

Zambian Humanism: The Way Ahead

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THE BIRTH OF THE IDEOLOGY

When was the birth of Zambian humanism? Not an easy question. One view is that it is a formalization and systematization of values and social principles which were live realities in precolonial society: the absence of exploiting classes, egalitarianism, communalism and inclusiveness, self-reliance balanced by mutual aid, hospitality together with generosity, politeness and respect. A second view is that Zambian humanism is a codification of the principles which the United National Independence Party adopted during the independence struggle: an independent republic, unitary government, universal franchise, a welfare state, economic development for the benefit of the masses, and rejection of racism and colonialism. The third view, of course, is that Zambian humanism expresses the thoughts of President Kaunda. The truth, I suggest, lies somewhere between these three points of view. Humanism preserves selected values from the past, embodies convictions which grew up during the nationalist struggle, and adapts these principles to the problems of the present in order to give direction for the future.

But it is necessary to be clearer than this about the circumstances out of which Zambian humanism has grown. Settler society in Northern Rhodesia had its own ideology. This was built on the myth of European racial superiority which was held to justify this minority having an almost complete political and economic monopoly. Racial inequality, discrimination and segregation flowed as natural corollaries from this. The settler ideology also accepted a capitalist economy with the super-exploitation (geographic, racial and class) which characterizes a colonial situation. And, finally, in cultural and international terms, the Northern Rhodesian settlers had exclusive loyalty to a perverted and degenerate view of the West. The Zambian independence movement rejected key dimensions of this settler ideology: white racial superiority, minority rule, an economy organized to benefit local whites and overseas companies, etc. But—and this is the on-going problem which this new nation faces—what other values and social principles inherited from the colonial past are to be rejected? And from where is inspiration to be drawn for building a new society?

One obvious alternative is socialism. Indeed, socialist doctrine has provided—within the context of differing national cultures and historical experiences—the fundamental inspiration for restructuring societies in Asia, Europe and

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Latin America. This suggests the second circumstance out of which Zambian humanism has grown. Zambian leaders were acquainted with only one kind of socialism by the early 1960s. Yet over 50 years ago, the socialist movement split into two paths: social democracy which accepted a modified capitalist economy as the basis of society, but which sought to eliminate the worst of exploitation and protect the masses through a welfare state; and scientific socialism which rejected as impossible the reformation of capitalism and insisted instead on its elimination by transferring ownership of the means of production into the hands of the State. The State was to be controlled by a Party representing the urban working class and the peasants, and aiming to move forward to a communist society. While Zambian leaders were to some extent sympathetic to socialism because of its rejection of imperialism and racism, their contact was largely with social democracy, particularly the brands of the British Labour Party and the Indian Congress Party. They were cut off before independence from intellectual familiarity with the Marxist-Leninist theories of scientific socialism and also from practical experience of such socialist societies as China, Cuba and the Soviet Union. This was due to the deliberate colonial policy (embracing even the field of education) of the British. Indeed, the colonial legacy steered Zambians away from scientific socialism in many ways. The Western colonialists spread the notion that scientific socialism always destroyed religious observance. They denied Zambians all knowledge of the true nature of such societies as the People's Republic of China. And, perhaps most important of all, the Northern Rhodesian economy, especially the copper mines, were tied so closely to the Western capitalist States in terms of ownership, skilled manpower, machinery and markets that the Zambian leadership has had constantly to bear in mind the dangers of antagonizing the West by moving towards a Zambian version of scientific socialism too quickly or directly. It remains true today that the Zambian humanist ideology in practice has more to do with social democracy than with scientific socialism. And, as we shall see below, there are significant elements in Zambian society who want it to remain that way. The result is a continued widespread ignorance of the intellectual content of socialist thought, its explanations of the nature and direction of social forces, of imperialism and of the persisting underdevelopment of the former colonies in the third world.

The third circumstance which has affected the growth of Zambian humanism has been the bitter contradiction between a continued attachment to traditional values (already severely battered by the colonial experience) on the one hand, and the enforced facing up to the necessity for an industrial economy on the other hand (with its immense problems of national unity across both sectional and incipient class divisions, of economic development in the face of neo-colonial threats, and of urbanization with its undermining of valuable social principles and attitudes). Which traditional values must be preserved? Which ones are viable and can survive in an industrial urban society built on science and technology? In what unique ways are they to be given expression in the changing Zambian society? And equally, what kind of new society do Zambians want? How is the country to avoid the dehumanizing

effects of large-scale organization? Can it avoid the abject poverty, coercion and social degradation which so many other industrializing societies have forced on their populations? These are some of the dilemmas and problems which Zambian humanism has to face.

Finally, we must not forget the shadow which has been cast ever since independence by the continuation of white minority dictatorships to the South. The economic and military threats—as well as their relentless denigration and undermining of Zambia—have made infinitely more difficult the single-minded attention to ideological clarification and implementation which is necessary in Zambia today.

ZAMBIAN HUMANISM AND THE INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY OF AFRICA

The author of a recent book, Mr. Kandeke,¹ has given many reasons why ideology is essential in every new State and the functions which Zambian humanism can perform in Zambia itself. In view of the current scepticism about humanism among so many of the nation's young intelligentsia, it may be useful to suggest another dimension of the importance of Zambian humanism. Africa, including Zambia, urgently needs an intelligentsia, i.e., a group of people with the personal motivation, analytic skills and appropriate social values to wrestle with the problems which afflict mankind today. An African intelligentsia must be indigenous—in origins and in ideas. It must be self-confident, yet humble; independent, yet committed. Zambian humanism is both a product of such an intellectual, and it can also be a stimulus to the maturing and growth of such a group in society.

Let us explore this a little more.² An ever-present dimension of the European imperialist impact on Africa was the intellectual one. European imperialism sought to destroy the self-consciousness and self-confidence of colonial peoples by preventing the existence of an intelligentsia. This is why it destroyed the traditional intelligentsia in Africa—with misguided missionaries in the early years leading the war on traditional culture, religious beliefs, and behavioural norms. This is why it also prevented a new indigenous intelligentsia from growing up. For it feared such a group which would be capable of synthesizing the contradictions of indigenous African culture and European imported culture to produce a new interpretation of colonial reality. Such an intelligentsia would then have been willing to reject the legitimacy of the exploitive and destructive reality of colonialism. And since it would be in touch with the masses, it could form a revolutionary front with them to overthrow imperialism. This explains why there was so little secondary education and even less higher education in colonial Africa. But, of course, this attempt at holding back the political revolution of Africa, independence, was not successful. And so the continent witnessed, and still does, the third stage in this colonial determination to ensure the intellectual emasculation of Africa. This

1 Timothy K. Kandeke, *A Systematic Introduction to Zambian Humanism* (Lusaka: Neczam, forthcoming).

2 The thoughts which follow in this section first appeared in *Dzuwa*, a literary magazine produced by the UNZA Writers' Club (December 1973), Vol. 1, No. 2.

third stage is to allow and even encourage an African intelligentsia, but to ensure that mentally it remains imprisoned in certain conservative American and West European thought forms. This is why the few pre-independence universities in Africa were so Eurocentric, élitist, and segregated from the community. This is also the explanation for the huge flood of scholarships to the United States and Western Europe which continues to delay the intellectual independence of Africa although, fortunately, it is true that the contradiction between the ideological pretensions of Western capitalist society and its exploitative and frequently racist reality is compelling visiting African intellectuals increasingly to explore radical alternatives to bourgeois thought. For let us remember that the essential African revolution has three aspects: the *political revolution* (which outside Southern Africa is now almost complete); the *economic revolution* (where the battle is only beginning and where Zambian humanism has made a significant contribution); and the *intellectual revolution* (where the greatest task remains). Yet the intellectual revolution is the most important. For it is the only guarantee of the irreversibility and completeness of the other two—the political and economic revolutions. The intellectual revolution is also the only path whereby Africa will contribute to the progress of all mankind.

The intellectual autonomy of Africa is, therefore, a vital task for the present generation. It does not mean that Africa must cut itself off from world culture, science and technology. It does mean that Africa must move much closer to intellectual independence where indigenous Africans identify the problems of their societies, study them and make the difficult choices as to their solution. Zambia in particular is a victim of the mental legacy of British imperialism and the continuing current reality of Western intellectual neo-colonialism. So we have foreign advisers to make our national policies; foreign teachers to educate our children; and even foreign journalists to inform us about the world and stimulate our thinking. Yet other parts of the world have achieved substantial intellectual independence; the socialist States, Western Europe, North America, and even Asia and Latin America have moved a long way in that direction. The fruits are large: knowledge becomes relevant, self-confidence high, and the ability to create culturally unique solutions assured. Yet Africa, despite its intellectual giants (Samir Amin, Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, not to mention the growing host of novelists, playwrights and poets) is still a long way off from its third revolution.

Let us be quite clear why Zambia, and Africa as a whole, needs her own intelligentsia:

1. Independent Africa is still emerging from her past of colonial capitalism. How is the colonial legacy to be judged? Which aspects of the colonial legacy must be rejected? It requires an intelligentsia with sufficient numbers, freedom, leisure and commitment to answer these questions.
2. Africa is also moving into a future where her environment—technological, military, political, economic, etc.—is changing continuously. Again it

- requires an intelligentsia to perceive the problems, formulate the alternatives and help make the choices.
3. The great theme in Africa today, as in all human history, is the struggle to build better societies, with the masses confident of their own ability to direct themselves, mass participation and representation, social and economic justice, the liberation of women, individual rights and freedoms, and a commitment to communal cooperation. It is intellectuals who will act as the moral drumbeat of this social progress.
 4. Africa, like any other continent, needs peoples with cultures which can adapt to the changing world and yet preserve their individuality and continuity. For only such peoples have both self-confidence to survive as societies and richness in quality of life to make survival worthwhile. Yet culture, while it can be a mass possession, is an intellectual creation.

Zambian humanism is concerned with all these themes: evaluation of the past, the shape of the future, the need for social progress, and the content of culture. Whether new intellectuals in Zambia and elsewhere in the continent embrace humanism or, in rejecting it, are pushed into creating new African world views, Zambian humanism remains a stepping stone on the long road to the indigenization of African thought in the contemporary world.

PROBLEMS WHICH ZAMBIAN HUMANISM FACES

Mr. Kandeke has pointed out that Zambian humanism is an ideology in its infancy. We must, therefore, expect considerable growth and even modification of its ideas. It is also true that Zambia is not yet a fully humanist society; nor can the irreversibility of its humanist features be assumed. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine the main problems which the ideology may face in coming years.

The Problem of Distortion

The dilemma of any ideology is that, while it seeks to provide general concepts and principles to explain a wide variety of situations, its very generality at the same time lays itself open to distortion and misuse by various groups in society for their own ends. This has already begun to happen to Zambian humanism. We are all familiar with the story of the man who scrounged another beer in the name of humanism. Kandeke also felt it necessary to draw a distinction between humanism and humanitarianism. But there is another and more fundamental danger of distortion. The importance of Kandeke's book's contribution to Zambian humanism has been to highlight and explicate the socialist content of the ideology. The author has, of course, made it clear that Zambian humanism is not anti-religious and that it will not take a form identical to socialism in other countries for obvious historical, cultural and other reasons. Nevertheless, we must not be surprised if anti-socialist elements inside and outside Zambia dispute the socialist implications of humanism and try to give it a capitalist gloss in their own interests. The only

solutions to this danger of distortion are vigilance and greater clarity of content. Let us turn to this.

The Problem of Content

There are two problems of content. The first is that there seem to be at least three competing interpretations of Zambian humanism at the present time.³ The first has been promulgated by certain people in the Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance and interprets humanism as basically the preservation of traditional values. This raises various problems. Does Zambian humanism preserve *all* traditional values? Kandeke argues no. Beliefs in magic, for example, or the role of chiefs as political leaders, are rejected. But what guidelines does Zambian humanism offer as to which traditional values to accept and which to reject? And what if there is a conflict between the values of one precolonial society in Zambia and another, as with the Tonga stress on village self-government and the Lozi emphasis on centralized authority? What criteria does Zambian humanism offer in confronting such questions? Another difficulty is that certain traditional values may not be viable in modern day Zambia. For example, self-reliance through the self-sufficiency of the family unit is inescapably undermined by the division of labour in the modern economy and by the growth of specialized, State provided social services. It is also true that traditional values alone may not always be adequate guides when confronting today's problems.

A second interpretation of Zambian humanism is that it is in essence reformed capitalism. Thus Dr. Meebelo⁴ argues that humanism has different origins from socialism, contains a religious attachment which socialism does not, rejects the idea that class struggle is inevitable, accepts a mixed economy with much of the means of production remaining under private ownership, and lastly is wary of the virtues of a welfare state where allegedly Government is "a kind of public charity". There are difficulties with this interpretation, too. Can exploitation of man by man be eliminated under capitalism, even when reformed? Can the State in a mixed economy ever be powerful enough to curb capitalism? Indeed, is capitalism fundamentally capable of being reformed at all? Moreover, are there any ex-colonies which have found capitalism a permanently satisfactory road to development?⁵

3 A lot has been written on Zambian humanism. See *inter alia*: K. D. Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its Implementation* (Lusaka: ZIS, 1968), *A Humanist in Africa* (London: Longmans, 1966), *Letter to My Children* (London: Longmans, 1973); H. S. Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought* (Lusaka: OUP, 1973); B. de Gaay Fortman, ed., *After Mulungushi: The Economics of Zambian Humanism* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969); and J. B. Zulu, *Zambian Humanism: Some Major Spiritual and Economic Challenges* (Lusaka: Neczam, 1970).

4 H. S. Meebelo, *Main Currents of Zambian Humanist Thought*, op. cit.

5 For a critique of capitalism as a possible, let alone ideal, road to development in the third world, see P. A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York and London: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1968); Andre Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York and London: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1969), and *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (New York and London, Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1970).

The third interpretation of Zambian humanism is that its dominant character is socialism within the special context of Zambian conditions.⁶ It argues that the key to the best aspects of traditional society was its non-exploitive and pre-capitalist character. But industrial economies today are either variations on the theme of capitalism or one or other kind of socialism. Since capitalism by its nature is exploitive and inegalitarian, the contemporary equivalent of traditional society's absence of exploitation is some form of socialism within an African context.

Clearly, sooner rather than later, Zambians will have to make up their minds which of the above three interpretations of humanism is the reality of their ideology. Only then can distortion be avoided and a clearer direction given to the future of the society.

The second problem of content in relation to Zambian humanism can be dealt with more quickly. The ideology has had a lot to say about values, social goals and the translation of these into institutional reality, particularly in the economic field. Where the ideology still has a long way to go is as a mode of sociological analysis. The setting of goals is only one half of the task. The other half is to provide an intellectually satisfactory critique of the current state of society which in turn can serve as the rationale for accepting new values and goals. Yet how far has Zambian humanism probed the explosive questions of international exploitation (imperialism, neo-colonialism, etc.) and domestic exploitation (in terms of racial groups, class conflict, etc.)? And how far is it determined to shape its own tools of social analysis or to borrow from existing bodies of theory? This raises another problem to which we will return: Zambian humanism's present isolation from the main body of radical thought elsewhere in Africa.

Finally, let me merely suggest that there are three circumstances which will propel Zambian humanism to answer certain questions. Firstly, it has been thought out at a particular stage of Zambia's historical development—the very early post-independence period. Secondly, this has happened in a society with a very difficult geographical location. Zambia shares boundaries with all four of the unliberated States of Southern Africa and depends on them for access to the sea and even for certain imports and types of manpower. Lastly, she inherited an extraordinary colonial economic legacy—almost complete foreign control of the economy, near total dependence in 1964 on foreign manpower in middle and senior posts, domination by one export-oriented sector, copper mining, and extensive neglect of the rural areas. These circumstances may stimulate thought on the following issues:

- (a) the nature and role of non-class social formations (tribal, racial, regional, etc.) as a dimension of political conflict;
- (b) the effect of a large and rapidly growing urban population on incipient class formation and conflict;

6 This is the view which Kandeke's book puts forward.

- (c) the causes, manifestations and techniques of neo-colonial control by Western capitalism over the third world;
- (d) the phenomenon of sub-imperialism whereby a country like South Africa is in part an agent of Western capitalism; and
- (e) the problem of scale: the dehumanizing and dictatorial implications of the ever-expanding scale of human organization.

The Problem of Isolation

This brings us to the strange fact that Zambian humanism apparently has been thought out in virtual isolation from the growing body of radical social thought in Africa. Yet it is these works, largely by Africans, which are at the cutting edge of intellectual progress in the continent. It is these writers who are beginning to tackle the major socio-intellectual issues of our time in Africa. And for those who are not familiar with them, let me suggest some indication of their scope. Samir Amin, an Egyptian now working in West Africa, and Walter Rodney, a black Guyanese teaching in Tanzania, have brilliantly exposed the destructive impact of Europe's evolving contacts with Africa over the previous five centuries.⁷ Rodney has asked—and answered—the basic historical question: Was colonialism necessary to integrate Africa into a technologically modern world economy? His resounding 'No' is reinforced by Fanon's analysis of the catastrophic effects of French colonialism.⁸ From there it is but a short step to the theory and practice of revolutionary overthrow of colonialism. In this field, Fanon is joined by the towering achievements of the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies—themselves led intellectually by the solid genius of Amílcar Cabral, the assassinated leader of PAIGC.⁹ For those colonies which experienced a less violent transition to political independence, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah first analysed comprehensively the reality and dangers of continuing neo-colonial exploitation and control by the Western capitalist powers.¹⁰ It was Nkrumah too, who with immense foresight stressed the irrevocable need—a full ten years ago—for Pan Africanism to be given real substance through a Union Government of African States.¹¹

The record of division since the rejection of his bold proposals only underlines the truth of what he said. Finally, Samir Amin and others¹² have

7 S. Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa—Origins and Contemporary Forms," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, X, 4 (1972); and W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972).

8 F. Fanon, *Toward the African Revolution* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970); *A Dying Colonialism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970); and *The Wretched of the Earth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967).

9 A. Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea* (Stage 1, 21 Theobalds Road, London WC1, 1969), and *Our People are our Mountains: Speeches* (Committee for Freedom in Mozambique Angola and Guinea, 531 Caledonian Road, London, 1972).

10 K. Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1968). See also, J. Woddis, *An Introduction to Neo-Colonialism* (in Africa), (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1967).

11 K. Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1963). See also R. H. Green and A. Seidman, *Unity or Poverty?—The Economics of Pan Africanism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968).

12 S. Amin, *The Maghreb in the Modern World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970) and several books in French. See also, G. Arrighi and J. Saul, *The Political Economy of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

begun to probe the tasks of development in Africa while President Nyerere of Tanzania in both his writings and the practice of his Government is beginning to build a new society which is both socialist and African.¹³

What is needed now is a greater mutual familiarity and cross-fertilization of ideas between Zambian humanist theory and practice on the one hand and this exciting and expanding body of African thought and reality on the other. Only the mutual enrichment of both can result.

The Problem of Intellectualism

I have stressed so far both the need for a larger and more venturesome intelligentsia in Africa as well as the need for more cross-fertilization of ideas. It is appropriate at this point, therefore, to stress the other side of the coin: the dangers which face the intellectual who identifies with Zambian humanism. It may well be true that this ideology has been too much the preserve of curious foreign political analysts and somewhat abstruse domestic writers. Yet, the humanist intellectual, by reason of the very orientation of his ideology towards ordinary people, has a special obligation to avoid the four dangers of intellectualism: inaction, incomprehensibility, betrayal, and arrogance.

Inaction is the tendency for intellectuals to claim for themselves a special status which allows them to stay aloof from the battle for change in society. Many claim the right to stay in their ivory towers, to further their own careers and interests, and to ignore the conflict and suffering going on around them. This may sometimes be a personally tempting choice, but it is a socially irresponsible one. Great intellectuals are almost always socially committed and involved men. Take Fanon, for example, in Algeria—doctor, sociologist, philosopher and revolutionary. Indeed, the crime of the intellectual is not just not to use his intellect; rather it is his failure to act out the conclusions reached by his intellect. For the periods of great progress in man's history have been the products of a conjunction between great thinkers and popular social forces. Thus in Zambian higher educational institutions, the overwhelming majority of students show little desire to become intellectuals or even less to adopt humanism as their mainstay with all that it implies in terms of personal integrity, disciplined life-style, untrodden paths and unprobed problems. Instead most students see education as an unpleasant obstacle race, the skills from successful completion of which open up the green pastures of high incomes.

Incomprehensibility is the second danger which the humanist intellectual faces. He must write, speak, teach and act in such a way that the masses do not find it impossible to understand his critique of the status quo, his vision of the future, and his suggestions as to strategy. For an intellectual without the masses is a fish out of water. The greatness of a Nyerere or a Mao is their closeness to the masses. And they achieve it through overwhelming lucidity, their endless capacity to convey a point through a familiar tale told with a new twist, and their willingness to be with the people.

13 J. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (Nairobi: OUP, 1968); K. Nkrumah, *Class Struggle in Africa* (London: Panaf Books, 1970); and I. Cox, *Socialist Ideas in Africa* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1966).

The third danger is betrayal. There are two characteristics of the intellectual's environment which render him peculiarly vulnerable to betrayal of his political duty to the masses. The first is that he often forms his ideas at an educational institution where he is divorced largely from the necessities of finding (and keeping) a job, looking after a family, and the general pressures of society to conform. The depth of his commitment can only be seen when he leaves such a relatively sheltered existence and goes out into the maelstrom of society. The second circumstance (but one which has not yet afflicted Zambia) is the ease with which third world intellectuals and professional men can emigrate from their own countries to the fat salaries of the West, thereby leaving the masses to their fate.

Finally, and most insidious of all, there is the danger that the intellectual who becomes politically active, remains comprehensible to the masses and does not betray them, succumbs at last to the fourth temptation: arrogance. It is so easy for intellectuals, with all their training and knowledge and self-esteem, to assume their right to predominate in leadership positions. It is so easy to believe that the masses ought to accept passively the goals and vision of the future depicted for them by the intelligentsia. Yet the masses have visions of their own. And wisdom too. They are not mere political cannon-fodder, fit only to be manipulated by leaders—no matter how intellectual. If humanism means anything in the political sphere, it means this. Therefore, the humanist intellectual has to accept this most difficult lesson of all: that a proper relationship of stable and mutual confidence between the intelligentsia and the masses can only exist where intellectuals accept wholeheartedly that the revolution is the people's revolution. Its goals must be the people's goals and reflect their interests and aspirations, albeit illuminated by the intellectuals' social insight and logic. And the people are, indeed, able to understand their ideology, the role of the intellectual being to participate in training the people's leaders. Finally, the leadership of the movement must be drawn predominantly from the masses. The intellectual can only be as salt is to meat. And, as with salt, he must mix with the masses and even on occasion share with them their hardships and way of life. This is the hardest test of all for the humanist intellectual. To fail it when occasion demands is to betray both the ideology and the people.

The Problem of Opposition

The problem of opposition is the most obvious and most immediate of the problems facing Zambian humanism. Moreover, the opposition is not merely international, but internal. And, as President Kaunda said, "it is one thing fighting foreigners on your own grounds, and another fighting your own people who have wrong ideas."¹⁴ It is therefore essential to analyse the nature of this opposition, to assess its strategy and adopt the necessary counter-measures. These are perhaps the most urgent of all the tasks facing Zambian humanism today.

¹⁴ In an interview in *Africa*, No. 25 (September 1973), p. 47.

Various social groups in Zambia contain elements hostile to the values of humanism and it would be dangerous to turn a blind eye to this fact. In the first place, there has been a very rapid growth since independence of an African capital-owning class. This class is mainly entrenched in the commercial, transport and agricultural sectors of the economy. Its interests run counter to Zambian humanism's commitment against exploitation and its measures to curb capitalism (for example: price control, a steeply progressive income tax system, and the threat, ultimately, to nationalize very large Zambian-owned enterprises). This new class also fears humanism's proclaimed intention to compel owners and managers to include workers in the control of companies. Nor does it like the advocacy of equality, particularly where the Government has put this into practice by abolishing the two tier, dual quality system of fee-paying and non-fee-paying hospital and school facilities. It must also be noted that this new bourgeois class may ally itself with other potentially reactionary class elements. Thus certain managers in the parastatal sector and senior civil servants participate indirectly in the private sector through relatives. Some of them are also hostile to humanism because they dislike decentralization (with the decline in their authority which this implies), workers' participation (for similar reasons) and the provisions in the new Code of Leadership which may make it more difficult for them to enter the private sector as commercial entrepreneurs, landlords and large-scale private farmers. Other wings of the new bourgeoisie whose opposition cannot be ignored are those politicians who are also deeply entrenched in the private sector and those army officers whose training was in capitalist States at institutions where the most reactionary class elements in British society still tend to congregate.

A different, but related source of opposition stems from non-citizen, but resident bourgeois elements, both European and Asian. These groups have suffered significantly at the hands of the Government policy since 1968 to restrict their participation to, increasingly narrow geographic areas and more limited types of economic undertaking. Already they have been partially squeezed out of the commercial, transport and small-scale construction sectors. However, the extent to which this has happened must not be exaggerated. For many have stayed on as agents of Zambian entrepreneurs or via the younger generation who are citizens. The possibility always exists of a temporary alliance between the new indigenous bourgeoisie and these non-citizen, resident, bourgeois elements which could quietly sabotage certain humanist objectives. The country has already had some experience of this where members of these ethnic minorities have tried to undermine humanism via non-cooperation in localization, corruption of State officials over citizenship, and possibly even financial support for dissident political elements.

A third and more serious threat is the huge multinational corporations which operate in Zambia. They, of course, are domestic in one sense while being able to mobilize international opposition at the same time. These giant, foreign owned companies have the self-confidence to object to the translation of humanism into practice where it affects them, and the power to resist

successfully. The successful refusal of the main banks in 1971 to submit to Government's takeover proposals is a good example.

The extent to which the MNCs hold Zambia in their embrace must not be underestimated. The most prominent are the two huge mining companies: Anglo American Corporation and Amax. But there are many others: new mining companies who are prospecting; a few giant oil companies engaged in marketing; certain large commercial firms; the banks; and various manufacturing companies. Most of these have accepted the 51 per cent takeovers by Government since 1968. Indeed, some of them may even have welcomed the takeovers since, on the one hand, the generous compensation enabled them to accelerate the export of surplus out of Zambia (currently running at some K200 million per annum or 20 per cent of the G.N.P.) while on the other hand, their being granted profitable management contracts enabled them to guarantee the full payment of compensation owing. But this must not divert us from the realization that international capital disapproves of third world countries taking over its firms even with compensation. Moreover, the moves begun in 1973 to revise the takeover agreements (starting with the mines) so as to increase Governmental managerial control and tax rake-offs will be even less popular. To this must be added the fact that the whole direction of State economic policy as well as the value implications of Zambian humanism are as unwelcome to these multinational corporations as they are to local and resident non-citizen bourgeois elements. The danger is that these MNCs will use their links with Western monetary markets, their relations with shipping firms, and their vital role in the supply of skilled foreign manpower, to compel Government to go slow on the further translation of humanism into practice. In particular, effective workers' participation, humanist management practices and significant income redistribution may all be delayed. This in turn may mean that solid working class support for Zambian humanism may not be forthcoming fast enough to provide the necessary bulwark against reactionary class elements bent on sabotaging humanist objectives.

The last important source of opposition is international. This comes from two interrelated sources. The first is minority-ruled Southern Africa whose core is the Republic of South Africa with its four million strong white minority. This is not the place to embark on a lengthy account of the threat which the white-ruled South has posed to Zambia ever since independence. It is sufficient to remind the reader of the long catalogue of sabotage, fire-bombs, border bombings, mine laying, armed incursions, threats of invasion and support for reactionary opposition elements. The reasons are not just white South African and Rhodesian pique at exclusion of their exports from Zambian markets, or their anxiety at the consequences of Zambian support for the liberation movements. The basic reason is their great and growing fear of a humanist Zambia. For such a society—stable, confident, growing and built on social principles which are the complete antithesis of the racist and reactionary South—is a mortal threat to the very legitimacy of these regimes. In the long run they cannot afford to see a humanist Zambia survive because it will prove an irresistible magnet and inspiration to their own subject peoples. This is part

of the reason why South African military spending jumped over 30 per cent in 1973/74 and is now approaching K500 million a year. It is also part of the reason why South Africa is building a tarmac road just south of Western Province to Sesheke. And in 1973 South Africa decided to build an enriched uranium plant which will produce the processed material for atomic weapons. These are facts which all who are committed to the building of a humanist Zambia cannot afford to ignore.¹⁵

The second source of international opposition may come from certain Western capitalist powers. They depend heavily on Zambian copper. And they will not like any further moves towards Zambian humanism in the economic field since these will lessen their control over the Zambian economy. Similarly they dislike the Zambian policy of non-alignment because of the possibilities it has opened up for diversifying the country's overseas copper markets. Nor do they welcome the reduction of Zambia's dependence on the South; with the completion of the Tanzam railway in 1974 Zambia's imports of manufactured goods made by Western subsidiaries in South Africa and Rhodesia will largely end, and the railway will also enable Zambia to continue her support of freedom fighters whose successes will ultimately threaten Western economic holdings in Southern Africa. We must also remember that certain Western powers, notably the United States of America, have frequently proved willing to try and topple the Governments of radical States.¹⁶

In conclusion, all these kinds of opposition in other third world countries have sometimes led to coalitions (often temporary and unstable because of their internal contradictions) which have brought together domestic bourgeois elements, multinational corporations and reactionary Western Governments to topple progressive regimes. These attempts have been successful in the cases of Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita and Milton Obote. And one casualty has been the throttling of new ideologies virtually at birth. Such is the intellectual cost of counter-revolution. The question which then suggests itself is: What makes an ideology so accepted as to become impregnable against opposition forces?

ZAMBIAN HUMANISM: THE WAY AHEAD

We have analysed the main forces which try to oppose directly, or subvert indirectly, Zambian humanism as its implications continue to be unfolded and its principles translated into social practice. The principal problem which the advocates of humanism face—and one which will remain for some time—is how to contain and neutralize these potential forces of opposition. The only certain remedy is the frank recognition that the major groups who can become staunch supporters of a humanist society are those who have most to gain: the rural peasantry and the urban workers. If their level of consciousness is raised, if they can be made to benefit directly from the fruits of a humanist society,

¹⁵ For more details, see Robert Moltano, *Africa and South Africa: The Implications of South Africa's 'Outward-Looking Policy'* (London: Africa Bureau, 1971).

¹⁶ R. J. Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution* (NY: World Publishing Company, 1968).

and if political and military power is placed firmly in their hands, then, and only then, will a humanist Zambia be secure. What steps, therefore, need to be taken?

1. *Ideological Clarification*

This has been discussed earlier in this paper. What is needed is for the ideology to develop more adequate tools of social analysis so that the sources of threat to Zambian humanism can be correctly identified.

2. *A Stronger Party*

The historic decision to become a one-party State was taken at the end of 1972. New State and Party constitutions were adopted in the following year. But this can only be the beginning of the road. First, the leadership of the Party must accept a rigorous Code of Leadership and must carry out both the letter and the spirit thereof. For only if the leadership lives up to the full implications of the ideology in their personal and public lives, can the ideology hope to gain widespread credibility. Indeed, it would be true to say that it has been precisely the absence of this condition which has led to such widespread scepticism among the younger, educated generation. The danger of any ideology which is elaborated only after the victory of the independence struggle is that the cynical will view it as primarily a rhetorical smokescreen to legitimize the indefinite continuance in power of the original nationalist leadership. To disprove this by the only convincing test, which is personal example, must be the first task of the Party leadership. This involves too the equally difficult tasks of purging the leadership of those self-seeking elements who use the Party as a stepping stone to wealth while paying only lipservice to the ideology. In addition, a major effort will have to be made to include significant numbers of workers and peasants, particularly from the younger generation, in the Party leadership. This is the only way to guarantee the lasting support of these groups.

A strengthening of the Party also involves other measures. More intensive efforts are needed to train Party officials right down to branch level in the meaning of the ideology and in certain organizational and technical skills. A small start has been made with seminars and very short courses at the President's Citizenship College at Mulungushi. But these need to be greatly expanded with longer courses, for many more people, and even more carefully thought out. Only then will the Party develop the tens of thousands of officials who will be able to raise the consciousness of the Zambian masses. And this brings me to the third urgent reform which is needed if the Party is to strengthen itself. This is the development of more effective Party organization at section and village levels. The difficulties of the Party in late 1973 in preparing a complete list of Party officials at all levels for the primary elections revealed certain serious gaps in Party organization: in low density urban areas, in certain rural areas, and among specific groups of people. These organizational gaps must be plugged.

3. *More Rapid Translation of Humanism into Practice*

An immense amount has been done in this field already and the various books on Zambian humanism have dealt with this at length. But more needs to be done—and soon—if the active enthusiasm of the urban workers and rural villagers is to be mobilized behind the social principles and values of the ideology.

Let me suggest the kinds of measures which the urban workers need. The trade unions must continue to have a secure and recognized place in Zambian society, autonomous, but voluntarily and closely linked with the Party. The Ministry of Labour must show much greater respect for the views of workers' leaders. Secondly, the Works Councils which were promised by the Industrial Relations Act as long ago as 1971 must be speedily introduced. Moreover, the Works Councils must avoid the clear weaknesses and loopholes of the present legislation whose successive versions and final outcome show clear signs of having been watered down by capitalist elements. Industrial democracy is the economic brother to political democracy. Lasting worker support can only come when they share in the decision-making processes of the enterprises where they work. Moreover, the introduction of Works Councils will have to be accompanied by extensive worker education and other measures necessary to make them operate effectively. Thirdly, more effective machinery for the Zambianization of jobs in the private sector is required. Measures might include firm by firm localization plans; statutory compulsion of each firm to set aside a certain percentage of profits for localization and training fund; and an inspectorate including trade union representatives who would enforce these measures. Fourthly, there has to be new thinking about, and more enforcement of, Zambian humanist management practices with regard to job security, incentives, supervisor-worker relations, job rotation and job content diversification in order to humanize the monotonous tyranny of specialization and the assembly line. Fifthly, workers will remain sceptical of humanism so long as huge salary discrepancies remain. So long as some earn K360 a year while a top parastatal manager is given K18,500 (a 50:1 gap), the equality which humanism advocates is a deception. Moves towards real income equality must be made. Lastly, a more conscious and concerted industrialization strategy by the State needs to be adopted so that urgently needed jobs for the unemployed can be provided.

Turning to the rural areas, the great success has been in the extension of social services, especially education and health services, to the village communities. Great efforts have also been made to supply agricultural assistance of various kinds. But it must be admitted that, from the point of view of the ordinary villager, this has had little effect. The need now is to raise the real incomes of the over three million Zambians in the rural areas. The only way to do this is to help them raise their agricultural output and to market it. This, in turn, will only be achieved if a revolution takes place in the policies, attitudes and organization of the public service. This revolution requires political and economic education of public officers on an extensive scale, new

incentives for them to work in the rural areas, and a real decentralization of powers and resources to the officers at District and lower levels.

4. *Power to the People*

Zambian humanism has long proclaimed its commitment to participatory democracy. Great progress has been made. But here, too, more needs to be done. Firstly, as was said, decentralization in the public service must forthwith become a reality. Secondly, the structure of village productivity committees needs to be overhauled. Each of these committees at present embraces too few people for effective collective action; one practicable suggestion is to base these committees on the larger, but already socially accepted, catchment area of the primary school. The leadership and members of the village productivity committees also lack training and often have little or no understanding of their tasks and opportunities. In addition, they are divorced by and large from constant contact with field level Government workers; yet this contact is essential if they are to influence Government policy in the Districts and build up a relationship of mutual respect and assistance between the village communities and Government agencies. Finally, these village committees too often lack significant resources, financial and physical (e.g., transport, building materials), and these must be provided on a small scale as catalysts to rural reconstruction.

But making participatory democracy a reality in the political arena and the economic arena (works councils in the towns and village productivity committees in the rural areas) is not enough. Political and economic power to the masses must be supplemented by military power. Again a small start has been made with home guards. But more needs to be done to train and arm the urban workers and rural villagers. For a widespread citizens' militia is the only long-term guarantee against attack from abroad and subversion at home as the tragic counter-revolution in Chile in 1973 demonstrated so clearly.

5. *An End to Dependence*

Measures need to be accelerated to reduce dependence on the South and the major capitalist countries. This is the only long-term security against international opposition. A great amount has already been achieved in the fields of transport and economic infrastructure. Indeed, when the Tanzam railway and Kariba North Bank power project are complete, this part of the job will have been fulfilled. The next steps will then be self-sufficiency in food and greatly increased industrialization. Another vital field of dependence which has been tackled is manpower. Here two new steps are, however, needed. Greater resources need to be devoted to replacing expatriates in certain key fields: management, engineers and technicians, and teachers. Secondly, the content of education must be changed from an exclusive stress on the inculcation of skills to a parallel emphasis on imparting humanist values. It is here that almost all educational institutions have most seriously fallen down. For a humanist society will only exist if the new generation which is coming up understands

the principles on which it is built, benefits from humanist institutions, and uses its skills to strengthen and build further a humanist Zambia. In the last resort a humanist Zambia will only be secure and become a reality if it exists in the hearts and minds of its people.

CONCLUSION

Many who have read this paper this far will be shaking their heads. This idea is unacceptable. That idea impossible. The answer can only be this: the world is in a tragically dangerous and degenerate state. War, imperialism, poverty, pollution, over-population, alienation and oppression are the order of the day. In every country there are people searching desperately for moral and social inspiration. Zambian humanism, as interpreted in Kandeke's book, is one answer being evolved in this society and relevant throughout Africa and much of the world beyond. But—and this is a big 'but'—it can only bring a better life to the people of Zambia and carry inspiration to those outside, if it is put into practice and translated into social reality. This itself is an enormous task. It is made infinitely more difficult by the strong forces of opposition both inside Zambia and outside. These must be identified. Then they can be contained, but only if humanism as rhetoric becomes humanism as reality, a living flame in the hearts of the people. The way ahead is hard. The rewards in terms of the liberation and joy of the people are infinite. But the price is high.