

11. Tanzania Investment Bank, "Study on Performance and Productivity in Tanzania" mimeo, 1978, p. 41.
12. *Udoji Commission, op. cit.* p. 19.
13. *Udoji Commission, ibid* p. 20.
14. Kingdom of Swaziland, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry (Walwa Commission)*, 1975/76, Government Printer 1976, pp. 39-40.
15. Dale Yoder, *Personnel Principles and Policies; Modern Manpower Management*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood, 1961, p. 514.
16. Interviews with many senior government officials in Kenya in 1979 supported the point.
17. The exercise was initially approached haphazardly and had as its major objective: the equalization of pay in the government and the parastatals and not the development of a rational unified grade structure. So the cart was put before the horse.
18. *Udoji Commission, op. cit.*, p. 159.
19. *Wamalwa Commission of Inquiry, op. cit.*, p. 123.
20. *Udoji Commission, op. cit.*, p. 52.
21. Kingdom of Swaziland - *Report of the Commission of Inquiry*, Wamalwa, p. 36.
22. Republic of Kenya, *Organizations and Functions of Directorate of Personnel Management, Office of the President*, April, 1978, p. 7.
23. Public Servants have not been covered by the International Labour Organization Convention of 1949, which established the right to organize and collectively bargain, until quite recently. It is no wonder therefore, that trade unions for public servants and staff associations have in many of the countries remained underdeveloped or are toothless bull dogs.
24. *Udoji Commission, op. cit.*, p. 53.
25. Republic of Kenya, *op. cit.*, The Commission thought that the increase in reported grievances which might result from the formalization of the procedure and its publicization might have positive results for the service and should be welcome. See p. 79.

## The Australian Governments' Changing Attitudes Towards Southern Africa - More Than Just Words of Sympathy for the Blacks?

Klaas Woldring\*

At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' summit, held in London in June, 1977, the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser made history by strongly attacking the racial policies of the white minority regimes of Southern Africa. He made history because no Prime Minister representing the generally conservative Liberal Party had done much more than mildly disapprove of the inequalities of white rule. In many respects Fraser must be rated as one of the most conservative amongst Prime Ministers produced by his Party, especially as far as the domestic economic policy is concerned and also in relation to Russian 'global ambitions.' Thus, his stand at the Summit was perhaps least expected by those not too well informed of the formation of government policy towards Southern Africa and Third World issues, and apparently it even came as a surprise to some who were.

*The Australian Financial Review* went as far as suggesting that 'compared to Malcolm Fraser, Gough Whitlam's (the previous Prime Minister) performance on the international stage is emerging in retrospect as close to the "imperialistic lakely" tag so often contributed by conservative Australian Prime Ministers by Third World countries.'

Fraser's words in London were forceful and could not be misunderstood. "Apartheid is an offense to the human dignity and a scourge to the dignity of man." Fraser followed Whitlam's uncompromising line on racist sport - a stand that produced a sharp difference of opinion with the New Zealand Prime Minister Muldoon, whose reactionary position on this matter is not admired in Australia. As regards Rhodesia, which he referred to as Zimbabwe, Fraser said; "I think white Rhodesians still hope by some means to muster world opinion in their support. Well, the more they know that they will not be able to do that the more they ought to understand that they have got to come to a proper accommodation in relation to the future, and I think that as each month passes, they ought to know that even more forcefully."

Fraser went on to comment, in another context, that he "didn't believe that there was a policy more offensive to humanity than apartheid." Fraser's rejection of international open market systems as

\*Klaas H. Woldring B.A. (UNISA), M.A. (Sydney) Ph. D. (UNSW) formerly lecturer in Political Studies, Northern Rivers C.A.E. Lismore NSW Australia. Now he is Senior Lecturer, University of Zambia, Lusaka.

inadequate and damaging to the opportunities of the Third World countries and "as belonging to the laissez-faire economics of the 19th century" certainly raised many eye brows in Australia and elsewhere coming as they did from a declared admirer of Milton Friedman and Ayn Rand. In a series of "Letters to the Editor" in national newspapers and in editorials Fraser's role reversal was attacked by some prominent Australians for various reasons. It was pointed out particularly that the Government's policy towards Aborigines was rather less generous than that of the preceding Labour administration; that neighbouring Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines were becoming increasingly apprehensive about the protectionist trade policies that had been adopted by the Australian Government.

In spite of these contradictions, it was plain to all that the December, 1975 election promised that a Fraser Government "would return to traditional friends" and "the castigation of the Whitlam administration for giving aid to African guerillas" were not only set aside at the Commonwealth summit but that these policy positions had been reversed.

Meanwhile, aid to African guerillas, which has always taken the form of humanitarian assistance, had actually continued after December, 1975 and Australian funds were also being provided to Mozambique to compensate it for economic sanctions applied against Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). Australia's contribution was provided in the form of 286 tonnes of corned meat and 3,800 tonnes of wheat as well as a quantity of skimmed milk powder, which, including cost of freight, was estimated at Aus. \$1 million. In addition, Aust. \$80,000 was promised for a special fund established under the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation for technical assistance to Mozambique.

In 1976, \$25,000 went to the UN Fund for Namibia (the fourth grant in a series initiated by the Whitlam administration which for instance provided \$150,000 to SWAPO and MPLA jointly for medicines and education).

Australia has been a member of the UN Council for Namibia since 1975, a situation which has been accepted and continued by the present Government. It is well-known here that the Foreign Minister, Andrew Peacock, whose policies are hardly distinguishable from those of the previous Prime Minister, who actively pursued a pro-Third World and anti-Southern Africa policy, at least verbally. In a major statement in March, 1977 Peacock argued:-

The last year has been the tempo of change in Southern Africa quite decisively, bringing the region to the forefront of the world's attention. The meaningful questions now are not whether fundamental changes will take place but when they will take place. These questions are clearly related: fundamental changes will have to be made sooner - very much sooner - if they are to be made comparatively peacefully and if the whole region is to avoid the incalculable consequences of large-scale outside intervention. Obscuring this fact will serve no-one's interest. We recognise the difficulties which have grown with the wasted years, but the future of all the people, both black and white, now

depends on making swift and resolute use of the little time remaining. This is why we have supported the process of negotiated change in Zimbabwe and Namibia. This is why, in pursuing a policy of maintaining a policy of correct diplomatic relations with South Africa, we have sought to convey very firmly that we not only oppose that regime's policies of racial discrimination without reservation, but we believe its political structure cannot indefinitely sustain the tensions and divisive forces inherent in a system which institutionalises racial inequality. The tragic and significantly sustained eruption of violence in Soweto underlines the validity of this message. It is one which is proper for us to convey and we will continue to do so. For what is happening in Southern Africa is significant not only in Africa; it demonstrates in most convincing terms the potency of the racial question in contemporary international politics and it has an important effect on the whole spectrum of third world-Western relations.<sup>1</sup>

Peacock is generally credited with provision of the major muscle behind the policy adopted by Mr. Fraser. There was some minor backtracking by the Australian Prime Minister, however, on the use of force when he clarified his position in London on this matter by saying that he did not want "anyone reading 'total support' for the liberation struggle - as stated in the final communique of the summit - as implying an obligation to provide armed assistance." But he did agree that the armed struggle was necessary and complementary to other efforts including negotiation and sanctions - even though it might be 'illegitimate.'

At the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid held in Lagos, Nigeria, from August 22-26, 1977 Peacock represented Australia and further explained the Government's new position. He stated that Australia opposed Apartheid on moral, intellectual and political grounds. The arguments for Apartheid were fraudulent and internally inconsistent. Politically, it was a design for disaster:

On some issues, morality and realism point in different directions and present difficult problems of choice. This is not the case in Southern Africa. In this instance, moral, intellectual and political considerations are mutually reinforcing.<sup>2</sup>

There can be little doubt that the sustained campaign organised by a relatively small core of dedicated anti-apartheid activists - usually operating on a shoestring budget - did arouse public opinion sufficiently for it to become increasingly aware of and critical towards official white policies in Southern Africa. Companies with interests and investments in South Africa and unduly benefiting from the low wages of Africans were exposed by them and urged to change their ways or withdraw from the involvement altogether. Boycotts of South African products especially of Woolworth's fish fingers come to mind. Woolworths imports were relentlessly attacked with the eventual effect that this company did turn to other sources of supply. Considering that Australian society is basically conservative and suffering from the effects of long-term isolation from the mainstream of Western protest movements in respect of Southern Africa, this has been a remarkable achievement.<sup>3</sup>

While verbal and UN support for the African and anti-Apartheid

causes could not be mistaken and also the amount of aid to African countries improved considerably under the Labour administration, trade relations were hardly affected. In fact, the volume of both exports to and imports from South Africa steadily increased until late 1975. The reasons for this are complex and both political and economic in nature.

	Exports to Sth Africa	Imports from South Africa	Total Aust. Trade with South Africa
1973/74	\$90.3m	\$36.6m	\$126.9m
1974/75	97.9m	43.9m	141.8m
1975/76	90.9m	36.9m	127.9m
1976/77	69.6m	56.6m	126.2m <sup>4</sup>

It must be remembered that South Africa is Australia's main African trading partner with the balance of trade (still) in Australia's favour.

In the Whitlam period, Australia began to benefit from a flow of private capital to South Africa — a situation that no longer exists. Australia's main export items to the Republic are cars and car components and the vulnerability of this industry is such that it would be economically and politically detrimental to any Australian Government to implement a trade embargo. For the Whitlam Government it would have been electorally suicidal since its stocks were already low in 1974 and 1975. Repeatedly, the Labour Government stated its preparedness to join in an economic embargo if her other major trading partners did so. This view was and is still held by Mr. Bob Hawke, President of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, an extremely powerful pressure group. Naturally, the chance of this occurring has always been very slim. The former Labor Minister for Overseas Trade, Dr. Jim Cairns argued that:

You cannot stop trade with countries because you don't like their policies. If we did that, we would stop trading with just about every country except Sweden and Switzerland. Rhodesia is still the only country with which Australia does not trade, because it is the subject of a UN resolution.<sup>5</sup>

A 'no promotion' position has been maintained by the Fraser Government and in view of the poor state of the economy during the past five years is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Peacock rightly claimed in Lagos that the Australian Government "does not actively promote trade with South Africa" and "our economic interests in South Africa have, as a consequence, diminished."

It would be fair to say that Australia, as a nation, has ceased to be the last friend of the white minority regimes. A pervasive awareness has emerged amongst her people to ensure that blacks in that part of the world will be given a 'fair go' in the future. Compared to South African society, Australia is essentially an egalitarian nation which does not take

kindly to restrictions on personal freedom. Significantly, a growing acceptance of multi-culturalism within the one political system is also spreading and could be taken as a model for future Southern Africa. The polite conservatism not to interfere in the domestic affairs of another country has given way, especially amongst the young, to a desire to be involved in these important foreign issues, to become better informed and to act accordingly.

It is realised much more now than, say, 10 years ago that the Australian complicity in Apartheid by some firms reflects poorly on her relations with the many surrounding Third World nations and that the successful tackling of still outstanding Aboriginal issues is closely connected with the conduct of external race relations.

During 1978 the Australian Government has continued with its support to the guerilla forces in Zambia and Mozambique. It approved the Anglo-American Proposals for a Settlement in Rhodesia and indicated that the Internal Settlement can only be expected to work if the guerilla leaders are to be included in it. The implication of this position is clearly a rejection of the Internal Settlement as unviable and unjust. In June, 1978 when Mr. Fraser was in Europe, when the Zaire crisis erupted, pressure was apparently put on him to support a plan to save Zaire for the West. The Prime Minister declined, however, and he made it plain that he was more concerned with economic issues of the Third World than with taking sides in a political controversy with complications that could easily tarnish the favourable image that Australia is trying to build up in the Third World. As the *Australian Financial Review* stated "Mr. Fraser's relief at missing out underscores the massive changes that his government has made in Australia's view of its place in the world."<sup>6</sup>

A desire to play a constructive role in the implementation of the independence settlement in Namibia has prompted Mr. Peacock to promise Australian support for a UN Peace keeping Force in that territory. This followed discussions between Mr. Vance, Dr. Owen and himself early in 1978. Although this commitment is mildly opposed by the Department of Defence and sections of the conservative press (Australia has several of such involvements already and has no historical duty in Africa") an Australian contingent can be expected to be part of that Peace keeping Force - if it does materialize.<sup>7</sup>

That Australia has no historical duty does not mean that it could not play a constructive role in Africa. Actually, it could mean that for that very reason it is in a very advantageous position to play such a role. At the recent Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting, held in Lusaka in August 1979, the Australian delegation shone throughout. Mr. Fraser announced, on arrival, that Australia would give Zambia 60 grain storage silos each having a capacity of 100 tonnes (prefabricated, galvanised and easy to erect). The gift was made following an appeal by the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Shridath Ramphal, to members of the Commonwealth to assist Zambia in overcoming its economic difficulties. This was complementary to earlier food aid.<sup>8</sup> Mr. Fraser also

said that he would be presenting to President Kaunda a gift of library books on agricultural topics relevant to Zambia. The collection of books and periodical journals would be on agricultural science and include details of the Australian experience in Arid Zone farming. On the political front, the pessimism following Mrs. Thatcher's statement to the Australian National Press Club in Canberra, a month earlier, gave way to optimism in Lusaka. She had said on that occasion that Britain was unlikely to renew sanctions in November and that the Muzorewa - Smith regime would probably be recognised "a little later." If she was testing the water there, it proved to be quite chilly because Mr. Fraser immediately dissociated himself publicly from this position.

In fact much of the credit of persuading Mrs. Thatcher to see reason on this issue must go to the Australian delegation. Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Malcolm Fraser, first to reply to President Kaunda's welcoming address, set the tone of the meeting from the start. He reconfirmed the position taken by his government in relation to Southern Africa at the last meeting in London, in 1977, and repeated on several occasions since. Although the conference and the British government still regard the issue as Britain's responsibility, her record of efforts to find a solution to it has been extremely poor.

Nevertheless, the new Constitutional Conference to be held in London from 10th September onwards is in itself a breakthrough. If, however, no agreement is reached a country like Australia would seem to be in an advantageous position to try to resolve the deadlock. Australia can only be regarded as essentially a neutral power in this issue which is likely to consider the interests of all parties to the conflict more equitably than, say, Britain, the US or Nigeria.<sup>10</sup> If the London conference is a success these remarks equally hold true for the still formidable outstanding issues of Namibia and South Africa, possibly even more so. It is becoming increasingly clear that the political and constitutional re-organisation of Southern Africa is essentially an international concern. It is also obvious that all major powers have vested interests in the area which hinders them from acting as conciliators and mediators. The U.N. is not too well placed either, as in one sense it is dominated by Third World Powers extremely antagonistic to white South Africa but, on the other hand, when the chips are down, the Western powers still shy away from effectively sanctioning white South Africa.

The ability of white South Africa to extricate itself from the vicious circle of racial rule is questioned every where. Endlessly new schemes are drawn up which are supposedly breakthroughs and aim at ending Apartheid, but the reality is quite different. Heribert Adam has called this process rather kindly 'modernising racial domination!' I would prefer to call it intensifying political schizophrenia. The latest manifestations of this may be seen in Namibia where the DTA will not be backed by the for-

mer head of the Selous Scouts, Lt Colonel Daly, who is to form a special contingent of South African troops to keep SWAPO at bay. This latest development demonstrates that the white political leadership is beyond learning lessons from the most recent history of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). The causes of such a state of mental abnormality are manifold and may be worth examining in another paper. It is suggested, however, that further pressures alone - economic boycotts, isolation, effective divestment - could lead to increasingly abnormal and dangerous behaviour, e.g. the use of nuclear weapons. It is for this reason that new approaches may prove more fruitful in the future than mere isolation. Only the representatives of a few countries would qualify to engage in dialogue with people whose racial arrogance is probably waning but who are increasingly suffering from the stress of being under siege and of carrying international stigma.

If the international community is able to look beyond the dichotomy provided by the capitalist and socialist frameworks of interpretation, the negotiations about political re-organisation in Southern Africa may be moved to a new plane. It is at this level that I can see a role emerging for Australia as a mediator. Although perhaps less well-known internationally than their European and U.S. counterparts, Australia has some eminent constitutional lawyers and political scientists with a special interest in African affairs who could assist in this process of conciliation and reorganisation.

It would be an error, however, to accept the new policies of Mr. Fraser and his Ministers as support for socialist or even social-democratic ideals in Africa. To the contrary, most enlightened Australian conservatives now realise that continued white domination has become a distinct liability to the Western Alliance; that unless fundamental changes are introduced in South Africa itself soon, not only will there be a prolonged and bitter race conflict but that it is likely to end in a Marxist victory. To the present Australian Government the latter option would be more objectionable than black majority rule within the framework of some form of Western democracy and a mixed economy and it is prepared to act accordingly. Regardless of the ideological orientation that sustains such a position, the net effect is what matters at this point of time. The Fraser policy can only have come as a shock to white Southern African images of Australian traditional friendship.

Marxist interpreters of the Zimbabwean struggle for independence and social justice might view a more broadly based constitutional settlement as merely a marginal improvement on the Internal Settle.<sup>11</sup> On this reading, its aim would still be to keep Zimbabwe within the Western sphere of influence and its economy subservient to Western capitalist interests. Australian advocacy of participation by the guerilla leaders in a new government and the further reduction or elimination of white power, seen in this light, would fall well short of Marxist objectives. Very likely these objectives would be frustrated by a new settlement in the short run.

The practical choice for the ideologies in the Patriotic Front, therefore, is whether to pursue the guerilla war until final victory is achieved militarily or to opt for what may be termed the Eurocommunist approach. It would seem to me that the first option is too hazardous to be seriously contemplated and, possibly, that it is even counter-productive at this point of time.

Increasingly, the indications are that the opposition forces inside and outside Southern Africa as a whole should begin to examine social-democratic approaches to liberation as an additional, not an alternative, strategy towards a liberal socialist society. In particular, the proposed federal re-organisation of Southern Africa should be looked at as a device that could be used by those of a socialist orientation to further their cause.<sup>12</sup> It is interesting to note in this context that the Australian federation has many lessons to offer and it even provides a bi-ideological historical context both in its formative period and the 79 years of its operation.

The newly developed interest in African affairs by Australia is both remarkable and hopeful. It remains to be seen, however, that the present Australian Government will heed the understandable call by Donald Woods, a guest of the Australian National Press Club last year, to sever diplomatic relations with the Republic of South Africa.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. *Australian Foreign Affairs Record*, March 15, 1977.
2. 'World Conference for Action Against Apartheid,' UN Centre against Apartheid, *Notes and Documents*, December, 1977.
3. Neville Curtis, 'Australian Opposition to Apartheid,' UN Centre against Apartheid, *Notes and Documents*, January, 1977.
4. Data supplied by the *Department of Foreign Affairs*, Canberra, A.C.T.
5. *The Australian*, July 2, 1973, quoted by Curtis, op. cit.
6. *The Financial Review*, June 13, 1978.
7. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, August 2, 1978.
8. *Times of Zambia*, August 1, 1979. One of the silos was on display at the Lusaka Agricultural Show (2-6 August). In 1977/78 Australia made a financial contribution of K258,000 to a valuable UNICEF health program for mothers and children.
9. White Rhodesians of British and other European descent (of which there are several) who do not wish to stay in Zimbabwe under a black government might find Australia and suitable land to resettle in. See, for instance, *The National Times*, "The Rhodesians are coming," October 18-23, 1976. Australia attitudes to an expected stream of white Rhodesian refugees have many facets. Australia has become a home for refugees from many countries since WW II and there has been encouragement from the "Frontline" Presidents for the resettlement of those whites who would not wish to live under a black Government. In October, 1976 the official immigration policy changed somewhat in the direction of making it easier for Rhodesian whites to settle in Australia than for others. About 4,000 whites from Southern

Africa migrated to Australia in 1977, twice the number of 1976. In 1978 the number doubled again and this year a possible 10,000 are expected.

10. See my letter to *Times of Zambia*, August 12, 1979.
11. Vunguza Nyathi, 'Colonial Zimbabwe: A Synopsis of the Economy,' *The Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 7, July/August, 1978.
12. See K. Woldring, 'Southern Africa. The Prospects of Federalisation in Southern Africa,' *The African Review*, Vol. 3, 1973, pp. 453-478. The author is working on a book which will be titled:- *The Federal Principle and Southern Africa - A Road towards Social-Democracy for a Multi-Cultural Society*.