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## CONTENTS

|  | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. <b>Bureaucracy and Socialism in Tanzania</b><br><b>The Case of the Civil Service</b> .....  | 1    |
| <i>R.S. Mukandala</i>  |      |
| 2. <b>Organisational Perspectives And Issues In Tanzania's Development</b><br><b>Administration</b> .....                                | 22   |
| <i>Gaspar K. Munishi.</i>  |      |
| 3. <b>Depo Provera — A Choice Or An Imposition On the</b><br><b>African Woman: A Case Study of Depo Provera Usage in Maiduguri</b> ..... | 39   |
| <i>S. Ogbuagu</i>  |      |
| 4. <b>From Co-operation to Generalised Co-development</b><br><b>Alternative Models of Franco African Economic Relations?</b> .....       | 52   |
| <i>E. Nwokedi</i>  |      |
| 5. <b>The Producer in the Palm Oil Export of South-Eastern</b><br><b>Nigeria in the Era of 'Legitimate Commerce'</b> .....               | 63   |
| <i>O.N. Njoku</i><br><b>(REVIEWS)</b>  |      |
| 6. <b>Capitalism and Racism in South Africa</b> .....  | 77   |
| <i>Jan Kees van Donge</i>  |      |
| 7. <b>The Development Process: A Spatical Perspective</b> .....  | 83   |
| <i>R. Chanda</i>   |      |
| 8. <b>The Unproductive School</b> .....  | 85   |

R. S. Mukandala

## Introduction

The state bureaucracy is important in any state, but especially so in the Third World where, it has been argued, it has at times transformed itself into a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, a class with its own interests riding roughshod over the masses, and conniving in and facilitating their exploitation by international capital. Inevitably, therefore, it has occupied a central place in the discussion of the socialist policies in Tanzania since 1967 when they were announced. Several issues have been raised about the Tanzanian state bureaucracy. Some writers have drawn attention to what they perceive as the transformation of this social category into an effective class, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and, therefore, into the enemy of the people; indeed, the immediate enemy in the struggle for socialism. Others, however, have drawn attention to the continued incapacitation and demoralisation of this group, overburdened by increasing demands, formulated in a very hasty manner without the benefit of an effective weighing of needs and means while their conventional neutrality and status have increasingly been 'stripped' from them. Yet others have been dismayed by the increasingly falling rates of performance, rapid growth rates in size, etc.

In almost all these writings however, no distinction has been drawn between the various constituents of the bureaucracy, especially between the civil service and the bureaucracy centred in the parastatal organisations and, to a lesser extent, the party bureaucracy. Although the latter is not, strictly speaking, a state bureaucracy, in the case of Tanzania it has been treated as such partly because of its involvement in running/supervising state activities and, very importantly, because it is financed by the state. This non-differentiation of the various bureaucracies is important principally because it masks very significant differences between them, for the various parts have been affected in different ways by the socialist policies. The demonstrated positive effect of socialist policies on the parastatal bureaucracy's income, for example, has not applied equally to the civil service earning capacity. Secondly, the bureaucracy and its various parts have not been deeply studied except to evaluate the impact of the socialist policies reaction to these. No in-depth studies have been made of the internal dynamics of the bureaucracy, its internal structure, emolumative policies and other aspects. Firstly, generalisations based on the conception of the bureaucracy as a homogenous entity, without differentiating it into its constituent parts, have been misleading. As mentioned above, the civil service bureaucracy and the parastatal bureaucracy have had several differences in terms of the impact of the socialist policies on them, the masking of which leads to erroneous conclusions. Secondly, and related to the above, even within the constituent parts of the bureaucracy several differences occur. To mask them and argue that the civil service as a whole, for example, has prospered under socialism, does very little in reflecting reality and aiding its comprehension.

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It is within this perspective that this paper dissects the state bureaucracy concentrating on the civil service. The structural changes as well as the duties and responsibilities thrust on the civil service in the wake of the Arusha Declaration are first described, followed by analyses of the change in civil service size, income, effectiveness and efficiency.

### **Civil Service Organisation, Duties and Responsibilities**

The Arusha Declaration's reliance on the state as the major innovator, implementor and generally the cutting edge of the development efforts has resulted in some changes in the civil service — the state connection making control of the former by the latter more effective and efficient thus ensuring the service's capacity to meet the new duties and challenges.

Prior to 1967, the civil service functions were essentially similar to those in colonial times consisting of (a) maintenance of law and order; (b) the collection of revenue; (c) the provision of basic service such as roads and water supplies; and (d) the advancement of exports of all types of commodities. The policy of socialism and self-reliance, emphasising as it did the "development of people and not things", greatly multiplied the duties and responsibilities of the civil service. In addition to the above activities, it had to promote rural development, including the provision of educational, water and health services to the whole population and supervise a range of activities with which they were hitherto uninvolved through their supervision of the newly-created parastatal organisations. Such activities included banking, insurance, internal trade, transport and communication, as Nyerere has commented, "by our commitment to socialism, we have given them all more work";

However, the multiplication of tasks for the civil service was also accompanied by the creation of new organisations under the supervision of ministries although some of the activities hitherto carried out by ministries were given to parastatals created for the purpose as, for example, in the case of the water supply for Dar es Salaam, national banks and tourism development. In addition, the creation of parastatals in some areas did not result in a ministry reducing its involvement to the supervision of such parastatals. The ministries continued to carry out their activities in such fields side-by-side with the parastatals. For example, in agriculture the ministry continued to offer extension services alongside the crop authorities and, for a time, co-operative unions.

The above changes in duties and responsibilities led to, or were accompanied by, several structural changes. Up to 1967, the civil service was managed by about six institutions, whose duties and responsibilities often conflicted. These were the Central Establishment Division in the Office of the President; the Civil Service Commissions; the National High Level Manpower Allocation Committee (NHLMAC); the Manpower Division of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Economic Planning; the Treasury; and, lastly, the Ministry of Labour.

The Central Establishment Division in the Office of the President, whose Principal Secretary was the head of the civil service, played a major role in civil

service recruitment, administration and discipline. It was also directly responsible for those civil servants earning more than TShs. 37,800 per annum whose appointment, promotion and discipline was the responsibility of the President of the Republic. It was also responsible for the assessment of all manpower needs for all the ministries and other para-ministerial organs such as the army and the police.

The National High Level Manpower Allocation Committee received the above assessments and combined them with the other assessments of the needs of the sectors of the economy made by the Manpower Division in the Ministry of Manpower Planning and Administration (where the Treasury was involved in determining funds available). The NHLMAC determined priorities and drew up targets for such training institutions as the University of Dar es Salaam and also allocated graduates from the government training institutions to the various employers in the public sector. The appointment, promotion and discipline of these and all others in the civil service was the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission created under the Civil Service Act of 1962. The Local Government Civil Service Commission carried out those duties in respect to the employees in local government. The Ministry of Labour, under whose auspices the only Trade Union — NUTA — operated was also involved in the determination of the terms of service.

Three important changes have taken place within this structure since the Arusha Declaration. First were the decentralisation measures of 1972. These measures had several consequences for civil service organisation; (a) regions were elevated to the level of ministries and treated as such. The Regional Development Director (RDD) could now carry out duties in respect of the civil service hitherto carried out by the Principal Secretary; for example, as an appointing authority, "to the same extent as a Principal Secretary of a Ministry"<sup>2</sup> and (b) local government was dissolved and the Local Government Civil Service Commission merged with the Civil Service Commission. Apart from these changes however, very little else was changed and problems did not take long to arise. The conflict between the various organs involved in the management of the civil service, arising from clashing jurisdictions were now compounded by a new source of tension between the seventeen regions and their almost one hundred districts. Personnel were not only under a District Development Director, but also under the Regional Development Director, the relevant ministry in which an employee was a functionary and also the various central organs. This conflict led to a second fundamental change in 1974.

This change consisted in the creation of the Ministry of Manpower Development, under the Office of the President, out of the former Central Establishment Division in the same office, whose Principal Secretary continued to be head of the civil service. The Ministry was charged with the following functions:

- a) to co-ordinate the intergrating, streamlining and formulating of the nation's manpower policies;
- b) to arbitrate on the duties and responsibilities of the various organs involved in civil service management;

c) to facilitate the provision of central services to the various organs and the service as a whole by publishing and distributing agreed policies and interpreting specific aspects of policies on request; and

d) to monitor and ensure that agreed policies were implemented.

While integrating the various organs and clarifying their duties and responsibilities the move also allocated an increasingly active role to the Prime Minister's Office, which was to promote and represent the manpower requirements of the regions. This grew out of the fear that sectoral ministries might be more concerned with staffing their national programmes and that while each region knew its requirements, it had difficulty in viewing them in the light of other region's needs.

While solving some problems the move definitely created others. The Prime Minister's Office now played a role almost equal to that of the Ministry of Manpower, acting as the clearing house for all the regions' civil service needs and policies. The Ministry of Manpower, even though operating under the President's Office, did not have a free hand with respect to the regions as envisaged in the policy.

This led to the final major change in 1980, namely shifting the Ministry of Manpower from the Office of the President, to the Office of the Prime Minister. The Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office also replaced the Principal Secretary in the President's Office as head of the civil service.<sup>3</sup> The responsibilities of co-ordinating the regions could now be done alongside the co-ordinating of other sections of the civil service.

The above changes were accompanied by changes in civil service appointment and promotion policies. Prior to 1972, the appointment and promotion of staff earning TShs. 41,400 per annum (MS 7) and above was Presidentially controlled through the Central Establishment situated in that Office. The appointment and promotion of officers earning TShs. 17,860 (MS 3) to 37,880 (MS 6) was the responsibility of the various sectoral ministries subject to the approval of the Central Establishment and the Civil Service Commission. Sectoral ministries had overall power in the appointment and promotion of employees earning TShs. 4,080 per annum (O.S. 1) to TShs. 10,260 (MS 2). Definite changes in these procedures followed each of the steps mentioned above. Firstly, decentralisation, accompanied by the elevation of regions to the level of sectoral ministries, turned the Regional Development Director into an appointing authority like the Principal Secretary of a Ministry. In practice, this meant that the RDD and District Development Directors could make appointments to the operational service level of staff — i.e. those with salaries not exceeding TShs. 10,260/- per annum.<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, following the creation of the Ministry of Manpower, there was development and realisation of the problem of over-employment in the civil service which was partly attributed to the one-man hiring procedure at the operational service level, on which we shall have much to say later on. In 1967, special committees known as KAMUS<sup>5</sup> were established in every region as well as ministries, independent departments, exchequer and audit departments, and the National

Assembly. These committees were charged with the recruitment of employees earning a salary of up to TShs. 10,260/- (MS 2), a job hitherto done by a Principal Secretary or Department Director alone.<sup>6</sup>

### Civil Service Size

One of the most glaring facts about the Tanzanian public service in the period under consideration is its increase in size. As Table 1 below shows, the number of established posts increased from 65,708 in 1967 to 101,182 in 1972, was 191,046 in 1976, and the Ministry of Manpower put the total number of posts at 295,352 in 1980.<sup>7</sup> This increase in size had taken place in spite of two parallel trends. One was the rapid localisation rate involving the replacement of expatriates by indigenous Tanzanians. While in 1967 the localisation rate was 74.16 per cent of officers in the senior and middle grade posts, by June 1976 the rate had shot up to 93.4 per cent. The second parallel trend had been the persistently high vacancy rate in the middle and senior levels. While the vacancy rate in the two categories ran at 10 per cent at independence in 1961, it had increased to 29 per cent by 1972 and it now averages 36 per cent.<sup>9</sup>

**TABLE I**  
**ESTABLISHED POSTS IN THE TANZANIA CIVIL SERVICE**  
**1966-1981**

| Year | Total Establishment Posts | Annual Rate of Growth | Cumulative Annual Increase (1966=100) |
|------|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1966 | 65708                     | —                     | 100.00                                |
| 1967 | 80239                     | 22.11                 | 122.11                                |
| 1968 | 88327                     | 10.061                | 132.17                                |
| 1969 | 94050                     | 6.47                  | 138.64                                |
| 1970 | 95318                     | 1.34                  | 139.98                                |
| 1971 | 99564                     | 4.45                  | 144.43                                |
| 1972 | 101182                    | 1.62                  | 146.05                                |
| 1973 | 129832                    | 28.31                 | 174.36                                |
| 1974 | 167665                    | 29.13                 | 203.49                                |
| 1975 | —                         | —                     | —                                     |
| 1976 | 191046                    | 26.66                 | 230.15                                |
| 1977 | —                         | —                     | —                                     |
| 1978 | 250296                    | 31.01                 | 261.16                                |
| 1980 | 295352                    | 18.00                 | 279.16                                |

Source: Compiled from: *Survey of Employment and Earnings* (Dar es Salaam Government Printer) 1966 and 1977.

This high vacancy rate has been largely due to the absence of cash voted for these posts and also due to the unavailability of personnel to fill these posts. Indeed, well over half of these vacancies fall within the science-based and highly skilled technician cadres, who are scarce in Tanzania. There are no vacant posts in the lower levels of the service.

The vacancy and localisation rates notwithstanding, the public service has been expanding at a very fast rate. This becomes clearer when comparing the expansion rate of the public service with the expansion rates of national total wage employment and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As shown in Table II, while the GDP expanded at annual rate of 3.88 per cent between 1966 and 1976 (excluding 1967 which figures are not available), and total wage employment increased at an annual rate of around 2.84 per cent between 1966 and 1976, the civil service expanded at an average annual rate of 13.3 per cent, a rate more than treble GDP and total wage employment.

In terms of time, this expansion rate was greatest soon after the Arusha Declaration in 1967/68; increasing again after Decentralisation in 1973/74, and has continued climbing rapidly again since 1977, as is evident from Table I. In terms of location within the service, expansion has been greater in the lower grades of the service. As shown in Table III, while the senior and middle categories together expanded by about 10,000 posts (149 per cent), and indeed the number of posts in these categories has stabilised at around 16,000, the lower categories alone expanded by about 100,000 posts (136 per cent). Also, as already noted, 36 per cent of the posts in the senior and middle categories (6,065 out of a total 16,805 posts) were vacant, while there were no vacancies in the lower categories. Moreover, recruitment into the lower categories had at times gone beyond the official establishment. According to Hyden for example, "In some regions, labourers have been employed outside of the approved establishment".<sup>10</sup> Lastly, as far as geographic location is concerned, the expansion was accompanied by a shift of more and more employees to the regions so that, as Table IV shows, by the end of 1980 73 per cent of the total civil service was situated in the regions.

Three arguments have been offered to explain this expansion. On the one hand, the state views the trend as a necessary consequence of the increase in duties and responsibilities thrust on the civil service since the Arusha Declaration in 1967.<sup>11</sup>

Mutahaba, on the other hand, attributes the increase to corruption and favouritism in recruitment by senior civil servants who:

have relatives — cousins and sisters — looking for jobs. They cannot support them for too long on the incomes they are left with after taxes, so they do what seems the most logical thing to do: have them placed in jobs either in their institutions or in the institutions of their friends.<sup>12</sup>

TABLE II  
PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE IN TANZANIA'S GDP, TOTAL WAGE  
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE SIZE 1966 — 1976

| Year                    | Total Employment | Public Service Size | 1966 Constant Prices GDP at  |
|-------------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------------------|
| 1967                    | 3.0              | 22.11               | 0.0                          |
| 1968                    | 1.4              | 10.06               | 2.1 at 1960 constant prices. |
| 1970                    | 2.1              | 1.34                | 5.2                          |
| 1971                    | 4.6              | 4.45                | 4.5                          |
| 1972                    | 3.3              | 1.62                | 5.3                          |
| 1973                    | 3.4              | 28.31               | 4.4                          |
| 1974                    | 4.1              | 29.13               | 2.2                          |
| 1975                    | 3.0              | 0.0                 | 4.6                          |
| 1976                    | 4.9              | 29.66               | 5.2                          |
| Cumulative increase     |                  |                     |                              |
|                         | 128.4            | 216.15              | 134.9                        |
| Average Annual Increase |                  |                     |                              |
|                         | 2.84             | 13.00               | 3.88                         |

Source: Compiled and computed from: *Survey of Employment and Earnings*. Government Printer Dar es Salaam 1966-1977.

**TABLE IV**  
DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS BETWEEN REGIONS AND CENTRAL  
MINISTRIES IN DAR ES SALAAM

**Lower Grades**

**Middle & Senior Levels**

|                             | 4,560/=<br>TO<br>4,620/=<br>p.a. | 4,800/=•<br>TO<br>5,880/=<br>p.a. | 6,000/=<br>TO<br>7,080/=<br>p.a. | 7,200/=<br>TO<br>8,160/=<br>p.a. | 8,400/=<br>TO<br>9,540/=<br>p.a. | 9,600/=<br>TO<br>10,320/= | 10,000/=<br>TO<br>11,880/=<br>p.a. | 12,000/=<br>TO<br>23,940/=<br>p.a. | 24,000/=<br>AND<br>ABOVE. | TOTAL   |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------|
| MINISTRIES                  | 1,846                            | 23,253                            | 4,567                            | 22,273                           | 6,356                            | 1,285                     | 2,142                              | 8,655                              | 3,889                     | 74,256  |
| EXTRA MIN-<br>ISTRIAL DEPT. | 205                              | 1,287                             | 1,836                            | 152                              | 97                               | 15                        | 355                                | 1,071                              | 305                       | 5,323   |
| REGIONS                     | 4,293                            | 67,546                            | 39,402                           | 33,794                           | 18,095                           | 6,463                     | 11,175                             | 28,220                             | 6,785                     | 215,773 |
| TOTAL                       | 6,344                            | 92,086                            | 45,805                           | 56,219                           | 24,548                           | 7,763                     | 13,672                             | 37,946                             | 10,979                    | 295,352 |

Source: Watumishi wa Serikali kwa Mwaka 1979/80. Ministry of Manpower Development, Dar es Salaam 1981.

**TABLE III**  
INCREASE MIDDLE & SENIOR VS LOWER CATEGORIES OF THE  
CIVIL SERVICE

| YEAR                  | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972   | 1973   | 1974   | 1975  | 1976   | 1977  | 1978   |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| MIDDLE<br>&<br>SENIOR | 6754  | 7827  | 7474  | 9419  | 10723 | 12733  | 13400  | 16183  | 17250 | 16805  | 16808 | 16805  |
| LOWER                 | 73485 | 80500 | 86576 | 85899 | 88841 | 88449  | 116432 | 171482 | -     | 174241 | -     | 173579 |
| TOTAL                 | 80239 | 88327 | 94050 | 95318 | 99564 | 101182 | 129832 | 167665 | 17250 | 191046 | 16808 | 250296 |

Source: Compiled from (1) Reference file EB 18/013 Ministry of Manpower Development Dar es Salaam 1967-1977.

(3) Survey of Employment and Earning (DSM Government Printe) 1966-1977.

(3) Annual Manpower Report to the President. The United Republic of Tanzania. (DSM Government Printer) 1966-1978.

Lastly, Adedeji sees the increase as:

Merely a manifestation of one of the bureaucratic phenomena, the fulfillment of Parkinson's law of the multiplication of work and staff.<sup>13</sup>

All these arguments do contain a certain amount of truth. Indeed, some increase was inevitable given the increased duties and responsibilities. This explains why, for example, the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which ushered in civil service involvement in the private sector, and the Decentralization measures of 1972, which involved the absorption of the former employees of the local governments which were then dissolved, were each accompanied by rapid rates of expansion. This does not, however, explain the continuing rapid rates of expansion from 1974 to the present, for there has not been any comparable major political or administrative move. Also, it must be borne in mind that some of the posts made necessary by development changes have gone unfilled. Indeed, the notion that some of the expansion was officially unplanned and even undesirable is strengthened by the government's move<sup>15</sup> in 1976 to reduce the civil service labour force by 20 per cent. The actual number of staff to be retired was given as 9,466.<sup>14</sup>

There are three interesting facts about this move. Firstly, the number of staff to be exed did not amount to 20 per cent of those in post but to less than 10 per cent of the labour force and to a mere 6 per cent of the total approved establishment. Secondly, within the same year, it came to light that people had been employed to replace those who were retired. In August 1976, an order had to be issued stopping the practice.<sup>15</sup> Thirdly, it was an isolated move. It was not part of, nor accompanied by, a broad reconsideration of the overall government hiring policies. For example, the government's commitment to hiring all graduates from post-secondary school training institutions and almost all high school graduates continued. A reconsideration of such a commitment was possibly difficult because of the government's ideology and other political factors. However, that commitment alone ensured the entry of at least 8,000 new recruits into the service annually. Although other isolated steps were taken on occasions their effect was partly neutralised by other equally isolated moves, some of them politically motivated, as in the special arrangements made for hiring many of the former members of the militia who had participated in the Tanzania — Uganda (Amin) War in 1979/80.

Adedeji's argument, while generally true, is also partial. To be complete, forces behind the manifestation of the law in the specific context of Tanzania must be spelled out. Also, the argument does not explain why the expansion has been more predominant in the lower grades of the civil service. It is at this point that Mutahaba's argument becomes relevant. The argument is made more credible by the fact that in 1977 the government implicitly acknowledged the problem of corruption and favouritism in recruitment and replaced the one-man hiring procedure for the lowest grades in the service by committees, although it evidently did not solve the problem.<sup>16</sup> This argument however, suffers from three shortcomings. Firstly, it tends to over-emphasise the element of personal (private)

motivation in the over-recruitment into the service. Hyden, among other researchers, has shown that officials tend to hire more and more labourers to compensate for the shortage of machinery and tools. In the absence of trucks, for example, labourers are hired to carry loads.<sup>17</sup> Secondly, and connected to the above, no account is taken of the government's hiring policies and commitments, some of which have been mentioned above. Thirdly and very importantly, the argument is incomplete because it does not go into factors which have rendered the high officials income inadequate, taxation notwithstanding.

### Public Service Income

The Public Service remunerative structure has undergone one major change since 1967 as in 1974 the number of salary scales were increased from forty-one to fifty-six. This number was reduced by one to fifty-five in 1980. This change was essentially a refinement of lower and middle grades and did not in any way affect the senior grades. Also, it was only a change of increased quantification within grades. It did not affect the overall structure of the service which is still grouped into lower, middle and senior categories as it was in 1967, as recommended by Adu in 1961.

As far as the renumerative policies are concerned, there has been a more far-reaching change affecting all the grades, although in opposite directions. This is because the policies have had as their goal the restriction of the extent and range of salary and emolument differentials in the public service. These policies can be grouped into three major types.

In the first type are those policies which have involved the freezing of high incomes and restriction of the earning capacity of higher officials from other sources. Immediately after the Arusha Declaration, upper salaries were frozen and a policy was adopted of "the top to stand still until the gap (between the lowest and higher salaries) narrowed".<sup>18</sup> This policy was supplemented by a progressive taxation policy, under a 'pay-as-you-earn' (PAYE) scheme, whereby the more the employee's income, the greater the amount paid in taxes.

The Arusha Declaration also included a strict leadership code which stated that: every party and government leader must be either a peasant or worker and should in no way be associated with the practice of capitalism or feudalism; no party or government leader should hold directorship in any privately-owned enterprise, receive two or more salaries, nor own houses rented to others. In addition, under Regulation 21:3b, public servants could not be appointed, promoted or transferred to a post whose salary was more than TShs. 12,800 per annum without satisfying the code's conditions.<sup>19</sup> Consequently, in 1968, all those officers who did not satisfy the conditions of leadership were required to give government due notice of relinquishing their posts.<sup>20</sup> In the mid-seventies, the party further ruled that the leadership code would also bind all members of the party, even if they were not 'leaders' by the Declaration's definition.

In April 1971, the screws were even made tighter for not only was renting houses to others illegal, but the Building Acquisition Act passed that year stipulated that: any public officer owning a house worth more than TShs. 100,000 in annual rental or cost of construction would lose it by being acquired by Government.<sup>21</sup>

The second type of policies are those which involved increasing lower incomes. In 1972, the statutory minimum wage was raised to TShs. 270 per month and in addition, an allowance of TShs.20 was to be paid to all those in the two lowest salary scales. This was followed in 1974 by wide ranging salary increase based on the principle of TShs. 100 per month increase or 15 per cent of gross salary, whichever was greater. In real terms, the top salaries were increased by 6 per cent and the lowest by 15 per cent. There was another boost in 1980 when all the employees in the lowest categories received a raise of TShs. 100 per month. A year later, there was a blanket increase of salaries ranging from a 20 per cent increase for the lowest salaries and declining progressively to 15 per cent for the highest incomes.

Lastly, the third type of policies are those which have involved the abolition of some of the privileges hitherto enjoyed by middle and senior grades, and the extension of others to all the employees in the service. Privileges which were abolished or severely restricted included personal transport, which was to be provided only to principal (permanent) secretaries, regional development directors and high court judges — the highest officials in the service. These three categories were also the only ones who could have an entertainment allowance and who could travel by air. Also, loans to public servants to acquire cars and domestic appliances, such as cookers and refrigerators were stopped in 1968 and 1976, respectively. Civil servants of all ranks can now borrow money from the government to acquire bicycles or reading glasses. Privileges extended to all ranks in the service included housing, hitherto a preserve of the high officials. It was made into an entitlement for high officers and an eligibility for the rest of the employees. More importantly however, house rent was to be charged not according to the grade of the house (economic rent), but according to one's salary: with senior grades paying 12½ per cent of their salary as rent per month, middle and lower grades paying 10 per cent and 7.5 per cent of their salary as rent per month, respectively, irrespective of the quality of house occupied.

All categories in the service were made pensionable. All employees and their families were eligible for health and education — as is the case for all Tanzanians. The conditions for maternity leave had hitherto granted leave to those women on permanent and pensionable terms, and only if they were bonafide married, and indeed stipulated that: it will be necessary before granting maternity leave for principal secretaries and heads of departments to satisfy themselves not only whether the parties are bonafide married officers, but also, whether pregnancy occurred within wedlock.

These conditions were changed in 1975 and paid leave was to be granted to all females in the service, "immaterial of whether or not the officer who applies for such leave is lawfully married".<sup>23</sup> Finally, it was stipulated in 1970 that in case of an officer's death, the government was to shoulder the expenses for a coffin, grave, shroud, wreath and transport of the body of the employee to the place of burial, at the station at which the death occurred, irrespective of rank.<sup>24</sup>

These policies have had several effects. First, the post-tax differential between the highest and lowest salaries paid to civil servants has declined from 33:1 in 1967, through 15:1 in 1974, to 5:1 in June 1981.<sup>25</sup> As indicated above, the movement has in the main been accomplished by reductions at the top and levelling upwards at the bottom. Secondly, the measures extending privileges like housing, have affected the distribution of existing utilities without in any way increasing them. Combined with the rapid increase in the size of the public service, the measures have led to an acute shortage of some of the utilities. In Arusha Region, for example, while there were 6,000 staff eligible for government housing in 1980, there were only 900 units available. Thus, the majority of these houses were shared by two or more officers, and between 50 and 70 per cent of staff were either unhoused by the government or inadequately housed.<sup>26</sup> The conditions of service for civil servants have not been easy. Tanzania's President, Julius Nyerere, was very correct when he said:

Tanzania's senior officials in Government and parastatal organisations should receive full credit for the spirit with which they have accepted the worsening of their economic position, for in recent years they have suffered from a real reduction relative to other workers .....<sup>27</sup>

However some people may not be convinced about the nature of 'the spirit' being praised by Nyerere in view of the civil service effectiveness and efficiency to which we now turn.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

This topic arouses more controversy than any other considered so far. This is due partly to the problem of evaluating civil service effectiveness and efficiency for, as Baguma correctly points out:

There are not, as there are in the commercial, industrial or mining sectors, measurement tools to evaluate labour input and output, and also inefficiency can be contained for quite a long time in the public service without bringing it to a halt.<sup>28</sup>

There have been two contending schools on the question of civil service effectiveness and efficiency. President Nyerere represents those who argue that there has not been any fall in effectiveness and efficiency. In 1968, he said:

I would like to take this opportunity to express our nation's deep indebtedness to them (the bureaucracy). Had we continued along the road to capitalism, the members of our civil service, local government service, our army and police, our doctors, auditors, administrators, and so on might well have been among the privileged class of Tanzania. By our commitment to socialism we have given them all more work at the same time as we have closed their road to individual wealth.<sup>29</sup>

Nine years later while evaluating the Arusha Declaration, he not only noted the worsening of the civil servants' economic situation as already mentioned, but he went on to say that:

The country is fortunate in their patriotism, and their commitment to our socialist policies. Those armchair revolutionaries who denounce those young men are talking like idiots. Not all young nations have been so well served by their educated leaders. <sup>30</sup>

The other school, basing themselves on casual observations argue the opposite, though not all fit into Nyerere's category of 'armchair revolutionaries'. Pratt, previously Nyerere's advisor, maintains that:

Contemporary rural administration (for example R.S.M.) has reached a genuine state of crisis — a point where the ineffectiveness of major public services has become so obvious that it becomes difficult to justify further public investment in these sectors. In many cases what is involved is more than inefficiencies caused by a lack of appropriate skills. Rather what has happened is that whole sections of the government have broken down as effective operating mechanisms. <sup>31</sup>

Others agree with Pratt's assessment. In Mutahaba's opinion:

There is no dispute about the fact that there is presently an increase in irresponsibility and inefficiency within the Civil Service. <sup>32</sup>

while Baguma maintains that:

One needs only to visit a Ministry, the University, or any similar Institution to see for oneself the sort of sluggishness, carelessness, negligence, etc. at work; <sup>33</sup>

and finally, Hyden is of the opinion that:

The bureaucratic bourgeoisie when forced to run, has been constantly failing and not without costs to the country's development. <sup>34</sup>

These claims based on casual observations are strengthened by several government reports. Not only do these reports confirm the trend towards inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the civil service, but they also offer a proper time perspective to the trend. This trend did not start in 1967 with the Arusha Declaration, in 1972 with Mwingozo as it has been claimed by many observers. In the annual report for 1963, the Controller and Auditor General observed that:

Several of the following things have been observed to occur frequently.

- a) official telephones are used on non-official business and no payment is made;
- b) equipment bought with government money is not recorded and thus not recognised as government property;
- c) government equipment is loaned to people for a very long period of time;
- d) government bills are not paid promptly as required; and
- e) no records are kept on the use of government vehicles and there is therefore little control on the use of vehicles. (author's translation from Swahili). <sup>35</sup>

The problem of inefficiency, therefore, did not start with, but prior to, the Arusha Declaration. What cannot be denied, however, is the fact that the problem has tended to increase since the Arusha Declaration. What cannot be denied, however,

In 1968, the Principal Secretary to the Central Establishment issued a circular in which he pointed out:

... the casual regard officers seem to have to attending to office duties. There is a lack of evidence on the part of officers for enthusiasm in their work and for willingness to put themselves out in the public interest. This is particularly noticeable in the matter of office hours. Officers are late in coming to work, ... regularly read newspapers in the office ... It is not uncommon to find registry officers closing the registry before the closing time or typists leaving the day's work unfinished ... unauthorized absences from work during office hours are becoming more noticeable. This attitude on the part of the junior officers is to be deplored. <sup>36</sup>

That this trend has continued is confirmed by the fact that in 1978 the Ministry of Manpower Development set up a committee to look into the problem, which presented its findings in form of a Cabinet Circular in 1980.<sup>37</sup> The report is said to have identified defiance of work ethics, poor execution of tasks, and misuse of government funds and property as key areas of increasing indiscipline.<sup>38</sup> Although the report was not available, a careful look through the reports of the Controller and Auditor-General sheds light on what may have been discovered.

Firstly, while account reports have to be rendered by 53 government accounting officers on or before October 31st of each year, only 29 accounting officers did so in 1976/77 and a mere half (26) in 1977/78.<sup>39</sup> Secondly, in that same year, for example,

Out of the 20 Regions, the accounts of two Regions were received late ... of the remaining 18 Regions the examination of whose accounts was completed, the account of *only four* Regions could be awarded by certificate of correctness. (emphasis added). <sup>40</sup>

This was partly due to the third problem namely, unvouched and improperly vouched expenditure:

A considerable portion of the expenditure charged to the votes, is not supported by payment vouchers or documents such as local purchase orders, invoices, master roles, receipted pay rolls, etc. In the absence of proper vouching, it is not possible for me to ascertain the genuineness of the expenditure or the purpose for which the payments were made and audit is thereby rendered ineffective as a deterrent. <sup>41</sup>

Fourthly, and as a result of the above, there has been a continuous problem of over-expenditure as, Table 5 indicates. Fifthly, the Auditor-General further observes that:-



*The continued decline in the Standard of Accounting during the last 5 years and the general slackening of financial control and supervision resulted in a continued evidence of embezzlement of cash and stores. (emphasis added)* 42

This is borne out by facts for, as Table 6 shows, the unaccounted cash increased from thousands of shillings in the 1960s to millions in the 1970s. Meanwhile, outstanding personal advances and travelling imprests amounted to TShs. 48,946,267 million in 1974/75 and had increased to 60,720,000 million by 1977/78.<sup>43</sup> During 1980/81, the annual loss shot up to 221.79 m. There is, therefore, more than mere casual observation to back the claim that there has been a trend of declining effectiveness and inefficiency in the civil service.

Falling levels of performance has commonly been attributed to Mwongozo, especially Article 15, while its impact:

has been mainly that the administrator or the supervisor sensitive to the pending scandals if he follows the old management styles of commandeerism, has decided to play it cool. Because of the change however, some workers have developed negative attitudes to work which have resulted in inefficiency. 44

This argument suffer from two related shortcomings. First and foremost it is a historical. Problems of falling levels of performance started long before Mwongozo, as shown above. Secondly and related to the above, the argument ignores other contextual factors within which, and together with which, Mwongozo has been able to have the said consequences.

Three factors are especially important. First, Mwongozo was a result of a mode of policy making which has made policy implementation difficult. This mode of policy making, which Hyden has called "we must run while others walk" has consisted in the urge to do everything and do it at once, resulting in unending launching of 'operations', often without a proper evaluation of means and ends. Such policy making has not suprisingly, thrown the bureaucrats 'out-of-gear'.<sup>45</sup> Secondly, and connected to the above, such 'operations' have more often than not been part of, or been accompanied by or even resulted in, large-scale reorganisations and restructurings as mentioned in an earlier section of this paper. At times this has involved the disbanding of organisations such as co-operative unions and local authorities only to recreate them after a few years. This has led to uncertainty on the part of the bureaucrats and made the meshing of bureaucratic gears more difficult.

Lastly, mention must be made of the lack of organisational resources. As shown by several researchers, shortages of the physical support of funds, vehicles, and operational supplies have constituted a major constraint to both staff performance and job satisfaction. Wily shows, for example, that 61 per cent of all the vehicles in Arusha Region in 1968 were either in poor working condition or off the road. According to her estimate, this factor affected 75 per cent of all the staff in the region in one way or another. Hyden also concludes that:

In fact low moral among the workers is often a result of unavailability of material and equipment necessary to do one's work well. 47

Important here is also the issue of staff welfare. As pointed out earlier, some of the equalisation measures taken after the Arusha Declaration affected the distribution of existing utilities of housing and personal transport without in any way increasing them. This has led to shortages of such utilities and affected staff morale. According to Wily, for example:

Accommodation is a key factor in inhibiting job satisfaction and overall morale of staff.<sup>48</sup>

Also, stagnant salaries for middle and senior staff in the light of a high rate of inflation may have contributed to the noted rise in personal advances and travelling imprests as officers have tried to supplement their income. This had furthermore led to long absences from work places, reinforcing inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Most likely, the above must have also contributed to the already noted increasing pattern of embezzlement of cash and stores.

Mwongozo has, therefore, been one contributing factor. At a general level, it has been part of mode of policy making which takes place in a context of resource scarcity and creates uncertainty by its very nature as well as the attendant reorganisations and restructurings which it promotes. More specifically, Mwongozo has undermined the 'coersive' means of eliciting compliance while at the same time the 'utilitarian' means has been undermined by the equalitarian measures, and the 'identitive'<sup>49</sup> means have become increasingly ineffective as the country has appeared to move further and further away from the officially-declared goals.

## Conclusion

It can be seen, therefore, that the civil service in the period under consideration was characterised by six major trends, which are:

- change and increase in duties and responsibilities;
  - a constant reorganisation and restructuring;
  - a decline in incomes and privileges of the organisation's senior officials;
  - an astronomical increase in personnel;
  - an accelerated decline in effectiveness and efficiency; and
  - an increase in corruption and embezzlement of public funds.
- Some of these trends were anticipated and consciously planned for, including the first, second, and part of the fourth which arose out of the efforts to equip the civil service with adequate capacity commensurate with the heavy responsibilities thrust on it by the socialist policies. This category also includes the third trend which developed from efforts to imbue the civil service with a 'socialist' character. These trends can, therefore, be squarely attributed to the socialist policies.

As for the fifth and sixth trends as well as the residue part of the fourth trend, ascertaining their causal factors is much more problematic. True, they were definitely connected to the socialist policies and occurred within the context of those policies and in the same time frame. Yet, any conclusion reached must be tentative because their causal factors seem to be a combination of the socialist policies and their articulation with other broader variables, a consideration of which lies outside the confines of this paper.

Lastly, to return to a problem raised in the introduction of this paper, it is very difficult to subscribe to the view that civil servants have become part of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie in view of the above. This is because firstly, these officials have low incomes and do not own the means of production. Secondly and more importantly, even if one considers the money acquired illegally, such cash, given the requirements of the leadership code, has either been squandered in consumption; stashed away in pillows and mattresses; or buried underground in play-yards and chicken-sheds as any reader of the *Tanzanian Daily News* would know. Either way, a negative move for class reproduction.

TABLE V  
CIVIL SERVICE OVER EXPENDITURE

| Year    | Total Votes in Excess | Total Amount in Excess Votes (millions) |
|---------|-----------------------|---|
| 1973/74 | 31                    | 91.27                                   |
| 1974/75 | 42                    | 342.38                                  |
| 1975/76 | 38                    | 269.21                                  |
| 1976/77 | 34                    | 96.37                                   |
| 1977/78 | 35                    | 125.87                                  |
| 1978/79 | —                     | —                                       |
| 1979/80 | 29                    | 229.79                                  |
| 1980/81 | 37                    | 676.88                                  |

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