

CONTENTS

	Page
The Arusha Declaration Revisited	1
<i>J. Hartmann</i>	
Economic Co-operation Among Developing Countries: Status and Prospects	12
<i>S.M. Wangwe</i>	
War on Idi Amin: Towards A Synthetic 'Theory' of Intervention	24
<i>I.S.R. Msabaha</i>	
Ghanaian and Nigerian Perspectives on American Foreign Aid	44
<i>Yaw Agyeman — Badu and Kwaku Osei — Hwedie</i>	
Prospects for Africa — Latin America Co-operation	63
<i>A.K. Mhina</i>	
BOOK REVIEW	
The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia	74
<i>Jan Kees Van Donge</i>	

J. Hartmann

INTRODUCTION

The standard view of recent development policy-making in Tanzania is that the Arusha Declaration was the basis for the adoption of socialist policies. Surprisingly, no attempt has been made to subject such a historic document to critical examination. By adopting a micro-analysis of the processes through which the Arusha Declaration was debated and formulated, it has been possible to document and explain ambiguities and weaknesses within the policies. This approach has also enabled me to develop a number of issues which may be of practical and theoretical significance.

The analysis shows that Tanzania has a tripartite system of policy-making composed of the President, the Party and the Government. Each state organ functions independently of the other, introducing into the process of policy-making its own priorities and concerns. Thus, although the President was the initiator of the Arusha policies, its formulation was greatly influenced by the Party, and later modified by the Government. This explains the contradictions in the Arusha Declaration as development strategies.

The theoretical significance of this approach is that the concept of the state would have to be used with greater caution, since the concept denotes a monolithic entity which can conceal the complexities and relationships governing and operating within the state apparatus. The concept of a tripartite system offers us a more fruitful approach because it enables us to trace the various conflicting positions and priorities more concretely in sponsoring a particular policy.

To understand the Arusha Declaration and the tripartite system of policy-making, we have to understand something about the Tanzanian state. Briefly summarised, the 1965 Interim Constitution which created the One Party State in Tanzania separated the institutional functions of policy-making from implementation, which originally had been vested jointly with the Government. The responsibility for policy-making was given to the Party, TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), while that for the implementation of policies was vested with the Government. Since 1962 the President has enjoyed executive powers and has been the head of both organs of the state. This position allows the President to co-ordinate Party and Government affairs as well as to make policy decisions independently of both organs. Under the present institutional arrangement, the Government cannot formulate policies but, as the analysis of the Arusha Declaration will illustrate, it can influence policies indirectly via the Presidency. This situation in turn often forces the President to change his support from one organ to another in an attempt to balance conflicting priorities and positions. It is within these institutional arrangements that we shall analyse the development of the Arusha Declaration.

The Arusha Declaration

The policies of the Arusha Declaration originated from the President independent of both the Party² and the Government.³ The President was mainly pre-occupied with the problems of maintaining political stability. The 1960s was a period of immense political instability in African countries. No fewer than 26 of the then 35 African states experienced some form of military intervention.⁴ Tanzania experienced three crises: firstly, the army mutiny of 1964; and secondly, the foreign policy crisis of 1964/65 when Tanzania quarrelled with Britain over UDI in Rhodesia, with West Germany over the Hallstein doctrine and with the USA over its surveillance activities in Tanzania.⁵ The third crisis was the University of Dar es Salaam students' demonstration in 1966 against the newly instituted National Services scheme. In addition, there were the constant dangers emanating from the possibility of external intervention posed by colonial Portugal in neighbouring Mozambique and Ian Smith in Rhodesia.

Nyerere's concern with political stability and foreign policy issues were reflected in his Opening Speech in Arusha at the National Executive Council meeting of the Party. But Nyerere was also concerned about the effects of withdrawal of aid on the development of the First Five Year Plan as a result of the crisis.⁶ His speech called for a development strategy which could be based on the mobilisation of the people to counteract the effects of lack of funds and to consolidate political stability.

The president's opening speech and final party document

At the meeting of the National Executive Council held in Arusha, Tanzania on 26-28 January 1967, the President gave an unpublished speech in which he outlined broadly, and in popular language, the ideas of socialism, self-reliance and the Leadership Code, which were to form the basis of the Arusha Declaration policies.

Firstly, the President asked the question: Is Tanzania really independent? He contrasted the idea of political independence with the economic dependence of Tanzania on foreign countries. He argued that economic dependence brought about exploitation.⁷ The President argued the case for the nationalisation of foreign capital as a means of removing the economic linkages with foreign countries.

Secondly, the President argued that Tanzania must not depend on money to bring about development. Tanzania, he emphasised, must utilise its labour to generate wealth. The President spoke of the need to strengthen the Party because it could mobilise labour. In a meeting of the Regional Commissioners held at Arusha on 24 January 1967, just prior to the NEC meeting, Nyerere had explicitly stated that TANU must step up political education and orientation for its leaders, party cadres and party members.⁸

The third major issue in the President's speech stressed that there should be no exploitation within the country. Nyerere further argued that income differentials were not necessary because man's basic needs did not differ from one to another. This moral justification for equality brought him to the Leadership Code, which was aimed at reducing income differentials between the leaders and the masses. It called for leaders to reduce their salaries and to receive only one salary.

Nyerere developed his ideas consistently and used both political and moral arguments to convince his audience to accept the policy of socialism, self-reliance, and the Leadership Code, which was an integral aspect of strengthening of the Party. Socialism was linked to the idea of removing external exploitation through nationalisation; self-reliance was implied in the idea of activating labour in

rating development; and the Leadership Code was to reduce the gap between leaders and the masses and bring about equality. The successful achievement of these goals would create an autonomous nation, independent from economic and political pressures of foreign countries and a nation whose political stability was consolidated in social and economic justice.

Although all three ideas were important, nevertheless, Nyerere gave greater importance to the policy of the Leadership Code and the policy of Self-Reliance than to the policy of Socialism. It appears that Nyerere used nationalisation of foreign capital, which he knew was popular with the Party activists, to pave the way for acceptance of the conditions of the Leadership Code. Nyerere explained it thus:

Nationalisation, well very little — what is there to nationalise in Tanzania?... I think it (nationalisation) has prepared the mood for everything. It is very difficult after nationalisation to oppose self-reliance or to oppose the conditions of Leadership.⁹

Nationalisation, according to Nyerere, was of secondary importance, "although not more publicity than the other ingredients of the Arusha Declaration".¹⁰ The other ingredients were the policy of self-reliance and the conditions of Leadership. Nyerere again re-emphasised a similar point when he stated that the biggest challenge in the policies of the Arusha Declaration was not nationalisation but the policy of self-reliance.¹¹

The Party's formulation of the President's opening speech

The NEC appointed a Committee of Eight at the Arusha meeting to study the President's speech and give its recommendations to the NEC.¹² This committee appears to have influenced the final published form of the Arusha Declaration. The chairperson of the Committee of Eight was Barongo, Regional Commissioner and at the time also a junior minister to the Ministry of Agriculture. The Agenda was divided into three parts: the first part dealt with the policy of Ujamaa (Socialism), the second part with the policy of Self-Reliance, and the third part with the strengthening of Tanu.¹³

The Committee of Eight's discussion of the President's ideas is important because of its influence on the ideas of the Arusha Declaration as we have come to know them. We shall see how the Party was able to project its pre-occupations onto the President's. We can do this by comparing Nyerere's Opening Speech and the final form of the Arusha Declaration policies.

The Policy of Socialism

The final published version of the Arusha Declaration (AD) gave greater importance to the policy of nationalisation than Nyerere had originally intended. This was achieved by making public ownership an integral aspect of socialism. Thus:

The major means of production and exchange are under the control of peasants and workers.¹⁴

The official document also rejected the use of private capital in the creation of socialist development:

The policy of inviting a chain of capitalists to come and establish industries in our country might succeed in giving us all the industries we need, but it would also succeed in preventing the establishment of socialism.¹⁵

The Arusha Declaration gave a higher priority to agriculture and downgraded the manufacturing sector.¹⁶ This aspect was absent in the President's Opening Speech, suggesting that it can be attributed to the Committee's recommendation. Two reasons may explain this policy shift. First, the heavy bias towards agriculture at the expense of the manufacturing sector may be attributed in part to the chairperson of the Committee, who had been a junior Minister in the Ministry of Agriculture. Secondly, since the policies rejected private capital investment, it appeared logical to de-emphasise the manufacturing sector, since it was the most dependent on private funds for its growth.

The policy of Self-Reliance

The policy on Self-Reliance, unlike that on Socialism, was completely based on Nyerere's ideas given at the Opening Speech. There was no modification but nor was there any form of elaboration, especially in its methods of achieving a self-reliant economy.

The Declaration began with the assertion that the aim of self-reliance was to "move the people from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity". But this achievement could not depend on money. The attitude that "money is the basis of development and that without money we cannot develop is wrong"¹⁸

The policy paper then outlined a strategy of development which would be based on the assets Tanzania possessed, that is the people (labour), the land, good policies and good leadership. It also emphasised hard work and intelligence. However, the ideas had been expressed by Nyerere in his Opening Speech. We could argue that those concerned with the agenda on the policy of self-reliance failed to reformulate Nyerere's ideas into a viable developmental strategy. They merely restated the President's ideas without studying or elaborating their implications in developmental terms.

The strengthening of the party

The third part of the agenda dealt with the strengthening of the Party. What seems surprising is that there was no policy document which emerged from the meeting on how to strengthen the Party. Instead only ad hoc statements appeared emphasising the establishment of Party branches in all places of work,¹⁸ and the training of Party leaders, members and cadres in political education.¹⁹

The Party did not elaborate further on the Leadership Code but appeared to have accepted Nyerere's position that leaders should not receive more than a certain salary. Other equally important political criteria such as competence and skills were not seriously considered. This failure weakened the organisational growth of the Party.

We could argue on this basis that the Committee of Eight failed to evolve a policy on how to strengthen the Party. The emphasis on party branches, political education and Leadership Code were not a sufficient condition for the creation of a self-reliant economy, capable of meeting the Government's need for sustained economic growth. These variables only imparted a moralistic vision of a socialist state without a corresponding material base.

We can conclude that the Committee of Eight and the discussions which took place at the NEC meeting at Arusha in 1967 were able to strengthen the Party's position in areas which Nyerere had not given a very high priority (i.e., in the area of nationalisation) but did not elaborate on areas which Nyerere had considered crucial, namely, the policy of self-reliance, the policy of good leadership and the strengthening of the Party. Furthermore, the rejection of an industrial development policy in the Arusha Declaration also shows that the Party activists had seriously considered the implications of a development strategy which was based only on peasant-based agriculture.

These deficiencies weakened the policies of the Arusha Declaration. For instance, the failure to find a consistent policy on mobilisation affected the policy of self-reliance. The Party failed to evolve a developmental strategy which could generate revenue or contribute towards developmental expenditure and thus make the economy self-reliant. The Party merely criticised the existing policies of obtaining funds from private sources but offered no other alternatives.

The statement that self-reliance is based on the land, the people, good leadership, intelligence and hard work is a tautological statement. A developmental strategy is based on the assumption that these factors are in existence. It would indeed be very difficult to evolve a developmental strategy if there were no land, labour, or some form of rational leadership. It would appear that development was conceptualised as a process which required the injection of economic inputs and organisational ability. This oversight hindered the formulation of a viable developmental strategy in the Arusha Declaration. These deficiencies also caused concern about the problems for the Government which was responsible for the implementation of policies and for the generation of wealth in the country. We shall now consider the Government's reaction to the policies of the Arusha Declaration and how it sought to rectify the deficiencies.

The government's discussion of the Arusha Declaration policies

We have seen that under the 1965 Interim Constitution the Government (Cabinet) was responsible for the implementation of policies. How was the Arusha Declaration discussed in the cabinet? According to a former Government Minister interviewed by the author:

The discussion at Cabinet in relation to private capital and its role in development was general. Nobody knew what to do. One minister tried to establish government statement on private capital but was stopped by the president.²⁰

It would appear that the Cabinet's discussion of the Arusha Declaration policies was cut short because of the "political" status of the document, while the NEC discussed the economic implications of the Arusha Declaration policies in a very restricted manner. In different ways, therefore, the discussions of the Arusha Declaration as a development strategy were one-sided. Neither organ considered the economic implications of the policy of socialism (public ownership) and self-reliance within the context of chronic problems of capital and manpower in Tanzania.

Both the First Three Year Plan (1961-1963) and the First Five Year Plan (1964-1968) saw Tanzania's economic backwardness in terms of limited monetary

production: the predominance of the subsistence sector and the absence of manufacturing sector. For instance, during "the years 1960-1962 80 per cent of food consumer goods purchased by Tanganyikans were imported and 80 per cent of foodstuffs consumed did not pass through any market economic"²¹ Another obstacle to accelerated growth was the lack of manpower, especially in education and in the technical training of the people. For instance, the 1964 Plan pointed out that in 1963 only 1.7 per cent of the school age population attended Form I to III.

The major solution to the problems outlined by both Plans was increased production, which could be achieved by private capital. The Second Five Year Plan, for instance, relied substantially on the private sector to finance 116 million shillings towards development. This reliance on the private sector (48 per cent) was considered essential by the Government because of its recognition of the economy's limited capacity to generate and expand production through its own internal resources. By encouraging foreign and local capitalists to invest, the Government hoped that the burden of generating the necessary revenue would come from private investment rather than from individual labour through taxation. It was held that only through capital investment in production could a higher rate of capital formation be achieved which could finance the infrastructure of health, education, housing which was oriented towards supporting labour since the majority of the population fell into that category.

The following speeches given by senior government officials of ministerial rank illustrate the Government's concern for increased production through private capital to finance development:

..... there is an upper limit to the investment capacity of the government, owing on the one hand to the low level of domestic resources and on the other to constraints upon its ability to service overseas borrowings, the economy of the country will continue to depend to an appreciable extent upon the private sector to accomplish the necessary accretion of capital.²³

Minister of Finance, Bomani:

Socialism is not only concerned with the control of economic development and with the distribution of wealth. It is also concerned with the expansion of wealth, with the growth of output, with the raising of incomes, with the increase of welfare.²⁴

Minister for State in the President's office, Jamal:

What we must constantly tell ourselves is that revolutions ought to have clear objectives. To have revolutions just for the sake of having them is to commit a deception on the people. They will never forgive us. Let us always remember that.

Jamal then warned:

To attempt to produce without regard to cost of production can be self-defeating and a retrograde effort. To produce to the maximum extent at the lowest possible cost and then not to save for further investment will be equally frustrating and could lead to stagnation. This is not a matter of Eastern or Western ideologies and 'ism'. These stark economic facts staring us in the face. Ignore them if we will, it can only be at our peril. Every single activity, every attitude, every approach of ours must be determined

by the recognition of these realities. We are not the only struggling developing country in the world, nor are we the most gifted and favoured of them all.²⁵

These speeches illustrate the Government's concern for increased production which was used to support its policy of private investment and manpower.

The policy of socialism and self-reliance as enunciated by the Party conflicted with the Government's policies of private capital and the aim of maintaining and developing qualified manpower in positions. Rapid nationalisation would increase and make demands precisely on the resources which the Government lacked, manpower and funds. The Government's concern was further increased when Party activists in Parliament and in Party meetings called for the nationalisation of local capital, which the Arusha Declaration had left unnationalised.²⁶ The Government feared that its major aim for achieving economic growth would be compromised.

But later events during the Arusha year showed that the Government had not entirely lost its influence on the President. In February 1967 there were clarifications issued on the policy of socialism and self-reliance, which clearly reflected Government position and priorities. The first policy paper to clarify the Arusha Declaration policies was on the role of private capital. The policy paper entitled "Public Ownership in Tanzania", stated that its aim was to "make clear the areas where public ownership and control are required, and the areas where private investment is, and will be, welcomed".²⁷ This policy document argued that Tanzania was still interested in receiving both local and foreign capital because private capital "may act as a catalyst to our own effort".²⁸ As a result of this clarification, the Foreign Investment Protection Act (1963) was not repealed. The policy document was included as part of the Arusha Declaration policies although it was written a month after the NEC meeting at Arusha.

The second area in which the Government clarified the policies of the Arusha Declaration was in relation to manpower. The same policy paper (Public Ownership) argued that ownership did not imply management, which required skilled staff:

But policy has to be implemented. This is done by management and staff together, and taking an industry under Government ownership or control does not eliminate the need for skilled work and astute commercial expertise. We shall be asking the existing managers to continue in their present work.²⁹

The Government made a clear distinction between ownership and management, and by doing so was arguing for the continuation of employing skilled manpower to manage the newly-nationalised industries. This was motivated by its concern for economic growth, which was considered important by the Government to enable it to achieve developmental gains.

We can see, therefore, that the Government attempted to re-interpret the Arusha Declaration policies in a manner which would enable it to meet its institutional functions and responsibilities as caretaker of the economy. It gave more emphasis to the role of private capital and manpower considerations. This re-interpretation however, invariably changed the Party's orientation of Arusha policies. We shall now consider how the President attempted to explain these new changes to the Party.

The President's explanation of the Arusha Declaration's reinterpretations.

The new economic emphasis given by the Government, the need for private capital and manpower, in the policies of the Arusha Declaration necessitated an explanation and another reclarification by the President to the Party. Thus, at the Special TANU Meeting (1967) held to discuss the policies of the Arusha Declaration, the President expressed very strong arguments against further nationalisation, especially that of local capital. Nyerere argued that to embark on a rapid expansion of nationalisation would be adventurism and not revolutionary. Policy-making, he explained, must consider the practical problems of development. Nyerere stated:

A true idealist is one whose one eye aims in the direction of his journey and the second eye is aimed at the path, it sees mud, thorns, anti-hill, etc.

But the idealism of a distant vision only is blindness for you can fall in a pit.that I would like honorable TANU members to learn, the purpose of wanting to know the facts, facts, facts, facts, do not ignore facts, and make a decision intuitively.³⁰

At the Mwanza TANU Annual conference of that year, Nyerere's Opening Speech emphasised Tanzania's poverty and the need to expand production. Nyerere stated that Tanzania was a poor country and the problem of distribution of wealth was like sharing one rabbit between ten people:

The reason for the poverty is that we do not produce enough, to enable all of us to live a respectable life. We are like ten hunters who seek to divide one tiny rabbit.....There is no way in which to increase our wealth except by increasing our production.

The Government could, since it is very easy, order the Bank of Tanzania to print lots of bank notes and to give everyone a whole sack of notes annually, however, this would not be able to increase our wealth at all. You do not increase wealth through an increase in printing notes.

.....Even if we were to divide our resources our poverty would remain the same. There is no way we can increase our wealth without first increasing our produce.³¹

In these two speeches Nyerere explained Tanzania's backwardness and economic problems in terms of limited production rather than in terms of exploitation or profit appropriation. Indeed, improvements in living standards could only come from increased production and not from redistribution of wealth. Nyerere explained the problem thus

But the real problem in Tanzania is not redistribution between the rich and the poor, but a fair distribution of wealth of contribution to national expenses, between the very poor and the poor, between the man who can barely feed himself, and the man who can barely clothe himself.³²

At the same meeting in Mwanza, Nyerere also made an important clarification on the question of self-reliance. Certain people, he said, thought that self-reliance meant self-sufficiency in manpower and financial resources. It meant nothing of the kind. "Self-reliance meant that the country had to make the maximum use of available resources".³³ Nyerere defined a development strategy of self-reliance in the following manner.

It means to choose a different path of development, independent of people of foreign nations. It means to agree to cooperate with other countries and to be prepared to give and receive aid. It means to accept that foreign aid can enhance the progress of our projects. But it also means that our (development) path must be the one which we Tanzanians can afford.³⁴

In relation to the need for qualified manpower Nyerere stated.

To employ an inefficient person just because he is a Tanzanian when the job he has to do is crucial for our development, is not self-reliance, it is stupidity.³⁵

To conclude this section, the explanations issued by the President on the policies of the Arusha Declaration show that the President had accepted the Government's interpretations of the Arusha Declaration policies. At Arusha, the President had emphasised the problem of exploitation in Tanzania's development; at Mwanza, however, he was emphasising the need to expand production and the need for private capital in development. This showed that Nyerere, by September of 1967, had swung back to the Government's way of thinking.

Conclusion

Tanzania had a tripartite system in which Government, Party and President were involved in various ways in policy-making, had different concerns and priorities and were able to exert different influences on the processes of policy-formulation. Each organ was pre-occupied with its own problems and was able to re-interpret and superimpose its interests on the policies of the Arusha Declaration at different stages of its development — and in the process, changing the policies themselves.

Nyerere's Opening Speech was chiefly concerned with the maintenance of political stability and accordingly, gave greater emphasis to the policy of self-reliance and the Leadership Code. The Party, however, at its NEC discussions of the Arusha policies, gave nationalisation (public ownership of the means of production) greater emphasis. Later on, the Government was successful, to some extent, in restoring the centrality of economic growth based on the need for private investments and skilled manpower in the policies of the Arusha Declaration. This process illustrates that the State was not functioning as a homogeneous entity, but rather as different entities which were able to intervene at different stages with different priorities in the formulation and clarification of the policies. The Arusha Declaration was not an Act but a process.

I would argue that this form of policy-making did not only weaken the effectiveness of the policies of Arusha, but that the unresolved issues between the need for private capital and state control of the economy, for instance, created serious problems in the development process, because each organ stressed its own contribution and emphasis, and evolved its own policies, making co-ordination of policies and the planning of resources and implementation almost impossible tasks to achieve in Tanzania.

It is interesting to note how the Arusha Declaration developed into something different from Nyerere's original intention. We saw that the President had used nationalisation as a bait to catch the Party activists into accepting the Leadership Code, but it would appear that the Party activists in turn were successful in making nationalisation the most important and prominent feature of the policies, thus relegating the Leadership Code and the policy of Self-Reliance to almost insignificant importance. This was achieved (whether consciously or unconsciously) simply by not developing seriously and in-depth the two policies into viable and integrated policies of development. We could argue that Nyerere, in the process of out-manoeuvring the Party activists was himself outmanoeuvred.

But the Government, on the other hand, attempted to outmanoeuver the Party. This was achieved by the Public Ownership Policy which 'clarified' the policies of public ownership. Contrary to its title, the policy document was concerned mainly with private capital. As we saw, the President supported the Government, but there is no evidence to suggest that the Party accepted either the Government's or the President's clarifications on the Arusha Declaration policies. A major conflict between the Party and the Government in Tanzania has centered on the need for private investments in development.³⁶

Various political scientists, such as Msekwa have tended to over-simplify the complexities of the Tanzania political system either by de-emphasising conflicts,³⁷ or as in Pratt's work, by over-emphasising Nyerere's moral principles.³⁸ By attempting to reduce such a complex political situation to one actor — in the case of Msekwa, the Party, and in the case of Pratt, Nyerere — these authors leave us with an over-simplified picture of the process from which the Arusha Declaration emerged.

FOOTNOTES

1. Von Freyold, M. *Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania. An Analysis of a Social Experiment*, 1979, London, Heinemann.
2. Pratt, Cranford. *Critical Phrase in Tanzania, 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy*. Cambridge University Press, 1976.
3. Cliffe and Saul 1972
4. Msekwa, Pius. *Towards Party Supremacy*. Arusha: Eastern Africa Publications, Ltd., 1977.
5. Pratt *op cit*
6. Jacob, Abel. "Israel's Military Aid to Africa 1960-66," in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9,2, 1971.
7. Pratt *op cit*
8. Hartmann, Jeannette "Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy: The Case of Tanzania," in *The African Review*, Vol. 7, University of Dar Salaam, 1977.
9. TANU NEC Minutes — 26-28 January, 1967. Unpublished.
10. *The Nationalist*, January 14, 1967; (Dar es Salaam).
11. *ibid* March 6, 1967.
12. *ibid* March 6, 1967.
13. TANU, Party Special Meeting. Dar es Salaam; Government Printer, 1967. p.15
14. TANU NEC *op cit* p.67
15. *ibid*
16. Nyerere Julius K. *Freedom and Socialism*. London: Oxford University Press, 1968. p. 233
17. *ibid* p. 241
18. *ibid* p. 241
19. *ibid* p.235
20. *The Nationalist*, February 5, 1967
21. Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), Party Annual Conference, Mwanza, 1967. Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.
22. Interview with government Minister, July, 1981.
23. United Republic of Tanzania. *Development Plan 1964-1969, Volume One*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printers. p.7
24. United Republic of Tanzania. *Development Plans 1961-1963*. Dar es Salaam: Government Printers. p. 12
25. *ibid* p. 13
26. *The Hansard*, Tanganyika/Tanzania Parliamentary Debates, 1964, 1967, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam. p. 24
27. *ibid* p. 69
28. *ibid* pp.50, 61. TANU Annual Conference 1967 *op cit*
29. Nyerere *op at* p. 27
30. *ibid*
31. *ibid* p. 256
32. TANU Party Special meeting, *op cit* p. 96, 103
33. TANU Annual Conference 1967 *op cit* p. 40—42.
34. *ibid* p. 43
35. *The Nationalist* October 18, 1967
36. TANU Annual Conference 1967, *op cit* p. 36
37. *The Nationalist* October, 18, 1967.
38. CCM, *Mwongozo wa CCM* 1981
39. URT, Ministry of Interior. *A. Guideline to Investors in Tanzania* 1979
40. Msekwa, *op cit*
41. Pratt, *op cit*