	2000 Elections		1995 Elections	
	Number Voted For	Percentage	Number Voted For	Percentage
1. CCM	4,634,047	65.3	3,814,206	59.22
2. NCCR-M	258,591	3.6	1,406,343	21.83
3. CHADEMA	299,461	4.2	396,825	6.16
4. CUF	792,378	11.2	323,432	5.02
5. UDP	315,357	4.4	213,547	3.32
6. TADEA	9,647	0.1	76,636	1.19
7. NRA	70	0.001	60,707	0.94
8. UMD	7,550	0.1	41,257	0.64
9. TLP	652,535	9.2	27,963	0.43
10. NLD	2,507	0.04	26,666	0.41
11. UPDP	14,818	0.2	19,841	0.34
12. PONA	11,789	0.2	18,155	0.28
13. TPP	10,206	0.1	15,335	0.24

Source: The National Electoral Commission (NEC): Uchaguzi Mkuu wa 1995 na 2000.

Note: For the October 2000 elections, the figure for CCM does not include the number of voters in the 25 regions in which their candidates were unopposed.

As can be seen in Table 2, like in the popular vote for the presidential candidates, the combined opposition totals for the parliamentary elections dropped from 40.78 percent in 1995 to 33.3 percent in 2000. Secondly, the lead party in 1995 - NCCR-M - was overtaken by the CUF in 2000. The third position was taken over by the TLP.

Election Results: Size in Parliament

In 1995, under the first-past-the-post, or winner-takes-all electoral system, the incumbent party - CCM - secured 80 percent of the parliamentary seats, while the opposition secured 20 percent of the seats. In the 2000

elections, CCM secured 87.45 percent of the seats, while the combined opposition seats totalled only a mere 12.55 percent. The pattern in the presidential results in 1995 appears to replicate itself in the 2000 parliamentary elections.

Table 3: Number of Seats in Parliament

Party	2000	1995
CCM	202	186
CUF	17	24
CHADEMA	4	3
TLP	4	-
UDP	3	3
NCCR-M	1	16
Total	231	232

The picture is similar in the election results for councillors. The incumbent party, CCM, secured 93.2 percent of the seats in the 1999 elections, as compared to a mere 6.8 percent for the entire opposition.

Table 4: Elected Councillors by Political Parties in 1999 Local Government Elections

Name of Party	Number of Councillors	Percent of Total
CCM	2,327	91.72
TLP	59	2.33
CHADEMA	50	1.97
CUF	49	1.93
UDP	30	1.18
NCCR	20	0.79
TADEA	2	0.08
Total	2537	100

Source: Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi (2001) Taarifa ya Tume ya Uchaguzi: Jedwali N0.7 uk. 74

Respect for the Rules of the Game

The overall results of the two elections show that the incumbent party scooped victory over the new parties. There has not been any transfer of power from the incumbent to the other parties. As such, the issue of

"powerful players" and their backers being ready to respect the rules of the game above the temptation of holding on to power where the opposition are victorious does not arise. At best, as we shall demonstrate below, the trend has been otherwise: the powerful players have demonstrated the readiness to respect "the rules of the game".

Trust in Elections and Rule of Law

Under the prevailing conditions where the incumbent party is still dominant, it is difficult to account accurately for the development of attitudinal change towards the belief that elections are the only viable means of getting leaders. What can possibly be said, by way of citing examples, is of situations where:

- (a) The powerful players - the party in power and its backers - have shown readiness or otherwise to conduct regular elections, especially under possible threat to lose in the contest.
- (b) The powerful players have not resorted to extra-electoral and illegal means, manipulation of the laws, use of force, or fraud to gain victory.
- (c) The opposition parties and their supporters have shown readiness to participate in elections even when they have reservations with regard to their freedom to compete.

With regard to readiness by the incumbent party to call regular elections, interestingly, even under the entire period of single-party non-competitive system, elections have been held every five years without a break. But one could argue that the incumbent party then, and even now under the current conditions of multi-party competitive politics, has hardly seen any possibility of losing in any election. Towards the 2000 elections, there were constitutional and legal reforms which can be interpreted as a move on the part of the incumbent party and its backers to ensure victory and dominance of their party in the elections. The said reforms included the provisions that:

- (a) victory for the presidential elections would be decided through simple majority, rather than the long-time absolute majority system;
- (b) the president could nominate up to ten (10) individuals to parliament; and
- (c) total refusal by the party in power to change or combine a system of proportional representation with the prevailing winner-takes-all-system.

With regard to the issue of powerful players resorting to extra-electoral and illegal means, manipulation of the laws, use of force, and fraud to gain victory, there is contradictory evidence. First, various election monitoring agencies - both local and international - ruled that, on the whole, the results for both the 1995 and 2000 elections represented the will of the electorate. This means that the incumbent party, in particular, observed the rules of the game; and did not resort to any extra-electoral and illegal means to gain victory.

This is not to suggest that the elections were all free and fair. There were cases where fraud, intimidation, and manipulation of rules and procedures were used either by the party, organs of the state, or individual candidates. This was - at least in part - demonstrated by the petitions filed in the courts of law and the decisions made in favour of the complainants. Subsequent to the numerous petitions and the outcome of those petitions - which were especially negative for the incumbent party - two pieces of legislation were passed intended to make it difficult to petition election results. One required the contestant to deposit Tsh 5 million for each petition, a condition that previously did not exist. Surely this amount is too big a sum and will deter even genuine potential petitioners from seeking redress of wrongdoings committed during the elections.⁸ The second legislative act prolonged the minimum period for holding by-elections from 60 days to 24 months. This means that a seat fraudulently acquired may remain unfilled for two years. Both legislations, therefore, work in favour of the party in government.

On their part, long even before the 1995 elections, and up to the 2000 elections, the new parties raised their concerns regarding the "free-to-compete" circumstances under the existing constitutional and legal framework as has been elucidated earlier. The crucial issue here, however, is that even under the circumstances which clearly indicated the unlikelihood of their winning the elections, they demonstrated their trust in elections as the only viable and civil means of getting leaders. The new parties - sometimes in desperate situations - have resorted to angry statements and defied orders that obstructed their right and freedom to compete. On the whole, however, one can suggest that the new parties will always look towards elections as the viable means of putting democratic legitimate leaders into office.

Constitutional and Legal Reform

As mentioned earlier, the reintroduction of competitive politics was effected through a constitutional amendment in 1992, and subsequent legal reforms. Another milestone in the constitutional and legal reforms was 13th amendment of the constitution effected just before the 2000 elections. The basic question here is: what have constitutional and legal reforms contributed in terms of advancing democracy?

In themselves, the constitutional and legal reforms hardly aim at constraining the freedom to compete. Instead, however, it is the party and government which have decided to assure themselves a dominant position in the political process.

For example, the decision that victory for the presidential elections would be decided through simple, rather than absolute majority, first avoids a re-run election in case no individual candidate secures the absolute majority, a very possible scenario as the new parties consolidate their gains. Secondly, this is a decision that suits the CCM, which is likely to secure the presidency through narrow margins over the long period to come. This, therefore, assures the CCM of continued leadership; subsequently denying the opposition the chance to win the presidential seat.

With regard to the ten nominated seats, this provision can only be interpreted to mean that the party in power intends to ensure its dominance in the legislative body so that it can easily effect legislation. This is so because it is unlikely that the president will nominate a big number of members from the opposition to fill these positions. For example, of the current ten seats, the president has nominated only one member from the opposition party, CUF.⁹

Preference for the winner-takes-it-all system instead of the proportional representation gives added dominance to the party in power against the opposition parties. For example, while in 1995 the combined popular vote for the opposition parties was 40.7 percent, their share of seats in parliament was a mere 20 per cent. In the 2000 elections, while the combined popular vote for the opposition parties was 33.7 percent, their share of seats in parliament was a mere 12.6 percent. Under a full proportional representative electoral system that matches the popular vote with the percentage share of seats in parliament, the opposition should have secured

at least 40 percent in 1995, and 33.7 percent in 2000 of the seats. These proportions would have at least restrained the incumbent party from passing legislation with the relative ease that it enjoys under the present system.

Elections and the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Tanzania

From the discussion above, what are the prospects for democratic consolidation in Tanzania based on how the two elections were run and their results? Individuals, the media, and observer groups have made casual and broad comments regarding the democratic process in Tanzania. One of the general views is that the democratic process in the country is receding towards the monolithic single-party order, as an observer group commented during the 2000 elections. The group argued that democracy in Tanzania is not taking root, rather it is backsliding as demonstrated by various actions on the part of the incumbent party and its government, including:

- (a) breach of freedom of association and assembly by the police, thus constraining the freedom to compete;
- (b) expulsion of 15 members of parliament from the opposition party, CUF¹⁰;
- (c) too much control over unions, NGOs and the media;
- (d) dominance of the party in power in the parliament such that legislation is passed at the exclusive wish of the party;
- (e) nomination of 10 members of parliament by the president that gives additional dominance of the legislature by the party in power;
- (f) prolonging of the minimum period for holding by elections from 60 days to 24 months. This was a serious matter considering that the act was passed within the context of the expulsion of the 15 CUF members of parliament, suggesting that for at least 24 months the opposition would not only have missed representation but also that their chances to regain the seats in a by-election would have been considerably delayed.

If one looks at the trends within the opposition parties after the 1995 elections, one can safely conclude that the general direction of the democratisation process was on the reversal heading towards the one-party system. To come to firmer conclusions as to whether democracy is

getting consolidated, moving towards consolidation, or is perhaps back-tracking, let us look at the critical issues raised above.

Playing Out of Elections

Here we concentrated on three important features that have a bearing on democratic consolidation: participation of citizens and political parties, freedom to compete, and the frequency and scale of elections.

Participation in Elections

First, as was noted earlier, the participation of citizens in the elections has been enhanced during the two elections from 81 percent of eligible voters in 1995, to 97 percent of during the 2000 elections. This suggests that the electorate views elections as the legitimate means of voting leaders in or out of office. Secondly, there has been a significant showing by the political parties during both the 1995 and 2000 elections. All fully registered parties participated in both general elections from the local level, to parliamentary and presidential elections. Such participation legitimises the electoral process as the rightful institution for the acquisition of political office. Unlike elsewhere in the politics in transition, the political parties did not stay away from the elections notwithstanding complaints.

It must also be underlined that the full participation of citizens and political parties was greatly enhanced by civil society groups, as well as the NEC, that conducted voter education underscoring the need for all stakeholders to participate in the electoral process.

This increase in voter turn-out and sustained political parties participation clearly demonstrates that the conception of elections as an important institution for democracy will continue to be entrenched with citizens and political parties in the country.

Longevity of Elections

We mentioned earlier the duration within which one can make a meaningful evaluation of democratic consolidation is at least 20 years of regular elections. Tanzania's experience with competitive elections is close to ten years, half the duration considered as appropriate. One may, therefore, dismiss outright the duration as not long enough to aptly evaluate if the practice of competitive elections is institutionalised and has developed into a habitual practice such that it is unthinkable for the

population to conceive any other way of effecting leadership change. However, while this may strictly be the case, an interim assessment of the two major elections and by-elections points toward the development of elections as a regular institutionalised practice. Already, individuals and political parties have started preparing for the 2005 elections.¹¹ This conclusion is supported by two other observations. First, both general elections in Tanzania have been expansive in terms of scale - vertically as well as horizontally. This means that the entire population is committed to the democratic process of elections. If it had been conducted in isolated locations at irregular intervals this would have established the precedent for the regime to defer subsequent elections or hold them in various locations at its own whim. In the case of Tanzania, one can expect a general upheaval should such a step be even contemplated.

Secondly, as the debate on democratic consolidation suggests that the institutionalisation of elections - in part - depends on the nature of the outgoing regime. Military oligarchies would pose greater difficulties for introducing and institutionalising elections than civilian single-party regimes. In the Tanzanian case, elections were held uninterrupted every five years even under the more than 30 years of single-party rule and were often very fiercely contested. Thus, in our view, multi-party competitive elections have enhanced a practice that the Tanzania society has experienced for a long time. Under such a case, therefore, elections in Tanzania have grown into a habitual practice of placing and removing leaders from office.

Freedom to Compete

The issue of freedom to compete is a serious one and the country needs to address it squarely so as to promote democracy. Each of the areas associated with the concept of freedom to participate has raised questions on issues that definitely restrain free and fair participation - particularly by the new parties in the elections. It seems here that there is the political will on the part of the incumbent leadership to undertake in-depth reforms so as to provide an evenly contested electoral playing field. Issues that need to be addressed here are those that relate to the limitations in the constitutions and electoral laws; the constitution and practice of the NEC; the practice of state organs; and funding of political parties. That the regime has shown little interest to reform these areas suggests that the process of democracy taking root may be delayed.

Election Results

As regards the results of the elections in showing the trend towards democratic consolidation, four issues are involved: the transfer of power; respect for the rules of the game; trust in elections; and the rule of law and constitutional and legal reform. As has been argued, issues raised under respect for the rules of the game and the trust in elections are more speculative than real. This has understandably been because - at least in part - basic to it is whether a transfer of power has been effected. Thus, we shall only address the more concrete issues of power transfer and constitutional and legal reforms.

Transfer of Power

On power transfer, the standard indicators of such a process taking place are all negative. It is partly this negative trend that has made some observers decide that the new parties are not worth banking on. It has been suggested that in between the two elections the new parties lost appeal so much that during the 2000 elections voters may have decided to support the incumbent party! For how does one explain the fact that even the parties themselves did not field as many candidates in 2000 as was the case in 1995?

The lack of resources constrained the new parties from fielding as many - or even more - candidates in 2000. The withdrawal of the state financial support - which they had in 1995 - to finance the elections may have played a very significant role in the poor performance of the new parties in 2000 as compared to 1995. This being the case, it is erroneous to speak of a reversal trend in terms of popular support. The rules that facilitated the huge support in 1995 changed, and therefore the end result was also effected. Had the rules remained constant, it could have been the case that the new parties would have maintained, if not enhanced, the support they got from the public during the 2000 elections. Tables 5, 6, and 7 show that even under the adverse conditions of resource constraints during the 2000 elections, the new parties made significant gains from which they can build on, resources permitting. First, as can be seen in Table 5, the opposition won 30 seats in the parliament. CUF, being more resource-endowed than any of the other new parties, retained the lead in the number of seats it secured, although these retrogressed from 28 seats in 1995 to 17 in 2000.

Table 5: Parliamentary Victory for the Opposition in 1995 and 2000 General Elections

Party	2000 Elections	1995 Elections
CUF	17	28
TLP	4	—
CHADEMA	4	4
UDP	3	4
NCCR-M	1	19
Total	30	55

A closer study of the election results as shown in Table 6 shows weaknesses in the incumbent party. First, of its total 167 wins in the parliament, 25 cases were won only by narrow margins with not more than 55 percent of the total votes. In some cases, e.g., Tarime, the margin of victory was so narrow that the difference was only in terms of a small number of votes. In eight constituencies, the incumbent party got less than 50 percent of the total votes. Also in all of the constituencies save five, the popular vote was reduced from the parties' position in the 1995 elections. The suggestion here is that with a little more effort, the new parties could have taken over those narrowly won seats.

Table 6: Narrow Victory for CCM (Less than 55 Percent Win)

Constituency	2000 Elections Percentage	1995 Elections (Election Results In Same Constituencies)
1. Arusha	51.8	39.7 CCM
2. Kinondoni	53.3	61.9 CCM
3. Temeke	43.5	66.9 CCM
4. Kondo North	49.5	53.5 CCM
5. Biharamulo-West	54.9	47.4 CCM
6. Karagwe (Kagera)	51.7	60.1 CCM
7. Kigoma North	45.7	44.1 CCM
8. Kilwa South	53.5	65.5 CCM
9. Musoma Urban	53.5	54.2 CCM
10. Tarime	48.7 (29,283 Votes)	51.3 CCM
11. Kyela	52.7	59.5 CCM
12. Kilosa	53.2	64.1 CCM
13. Sumve	50.7	60.5 CCM
14. Busega	50.9	54.7 CCM
15. Mwanza Urban	46.2	49.6 CCM
16. Mpanda Central	52.2	55.1 CCM
17. Mbinga West	53.4	63.5 CCM
18. Songea Urban	46.2	74.0 CCM
19. Maswa	53.6	73.7 CCM
20. Meatu	49.8	52.6 CCM
21. Shinyanga Urban	54.3	61.8 CCM
22. Bukene	48.4	55.4 CCM
23. Tabora South	51.9	54.7 CCM
24. Chakechake	50.4	74.7 CUF
25. Kiwani	52.9	65.1 CUF
Total		25 Constituencies

Table 7 gives an indication of areas where opposition had strong support (where they won by more than 30 percent). The table shows that there were 46 constituencies where the new parties secured over 30 percent of the votes. In 19 of these constituencies, they received over 35 percent of the votes. In 22 constituencies, the new parties secured more than 40 percent of the votes. In 9 of these, the score was above 45 percent.

Table 7: Parliamentary Win for the Opposition in 2000 (In Big Percentages)

	More than 30%	More than 40%
CUF	22	9
TLP	12	7
NCCR-M	8	
UDP	2	4
CHADEMA	2	2
TOTAL	46	22

Even considering only the results of the 2000 elections, there are noticeable trends towards power transfer. Not only were seats gained, but there is an immense potential for other seats being secured in the near future. These are in areas where the incumbent party narrowly won seats and in areas where the opposition secured a high enough percentage which could be enhanced in subsequent elections.

Constitutional and Legal Reforms

As concerns constitutional and legal reforms consolidating the process of democratisation it has been claimed that the reforms amount to a manipulation of the rules of the game so as to guarantee the dominance of the party in government. This has been noted, especially in the 13th amendment and subsequent legislation, such as in the following:

- Victory for the presidential elections being decided on simple rather than absolute majority system.
- The president nominating up to ten individuals to parliament.
- Commitment to an electoral system based on the prevailing winner-takes-all system.
- Legislation that requires petitioners to deposit Tshs 5 million for each petition.
- The prolongation of the minimum period for holding by-elections from 60 days to 24 months.

From this background, have the constitutional and electoral reforms gone towards easing constraints to freer participation in the political process, or the opposite? It is obvious that the above five constitutional and legal reforms have only consolidated the dominant position of the party in power. In this regard, democratic consolidation becomes elusive. However, one must at the same time accept that there have been noticeable positive trends in the constitutional and legal reforms that, if appropriately

harnessed, can lead to the consolidation of democracy in Tanzania. The first is the 1992 political parties act that provided for competitive multi-party politics in the country. This was an important political dispensation that gives an opening for citizens to organise and mobilise support around alternative policies in order to secure the necessary mandate to lead the country. The second was the creation of NEC, the election management body charged with the responsibility to run competitive elections impartially. Alongside the creation of an independent elections body, was the strict legal demand on the NEC officials to abide by the law in running the elections. While this legal demand on the conduct NEC officials was lax in the 1995 elections, towards the 2000 elections a fine of between Tshs 100,000.00 to Tshs. 300,000.00, or an imprisonment of up to 5 years, or both, were imposed NEC officials in the event that elections are nullified by the court of law due to misconduct of an election official.

The above are just a few examples to remind readers of the positive side. While a number of constitutional and legal issues have not yet been addressed in the reform process, a path has - and still is - being charted to provide for a constitutional and legal framework that may eventuate into the consolidation and proper functioning of democracy in Tanzania.

Conclusion

The process of democratic consolidation is one that builds up step-by-step, and is facilitated, in part, by a long period of frequent elections. Thus, besides assessments based merely on the basis of the overall victory, incremental gains are also an indicator of the direction towards which the process may eventuate. Such a measure is significant for the interim assessment of nascent and newly democratising countries. In the case of Tanzania, the two multiparty elections have demonstrated that strides have been made towards installation of democracy, even though there have been some negative moves in some areas. But as Solinger suggests, these gains will be foundations upon which pro-democracy movements can develop their efforts until fully fledged democratic practices are instituted

Notes

1. In a number of cases the entire, or some elements of the, constitutional reviews were carried out to "wind the clock back".
2. The article exclusively discusses issues on Mainland Tanzania, excluding Zanzibar.
3. Among the numerous current commentators of the direction in which democracy is moving in the Third World Countries is Carlos Santiso (2001).

4. In 1995 there were 13 fully registered political parties. In October 2001, two more parties got full registration: CHAUSTA, led by the founder Chairman of the present CUF, James Mapalala, and Chama Cha Demokrasia Makini (Party for Genuine Democracy) founded by Leonard Shayo a Mathematics Professor from the University of Dar es Salaam. In 2002, another two parties were registered. These were FORD and DP. On the other hand, during the same year, two of the previous 13 registered parties—TPP and PONA—were deregistered.
5. These are NCCR-Mageuzi, CUF, Chadema, UDP. "Promising" is used in terms of their ability to command a fairly large following.
6. We borrow from Michael Bratton & Nicolas van de Walle (1997: 9) who define regimes as "sets of political procedures—sometimes called 'rules of the political game'—that determine the distribution of power. The rules prescribe who may engage in politics and how. The relevant rules may be formally codified in constitutions and other legal statutes; or they may be informal, embodying customs and habits to which all participants are attuned".
7. David Beetham (1994) estimates that a period of at least 20 of regular elections may be required to determine that democratic practices and values have been institutionalised.
8. This legislation did not last long before the Court of Appeal nullified it as contravening the provisions of the basic law in the Constitution.
9. Besides, it is important to indicate here that the nomination of an opposition member, and one from the CUF at that, was driven by the demands of the peace accord signed between the CCM and CUF (*Mwafaka 2*), where the president is required to nominate some CUF members to parliament.
10. The 15 members of parliament from the opposition party CUF were expelled in fulfilment of a constitutional provision which requires that if a member of parliament absents herself/himself from three consecutive sessions without the permission of the Speaker, s/he is deemed expelled from the House; and fresh elections must be held to fill the vacant seat. The CUF members of parliament decided to boycott the sessions in protest against the conduct of the elections.
11. Almost every day, newspapers carry statements related to the next elections in 2005. At the writing of this article, one daily evening paper, *Dar Leo*, had a headline associated with CUF officials entitled: "Tunamtaka Salim". The news goes on to say that the CUF leadership are prepared to take on the former and last Secretary General of the

defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) should CCM decide to nominate him as the presidential candidate for 2005.

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The Impact of Petroleum Exploration on Agricultural, Technological, and Human Resource Development in Nigeria, 1908 - 1995

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Introduction

Petroleum, *Petra Oleum*, etymologically means rock oil because of its natural deposit in subterranean sedimentary rocks. Its long history of discovery, exploration, and use from ancient world civilisations is outside the scope of our study, and need not detain us (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 165-176). It has also become such a common word in Nigeria that it does not need more definition.

However, in contemporary Nigeria, as a result of its mixed impact on the economy, some doubts have been expressed as to whether petroleum is a blessing or a curse for the country. In this article I shall join in this debate by examining the impact of petroleum exploration on three sectors of the Nigerian economy: agriculture, technology and human resources. These sectors were selected because of their fundamental contributions to the nation's economic development. Petroleum exploration is used in this article in the composite sense of exploration and exploitation because both promote each other. To achieve our objectives, we shall first outline developments in petroleum exploration since its inception in 1908. We shall then follow up with an analysis of its impact on agricultural, technological and human resource developments in Nigeria, since 1956, when petroleum was first discovered in commercial quantities triggering off a heightened pace of exploration. We shall conclude with a summary of our findings.

Outline of Petroleum Exploration in Nigeria

It was a German company, the Nigeria Bituman Corporation, which started petroleum exploration in the Araromi area of Ondo State, in 1908, as a result of oil seepages that were found in that area. But the First World War brought this pioneering effort to an end. Exploration started seriously once again in 1937, when Shell D' Arcy, a Dutch company, merged with

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