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EDITORS

The Politics of Consensual Decolonization

GARY WASSERMAN*

Their purpose is to capture the vanguard, to turn the movement of liberation towards the right and to disarm the people: quick, quick, let's decolonize. Decolonize the Congo, before it turns into another Algeria. Vote the constitutional framework for all Africa, create the Communaute, renovate that same Communaute, but for God's sake let's decolonize....

Frantz Fanon

Decolonization was 'the logical result indeed the triumph' of Imperial policies and tradition.

Harold MacMillan

Decolonization, as generally understood, refers to the transfer of political authority from colonial rulers to indigenous leaders within the framework of State sovereignty. In Africa decolonization involved two apparently contradictory thrusts. The most visible, and most widely discussed, was the disjunctive removal of colonial authority by the metropolitan power. Phrases such as 'emerging nations' and 'the twilight of European colonialism' illustrate the emphasis which had been placed on the disjunctive aspect of decolonization. But the disjunctive effects of decolonization, it will be argued, were secondary to the underlying continuity the decolonization process ensured.

Decolonization's other thrust preserved the colonial political economy and, beyond that, integrated an indigenous elite into positions of authority where they could protect the important interests of the colonial system. Decolonization, while breaking linkages of authority, reaffirmed other ties of economic dependency and elite compatibility. And, in the sense of being able to preserve certain values and processes outside a formal authority structure, decolonization was a reflection not of the weakness but of the strength of the decolonizing power and of its colonial political economy.

The discussion that follows is an attempt to draw a theoretical outline of the conditions and process of consensual decolonization¹ occurring in Africa in the early 1960s. The heart of the argument is that the decolonization process was shaped by an adaptive reaction of colonial political and economic interests to the political ascendancy of a nationalist elite and to the threat

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¹ "Consensual decolonization" is the process of transferring colonial political authority in which there is a large measure of agreement among the participants that the outcome of the process is to be independence. Cases where decolonization directly resulted from military conflicts (Algeria), or from sudden uncontrolled shifts of nationalist strength (Guinea), are excluded.

of disruption by the masses. It is based largely on research in Kenya on the bargaining of the European population during decolonization.²

THE DISJUNCTIVE PERSPECTIVE

The opposing perspective emphasizes disjunctive historical conditions as explanations for the colonial divestment. It makes two general points: first is the weakening of the colonial power's position in its colonies leading inexorably to independence; and second, is the disjunctive nature of the process of decolonization itself. The historical conditions underlining these points include the Cold War political environment, the rise of Third World nationalism, and the changing intellectual climate toward colonialism. These conditions are viewed as permissive incentives encouraging the peaceful and progressive attainment of independence.

The essential function of these conditions was to raise the colonial calculation of costs over benefits for the metropole. At some point metropolitan Government leaders came to view the formal political link with the colony as more expensive than it was worth, or soon to become so. As one student of British colonial policy wrote, "A point had been reached beyond which the prolongation of the old tempo and style of colonial policy would simply incur greater political, social and economic costs than Britain could hope to meet."³ In the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s the calculation likely contained a number of factors.

The East-West conflict made the Third World a battleground and a prize for the competing powers. The presence of communist and neutralist countries in international forums gave the 'other side' an opportunity to exploit the widespread distaste for colonial holdings. The rise of articulate, western-educated nationalist leaders threatening to raise the cost of maintaining colonial possessions undoubtedly accelerated the process of decolonization. The attainment of independence by colonies in Asia and Northern Africa had set a 'demonstration effect'. Independence for non-white States such as India and Ghana gave an impetus to the nationalist cause in other colonial territories. Examples of the costly, and unsuccessful, conflicts in Algeria, Indochina and Indonesia stood as precedents few colonial officials wished to emulate.

The intellectual climate had cooled toward the rectitude of the imperial mission. Colonization appeared to be an anachronism, an affront to universally proclaimed truths of the United Nations Charter and the Atlantic Charter. The benefits of colonies for the metropole were widely disputed both from the left and the right. The European powers were turning inward to meet domestic priorities and hopes for European unity. The Second World War had diminished the colonial powers' resources and its stature in the Third World. Crises like Suez in 1956 appeared to underline the new limits on the

2 See the author's "The Independence Bargain: Kenya Europeans and the Land Issue, 1960-62", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. XI, No. 2 (1973), pp. 99-120.

3 David Goldsworthy, *Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961* (Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 1.

power of the European colonial countries. Third World nationalism, self-determination and independence seemed to be historical forces whose inevitable time had come.

CRITIQUE

The argument against the disjunctive perspective is not that it is wrong but that it is incomplete and undimensional; that without an understanding of the continuous and adaptive functions of decolonization for colonial political and economic interests one is misjudging both the motives for and the consequences of the phenomenon.

The first point to be made about these historical conditions is that decolonization was not, in general, a *result* of them, but rather a *reaction* to them. As such they provide only a few insights as to *why* decolonization occurred and fewer still as to *how* it proceeded. For example, the East-West conflict encouraged decolonization because the decolonizing powers saw the process as a necessary lever to use against their communist adversaries. In his famous 'Winds of Change' speech in December 1959, the British Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, stated, "As I see it, the great issue in this second half of the Twentieth Century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West. . ." To drive nationalism back, he asserted, would be to drive it to communism.⁴ Beyond this, nationalist forces were seen as a potential ally in the Cold War struggle. In his important book, *British Policy in Changing Africa*, the former head of the African Division of the Colonial Office, Sir Andrew Cohen, stressed that "Successful cooperation with nationalism is our greatest bulwark against communism in Africa".⁵ American assistance was expected in stabilizing the post-colonial areas, both by maintaining traditional interests and by inhibiting foreign rivals' inroads in the contested Third World.⁶

From within the colony the disjunctive perspective views independence as a point in the linear development of a nationalist party. The party, initiated and led by an urban elite, spreads to the countryside, organizes, suffers reversals, reorganizes and finally gains independence for the colonial territory under nationalist leadership. Continuities from the colonial period are residual, holdovers which are soon to be removed as the new nation-state gains greater independence. The opposing notion that the State (and the party) is being further integrated into a transnational network is ignored. The struggle for independence becomes an aspect of political development resting on an assumption of the increasing autonomy of the State. Yet what is being developed is a political economy spawned and nurtured from 'outside'.

These disjunctive historical conditions are also incomplete in that there

4 As quoted by Dan Horowitz, "Attitudes of British Conservatives Towards Decolonization in Africa During the Period of the MacMillan Government, 1957-1963", (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1967), pp. 72-73.

5 Sir Andrew Cohen, *British Policy in Changing Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1959), p. 61.

6 Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

was no necessary connection between them and decolonization. All the colonial powers at some time or place stood resolutely against the 'winds of change'. The French in Vietnam, Madagascar and Algeria, the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in pre-War India and Kenya—all chose to use force to suppress indigenous movements with which they were unwilling or unable to come to terms. In these cases the previous conditions were all, to a greater or lesser degree, present. Nor, from within the colony, does the perspective deal with the rapidity and similarity of the process of decolonization in different parts of Africa. In the early 1960s independence came to territories where the nationalists were not yet well organized (e.g., Kenya), or where their leaders were not even demanding independence (e.g., Ivory Coast).

The questions, then, remain. What conditions explain the probability of a relatively consensual decolonization process occurring? What is the process of consensual decolonization? How did it proceed and to what ends? To answer these questions we shall formulate three central themes of consensual decolonization and discuss these themes in the context of the conditions and process of decolonization.

THEMES OF CONSENSUAL DECOLONIZATION

Within the process of decolonization, we can distinguish three major themes. These themes are both conditions for the attainment of independence and aspects of the decolonization process leading to that attainment. The first is the *adaptation* of the colonial elites to the removal of colonial authority. The second is the *co-optation* of the nationalist elites into the colonial system. The third is the *pre-emption* or control of mass discontent, ensuring the acquiescence of the masses to the process of consensual decolonization.

By *adaptation* is meant the changes in a social group aiding the survival, functioning, maintenance of achievement of purpose of the group. It is a reaction to threats both external and internal. There are two aspects to this definition. One, taken from the narrower use of the word in biology, refers to changes necessary for survival. The second aspect of adaptation refers to modification which aid the functioning or maintenance of a system or group, or to the achievement of their purposes. The one implies a gradual yielding to an inevitable alteration caused by a weakening bargaining position; the other is a more creative adjustment to new relationships and institutions considered not only as threats, but as opportunities as well. Generally the behaviour of the decolonizing power falls closer to the second pole of the definition.⁷

The process of decolonization is adaptive then in so far as it reflects the adjustment in political behaviour of the colonial political and economic elites to the removal of metropolitan authority. Implied by this is that these elites will seek to preserve their values and positions by altering their methods of influence, modifying their own structures and institutions, and identifying with

the new rulers, as well as seeking to affect their composition and behaviour. This adaptation is thus not only adaptive to decolonization, but is also an influence upon it.

Decolonization is *co-optive* in so far as it is the process of absorbing new or opposing elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of the colonial system as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence. Philip Selznick describes formal co-optation by an organization as resulting when the organization's legitimacy is called into question, and when there is a need of greater administrative accessibility to the relevant public. Co-optation is needed "when the requirements of ordering the activities of a large organization or state make it advisable to establish the forms of self-government". Selznick further asserts that the locus of significant decisions is preserved in the initiating group.⁸

Co-optation in the context of decolonization also involves the political socialization of the nationalist party. An important aspect of this socialization is the learning directly linked to recruitment into, and performance of, specialized political roles in the bureaucracy and leadership positions. Another aspect is the ostensibly non-political learning which nevertheless ultimately affects political behaviour. This would include the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and personality characteristics. That political socialization has an essentially conservative character with regard to existing political arrangements is a conclusion shared by a number of scholars.⁹

Finally, decolonization is *pre-emptive* in that it is designed to anticipate and prevent in advance the formation and mobilization of a mass nationalist movement. The political quiescence and subordination of the masses is a necessary condition for the attainment of independence as well as a goal of the decolonization process. Conflict encourages mobility, and the fear of widespread violence and mass uprisings is both a cause of, and a threat to, decolonization in the sense adopted here. This fear of mass mobilization is also the catalyst encouraging the consensual resolution of the bargaining process.

CONDITIONS

Using these three themes, a general picture of the conditions leading to consensual decolonization can be attempted.

The first condition present in the colony was that the indigenous elite should be able to rule consensually among themselves and functionally in terms of a mastery of the inherited political framework. The functional aspect not only implied that they be well-educated in the metropolitan mold but that they had 'maturity' or 'responsibility'. These vague though catchy phrases referred both to some competency by the elite in managing metropo-

8. Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), pp. 13-14, 259.

9. See Fred I. Greenstein, "Political Socialization", *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 14, pp. 551-5.

7. See *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

litan political procedures and to the absence of (as well as the elite's ability to prevent) upheaval in colonial-metropolitan relations.¹⁰ The need for elite consensus did not prohibit attempts to divide and isolate potential nationalist threats during the period of transition. This divide-and-rule strategy, however, gave way to a desire for political consensus or quiescence as independence neared and as the undesirable segments of the elite were eliminated.¹¹

The reason for this stress on consensus lay in a second political requirement of a colony for a successful consensual decolonization: the prevention of mass unrest. Disagreement among the indigenous elite on the rate, desirability and conditions of self-government could facilitate the formation and mobilization of mass nationalist opinion. As one American scholar wrote, "it is conflict that involves the people in politics and the nature of conflict determines the nature of the public involvement".¹² The prospect of mass mobilization was both a cause of and a threat to decolonization. Independence was a means (not always successful) of pre-empting the mobilization of mass discontent and maintaining stability at a low cost. The British Colonial Secretary, Ian Macleod, later wrote of his policies, "It has been said that after I became Colonial Secretary there was a deliberate speeding up of the movement towards independence. I agree. There was. And in my view any other policy would have led to terrible bloodshed in Africa. This is the heart of the argument. . ."¹³

This tacit agreement on the prevention of mass mobilization was to lead to the political irrelevance of the masses. Lavish praise was to be the only political contribution expected of the lower classes. The nationalist elite behaved ". . . to ensure the political superfluity of any political activity other than voting".¹⁴ The lack of significant mass involvement in politics continued with the formation of one-party States. Reflecting the weakness of their political system, one-party Governments acted to prevent the mobilization of the mass base by rival parties.¹⁵ The ruling party and its Government were in turn removed from mass involvement and pressures.¹⁶

This pre-emption or control of mass discontent through decolonization

10 For an excellent discussion of the concept of 'maturity' see Trevor G. Munroe, "Political Change and Constitutional Development in Jamaica, 1944-1962", (Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1969), p. 306.

11 One student of decolonization discussed Secretary of State Reginald Maudling's role in Kenya in 1962 in these terms: "Maudling's role in helping the Africans to resolve their own conflicts was a consequence of the policy of disengagement and of the supposition that in order to avoid a Congo-like situation unity among the Africans should be a precondition for independence". Horowitz, "Attitudes of British Conservatives", op. cit., p. 177.

12 E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 129.

13 Ian Macleod, "Trouble in Africa", *Spectator*, 31 January 1964, p. 127.

14 Munroe, "Political Change", op. cit., pp. 317-18.

15 E. E. Schattschneider points out that the exclusion of black Americans from southern politics in the United States was brought about at the price of establishing a one-party system. See *The Semisovereign People*, op. cit., p. 15.

16 Even in a State with progressive leadership, the insignificance for the population of modern political activities has received comment. See Henry Bienen, "The Ruling Party in the African One Party State: T.A.N.U. in Tanzania", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. V, No. 3 (November 1967), p. 15.

has been noted by a number of scholars. Richard Rathbone in his thesis on the "Transfer of Power in Ghana, 1945-57", quoted a letter from the Colonial Governor of Ghana, C. N. Arden-Clarke, in this context: ". . . you cannot slow down a flood—the best you can hope to do is keep the torrent within its proper channel". Rathbone concluded that the 1930s made clear to colonial officials that gradualism in Asian colonies would have to give way to rapid change if discontent was to be contained and stability maintained.¹⁷ Similarly, in Jamaica, Trevor Munroe found that the advance to self-government had little to do with the growth of nationalism, and that in fact rapid decolonization made mass nationalism unnecessary for the creation of the new State out of the former dependency.¹⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein summed up the pre-emptive strategy of the colonial authorities. He wrote that the response of the Europeans in most of Africa "was to come to terms with the middle class leadership by arranging a rapid transfer of power to them in the expectation of ending their verbal radicalism before it became coherent, ideological and national in organization. . ."¹⁹

In the historical context of African decolonization of the early 1960s the effort at pre-emption may have conflicted with the first goal of co-opting a trained indigenous social class into the political framework. Certainly the British Secretary of State at the time, Ian Macleod, emphasized the unviability of the colonial relationship and the threats of violence in pushing for more rapid devolution. But this was an alteration of timing, not of kind. The political and economic models to be followed, the integration of the indigenous elite into colonial patterns, and the forms of the transfer itself were compressed, not altered. Just on the most visible level of the forms of political authority in the English colonies, changes in the 'Westminster Model' were neither sought nor thought needed. "There was never any seriously sustained attempt, and certainly not at the policy-making level of successive British governments, to consider the possibility of granting independence on any other basis than that of the 'Westminster Model'".²⁰

Economic criteria for a colony's evolution were more ambivalent than the political requisites. Rathbone listed economic viability as a criterion for Ghanaian independence.²¹ But it would be tortuous to explain, under this criterion, French devolution in Togo or Niger, Belgian devolution in Ruanda, or the British in Gambia. More important than the relative viability of the economy would be the relationship of the colonial elite and metropolitan interests to the economy. Questions of the economic value of the colony to metropolitan

17 Richard T. A. R. Rathbone, "The Transfer of Power in Ghana, 1945-57," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1968), p. 195 and Chapter 10.

18 Munroe, "Political Change", op. cit., pp. 49-52.

19 I. Wallerstein, "The Colonial Era in Africa", in Vol. 2 of *Colonialism in Africa*, edited by Gann and Duignan (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 399-421.

20 John Fletcher-Cooke, "Parliament, The Executive and the Civil Service", in Sir Alan Burns, ed., *Parliament as an Export* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 142-65. He also remarks that Africans clamoured for "the Westminster Model, the whole Model and nothing but the Model." (p. 159).

21 Rathbone, "The Transfer of Power in Ghana", op. cit., Chapter 10.

interests, and of the indigenous elite's willingness to maintain the economic structures would be more relevant. The central qualifications, then, were less in the strength of the economy itself than in the political relationships of the involved elites of the colonial economy and their willingness and ability to maintain them.

There were also conditions within the metropolitan power allowing it to initiate and adapt to the decolonization process. Mention has largely been made of a certain slackening of the colonial power's attentiveness toward its colonies, as well as a weakening in its ability to undertake expensive coercive action because of domestic constraints and conflicting foreign interests. Nevertheless, just as important as the weakening of the metropole's commitment to the colonial relationship was its capacity to maintain the fruits of that relationship within an altered authority structure. The question facing the metropole and colonial leaders was: Can whatever political, economic and strategic interests which supported and justified the colonial relationship be preserved outside of the colonial structure? Within the metropole the answer to this depended on the strength of its political and economic system; its willingness to maintain financial, technical and, if needed, military assistance; to exert political pressure; and to mobilize allied States in support of these leverages. In this sense, decolonization can be seen as an act of strength by the decolonizing power.²²

To alter a formal relationship of dominance to a more subtle one of influence (very great, to be sure) not only required domestic control and calculating leadership by the metropole, but also a political economy which could retain its interests in the former colony and protect them both from internal agitation and foreign competition. Perhaps this point becomes clearer in looking at Portuguese Africa, where decolonization has only recently been initiated.

In the early 1960s Portugal appeared to be the colonial power least able to resist the inevitable tide of nationalism. In explaining what may appear to be a residual aberration, scholars have stressed the traditionalism of the Portuguese political-economic structure. Ronald H. Chilcote argued that Portugal's "traditional structural weaknesses" in large part determined the direction of an overseas domination which was both the most primitive form of colonialism and the most extreme. He wrote that the intransigence of the industrial and agrarian elites in Portugal to colonial changes was directly attributable to the shortage of capital and labour, ineffective civil administration and economic and financial instability.²³ James Duffy similarly pointed to the resentment of colonial commercial and plantation industries towards the Portuguese mercantilist policies as forming a significant element in conservative separatist sentiment in Angola and Mozambique.²⁴

22 For example, not until President de Gaulle was securely in power was the French Government strong enough to embark on a policy of decolonization in Algeria.

23 Ronald H. Chilcote, *Portuguese Africa* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 124-26.

24 James Duffy, *Portugal in Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 191-203.

One can argue, then, that the very weakness of the Portuguese colonizers left them only with the response of forcibly suppressing nationalist movements. The encouragement of foreign investment, while an effort to strengthen the ties between the colonies and the metropole, may have been an important influence behind the formal divestment. But the essential dilemma remains: Portugal was not economically (and politically) developed enough to maintain its favourable colonial relationships without formal authority. As Amílcar Cabral, the slain leader of the nationalist movement in Portuguese Guinea, said in 1971 in a speech in England, "The reason that Portugal is not decolonizing now is because Portugal is not an imperialist country, and cannot neo-colonize. The economic infrastructure of Portugal is such that she cannot compete with other capitalist powers".²⁵

Recent events in Southern Africa do not necessarily alter this conclusion. If the Portuguese political economy did not contain sufficient strength to maintain the colonial relationship without extensive foreign investment and aid, one can surmise that similar supports will be needed to bolster the decolonization process. Whether this diverse foreign involvement (including newly adaptive South African interests) can engineer a consensual decolonization depends not only on the degree of conflict among these foreign interests, but also on the strength of the nationalist leadership as well as the steps other African States take to insulate the process. Potentially wealthy Angola with major foreign interests, besides Portugal, based in the United States, West Germany, France and Britain, and a factionalized nationalist leadership is likely to be the setting for the most intense struggle. But, as a recent report on Angola concluded, uncertainty remains:

Whether these countries, or the multi-national corporations based in them, will not pressurize Portugal, and indeed one or the other of the liberation movements, to construct a decolonization formula that will ensure that their interests are not threatened is still an open question.²⁶

The British experience differed. In Ghana the British reaffirmed in an African setting that they could groom their political successors, and, by manipulation of franchises and economic inducements, have a large influence over who they might be and what they would be likely to do. As Rathbone concluded,

25 A. Cabral, "Speech at Central Hall Westminster, Tuesday, October 25, 1971", in *GUERRILHEIRO*, Bulletin of the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, No. 7, November-December 1971.

26 Godwin Matau, "Angola: When the Guns Begin to Flower", *Africa*, No. 39 (November 1974), p. 44. Although Angola is the closest to the 'Congo model' (a weak colonial power granting rapid independence to split nationalist groupings, to be followed by a period of instability reinforced by international conflicts, with the eventual emergence of a local leadership closely tied to the dominant foreign economic interests), an expectation of continuity pervades the other decolonizing processes. Certainly the thrust of the argument here leads to more conservative/pessimistic conclusions about Mozambique (about which this author knows little) than those advanced by John Saul in his analysis of the internal politics of FRELIMO. (See John Saul, "FRELIMO and the Mozambique Revolution", in G. Arrighi and J. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973], pp. 378-405).

Behind a facade of African rule, which of course had considerable substance to it, British interests had been allowed to remain paramount. Ghana had proved that it was possible to be constitutionally concessive without hazarding major fields of British concerns.²⁷

This represented no great alteration to traditional British imperialist policies. Two leading English scholars, discussing British expansion in the nineteenth century, persuasively argued that British policy followed the principle of extending control informally if possible and formally if necessary. Only where informal political means failed to provide a framework of security for British interests (be they commercial, philanthropic or strategic) did the question of establishing a formal empire arise. Power would then be used imperialistically to adjust the situation.

In other words, responsible government, far from being a separatist device, was simply a change from direct to indirect methods of maintaining British interests. By slackening the formal political bond at the appropriate time, it was possible to rely on economic dependence and mutual good-feeling to keep the colonies bound to Britain while still using them as agents for further British expansion.²⁸

In tropical Africa, Robinson and Gallagher concluded, the absence of strong indigenous political organizations and the presence of foreign challenges to British paramouncy in the area led to the switch to formal rule.²⁹

The calculations involved in British decolonizing policies in the 1950s and 1960s were covered in two noteworthy studies, J. M. Lee's *Colonial Development and Good Government*³⁰ and David Goldsworthy's *Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961*.³¹ The first dealt with the formation of policy by the traditional governing class, while the second attempted to assess the impact of party and group activities on these policies. Both concluded by emphasizing the control and continuity of the British administrative elite over colonial policies. Lee's study stressed the administrative elite adapting not only to changes in relations to the colonies but to England's wider ties in the world. In this aspect the admission of the United States into the system of relationships between Britain and her former colonies loomed large. With its greater resources and similarity of interests, the United States was invited to maintain the political and economic patterns established by decolonization. The "Greenbrier Philosophy" came out of a series of informal meetings in 1959 between British and American officials involved in colonial affairs. This "philosophy" was described as "the assumption that Britain and the United States had broadly the same interests in aiding the new states of Africa and, in spite of many differences of opinion, common philosophies actuating the formation of policy". Both groups, for example, thought "that the chief political problem

27 Rathbone, "The Transfer of Power in Ghana", op. cit., p. 378.

28 R. E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, "Imperialism and Free Trade", *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1-15.

29 Ibid., p. 13. Egypt is cited as an example of the failure of informal rule due to the undermining of the satellite State by investments and pseudo-nationalist reaction to foreign influence.

30 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).

31 (Oxford University Press, 1971).

after independence would be the survival of the political *elites* to whom power was transferred".³²

One can summarize by asserting that a successful process of consensual decolonization in Africa in the 1960s was conditioned by a number of factors prevailing in the metropole and colony. In the colony the presence of an indigenous elite capable of managing the inherited political framework, in some pattern of co-operation among themselves, and willing to maintain certain important colonial interests (political, commercial or strategic), enabled the colonialists to pass on the State to their inheritors. At the same time, the quiescence of the colony's populace and the pre-emption of potential agitation of the mass base were important ingredients in the rapid attainment of independence. Similarly, metropolitan authorities and colonial interests expected that through leverages other than formal political control, such as aid and trade policies, technical advisers, cultural ambiance and the assistance of allies, they would have a good chance to maintain most of the advantages of the original colonial relationship. This implied the capacity of the metropole to reassert predominant influence in the crunch, and to exclude foreign rivals from the area.

PROCESS

With the previous conditions satisfied, or with at least a reasonable expectation of their being met, decolonization proceeded as a dual process of bargaining and socialization. Independence was to be the culminating bargain. Debate centred on the terms and timing of independence, the position of minorities and loyalists in the new State, the conditions of the post-colonial relationship with the metropole, the political structure of the independent State as encapsulated in a constitution, and even the composition of the new elite to ensure both consensus and moderation. Rathbone remarked that Ghanaian decolonization showed that "Britain could, if the results of the Ghana experiment were considered, groom its political successors, and by tinkering with franchises might have a real hand in determining who these might be in the rest of Africa".³³ At the same time, colonial officials sought by judicious use of international and transnational ties (aid, trade, advisers) to constrain the new State to remain in the appointed orbit. By such a bargaining process colonial interests came to terms with potentially disruptive elements in the nationalist party, and vice versa.

The socialization of the nationalist elite was the dynamo behind the bargaining process. This had both substantive and procedural aspects. The substantive part involved negotiations on issues such as trade policies, constitution-making, judicial norms, pensions for colonial officials and, in the Kenyan case, most notably the land issue. But the procedural aspect, the involvement of the nationalists in the colonial forms of governmental authority, was both more subtle and more compelling.

The nationalists were caught in a dilemma by decolonization. Within the

32 Lee, *Colonial Development*, op. cit., pp. 248-49.

33 Rathbone, "The Transfer of Power in Ghana", op. cit., p. 379.

colony the essential justification for colonialism was that the colonial subjects were 'unready' for independence. The metropolitan-educated elite countered by demanding the same democratic procedures as prevailed in the metropole and their participation in them. The indigenous elite was at some point integrated into parts of the political system with the understanding that constitutional advance was to be based on their ability to act in conformity with the requisites of that system. To deny their inferiority and assert equality, the elite felt compelled to argue for higher constitutional forms. They stressed that refusal to grant these concessions would lead to bad government or even revolt. On the other hand, their competent handling of the colonial machinery enabled them to argue that greater democracy would bring greater efficiency. "In either event, the frame of reference for the argument and the forms for the test had to be metropolitan. Hence 'opposition to Western rule has not usually meant opposition to Western institutions', but rather the affirmation of their necessity".³⁴

The co-optive and pre-emptive aspects of this socialization were clearly interconnected. The constitutional participation of the nationalists not only socialized them into the colonial political norms but also deflected nationalist agitation into governmental co-operation and, indeed, created a counter interest to mass rebellion.

An example of the use of this political socialization occurred in Kenya in early 1963. A meeting was called by the Deputy Governor on 18 January 1963, to discuss breaches of the conventional code of behaviour by Parliamentary Secretaries. Specifically at issue were statements by J. G. Kiano, Parliamentary Secretary for Constitutional Affairs and Economic Planning, and a KANU leader. Kiano, in public statements and a letter to the *East African Standard* on 9 January 1963, had said that nationalization would be inevitable with self-government, no matter what was said by the present interim coalition Government. The Deputy Governor warned the Parliamentary Secretaries that during their participation in the Government they must avoid critical statements of the Government and stick to collective responsibility.³⁵

Kenya also provides a number of examples of adaptive behaviour by colonial interests. In 1960 European leaders saw that the political influence of their community was best exerted through less visible, non-political channels. One of them wrote at the time:

A European political front is not the correct method of ensuring European strength and influence. This should come through economic organizations (with if possible participation by other races where there is an identity of interest), i.e., Chambers of Commerce, Farmers Union, Civil Servant Association, etc.

34 Munroe, "Political Change", op. cit., pp. 242-43. Munroe argues that the only alternative for the nationalists was complete rejection of the existing order—its institutions and values. This was unlikely because of the logic of anti-colonialism, the illogicality of revolution, and the attractiveness of continuity.

35 "Record of a Meeting of Parliamentary Secretaries held in Government House at 11 a.m. on Friday 18 January 1963", 10 pp., Governor's Office, 22 January 1963, the papers of P. Marrian, private collection.

Obtain the strength of unity at this level and project it through your political representatives. A European political front as such will get us nowhere.³⁶

The attempt was made both by the British Government and European farmers to use international finance, particularly the World Bank, to stabilize post-independent Kenya and consolidate European interests there. Regarding the World Bank, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office explained to a visiting farmer leader that,

there is no government in the world which has yet dared to offend this institution and, therefore, it is most important, with independence on the way, the Bank should be linked with Kenya's development. It would constitute a most potent stabilising factor.³⁷

The more liberal adaptive elements in the settled European population also appeared to be those in the most secure financial situation (either through greater liquidity of holdings or wealth held outside the colony) or those who had been in Kenya the longest. A student of the French community in Senegal reached a similar conclusion, remarking, "Those Europeans in more secure business and professional positions were able to accept alterations with minimum of difficulty".³⁸

In some cases, notably in the francophone States of Africa, the transitional phase of decolonization involved bolstering a reluctant local leadership to induce sufficient confidence in their own capacities to survive outside formal colonial authority. (Both Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast were reluctant and tardy advocates of independence for their territories). Other areas demonstrated the colonial authorities playing the more orthodox bargaining role: citing the problems, the divisions, the inadequate resources inhibiting a more rapid devolution (Ghana, East Africa). In either situation, with independence the functionaries perhaps changed, the functions remained.

Much has been written discussing the continuity of the colonial system in sundry aspects of the independent State.³⁹ The economic system remained

36 P. Marrian, letter to M. Blundell, 26 November 1960, *Blundell Papers*.

37 J. Seys, Letter to Lord Delamere, 3 March 1961. *Kenya National Farmers Union Papers*.

38 Rita Cruise O'Brien, *White Society in Black Africa: The French of Senegal* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1972), p. 97.

39 Besides the works cited elsewhere, there is a fairly extensive bibliography generally available on the continuity of colonial structures and patterns into the independence period in Africa. In the field of administration A. L. Adu's *The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970) and James Nti, ed., *The Task of the Administration: Report of the Sixth Inter-African Public Administration Seminar* (Ghana, 1968) stress the emphasis on security rather than developmental goals as an inheritance of colonialism. The continuity of economic patterns and institutions in Africa has been dealt with by Rene Dumont, *False Start in Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1966) and R. H. Green and Ann Seidman, *Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan Africanism* (London: Penguin, 1968).

The psychological burden of colonialism on the colonized is described in Albert Memmi's *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon, 1965), especially Part 2; O. Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization* (New York: Praeger, 1956); and Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1967)—all centering on the French experience.

Specific case studies of colonial continuity can be garnered from William J. Foltz,

based on producing primary products for the metropole and other industrial countries allied to the metropole. The neglect of the rural areas, other than those producing cash crops, and the concentration on the colonial-established urban centres continued, even accelerated. The only change after independence was that the surplus from peasant agriculture was garnered and protected by the nationalist/expatriate bureaucracies. Development strategy was external, based on foreign capital, experts and institutions. African socialism remained a vague goal seldom restricting the encouragement of foreign capital, the consumption habits of a growing indigenous bourgeoisie, and the pursuit of economic and development policies similar to those of the later 'welfare' period of colonialism.

In almost all areas of the modern State the transnational system, once maintained in the colonial structure, was continued. After an initial period of activism, the nationalist party sank back to a dependence on colonial forms and institutions, especially those of the bureaucracy. The Government and its bureaucracy in turn maintained "the relational, procedural and substantive norms" of the metropole administrative apparatus.⁴⁰ The educational, social, cultural and linguistic models were those of the metropole. Influence was maintained through financial channels (i.e., the franc zone), a metropolitan education of future leaders, tourism, and the high prestige of the metropolitan society in the former colony. Even the decision on the use of at least quasi-legitimate force lay outside the independent State. Metropolitan garrisons, especially in French-speaking Africa, bolstered cordial regimes. When this failed, armed interventions—as in Gabon, Chad, Central African Republic, Cameroon, the Congo, Kenya and Tanzania—were both expected and accepted by the nationalist leaders. In its aspirations, its techniques, its style, the 'independent' leadership remained *plus monarchiste que le Roi*.⁴¹

CONCLUSION

The result of the decolonization process, then, was the integration of an indigenous leadership into colonial political, social and economic patterns. Decolonization's three themes—adaptation, co-optation and pre-emption—aimed at altering political authority (while perhaps changing the methods of social control), in order to preserve the essential features of the colonial political economy. From this perspective the decolonization process was not so

From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Aristide Zolberg, *One Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton University Press, 1969); C. S. Whitaker, "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change", in *World Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 2. (January 1967), pp. 190-217, centring on northern Nigeria; Guy de Lusignan, *French-Speaking Africa Since Independence* (New York: Praeger, 1969); and Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

⁴⁰ David Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 282.

⁴¹ The President of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, living in the former Governor's palace with his French wife, spending summers in France, surrounded by avenues honouring Frenchmen, guarded by a French garrison, and writing French poetry glorifying *negritude*, may be a model of sorts for this. See Irving L. Markovitz, *Leopold Sedar Senghor and the Politics of Negritude* (New York: Atheneum, 1969).

much the upward development of an indigenous African political movement, as the downward manipulation of that movement into a system. Independence for the new State marked not so much a moving out of the colonial relationship as an enlarging and enhancing of that dependent relationship, with the colonial patterns emerging relatively unscathed.