

towards the potential political 'new class' as towards the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Nyerere has never supported the argument that TANU should become a vanguard Party, that is, a Party which would be a closed Party of committed socialists, admitting to its elite membership only those whom it feels are committed to its doctrines. This has never been Nyerere's position. His reason is simple. A vanguard Party would need to be a Party of angels and "we are not angels".³²

The fact that Nyerere hopes for an increasing number of committed socialists within the leadership of TANU in no way means that he is in effect advocating a vanguard within a mass Party which would be little different from a vanguard Party within a mass society. The difference is, in fact crucial. In the former case the leadership would not be a closed elite but would be open to anyone in the Party who could win the confidence of his fellow Party members while the people themselves would have a structure, the Party, and a process, the elections, through which to assert their rights and to exercise a final control upon the leadership. For Nyerere, all of this is particularly relevant to the transition to socialism for in that transition the power of the State is likely to increase and the risk of oppression or at least the potential for it, will therefore be greater. "State ownership and control of the key points of the economy can, in fact, lead to a greater tyranny if the state is not itself controlled by the people, who exercise this control for their own benefit and on their own behalf".³³ Democracy, in consequence, including the recurrent election of leaders in free elections, is thus an important component of his political strategy for the transition to socialism. It has been on the basis of this strategy, with its emphasis on greater equality, on national self-reliance, on the building of socialist institutions and on increased democratic participation that Nyerere has sought since 1967 to guide Tanzania in civil peace and without external entanglements to a socialist transformation of its still developing economy and society.

South Africa's Africa Policy Reconsidered

KLAAS WOLDRING*

In this article the intention is to discuss South Africa's Africa policy as the all-important aspect of her foreign policy, its historical perspectives, its complexities, its motivation and its failure to achieve the objectives sought in 1967. It is, of course, true that any State's foreign policy is a function of its domestic policy. Secondly, it is an accepted axiom that a State's foreign policy is dependent on its national power, as determined, among other factors, by its industrial and military capacity, resources, geographical position, population, the level of that population's development and internal stability.

Unrevealing as they are as general principles, these two relationships hold true for South Africa as well. There are, however, complicating factors with each of these relationships in the case of South Africa, factors which have been grossly underestimated by the South African regime, from their own point of view to their detriment, and exposing the poor quality of their judgment. The first one is that foreign policy in South Africa is a function of white domestic policy, i.e., Apartheid-Separate Development, a system completely rejected by Africans everywhere. The second one is that, although industrially, militarily and in terms of resources, South Africa is the most powerful State in Africa, the basis of that power is shaky in the African setting because (a) it rests in large measure on African labour and co-operation, and (b) white power is continually subjected to international pressures and threatened by denial of markets on account of the domestic racial policy. To be effective, power must be accepted and recognized. Exclusive white power is less and less accepted internationally and is in danger of *de facto* de-recognition.

The decisive rejection of the Africa policy by most African leaders, although most consistently by those of Central and East Africa, together with other, internal and external factors, e.g., strikes by African workers, the resumption of guerrilla warfare against Rhodesia and, recently, the dramatic changes in Portugal, have led to the adoption by Pretoria of what may euphemistically be called a concessions policy. These events also seem to have stimulated Mr. Vorster and other Cabinet Ministers, notably Botha, to engage in more frequent and more regular dialogue with the so-called 'homeland' leaders. It is plain that the Africa policy phase had been considered necessary before it occurred to the white leadership of South Africa that internal changes had to be effected if there was to be a degree of acceptance of offers of aid, loans and technical expertise. Judging by the several previous attempts to create the impression that internal changes were on the way, it would be naïve to expect that the concessions are to be followed by any far-reaching reforms.

³² In an interview, June 1974.

³³ *Freedom and Development*, op. cit., p. 179.

*Lecturer in Political Science, Northern Rivers College of Advanced Education, Lismore, New South Wales, Australia.

nor is it likely that white South Africa will cease to attempt to penetrate Africa even though her Government has failed so far north of the Zambezi. There are, of course, attempts by the private sector to gain access to African markets, but the OAU and other organizations (such as the Africa Bureau, London) are quick to expose such attempts which seem to have been contained.¹

It is instructive at this point to look at the general nature of South African foreign policy in the fifties and early sixties in order to understand the base on which the Africa policy was to be built.

It was not until 1955 that South Africa had a Minister of External Affairs. Until that year the External Affairs portfolio had been held by the Prime Ministers of whom only Smuts really interested himself in international affairs. Smuts's tremendously important role on the international scene was quite out of proportion to the significance of South Africa internationally, and it was often curiously detached from his national role. He was far more than just a Prime Minister with a particular interest in the foreign affairs of his country. Smuts was an internationalist, albeit one of the old variety. For him the world community was a community of States, not of individuals. In his day that kind of internationalism was a fairly idealistic, progressive orientation. Today it is unquestionably representative of a conservative stance. The South African Government in its Africa policy has attempted to borrow from Smuts, twenty-five years late and in a context Smuts hardly dreamt of: a policy of formal equality amongst *African States* combined with a policy of racial inequality in South Africa itself.

In 1955, the then P.M. Strydom thought the time had arrived to entrust the portfolio to the aging diplomat Mr. Eric Louw, a man without experience in African affairs. But even then the need for a special Minister was not evident to all. One observer wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in that very year that "South Africa affords a convenient starting-point for a survey of the foreign policies of the members of the Commonwealth, because South Africa comes nearest to having no foreign policy at all".² The general nature of South African foreign policy in the late fifties and early sixties was characterized by the country's close ties with Britain and by its role in the defence of the Empire formalized by the Simonstown Agreement, the significance of which need not detain us here. Contrary to what South Africans were led to believe, J. E. Spence argued that "in post-war international relations there has been a steady decline in the stature of South Africa",³ and especially so after Smuts left. To be sure, this was not only due to a change in government but also to a gradual decline of the cohesion and status of the Commonwealth for which the Union acted as

1 E.g., the EDESA Corporation (Economic Development of Equatorial and Southern Africa) under the leadership of Dr. Anton Rupert, aims to develop resources, markets and investment opportunities in Africa. Of the 20 firms participating, six are South African or are South African but are registered elsewhere.

2 G. F. Hudson, "How Unified is the Commonwealth?" *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 33, No. 4 (July 1955), pp. 680-1.

3 J. E. Spence, *Republic Under Pressure*, "A Study of South African Foreign Policy", (Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 1. A more recent assessment by Spence is "The Strategic Significance of South Africa", Royal United Service Institution, 1970.

a vital military and industrial base, an important link in a chain. More recently, the long-term importance of the Cape route was further reduced as the result of technological improvements. Most modern warships and super-oiltankers can operate for long periods without refuelling and, therefore, do not need South Africa any more.⁴

As was to be expected, the Afrikaner Nationalist advance since 1948 heralded the advent of a period of heavy concentration on the domestic situation to the extent that events on the African continent occurred largely unnoticed except by some of the few in high places (Dr. Malan was one of them but decolonization only horrified him). In so far as foreign policy was a conscious response to external influences, the pre-occupation of the policy-makers has been with the defence and further consolidation of white domination internally against mounting criticism and, later, guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, there was also a measure of co-operation with the colonial powers in Africa, allegedly for humanitarian purposes, but in fact no less for political purposes. This was formalized by an organization called the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa (C.C.T.A.). The organization ground to a halt in the late fifties when the colonies approached independence and the UN and the OAU took over its technical functions. After that most of the colonial powers continued their relationships with their former dependencies on a new footing, leaving South Africa totally uninvolved in, and severed from, the rest of Africa. Although virtually throughout Mr. Louw's tenure, policy statements were issued to the effect that South Africa wanted to co-operate with other powers in Africa, and later with independent African countries, little was achieved in this field. The mounting international hostility and Mr. Louw's own paternalistic philosophy of Africa were jointly responsible for this meagre record. Criticism by the U.P. spokesman for external affairs, moved that an "Inter-State African Development Association" ought to be established. He made the following proposal:

I move that this House, recognizing that the future security and welfare of our country as an African state is in large measure dependent upon obtaining the respect and goodwill of the uncommitted emergent nations of Africa, is of the opinion that the Government should propose the establishment of an Inter-State African Development Association which should have in its articles as one of the main objectives the raising of the living standards of the African masses with a view to

4 In October 1974, the US and Britain nevertheless resumed joint naval exercises off the Cape Coast. This new, rather surprising policy appeared to be the result of mounting concern in Washington about the growing Russian presence in the Indian Ocean. Although seen as a victory by the South African regime, opponents of apartheid can only be dismayed by these developments. The US approach is likely to aggravate polarization in Southern Africa, a region that could well become the theatre of a new proxy war. Have the policy-makers in Washington learnt nothing from the Vietnam debacle? There may, of course, be an unexpected development. Some more security conscious whites, disenchanted with the Government, may now turn to the Progressive Party's reformist (and federal) policies. In short, under the umbrella of foreign protection, and in circumstances of absolute necessity, they may be more prepared to experiment with new forms of co-existence than at any time previously.

ensuring their acceptance of Western democratic standards as opposed to the communist ideology.

He continued:

We cannot afford to fritter away the last few precious moments left to us—White Africans of this country—. . . These events of the past decade, one can say, were taking place over our heads. As a country on the African continent we were, in fact, locked out of these great developments.⁵

Durrant then referred to a speech made by Mr. Louw in March 1957 at the University of Pretoria in which he had laid down the Union's policy for Africa. That policy hinged on the presumption that "our country would form a permanent link between the Western nations, on the one hand, and the populations of Africa south of the Sahara, on the other hand". Although at the time, in 1957, the U.P. had endorsed that policy, the situation had changed rapidly in four years and the Opposition called for drastic realistic changes. The policy of the Government had failed, Durrant declared.

That policy has failed. It has failed, firstly, because the great Western powers, the world outside, does not accept us in South Africa, our Government or our country as the link between the Western nations and Black Africa. It has failed for a second reason: The emergent nations of Africa do not accept our country as an African state, as the 'go between' between their independence as African states and the ideologies of the West.

Durrant was, of course, wasting words since Minister Louw was slow to adapt to the changing situation in Africa, and it was not until Dr. Muller took over that changes in foreign policy were even contemplated. But this did not mean that thereafter foreign policy was to be any less a function of domestic policy or that its motivation changed radically. From the end of the Second World War the major objective had been to stave off interference in domestic affairs, starting with India's criticism in the UN of the treatment of Indians in South Africa, an action that incurred Smuts's disapproval.

A new arena of confrontation, apart from the UN, emerged in the heart of Africa from 1966 onwards, although by the beginning of 1964 there were already indications that this was in the offing. The real threat to the *status quo* was to come from the African countries themselves, a prospect few Nationalist leaders seriously entertained before 1961. In order to understand the slow reaction to developments in Africa in the early sixties (and the alarmist attitudes generated by the Congo disorders) I refer to the "Notes" on South African foreign policy formation by Edwin S. Munger.⁶ In 1961, when Dr. Verwoerd was informed that South Africa would no longer be welcomed in the Commonwealth Club, he enthusiastically grabbed the opportunity to establish a new Afrikaner 'Republic' outside the Commonwealth. He did this without a clear mandate from even the white electorate and contrary to his own Party's mode of operation. This action was therefore quite arbitrary; he represented Afrikaners only and certainly not all of them. Thus, as it was

⁵ House of Assembly Debates, 24 February 1961, Vol. 106, Cols. 1923-1926.

⁶ Edwin S. Munger, *Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy* (Pasadena: Grand Dahlstrom Castle Press, 1965).

remarked quite correctly at the time, the score of the Boer War was finally levelled. This pre-occupation with ending the remnants of British political domination goes some way to explain the slow response to developments on the African continent in the independence period. Moreover, the decision-making process in the foreign policy sector of the Government hardly lent itself to rapid adaptation to the emerging realities. Munger noted in 1965 that foreign policy was the exclusive concern of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister; that the Department of Foreign Affairs was very small and understaffed and virtually without contacts on the African continent; that the study of African affairs was grossly neglected at the universities; that the advice of informed commentators on African affairs had no impact at all on the decision-makers in this sector; that the general public was very poorly informed on what went on in Africa, with Afrikaners ignoring the English-medium press⁷ for traditional reasons; that even moderately reformist Afrikaner writers like *Die Burger's* editor, Piet Cillie ("Dawie"), Schalk Piennar (*Die Beeld*) and W. van Heerden (*Rapport*) failed to influence the policy-makers; and the alternative advocated by the United Party and Progressive Party in opposition was totally ignored.⁸

When the Africa policy⁹ design came to light, Sir De Villiers Graaff, the Leader of the Opposition, felt justified in saying that the adaptations and changes made "were very much in line with U.P. thinking over the years".¹⁰ Though the Prime Minister refuted this in his reply because "neither he nor anyone in the country knew what U.P. policy was",¹¹ by and large Graaff was right. What it meant was that the only substantial difference that existed between the two major white parties up to that time was now removed and it rendered the Opposition still less effective and less attractive as an alternative to the white voter.

Munger's useful analysis also explained why the change in foreign policy, when it finally came, could take place at all, and in such a short span of time. Historians will have to sort out who was the originator of the Africa policy, Verwoerd, Muller or Vorster, but it is at least evident that the new approach emerged after Dr. Muller was appointed to Foreign Affairs Minister and,

⁷ The circulation ratio of Afrikaans medium/English medium newspapers and magazines is now about 1:6 according to Neville Curtis in "The Politics of Fragmentation", *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 50, No. 3 (January 1972).

⁸ Things have changed in that there is now more information available on African affairs, e.g., the Africa Institute, Pretoria, established in 1960, does produce some useful factual material. But there is still no representation in Africa apart from Malawi; and the facts are still misinterpreted by too few and too bigoted politicians and officials. Thus the oft repeated utterances by South African spokesmen, including Verwoerd and Vorster (and also Ian Smith), that they are "of Africa and understand Africa" on account of their long association with Africans, become almost nonsensical. That they know the African in the master-servant relationship is beyond doubt, but this knowledge is of no use elsewhere and is becoming useless even in South Africa; it actually inhibits a fuller understanding of Africa altogether.

⁹ Two early articles on the new policy were: L. M. Hoskins, "South Africa's Diplomatic Offensive", *East Africa Journal*, August 1967, pp. 17-23, and Y. Spier, "The Whites Discover Black Africa", *Round Table*, Volume 58, No. 231 (July 1968), pp. 306-310.

¹⁰ House of Assembly Debates, 11 April 1967, Vol. 20, Col. 3943.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Col. 3952.

dubious as it may be, that he should take most of the credit for it. A further contributing factor to facilitate change undoubtedly was the growing awareness, particularly amongst Afrikaner businessmen,¹² that there was money to be made in Africa. Finally, also accounting for a fairly quick acceptance of the volte-face, would seem to have been the slowly growing awareness amongst the general public, especially after 1966, of the potential guerrilla threat to the much praised (by white South Africans) 'South African way of life'.

Vorster and Muller soon came to dominate Africa relations, initially virtually to the exclusion of every other Cabinet Minister. After a spell in Parliament, Muller had served as High Commissioner, later Ambassador, to the UK, before being selected by Verwoerd to succeed Louw as Foreign Minister. Muller, therefore, had overseas experience in a key post, which suggests that he might have been better informed on developments in international politics than most in the Cabinet. As it turned out, as we shall see, he was not; he approached Africa with a right wing Cold War syndrome that was going out of fashion everywhere else. Vorster, as Minister of Justice and Police under Verwoerd, had no say in foreign policy-making, nor is there evidence that he took an interest in this field. Undoubtedly, his rapid transformation from primarily the new strong man, the generally expected role, to a Prime Minister who quite suddenly began to interest himself in Africa relations, was rather surprising. It is self-evident that he could neither apply expertise nor real understanding to this new function. Nevertheless, many Western powers and businessmen deemed the Africa policy a change for the better. Though investments in South Africa had continued to show an upward trend after 1961, they rose more sharply after 1967.¹³ These two men and their followers soon became known as 'enlightened Nationalists' and, at least for the time being, carried most of the Party with them. If the Africa policy had led to or was leading to a detente with the Central and East African States the external hostility at any rate might have ceased. But this has not been achieved to date; very much to the contrary. The almost total joint commitment to that policy by the National Party and the opposition United and Progressive Parties has further intensified ill-feeling in Africa quite contrary to the intentions of its designers.¹⁴ Even the reformist Progressive Party, which supported the Af-

12 The industrialist Anton Rupert is a better than average example. He has become known for his statement "If they, the Bantu, do not eat, we cannot sleep" and he was (until August 1973) honorary adviser to the Lesotho Government. His philosophy is that foreign enterprises should co-operate with independent African Governments on a 50/50 shared interest basis. What Rupert did not seem to realize was that if "they" eat, *under the present circumstances* the quest for fundamental changes is likely to intensify rather than to be satisfied.

13 Of the foreign investments and participators in the South African economy, the German industrialists and financiers stand out as the most naïve and the least responsible, including Dr. Walter Scheel, former Foreign Minister and leader of the F.D.P., a minority 'liberal' party, who has frequently stated his friendship towards South Africa. The situation remains one of the early thirties when precisely this class of people, in their naïveté, helped Hitler establish his regime.

14 "Enlightened" had originally a specific foreign policy orientation. It meant that they saw the need to reduce the hostility of independent Africa against South Africa by developing friendly relations with African leaders. It did *not* mean that the Afrikaner leaders knew how to do that. Their failures prove that point.

rica policy for quite different reasons than the N.P., finds itself often distrusted in the more radical African countries.

If Dr. Muller should be credited with having masterminded the Africa policy, just what were his views on the subject? It is by no means easy to extract these with certainty from his statements since he addressed himself frequently to two audiences (white South Africans and foreign African leaders), and sometimes even to three audiences at the same time (i.e., including Western Governments). In any case it can be said that Muller always presented himself as a staunch anti-communist. He sought to enhance South Africa's security by frequently emphasizing her supposedly indispensable role in the Western Alliance¹⁵ as well as her possible controlling role in Africa. This was done mainly by stressing her industrial and economic power and her strategic position. In an address delivered by him at a symposium on international politics held at Potchefstroom University on 31 August 1967, he discussed the post-war developments on the African continent:

The most important Western powers were weakened by the war, and the Russians seized the opportunity to reduce the influence of the West still further by organising a campaign to abolish colonialism. It eminently suited the Communists' selfish interests to pose as the champions and liberators of the dependent nations of Asia and Africa, conveniently forgetting the plight of those under Russian yoke. The Western colonial powers were unable to counter this trend particularly once the U.S. and the U.N. itself had taken up the cry and so they meekly proceeded with the large-scale and over-hasty liquidation of their colonial empires. . .

The West European Powers *gradually* made their exit from the African scene and *virtually overnight* we were left to steer our own course in the New Africa—an Africa which erroneously equated us [as a White man's land] with the Colonialism of the preceding centuries.¹⁶
(emphasis added)

Moving on "to the present interest in our Africa policy" he elaborated:

. . . the Government believes that international friendship and co-operation should at all times be based on mutual respect, the recognition of the sovereign independence of all states, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. . . South Africa is strongly opposed to any form of neo-colonialism or economic imperialism. We consistently refuse to interfere in the affairs of others and we resist all attempts by others to meddle in our affairs.¹⁷

South Africa was "in a unique position" to make a material contribution towards the development of the continent, he continued, but

We make no secret of the fact that we believe in co-operation rather than in gifts, and we regard it as a prerequisite to fruitful co-operation that each of the parties

15 Abdul S. Minty, "South Africa's Defence Strategy", Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, 1969. Minty's monograph must rank as one of the most convincing statements that the Western Alliance, wittingly or unwittingly, serves to perpetuate South Africa's system of racial domination. The author makes a strong case for Western withdrawal. See also Minty's paper "Apartheid: The International Aspects", read at the Oslo Conference on Apartheid, April 1973.

16 *The Republic of South Africa in a Changed World*, pamphlet, Department of Information of the R.S.A., Pretoria, p. 3.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 5. Since that statement was made South Africa meddled in the affairs of Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Rhodesia, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique.

concerned must be prepared to put a shoulder to the wheel and not leave it to others to solve their problems for them. . . In the long run this would also be to our advantage.¹⁸

However, Muller pointed out that "the uplifting and self-determination of the non-White peoples within our own borders. . . must always enjoy the highest priority". Quite illogically, he added that it was his considered opinion that "we must first concentrate on co-operation in Southern Africa".¹⁹

In his view, the approach he had in mind was not new because aid had been rendered on the basis envisaged earlier through C.C.T.A., i.e., in the fifties. It was necessary and expedient to take up the unfinished work again where it was left off.²⁰ As far as diplomatic relations were concerned, the time would come "when South Africa's interests may demand the institution of permanent diplomatic missions, especially in the case of states further from the Republic", but the exchange of diplomats had to be handled carefully, he added, and "we will also have to guard against the danger of it getting out of hand". However, the R.S.A. "simply had to accept" that her relations with the rest of the world were largely determined by her relations with the African States. The latter observation is quite true, of course. Because South Africa has failed to establish the desired friendly relations, the white rulers are now still more ostracized than in 1967.

The security aspect of the policy immediately stands out as the major motive. This impression is reinforced if one reflects on the substantial amount of Western aid flowing to Africa (bilateral, multilateral, and from the UN) which was conveniently ignored by Muller, with the exception of the mention of gifts which was "the wrong approach and not South Africa's to aid". Thus the motives and the context in which the envisaged aid was to be rendered differ materially from the previous joint involvement. The analogy drawn by Muller was misleading but sheds light on the realities of the new "Realpolitik" the R.S.A. Government then proudly claimed to have adopted. What has emerged since is that the Africa policy was totally unrealistic!

Muller's ideas on Africa relations had probably crystallized by the time he made that speech, but the near-certainty, late in 1963, that Britain would grant independence to the High Commission Territories must have helped greatly to mould them. For fifty years South Africa had hoped and tried to incorporate these countries into a 'Greater South Africa', a possibility that was proposed in the so-called 'Schedule' to the South Africa Act (1909) and which also formed part of the proposals and forecasts made by the Tomlinson Commission Report published in 1954, the blueprint for Separate Development.²¹

18 Ibid., p. 6.

19 Ibid., p. 7. Illogical, because "Southern Africa" implies international co-operation. It is clear that in Muller's estimation the borders of the R.S.A. are those of Southern Africa.

20 This was not necessary since the C.C.T.A. had been incorporated in the OAU in 1963.

21 The impossible dream has been extended to the concept of "a regional power block of independent States" which Mr. Vorster has posited against the much more pragmatic concept of federalism which is now, hopefully, gaining currency in Southern Africa. Most Afrikaner thinking on regional co-operation and politics is, of course, poisoned by racist considerations and fear.

In the view of successive British Governments the conditions governing such a possible transfer of sovereignty were never met, hence the granting of full independence. In September 1963 Dr. Verwoerd made a last attempt at a transfer and explained that South Africa would be in a much better position to guide the territories to a kind of independence, which in his view, "fitted the pattern of the South African society". He criticized the British Government for promoting a form of self-government which would allow multi-racialism which, he said, "had failed everywhere".²² But in 1964 Verwoerd changed his mind and stated that,

the South African Government has adopted the realistic attitude that South Africa no longer claims the incorporation of these territories. . . our attitude is that they are neighbouring states with which we want to have the best possible relations for the sake of our common safety and economic interests.²³

This change of attitude coincided with Muller's appointment as Foreign Minister. It was the first time that the R.S.A. was forced to define its stance towards independent African States (to be) situated on its borders. Verwoerd coined the term 'goodneighbourliness' to describe the desired relationship. Molteno has argued that this approach was not entirely new since it had a respectable precedent in the policy of the Boers in the nineteenth century vis-à-vis African political units, e.g., the Basuto, the Zulu and the Swazi.²⁴ This tradition made it easier for the present leaders to "legitimize their present policy in Africa in the eyes of their followers"; it affords a further, reasonably acceptable explanation for the volte-face, which has thus been projected to the rank and file of the Party as an apparent volte-face. But the justification was a false one because the analogy is meaningless.

The Rhodesian problem seems to have stimulated the development of the Africa policy further. Although Rhodesia is not in the same category as the independent African States, UDI and subsequent sanctions very soon involved the R.S.A., first unofficially, and later officially, in a *de facto* independent neighbouring State. Christopher Hill and Dennis Austin²⁵ suggested at the time that there was a number of alternative courses of action the R.S.A. could follow. The first one was to back the Rhodesian regime to the hilt. This was the most natural course from the whites' point of view; there was much sympathy for Mr. Smith's "striking a blow for Christian Western civilisation" as is witnessed by the formation and activities of the 'Friends of Rhodesia Association'. Most Afrikaner newspapers pointed out that Rhodesia was useful

22 H. F. Verwoerd, *The Road to Freedom for Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*, R.S.A. Department of Information, Fact Paper 107, Pretoria, 1963.

23 Assembly Debates, 21 January 1964, Vol. 10, Cols. 59-60.

24 The point is made explicitly by Dr. Hilgard Muller in "South Africa's Africa Policy", 25/4/70, reported in *Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 6 (July 1970). For an earlier assessment of the Africa policy see Robert Molteno, "South Africa's Forward Policy in Africa", *Round Table*, Vol. 61, No. 243 (July 1971), pp. 329-347.

25 Christopher Hill, "U.D.I. and South African Foreign Policy", *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Volume VII, No. 2 (July 1969), pp. 96-103; and Dennis Austin, "White Power?" *Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies*, Volume VI, No. 2 (July 1968), pp. 95-106.

for R.S.A.'s defence system, another line of reasoning was that a white-controlled State would be a friendly neighbour. The degree of objectivity with which Mr. Vorster and his Cabinet could regard Rhodesia was thus limited by solid public (white) support for the Smith regime; but it is in any case highly unlikely that the white leaders themselves could have been objective in this matter at all.

Theoretically, another option was to follow a policy of complete non-interference, but this carried with it the danger that the Smith regime might not survive and that the R.S.A. would soon be saddled with a hostile African neighbour. The border of white-controlled Africa would then shift from the Zambezi to the Limpopo. Third, the R.S.A. might denounce Smith and actively work for his downfall, while at the same time trying to install a friendly African Government, a logical move in terms of the Africa policy objectives. Finally, the South African regime might to some extent co-operate with the British, e.g., by means of gentle pressure on Smith in order to bring about a return to legality and/or a negotiated settlement. The latter course was adopted initially, but when the guerrilla incursions started, the R.S.A. moved troops and police to Rhodesia (in 1967) in support of Smith and to defend themselves (forward defence). When considering this together with the R.S.A.'s assistance to Rhodesia to maintain its import and export trade, it is clear, in retrospect, that the Nationalist Government opted for the first course of action: support for the Rhodesian regime to the hilt, a policy that continued until mid-1974.²⁶

Hill posed the question "Has U.D.I. and its aftermath made any difference to South African foreign policy?"²⁷ His answer was "virtually none, in the sense that no new long-term trends have become apparent, but that these events have merely hastened tendencies which were already there, imposing upon South Africa the need to proceed more rapidly and perhaps with less circumspection than would otherwise have been the case, but not imposing any significant change in direction". One could still go along with Hill's answer but I would add the rider that the R.S.A. involvement in Rhodesia also carried the seed of destruction for her Africa policy as far as Central Africa was concerned, which is where it matters from the South African point of view. The confrontation of the two audiences was there for all to see.

The 'outward looking' or 'forward' Africa policy also envisaged an ever growing trade with the rest of Africa. With a huge potential market to the north and the very likely decline in trade with its largest customer, Britain, as

26 During 1974 a reversal of policy was gradually accepted as expedient and inevitable by the Vorster Government. Mr. Smith's failure to reach a settlement and the dramatic events in Portugal, Mozambique and Angola resulted in a growing security problem for whites in Rhodesia. It was now realized (at long last) that Rhodesia was to become a grave liability under such circumstances. The key question remains, however: can white South Africa still withdraw from Rhodesia and hope for a friendly African neighbour? It is highly unlikely unless there are going to be fundamental changes in South Africa itself. The new detente moves by Mr. Vorster, either by (personal) design or on account of party pressures, primarily aim at preventing such changes.

27 Christopher Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

a result of the, then, pending entry into the EEC,²⁸ could the R.S.A. afford not to appease the hostility in the continent, on account of which it might be left out of this market forever? In addition, there was the decline in profitable gold mining which also forced the R.S.A. to become more friendly with Africa. The fact that gold was a wasting asset meant that the country would become still more dependent on the export of manufactured goods,²⁹ especially consumer products. No substantial expansion in agricultural products seemed possible; thus Africa naturally presented itself and still presents itself as an important potential customer. This is not only due to the geographical nearness but is also the result of price levels; South African goods are often cheaper than imports from elsewhere or sometimes even local products. However, the major obstacle to trade expansion in Africa is the political one. The OAU's trade boycott, by and large, has been successful although differences of opinion on this matter have cropped up in the last three years. The initial desire of some of the francophone States to trade with South Africa and to have a 'dialogue' allegedly rested on the premise that through this they might have been able to bring about fundamental changes inside South Africa. In 1970 and 1971 some leaders of French-speaking African countries definitely expressed interest in the Africa policy, notably Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Bokassa (Central African Republic), Bongo (Gabon) and Tsiranana (Malagasy). The African ranks seemed divided for a while, but subsequent developments destroyed Pretoria's hopes. At the 1972 OAU meeting in Rabat most francophone States had second thoughts on 'dialogue' and trade with South Africa. Solidarity to end apartheid was again re-affirmed and strengthened at the 1973 Mogadishu meeting. In the meantime South African involvement in Malagasy (tourist industry and harbour construction) was ended. The new military leader, General Ramanantsoa, replacing Tsiranana, in the course of 1972 first froze South African investment projects and then repaid South African loans from Chinese advances. South Africans have invested in several industries in Mauritius, mainly to gain access to the EEC by using that country's Certificates of Origin. But early in 1974 their key agent, the ex-Foreign Minister, Duval, was ousted from the Cabinet and the fortunes of anti-South African forces, as everywhere else, are rising. It would seem to be just a matter of time before that door is closed as well.

Dr. Leistner, of the Pretoria-based Africa Institute, has argued that the purposes of aid were "our security and our long-term economic prosperity".

28 "South Africa's 25 million canning industry—one of its most valuable export earners—faces collapse if, as is reasonably expected, the Common Market lays down high minimum import prices next January". *X-Ray*, October 1973, Africa Bureau, London. The research paper quotes the *Johannesburg Star* (18 August 1973) as claiming that South Africa's canning industry could be dealt a blow from which it would not recover, especially since it is extremely difficult to find an alternative market. At the time a grave warning about what he called "the increasingly protectionist policies of Britain and other Common Market countries", was given by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. L. Muller, in a speech to the S.A.—British Trade Association in Johannesburg.

29 The rise in the price of gold has given South Africa a new opportunity to either strengthen the *Laager* further or to adjust internally. If history is any guide the money is not going to be spent on African advancement but on defence of oil

His views were stated as follows:

As regards the security aspect, this entails three separate stands:

1. There is the fact that stagnating or even falling incomes per head in neighbouring countries inevitably create a climate conducive to social unrest and to external policies aimed at diverting internal pressure towards the Republic. Support for terrorists and other forces hostile towards South Africa is a case in point.
2. Inversely, by proving to other African states that it is willing to share its knowledge and wealth with them in order to promote their economic advancement and social stability, the Republic is more likely to gain their goodwill and vested interest in the Republic's continued prosperity than by cutting itself off from them.
3. The Republic strengthens its claim to being an important, in fact an indispensable, part of the Western world, by being seen carrying its share of the worldwide development effort that today's industrial nations acknowledge as virtually necessary to their own security.

As regards the long-term economic prosperity of the Republic there are two reasons why it is in our own interest to help others prosper:

1. The more highly developed a country's economy is, the more it is likely to buy our products.
2. When loans or grants and technical aid are given to other countries, this helps our domestic economy even in the short run. Funds will to a large extent, be spent on materials and services supplied by South African firms. External loans or grants given by South Africa can contribute towards easing inflationary pressures at home. Technical aid often leads to orders for machinery and equipment needed in conjunction with a given scheme.³⁰

Such a statement, when compared to those of the leading political actors in this field, at least admits the economic self-interest inherent in the Africa policy. But this logic does not tell us what is meant by "our security and prosperity" or how the wealth of South Africa should be shared by all. In contrast, P. M. Vorster, in an article in the *Investors' Chronicle* and *S.E.G.*, wooing foreign investors, stated: "I am confident that the present policy of the South African Government will lead to a better understanding of our country's unselfish motives towards Africa and the world at large".³¹

The very limited achievements of the Africa policy up to mid-1974 have remained restricted to Malawi and independent African States in Southern Africa. In 1967 a Trade Agreement was concluded with Malawi which "provides that country with assured markets for a substantial portion of its four main export crops, namely tea, tobacco, cotton and groundnuts".³² In May 1968, Muller announced an R8 m loan to finance the first phase of building Malawi's new capital of Lilongwe (total cost estimated at R43 m) at an interest rate of 4%. South African sources for building materials were to re-

30 Dr. G. M. E. Leistner, "South Africa's Development, Aid, to African States", occasional paper No. 28 of the Africa Institute, Pretoria, 1970.

31 12 December 1969. Five years later it is obvious that neither the Africa policy nor the policy of Separate Development has promoted this better understanding. What is fully understood now is that both these policies are essentially selfish white designs to prolong white domination in Southern Africa and beyond; and that these policies have been solidly rejected by Africans.

32. Africa Institute paper No. 28, op. cit., p. 20.

ceive preference. Since then a second phase has been financed. Both Vorster and Muller visited Malawi in May 1970³³ and Dr. Banda made a return visit to the R.S.A. in August 1971 that was hailed as "a great success" by both Governments.³⁴ Aid to Lesotho concentrates on the improvement of the infrastructure, such as the extension of the railway network and other facilities. An important project is the Malibamatso hydro-electric scheme to regulate and increase the water supply to the Rand industrial area and to provide cheap power.³⁵ The activities of the Lesotho National Development Corporation, financed by South African capital and supervised by Dr. Rupert, should be mentioned as well; the Corporation has been instrumental in establishing a number of light industries.

The R.S.A. also helped to finance the Lesotho Police Mobile Unit whose activities kept Chief Jonathan in power after the 1970 post-election coup. At the head of this para-military force was Fred Roach whose role was described as follows by Sechaba:

Mr. Roach is the 'strong man' of Lesotho, who has been in charge of his tough peace-keeping force for nearly three years and in that time has built it into a brutal death-dealing machine. It has become so powerful since the State of Emergency was declared that it almost rules Lesotho. The 6ft. 3 ins. policeman, who has battled with so-called 'terrorists' in Malaya and Tanganyika for over 15 years, has arrogated unto himself the unenviable role of Kingmaker in Lesotho.³⁶

Botswana, although dependent on the R.S.A. as an employer of its manpower (there is in fact a mutual dependency), does not look to South Africa for development aid to any great extent. The aid that has been requested and provided has been confined to animal husbandry, health and education. However, the country is now probably on the road to economic independence following the discovery of substantial diamond, copper and nickel deposits in the late sixties, and their subsequent exploitation. Revenue derived from these ventures has already overtaken Botswana's traditional source of income, the export of meat. Politically, Sir Seretse Khama's Government moved further away from South Africa when, recently, he made an agreement with Tanzania's President Nyerere to support the guerrilla struggle. Furthermore, persistent efforts are being made to improve communications and transport systems with Zambia and the East African countries. An oil deal with Libya made in January 1974 suggests that Botswana will continue to receive her usual needs which will reach her via the Tanzam pipeline. All this spells doom for South African political leverage.

33 *Pioneers in Inter-African Relations*, a record of speeches made by Dr. Banda and Mr. Vorster, delivered on 20 May 1970 in Zomba. (Blantyre, Malawi: Department of Information).

34 Africa Institute, *Bulletin*, No. 8 (1971).

35 For a fairly exhaustive, although propagandist account of South African aid to Africa especially to countries in Southern Africa, see *Bulletin*, No. 4 (1973).

36 *Sechaba*, July 1970. However, he was sacked in April 1972 by Chief Jonathan. The detained Opposition Leader, Mokhehle, was set free a few months earlier indicating a new approach in Lesotho. This trend has continued steadily but an unsuccessful coup in January 1974, followed by a surprising rapprochement with the Vorster regime, suggests that Chief Jonathan's limited popular support is dwindling.

Swaziland, rich in mineral resources and rather more advanced than the other two ex-High Commission Territories both in terms of industrial development and agriculture, is mostly in need of educational aid to reduce the illiteracy rate and raise the levels of productivity and income. Early in 1969 an agreement was concluded between the South African and Swaziland Governments under which the Republic agreed to recruit, pay and equip South Africans to work in Swaziland's rapidly expanding local administration. However, the major South African involvement in Swaziland is that by the business sector; as an infant country its dependence on South African expertise and markets is beyond question, for the time being at any rate.

The S.A. National Development and Management Foundation (N.D.M.F.) a leading businessman's organisation, has conducted courses in accounting, office administration, personnel practice, etc. for Swaziland government officials as well as businessmen since 1966. These activities have been intensified since the Swaziland Management Development Group was formed in 1969. Very well attended courses have been conducted monthly since the middle of 1969 by South African businessmen, university lecturers and other experts.³⁷

But the tradition-oriented Swazi Government has been looking elsewhere as well, especially to Zambia, the East African countries and Britain, for trade and aid. The pending independence of Mozambique under a Frelimo dominated Government clearly opens the prospect of Swaziland becoming a new base for guerrilla activity against South Africa. This prospect should in any case strengthen the Swazi Kingdom's position vis-à-vis the South African regime in that it should be able to extract more benefits from the Southern African economy and, possibly, re-negotiate the terms of the customs agreement to its advantage. No doubt, the Chinese will soon be sailing into Lourenço Marques and also look to Swaziland as a further ally and trading partner in Africa.

The dramatic changes in Portugal are bound to have fatal results for the Africa policy altogether, i.e., if one considers the involvement of South Africa in Mozambique and Angola as an aspect of that policy. It was seen as such at least by the white leaders themselves.

In Mozambique South Africa's involvement in the Caborra Bassa Scheme, risky from their point of view in terms of expertise, manpower and capital investment, has resulted in the near-completion of the first stage of the project. Although the enterprise was made feasible firstly because the South African Government undertook to guarantee the use of 50% of its ultimate output and, secondly, because it assisted militarily in safeguarding it from guerrilla onslaughts during the construction period, the question of distribution of output would undoubtedly be looked at again by an independent Mozambique Government. Conceivably, in the long run at any rate, South Africa is unlikely to receive the return on her investment she had hoped for if her racial policies continue to aggravate African opinion. To the contrary, both this scheme and work done on the Kunene River hydro-electric project in Southern Angola are bonuses to the opponents of the present white rulers. In the long run,

37 Africa Institute occasional paper no. 28, op. cit., p. 29.

so it has been calculated, South Africa would be partly dependent on Caborra Bassa for her electricity needs. So much for her expansionism! Similarly, the euphoria that accompanied the commercial activities of Federale Mynbou and General Mining and Finance when they acquired a 25% holding in promising oil concessions in the Cuanja area of Angola in the beginning of 1969, as well as the enthusiasm aroused by the boost to trade given by the South Africa Trade Organisation Mission in June 1969,³⁸ has faded. The persistent lack of local oil in South Africa, notwithstanding an eight year fruitless and expensive search for it, and which most whites erroneously consider to be her Achilles heel, renders the country largely dependent on imports from Arab countries. Only Iran has publicly stated that it is prepared to supply South Africa now (30% of her needs); oil from Cabinda, therefore, would have been a welcome addition to ease fuel restrictions. However, if previously some oil was available to South Africa, in the future, African Angolan authorities will have no sympathy with whites in need of oil unless they change their ways. Thus, instead of controlling Angola and Mozambique indirectly and exploiting these territories for their own ends, i.e., to permit them to maintain the *status quo* in South Africa, the war that carried "grave dangers" for Southern African whites (as Afrikaner military leaders repeatedly have warned), is now right on their own doorstep. Are Afrikaners now going to stand by that platform of their National Party, laid down in 1969, which was "that the Party, and with it South Africa, is irrevocably committed to a path which leads straight into Africa? Commercially, politically, and even militarily, the Republic is setting its face towards the hinterland";³⁹ or will they come to their senses at the eleventh hour and assist meaningfully in the reconstruction of Southern Africa into a land worth living in? Most African leaders consider the Africa policy an evil, a fraud, no matter how poor their countries, no matter how much strife there may be amongst themselves. That situation is likely to remain until fundamental changes are brought about in South Africa; until the whole fabric of Apartheid-Separate Development is discarded. Pretoria, on the other hand, keeps on thinking that by a combination of military pressure, dangling sufficiently attractive carrots before African leaders' eyes in the form of aid and other benefits, and by supporting groups likely to overthrow a hostile government, this attitude can be broken. The dominant African attitude in respect of the white south was clearly, although still moderately, expressed in the Lusaka Manifesto.⁴⁰ African leaders have grown less tolerant since then; and the African victories in the former Portuguese 'provinces' have strengthened their position immeasurably.

In the final analysis one must, I think, distinguish between the Afrikaner politicians and the political system, on the one hand, and the bulk of the white people, on the other hand. What is primarily wrong with the politicians

38 G. Cockram, *Vorster's Foreign Policy* (Cape Town: Academica, 1970), Ch. 11.

39 *South African Financial Gazette*, 21 November 1969.

40 *Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa*, Proceedings of the Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States, held in Lusaka, Zambia, 14-16 April 1969 (Lusaka: Government Printer).

is that they are grossly incompetent, collectively and most of them individually. This may well be the result of historical and sociological conditions, relative isolation from European political and social developments and, to some extent, due to the unitary form of the State and the electoral system, but it remains an undeniable fact that a whole generation of Afrikaner politicians has allowed Southern Africa to drift into the quagmire it is in. If the objective in the domestic sphere was the survival of the Afrikaner culture and identity in a separate, independent State, alongside other, African States, no real progress has been made towards that goal; survival in any sense is now far more precarious than it was in 1948. If the objective in the international sphere was to silence criticism of domestic politics, eliminate guerrilla threats and create stable, lucrative markets, the politicians have failed still more obviously. Now the regime has turned to a kind of concessions policy that, equally, is likely to achieve the opposite of what is intended: instead of appeasing African workers and the African intelligentsia, expectations are created that will remain unfulfilled and, simultaneously, it is bound to stimulate African political awareness which can only result in increased dissatisfaction. The regime still obstinately refuses to consider fundamental reforms and to adapt rapidly to the demands of a modern, industrial, multiracial society. Its concessions are bound to be too small and to come too late and, therefore, to be productive of revolution; it is simply unable to give South Africa leadership. If politics is the art of the possible, since 1948 Afrikaner leaders have attempted to do the impossible in every department of the game. It augurs ill for the Afrikaner community, supposedly so politics conscious—but not in fact—that their leaders' competence has been questioned so little that they could be returned to office with an increased parliamentary majority in April 1974. When the crunch comes, as it must eventually, the eternal political wilderness would seem to be their inevitable destination, at least at the central level; it might well be for their own good and most certainly for the good of the Afrikaner community as a whole.

Finally, in conclusion, it should be remembered that South Africa does have much to offer to other, newer African countries in terms of expertise, experience, aid and trade; that a mutually beneficial relationship between her and other African countries can easily be achieved if the politics of race are shelved or at least relegated to lower levels of decision-making; and that the incompetent politicians are but a very small group that *can* be replaced by men and women with foresight, skill and tact, of any racial group. A prolonged race war in Southern Africa, an ever growing threat, might leave that region in such a state of chaos that the workshop that South Africa possibly could be for Africa has nothing left to offer for a long time to come.

Africans decided fourteen years ago that the time had arrived for 'un-constitutional' change after nearly 50 years of trying to improve their lot within the framework of a constitution which was imposed upon them. One can only hope, for their own sake, that whites, at long last, are reaching the same conclusion, and not just the students associated with N.U.S.A.S.; and that they *act* to help end the tyranny which is the substance of this new Afri-

kaner 'Republic'. 'Legal' and parliamentary opposition have proved to be completely ineffective. Thus their only real hope lies in 'unconstitutional', 'illegal', and extra-parliamentary, although not necessarily violent, change. Satyagraha on a massive scale, selectively applied to the race laws, would seem to recommend itself as a morally responsible method.

the USSR from the movement might in fact have succeeded had the projected "Second Bandung" taken place in Algeria in mid-1965. The PRC had apparently lined up sufficient support, particularly in Africa, to achieve this result. However, the matter never came to a showdown because the conference was cancelled due to the Boumedienne coup d'état in Algiers on 19 June 1965. But it is important to understand why the PRC sought the expulsion of the USSR from the Afro-Asian movement.

Of the arguments the Chinese have invoked in the effort to exclude the USSR from the processes of Afro-Asian politics and diplomacy, one in particular is deserving of attention. The PRC insists that since the Afro-Asian solidarity movement is historically inseparable from the broad, world-wide, anti-imperialist struggle, only those States and forces that give first priority to this struggle should participate in the solidarity movement. Those whose priorities lie elsewhere should either recant or be ejected lest they deflect the movement from its true and authentic purpose. Hence, since the USSR holds that the "struggle for peace", "peaceful co-existence", or "detente", is the priority task of the progressive force, it should either so recant or be shown the way out of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement.

This issue is clearly crucial. The author of *China's Policy in Africa* notes how frequently the issue has cropped up in every forum involving Soviet and Chinese participation. For instance, he describes how the two sides' violent polemics on the issue nearly wrecked the third AAPSO conference in Moshi, Tanzania, in February 1963. However, Ogunsanwo confines himself to describing the virulence of the polemics and their disruptive and generally negative character. He does not squarely face the main issue itself. He fails to assess the merits of the arguments on either side, and thus, by default, creates the impression that the question: What is central, the anti-imperialist struggle or the peace struggle? is irrelevant, or peripheral, to Afro-Asian solidarity. Such a view is obviously erroneous. Afro-Asian solidarity is totally meaningless without a definite and relevant political content. The Chinese have surely been correct in placing top priority on the anti-imperialist struggle. If the Afro-Asian (as well as South American) countries and peoples who have suffered so grievously from imperialism, and who still have to achieve total victory against imperialism, give second place to the anti-imperialist struggle, this could only reflect their own misconception about the nature of contemporary international reality and the tasks that it imposes on those who would transform it. Peace is, of course, highly desirable. But even reactionaries have always denounced 'peace at any price'. Peace cannot be achieved, nor can it be rendered secure, in a context of injustice. Since imperialism represents a standing aggression, especially against the people of the Third World, how could there ever be peace in the world before imperialism in all its manifestations is liquidated?

The struggle against imperialism is, from the PRC perspective, a struggle against American policies and actions—including the actions of American monopolies—in Africa and elsewhere. In its approach to Africa the PRC has,