The Institution Building View of The African Development Dilemma

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Introduction

Explaining Africa's Development Problems.

"African is dying. If things continue as they are, only eight or nine of the present countries will survive the next few years. All other things being equal, absolute poverty, instead of declining, is likely to gain ground. It is clear that the economy of the continent is lying in ruins- Our ancient continent- is now on the brink of disaster" [1]

The above quotation sound alarmingly discouraging, and hence the urgency to find the roots of that state of affairs to correct it. Various explanations have been given for this state of affairs ranging from a deteriorating environment, imperialist exploitation and colonial plunder, to cultural maladies of an apathetic people unmotivated to make contribution to development. None of these broad explanations seen satisfactory, however, and the debate still rages on.

The Marxist perspective, for instance, posits that the current state of Africa's development has been a result of the extension of the mercantilist capital seeking to invest in greener pasture of cheap labour and raw materials. Industrial Europe Colonised Africa and Plundered its resources in addition to supervising the process of exploitation by the merchant capital. Independence in Africa has simply been a change of the orchestra's conductor, and the dance remains the same under the aegis of neo-colonialism and imperialism which together enhance the development of underdevelopment (Rodney, 1974, Nabudere, 1974, Coulson, 1982, Nkrumah, 1966, Kohli 1987 and Saul, 1985.

The Marxist explanation is convincing but it makes a lot of generalizations. In some situations it assumes some extremely selfish leaders, passive and uninterested local populations, and reduces complex development problems to general class relations. It can be agued at least that while the state has been categorised as an instrument of a ruling class in Africa,[2] in some countries it has had a central role to play in socio-economic transformation. [3] It is a contention of this paper that the failure by African states' to foster a significant socio-economic transformation is not necessarily and entirely owing to its imperialist connections, but rather to the very nature their social, cultural and political environments. The impact of imperialism on African development is a plausible, but partial explanation of the problem.

Another general explanation has been that Africa is not developed because of its cultural inhibitions on "modern" ways of life, and the atmosphere most conducive to development process is lacking in most African societies (Oosthuizen 1985; 80-83). This explanation ignores the fact that defining a culture in a situation of a multitude of ethnic entities (some of which have racial differences) is difficult. Thus one wonders as to the nature and character of an ideal African culture. Such theorists also tend to underrate the impact of colonial-cum- Western cultural penetration on African cultures. This means that such theorists need to reckon with the fact that what they see as African cultural problems is a mixture of European and other cultures --and this may be a development problem in itself.

Other approaches have looked into the functions of state administration, concluding that the current state of underdevelopment has mostly resulted from the malfunctions of the state institutions, mismanagement of the scarce resources, and uncoordinated efforts of various development-related organisations. Government responses to these pointers have been the creation and reform of exisiting organisations, decentralisation programmes, and "Integrated rural development programmes". The institution-based reforms is the focus of this paper, as we try to trace the development dilemma.

2.0 The Conceptual Controversy as a Problem of African Development

The institutional reforms made by some African governments have faultered at two levers: first, they have failed to identify the problem correctly, and secondly-- and related to the first-- they have assumed that once the organisations are created or reformed then the processes will naturally fall in to implement popular development programmes. This assumption ignores the fact that the reforms and the envisaged processes are most likely to be influenced by the crisis of the lack of ideological concensus and direction, the primacy of the state to keep the various "nationalities" (tribes) from disintegrating, and the preoccupation with elite power struggles. In fact most African governments have tended to create organisation and staffers who represent central governments interests more than the need to improve the capabilities of the majority poor to fend for themselves (see Sandbrook 1986 and Roth 1968.)

2.1 The Concept of Development

There is no agreement as to what development means. Generally development tends to be construed as a quantitative increase in the goods and services produced over a period of time. Aggregate indicator such as GDP, GNP per capita, etc., are used. In this discussion, however, development is further stretched to include a significant and relative improvement in the capabilities of the majority people (and their instruments of production) to increase production of goods and services which they need either to consume or to exchange for other values. This extension in the definition implies that a situation in which donors and goverments organize to feed a hungry population may not necessarily amount to a people's development. It might be a bribe for influence or window-dressing with hidden political motives.

Development in the above context is a result of a well planned arrangement of resources (material and human), and functions (institutional, corporate, or individual) taking account of the existing property and power relations with a view to enable the developmentally defranchised populations to actively participate in improving their living standards. Meaningful development seeks to involve people as human resource, as well as the intended beneficiaries of their own efforts. Participation therefore becomes an integral part of genuine developent and power distribution, which in turn determines who should participate in both production and distribution processes.

The role of the institutions of the state in development have been depicted as though development is a preoccupation of power elites, (educated, businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, international aid-agency personnel, etc.). bestowed on them to hand down biblical *manna* or largesse to the passively waiting beggars. This presumption leaves no room for local populations to develop social, technological, and managerial capabilities. In such a situation the general population have assumed that independence means, getting some goods and services hitherto denied to them by the colonial administration. This is in itself a problem of development since it tends to cultivate a dependency syndrome on the part of the majority poor.

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2.2 Organisations and Institutions

In taking about state *organisation* most scholars leave out a problem area in that they do not differentiate between an organisation and an institution. It appears that bureaucratic organisations are equated to social institutions (AAPAM 1986:18-58). Basically a bureaucratic organisation is a set of arranged hierarchy of authoritative relations which coordinate, evoke, and enforce rules and regulations to ensure that particular goals are efficiently accomplished.

On the other hand an institution is more than an organisation. It is an organisation which grows out of the basic social, cultural and economic exigencies, bearing roots of identity legitimacy within the community in which it operates. Having grown out of a socially—felt need, an institution usually belongs to, and serves the community from which it grows. Therefore one wonders whether the African states and their various organs can quality as institutions under the above definition. If they do not, they most probably alienate the people they claim to serve, itself another problem of development. Most of the state-sponsored programmes seem to bear insignificant results to the majority poor (Bratton 1980, Carlsen 1980, ILO 1981, and Watanabe 1984).

2.3 Local Government and Local Administration

Most African states have made various institutional development at the local level. But this very institution—building effort has tended to create problems, and sometimes such efforts have undermined popular development. What most African governments seem to have done is to extend central government-bureaucratic organisations to lower (sub-district and village) levels, where they pose as popular institutions. At times they have replaced more democratic existing social and economic institutions.[4]

African bureaucratic planning agencies have failed to differentiate not only organisations from institutions, but also local administration from local government. To most local administration has meant sending agents of the central government to lower levels to do functions largely perceived and rationalised by the central government. Genuine local government, however, implies authoritative agencies or agents created or appointed by the local people themselves to perform and coordinate activities necessary for their welfare. In most cases local govenment agencies are institutions which have pased a legitimacy—challenge to local adminiration units of bureaucratic organisations. This may partially explain why local governments tend to be legislated out of existence by the central governments in Africa. It would logically seem (on the part of the people) that since the govenment creates the organisations, then it definitely knows what to do with them *for* the people.

2.4 Participation: Genuine or Manipulated?

An important component of development as defined above is people's participation in the programmes which affect them. But theorists have tended to treat participation as though it takes place in a power vacuum. Since participation in development is inseperable from distribution of power, its definition must include giving powers to people to raise or mobilize their own resources, as well as to legally allow them to hold both the local administration and loal government officials and agents responsible in the manner they want them help to develop some programmes of their own perception. Short of extending substantive powers to a target population, participation becomes manipulated to serve sectarian rather than popular development interests.

3.0 The Deversity of the Development Dilemma in Africa

How does the concepts so far defined apply to the African development context? It is the contention of this paper, as shall be discussed below that, first, African states are not social institutions and that they can hardly champion popular development. Secondly, the administrative reforms and their apparent institutional build-ups have tended to kill off social institutions, or replace them altogether with quite alien forms whose rationale sounds logical and legitimate to the central government than to the target population. Thirdly, local administration programmes such as 'decentralisation' policies have been construed as a means of distributing the 'fruits of independence' consequently creating a dependency mentality on the part of the general population. Apparently such programmes have hardly created production capabilities and capacities at the level at which they are claimed to operate. Finally, participation programmes have tended to be a major means of political mobilization in which a people are manipulated to imagine they have a stake and say in the government of the day. This kind of participation has resulted into local constituencies sending representatives to the central government to bring to them some largesse out of the national cake. Such mobilization moves hardly encourage the local people to create their own cake out of their own resources.

3.1 The African Developement Dilemma Owing from the Nature and the Character of the State

In a situation where local entrepreneurial resources are underdeveloped and scarce, the state has to assume a central role as a major initiator of development programmes. Even if there are adequate investors, the state still has a major role in determining an ideology for development, and the provision of economic and social infrastructure.

The case of Japan during the Meiji (1868-1911) and post— World War II period is relevant here. Even in the capitalist marching "Newly Industrializing States" of Taiwan and Korea, the state bears a central role in tne management of development programmes. Therefore the *Laissez—faire* view of the invisible hand is irrelevant in many success cases, as it is in Africa in view of its development problems. Most African states are nearly three decades old but seem not to have made significant moves in development. Are they not a problem in themselves?

Independence in Africa saw the new elites taking over the organs of the colonial state organisations *holus bolus*. The colonial bureancratic organisations were basically created for the purposes of facilitating a smooth exploitation of Africa's raw materials and cheap labour. They were hardly forms of social institutions meant to mobilize local resources for the development of the local populations.

Obviously th ecolonial state were functional depending on the purposes and the *modus operandi* of the colonial era, but hardly useful for the popular aspirations in so far as popular development is concerned. "African states" have remained in a state of *modus vivendi*, pending reforms (or revolutions?) to make them African in nature and purpose. The temporariness and "irrelevance" of the "African states" remain a development problems because such inherent characteristics render them alien to the local people almost as much as they were during the colonial era.

The state—based development dilemma thushinges on three unanswered questions: whose state, whose/which ideology of development, and concomitanly whose development will such states champion?

Most African states' boundaries cut across integral ethnic and cultural entities which tend to portray a bearing of been nations-- they were categorised as tribes by the colonial administrators/powers. Post independence African governments thus find themselves in a crisis of having to hold together artificially created nations. Political (and consequently economic malaise) instabilities in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan, *inter alia*, are owing largely to the fact that the states and their various bureaucratic organisations have low levels of legitimacy among the dissenting tribes-- *sic*-- nations. Questions asked by the local "nations" under a particular post-colonial state include "whose" tribe (nation) does the government belong to? In response governments find themselves having to invest more in instruments of coercion (police, the army, non-uniformed informer and control organisations, propaganda machinery, etc.; and a distribution of the existing state controlled resources to bribe and try to integrate the dissenting tribes (nations). This kind of state behaviour is most unlikely to address more of the basic popular development than "hic ups" hither and thither.

Marxisim provides another answer to the question "whose state" -- in addition to an ethnic bearing. In this perspective the states in Africa serve the interests of the local as well as the international bourgeoisie rather than of the majority poor. This conforms to a definitional position that post- colonial African states hardly qualify as socio-political institutions. These states play the traditional roles of law and order administration rather than that of enhancing local productive capabilities of poverty-stricken populations. Marxism sees African states continuing to play some subjective roles as appendages of international capitalism from which bread crumbs fall upon the local "governing class" (Mueller 1980), which in turn partly passes them over to those from whom it wish to buy local support. This is a plausible explanation why state sponsored programmes are seen as either a means of delivering the "fruits of independence" to the hitherto defranchised populations, or as a means of national-political penetration and integration without inherently and necessarily enhancing local technological and economic capabilities.

In addition to the failure to precisely answer the question as to whose development interests the African states stand for, there is the related question of whose ideology or ideologies African states stand for. Ideologies give a sense of direction and destiny; a frame of social, political, and cultural or ethical preferences and references; and a dominant mode of economic relations in the various processes of development. Socialism and capitalism are some of the two distinct ideologies. Africa states to either going capitalist (most African state economies are an extension of the development of the European mercantilist capitalism). Others claim to be going for "African" socialism (Tanzania and Senghor's Senegal)[5] while some--especially in Lusophone—Africa claim to be adopting some forms of Lennist—Marxist socialism (Angola and Mozambique).[6] What one sees in Africa therefore, is a thick jungle of conveniently claimed ideological perpetrations which are uncapable of giving the African development efforts basic principles, some framework of reference, and a destiny.

The lack of a definite stand as to whose ideology African states advocate leaves African development with a diverse ideological dilemma. Those which claim to be on the capitalist road tend to help develop a dependent economy in trying to forster both the interests of the local and international bourgeoisie. This leaves the workers and peasants in a "boxing angle" to be more exploited than to be made able to improve their own lot.

Those claiming to pursue African socialism seem to be advocating a traditional ideal cultural past which was effectively destroyed by the colonial and imperialist

and Nkrumah's consciencism) fail to clearly define the future state for which Africa should then strive. Those who put claims to Marxism irritate and signal negative capitalist reactions internally and externally. Internally some factions refuse to adhere to the "state's" ideology, thereby seeking external support. For example, factions in Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, etc., have been given support by capitalist elements who want to maintain the *status quo*. Indeed such African states tend to be grounds for Russian and US cold wars, alias Marxism versus Capitalism. The results have been social, political, and economic destructions, and the states can hardly concentrate on the grassroot development problems of the day.

3.2 Administrative Reforms and Development

Despite the conclusions that African states are engrossed in crises of legitimacy, identity, and national disintegration (internal problems), and that they are in the clutches of external political and economic interests, the state will have to play a central development role. The World Bank has accused African States of having made policy mistakes which constrain economic growth. To the World Bank state intervention is inimical to economic development.[7] Given the cases of Japan, the newly industrialized states, and a host of others one can hardly agree with the World Bank's position.[8] In fact it is in Africa that one finds that the colonial states compensated for economic and social infrastructure-- areas where private capital can hardly venture into. The construction of the railway lines and trunk roads in Africa are just a few examples.[9] The problem needs to be moved to the level of the states' operating procedures and the modes of interventions considered to be inimicable to socio-economic transformation.

Given the crises surrounding African states, the intervention by way of institution building is encased in some unstated but pressing motives to consolidate state power, and sometimes the personal power of the ruling elites (Roth 1968 and Sandbrook 1986). In an atmosphere of low levels of state/government legitimacy there tends to be a few who are trusted. The trusted in turn become brokers between the ruling elites and those who can render political support at the grassroot level. Support is exchanged for services and goods offered by the state organs under the orchestration of important patrons who work as, or with the brokers.

State intervention in the above form will act against economic growth and socio—economic transformation, and can reasonably be condemned by critics. Most African states have fallen victims of the "scratch-my-back— I scratch-yours" dilemma, in the end turning social and economic relations into patron-client relations.[10] Eventually what happens is a state in which local political and economic magnets cultivate their own pockets of influential constituencies which support the government of the day in return for centrally controlled goods and services. This development leaves the majority in the cold, without either some generative (production of wealth) or distributive (consumption of social wealth) powers.

This development has had two main orientations. First, institution building of a kind that emphasizes the distribution rather than production of walth. Secondly, government intervention has created mutual expectation in which a few state agents exist in symbiosis with the few local beneficiaries of the distributive processes.

In terms of institution building, African governments have tended to embark on administrative and political programmes which eventually uproot local government and popular power. Instead local administration (representatives of central government) organisations have been established to help enhance "local" development.

The obvious consequences of replacing local government institutions with local government administrative organisations have been (a) local people become alienated, reluctant to participate in most programmes of the local administration agencies; and (b) the local administration agents become impatient, and instead of soliciting popular participation, they resort to the use of coercion-- almost just like the colonial local administration agents did. [11]

This situation culminates into a state of mutual suspicion. The local administration agents suspect and accuse the local populations of being tabooed, apathetic, and anti−development. The Local population in turn suspects the local administration agents as having and carying out ulterior missions bent on undermining their existence rationale and power. [12] The merging of the mutual suspicion reinforces the behaviour, of the local administration agents reaching out to dispense favours to the "cooperating" local poeple. [13] and the local people's behaviour to work though and support those they trust most. This cultivates some dependency relations that will hardly work for popular development. [14]

3.3 The Modes of Participation in Development Programmes

Participation in development imply a situation in which the affected and intended beneficiaries of development programmes are involved in goal setting, planning, and implementation. Popular participation would thus give powers to the majority in the target population to influence not only the goal setting and planning processes, but also the mode of implementation and the distribution of the collective efforts thereby expended.

Such a mode of participation ensures that people's social and technological capabilities are enhanced in a planned manner. The social capability part of effective participatory conditions implies that the social fabric which unites a local community−−has to be improved and local institutions based on such a social fabric need to be improved to handle the needs of modern technological development. Adminsitrative reforms at the sub-district level in Africa have undermined the existing social capability replancing it with "local" government functionaries. Therefore without social capability and inherent popular power, governments claim to be embarking on participation programmes is futile·No wonder that this has led to local administration agents manipulating "cooperating" village representatives to participate (symbolically) in the planning, but most essentially in the distribution of the benefits within the framework of patron-client relations politics.

Manipulated participation can hardly lead to popular development. In order to cater for popular, genuine and active participation, human resources development of the target population has to be undertaken. In addition, an examination and a redress of inappropriate social structures and relations must be undertaken to facilitate uninhibitted participation by the majority in the target population. No. genuine and popular participation can take place without the development of social capability in the way of educational reforms, health improvements, mass communication improvements, improvement of social relations, creation and improvement of social institutions, giving power to the participating community to create local institutions of governance and·plan implementation and finally giving the intended participants more of the regenerative/productive powers rather than selectively giving a few brokers and patrons some distributive powers over the meager government resources.

3.4 Development Administration or Political Messianism?

Political messianism means a situation in which the various campaings for independence promised to distribute the "fruits of independence" to the majority poor. The implications here are that the leaders in the campaigns were seen as the saviours of the poverty−−stricken majority. This political messianism could be true if there were unlimited resources, and if there were no limiting factors such as the character of social and economic relations, actions of international capital, political instability, and the crises of legitimacy and national disintegration.

Even if the resources were unlimited−a very unlikely event--this political messianic orientation in "development administration" would not necessarily result into a people's (popular) development because such a people would have no power and volition of their own to produce and consume what and when they need to. It eventually turns "followers"--selected beneficiaries-- into beggars who can hardly fend for themselves. It also ties people into a network of patron-client relations, sustenance of personal rulerships, etc, elements which effectively deny the majority poor their *vox populi* on the potential development programmes most likely to improve their living standards.

The multitude of the dissenting, and alienated groups of the population pegs African governments on a low legitimacy profile. Since the governments are aware of that problem, and to them survival ranks higher than anything else, all efforts are made to turn development administration into a distribution systems−distributing to those who have actual or potential power to directly or indirectly destabilize government. Since the governments have limited resources, international assistance is solicited to let messianism come true to various groups in the population thus bribed. It is partly because of this that international donors get accused of distorting or averting development efforts in Africa. (Morss 1984). One finds some aid programmes being used to reinforce social inequalities or as political bribes or spoils instead of being used to enhance social, technologıcal, and economic capabilities of the majority poor.

### 4.0 Conclusion: Unresolved Development Agenda

The above discussion has focused on the role of social and economic institutions (including the state) in initiating and managing development. It has been argued that the way African theorists and practitioners perceive socio-economic instruments such as the state and its various organs creates a development problem which needs to be resolved before genuine popular development can occur. Straight− jacket answers to the problem cannot be given as such suggestions would largely be irrelevant to the diverse environments of African nation-state .

Apparently neo-colonial state organisations are not popular socio−economic institutions of an African creation. The post-independence governments have not done much to adapt the state and its organisations becoming popularly−based purposeful instruments of the ordinary man's development. Governments' administrative reforms have tended to undermine the rationality of the local population's existence, thus alienating them from programmes pupportedly intended to serve them. This is a kind of institution building which tends to stifle popular participation in development, and instead it creates pockets of dependent people who behave as if the government has (amply) some largesse to distribute to them.

Finally while it seems relatively easy to answer the questions "whose ideology, whose state, whose development, and finally whose state organisations", it was not possible under the present scope and space to answer a very fundamental question as to "which way African development". What I have done here is to map out below the contextual frame of the alternative paths in diagramatic presentaton for further research.

A View of Alternative Paths for Africa's Development

A PAST UTOPIA	PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS	IDEAL FUTURE STATE OR UTOPIA
Stage A	Stage B	Stage C:
Characteristics of positive remnants, remnants of feudal elements,	Capitalist formations, social inequalities,	The ideal state of social relations,
Archaic social, economic and cultural traits,	Environmental deterioration, cultural diversity,	The ideal state of economic activities,
Elements of culture to emulate and integrate at stages B and C.	Coexistence in a diverse world, Interdependence dependency,	The leadership-subordinate relation,
	Imperialist/Neo-colonial strongholds,	Quantitative elements of the future state presumably superior to those at stage B.
	Appreciation of technological advancement.	

A Brief View of the Critical Optional Paths:

Path (1) assumes that Africa's past has a rich cultural heritage and there are quite a lot of elements to help to formulate the future ideal state of social and economic relations. It assumes a situation in which the past can be developed into a future ideal state. Ironically it ignores the impacts of stage B, i.e. machinations of colonialism, plunder, cultural, cultural penetration and imperialism in the form of religion, dress, address, ethics and consumption patterns. It also underrates the problems arising from the nature and character of African neo-colonial states and their multifarious nation-state crises. In view of these and other fundamental omissions path (1) is not fruitful. In fact it is unrealistic. Development ideologies like those of Tanzania, Nkurumah's Ghana, Senghor's Senegal and even some Lusophone "socialist" African states fall into this category. Romanticizing about a past ideal and wishing it to be a future state, and casually paying lip service to the impacts of the present (Stage B elements), will not get Africa out of its present ideological limbo.

Path (2) makes analysis of the present and stages the development endeavour from there. That is, if what the post-colonial stage has inherited is capitalist development or socialist (if ever), then adherence and maintenance of *status quo* are imprtant preoccupations of the post-independence state organs.   Indeed this approach is superflous -- it does not question the particular interests served by the inherited state organs. Apparently the future state is mainly to benefit those who are already benefiting, and of course adhering to the "Mathew principle". Development turns out to be a few crumbs escaping from those who have, which are in turn handed down to buy political support in the politics of personal rulerships and patron-client relations.

Path (3) is a possibility most likened to path (1). Unlike path (1), however it advocates the good old times and wish to resort to the same utopia. The remnants of traditionalists and "feudal roaders" depict this anti-development advocacy. It seems to ignore the positive elements of modern social and economic relations and management, the positive elements of modern technology, and the magnitude of a problem of having to reverse a future oriented social transformation.

Path (4) is a more punctuated realization of the negative and positive characteristics of the African traditional past (stage A); those of the colonial and post-independence period (stage B); and proposes a careful assessment of events, resources, methods, and weights of both stages to formulate an ideal state of affairs on which development goals should be pegged. It also sees a possibility of bypassing the ailments of stage B in the process of transforming those of stage A into stage C, if such a critical path analysis is seen to be fruitful.

The above presentation is meant to raise development− option questions relating to Africa's development dilemma. It is hoped that more thoughts will be devoted to philosophise and come out with suggestions for African leaders and economic managers.

Notes

1. Edem Kodjo. 1986 (former OAU Secretary General) quoted in Timber lake . *African in Crisis: the Causes, the Cures of Environmental Bankruptcy.* London: New Society Publishers.

2. There are disputes as to whether this is even correct since the elite in Africa is seen as an agents of international capitalism, having no power of its own. See for example Mueller 1980.

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3. The state has been at the centre of economic organisation in many success cases -- socialist as well as capitalist. See the example the cases of Russia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. See Okita 1984 for Japan and South East Asia, for example.

4. Decentralization programmes such as that of Tanzania in 1972 created cetral government authoritative bodies at the regional and district levels. Local governments (appointees of a local people) were automatically banned by the inception of the decentralization Programme of 1972, but have since been reinstated since 1982.

5. See Senghor 1965, and Nyerere 1968, but such claims have been questioned by Saul 1975, Rodney 1974, Shivji 1986, Moody *et al* 1976 and Freider 1986, among many others.

6. See, for example Coulson 1982, First 1983, Hanlon 1984 and Saul 1985.

7. See, World Bank 1981.

8. See for example a special issue of Southeast Asia studies (journal) Vol. 22 No. 4 in which there are a collection of articles to emphasize the role of the state in the nations discussed.

9. See McCarthy (1982) who discusses the case of colonial administration in Tanganyika.

10. See Weaver and Kroenemer 1981 and Sandbrook 1986:324.

11. See Mwapachu (1976) on the implementation of "ujamaa" villages in Tanzania to compare to McHenry's treatment of the colonial administration's (village) concentration centres (McHenry 1975).

12. See, for example Hyden's (1980) treatment of an "uncaptured peasantry" in Tanzania.

13. That administrative orientation is most likely to result into a reinforcement of the Mathew principle (Mathew 25:29) that -- "For unto everyone that hath shall be added/given and he shall have abundance, but from that hath not shall be taken away even that he hath", and no wonder agricultural extension agents pay more visits and supply more to the rich farmers than to the poor.

14. See Munishi (1987)-- a study of popular participation in Tanzania indicates a dominance of manipulated and passive participation than popular and active participation.

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