

development, movement in one direction or another affected in fairly uniform ways by similar stimuli.

When resources are wasted in the process of implementation, planning of basic objectives gets discredited as a process. Although planners may be engaged in both processes, their record in bringing about planned developments may well be determined less by the initial choice of programmes and projects than by the decision rules adopted to implement them. From the Indian experience, certain propositions can be advanced about the impact of decision rules on planning. Each proposition is only a supposition and needs empirical substantiation. First, the closer the decision rule is to the purpose of the programme the more likely the objectives will be maximized. Second, the more a programme or project contains the details of its own implementation (e.g., specifying in time and space the participants, etc.) the less likely an alien decision rule will be used. Third, the more politically controversial the programme, the more likely neutral decision rules will be used; the most controversial will probably require the rule of equity. Finally, the most controversial and hence most likely to have equity rules are programmes and projects which can be participated in by persons on the basis of some universalistic and non-achievement oriented characteristics: education, health and water supplies are examples.

If an input-output analysis were done on this paper, it would probably suggest that there was little efficiency. It would seem that an enormous input was required for me to say: a collaboration between administrators and scholars can be fruitful; that a common criterion of explanation to use in this collaboration is the productivity of knowledge for choice; that this criterion should follow "optimal ignorance" rather than "exhaustive explanations"; that optimal ignorance is the application of diminishing returns and economies of scale to information and explanation; that a result of much U.S. social science pursuing other criteria is intellectual neo-colonialism; that most explanations of productivity of the public sector use resources and administrative infrastructure as the most reasonable causes; that alternative explanations can use decision roles to explain productivity or decision rules; that the former is essentialist and not very productive in improving choice and that the latter is existential and is potentially more valuable, especially if political economy is used in choosing alternatives and implementational decisional rules are close to the objective of the policy. Perhaps the explanation for my inefficiency is my role. Had I been a man of action, I am certain I would have been more brief and brevity would have been my decision rule.

Civil Conflict and External Involvement in Eastern Africa

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In the first decade of the African redemption and independence movement there was a powerful sentiment abroad that Africa should not become the cockpit of great power conflicts and intrigues. There was a decidedly racial thrust to the feeling that Africa must not be allowed to become the object of a "second scramble" now that official colonialism was coming to an end.¹ One of the most vociferous advocates of an Africa free from entangling alliances, Kwame Nkrumah, warned that "a world war could easily originate on our continent if African states make political, economic and military alliances with rival powers outside Africa".² Nkrumah firmly believed in what has been referred to as the "Africa Monroe Doctrine" a principle "which asserts that there are certain African problems which should be solved by Africans themselves".³ He also warned that tribal, religious and border conflicts could lead to a further balkanization of the continent, a development which foreign elements might wish to use as a pretext to recolonize Africa.

In the late fifties there was a great deal of optimism about the facility with which Africa could work out its diplomatic conflicts. As Ali Mazrui noted "the bonds of a shared continent, of a shared colour and of a shared colonial experience held the promise of inter-African cordiality if not inter-African intimacy".⁴ Events in the Congo and Nigeria were to bring home to Africa and the world the tenuousness of the "we are all Africans" concept, and the ease with which the cold war could make its sinister influence felt at the very heart of the continent.

This paper will not attempt to describe in detail the various civil conflicts that have developed in all of Eastern Africa or to theorize about their nature. Its main aim will be to examine some of the root causes of these crises, and to evaluate their potential for provoking the sort of international collision about which Nkrumah warned. It will also attempt to identify those powers which have become involved in or provoked conflicts in Eastern Africa and

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- 1 Julius Nyerere, "The Second Scramble", in *Freedom and Unity* (Oxford, 1967), p. 204.
 - 2 Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (Heinemann, 1967), p. 172. Also *Challenge of the Congo* (Nelson, 1967).
 - 3 Ali Mazrui, "Moise Tshombe and the Arabs: 1960 to 1968", *Race*, Vol. X, No. 3 (1969), p. 292.
 - 4 *Ibid.*, p. 286. Cf. also "On the Concept of 'We are all Africans'". *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVII, No. 1 (1963).

assess the likely pattern and consequences of these and future incursions. Finally, an effort will be made to explore the strategies which might be open to African states to minimize the risk of having their domestic conflicts become ensnared in great-power rivalries. Areas of emphasis in this analysis will be the Sudan, Ethiopia, the countries belonging to the East African Community and Zambia.

The Sudan

The roots of the civil conflict in the Sudan lay in its religious diversity, its geography, its racial mixture and in its colonial experience. The civil war, which began with the mutiny of Southern troops in Equatoria in 1955 and ended in March, 1972, and which has claimed the lives of anywhere from 500,000 to 1,000,000 people, had the distinction of being the most protracted conflict in independent Africa. The Sudan is one of the major testing grounds for the continental controversy over the meaning of the concept "Africaness", and as such is one of the most strategically important countries on the continent. Southerners who demanded either secession or autonomy claim that the Arabs of the Sudan are not Africans, but imperialists and racists who wished to maintain the social consequences of their enslavement of Africans. Southerners are bitterly opposed to the attempts of certain Northern elements to Arabize and Islamicize the South which is either animist or Christian, and which for over a generation (1922-54) was isolated from the North by Britain's "Southern Policy".⁵ Some Southern intellectuals feel that there is a natural grass curtain separating North and South, and that although the South is economically underdeveloped, race, religion, historical memories, and geography have combined with contemporary Arab oppression to provide the preconditions for a separate nation, if not a fully fledged state.⁶

Although some Northerners recognize the reality of the cultural and historical differences between the North and South, it is often argued that the Sudan is more homogeneous than Southerners pretend and that many Southerners are influenced by Arabic culture.⁷ It is also noted that other groups in the "North"—the Nubia, the Beja, Fur, Nuba and Berta—are in conflict with the Khartoum Government—some of it involving guerrilla activity—and that there were many Southerners who opposed secession and who co-operated to varying degrees with Khartoum. Moreover, it is sometimes

5 Cf. O. Albino, *The Southern Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint* (Oxford, 1970), and Mohammed Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (Hurst, 1968).

6 L. Wol Wol, "The Economic Viability of the South Sudan", *Grass Curtain*, Vol. I, No. 4 (April, 1971), pp. 19-20. For a discussion of the pros and cons of secession in the Sudan, cf. Peter Russell and Storrs McCall "Can Secession be Justified? The case of the Southern Sudan". *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22. Russell and McCall believe that the Southern case is closer to that of Mozambique and Angola than it is to Biafra and Katanga.

7 Abd Al-Rahim, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan* (Oxford, 1969), p. 7. A linguistic definition of who is Arabic would substantially reduce the number of Arabs in a place like Zanzibar where many Arabs speak Swahili, cf. Ali Mazrui "The Black Arabs in Comparative Perspective" (*mimeo*).

impossible to tell by a simple examination of facial type just who is or is not an Arab in the context of the Sudan.

Northern élites who opposed autonomy for the South did so for two basic and at times interchangeable reasons, religion and ideology.⁸ Radical élites (both communists and Arab socialists) accused Southerners of being accomplices to imperialism, and of being conduits for Israeli penetration of the Southern flank of Arab Africa. Major Abdul Ibrahim, a member of Numeiry's Revolutionary Council, claimed that "there is a plot to make the South a base and a springboard for international imperialism and the retardation of the march of the Sudanese Revolution towards full integration with Arab or African Revolution".⁹

The Khartoum Government claimed that the "rebels" were being assisted morally, financially and in terms of propaganda by Christian missionaries who, following their expulsion from the Sudan in 1964, used Uganda, Ethiopia and the Congo as bases. It was also asserted that the "mutineers" received assistance from Christian elements in West Germany, Belgium and Italy and from the old Biafran lobby. Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda were at various times accused of allowing their territory to be used as channels for Soviet and Chinese arms captured by Israelis after the six-day war.¹⁰ The American C.I.A. was also implicated in what was seen as an "anti-Arab conspiracy". It is not always possible to map out the exact nature of Western involvement in the Southern Sudan, however, since much of it is very clandestine.

For more than a decade, the plight of the South was ignored by Africa and the world at large, and Southerners complained bitterly of this in-

8 Colin Legum identifies the four rival groups in the Sudan as (a) the secular nationalists who favour a policy of closer friendship with their African rather than their Arab neighbours; this is the largest group; (b) the Muslim Brothers who wish to turn the Sudan into a militant purified Islamic state; (c) the Communists, who are split between a pro-Moscow faction and one closer to Arab socialism; both basically share the same views as the nationalists about greater co-operation with non-Arab Africa; (d) the Arabists "possibly the smallest group... who give high priority to the Arab cause and to active involvement against Israel". *Observer*, 25th July, 1971.

9 Ibrahim made his remarks at a press conference at which the German mercenary, Rolf Steiner, was accused of attempting to "bring another bloody Biafra into being", *Asia and Africa Review*, Vol. II, No. 4 (April, 1971), p. 4. During the court-martial of Steiner, the prosecutor claimed that Steiner admitted that an agreement had been made between Israel and the rebels in September, 1969. It was also asserted that the commander of the rebels, Joseph Lagu, was given six months' training in Israel in 1967, that Israelis had laid mines in rivers that linked North and South. The Sudan-Biafra committee and the Caritas Catholic International Charity Organization were also accused of having used Steiner as their link-man in the South. Also mentioned as providing assistance for the rebels were the Verona Fathers, the British Society for the Support of Africa and the Bonn-based Committee for Human Rights, *Uganda Argus*, 6th August, 1971.

10 Obote was accused by Khartoum of aiding the rebels, but later came to be regarded as "a great son of Africa, faithful to the ideals of African unity and solidarity" for his co-operation in apprehending Steiner. Cf. *Asia and Africa Review*, Vol. II, No. 4 (April, 1971), p. 5; Ethiopia was said to be giving only limited assistance for fear of retaliation by Khartoum. Similarly, Khartoum gave little assistance to the E.L.F. for fear that Ethiopia might have given aid to Sudanese insurgents along the southern Nile.

difference.¹¹ The low level of interest was in part due to the fact that the Sudan, unlike Nigeria and Ghana, was not viewed as a typical newly independent country and, therefore, had low visibility in the international media. But another important reason was the fact that the Southerners were unable to mount as successful a propaganda effort as the Biafrans. The collapse of Biafra and the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 were, therefore, a strategic windfall for the Southerners. The fall of Biafra released a great deal of mobilized energy and material resources while the latter event dramatically changed the strategic environment in North-Eastern Africa. The humiliation of Egypt increased feelings of Arab solidarity, and the Khartoum Government became progressively involved in the quarrel with Israel even to the point where it committed troops to the canal zone and took the initial steps to form an *entente* with Egypt and Libya in November, 1970. President Numeiry in fact declared in Cairo that "Libya, Egypt and the Sudan could possibly struggle in Africa to defend the Arab civilization which is being encircled and hampered by imperialism in an attempt to stop its flux into the heart of Africa". He felt that the Tripoli Pact was "a clear manifestation of the grand reality of the Arab destiny and its elevation to the banners borne by Gamel Abdel Nasser".¹² Khartoum has not joined the federation formed between Libya, Syria and Egypt because of strong opposition from secular nationalists, communists and Southerners. But Numeiry at one point clearly felt that the Sudan's future destiny lay with the Arabs to the North and East rather than with Africans to the South, and promised to link Sudan to the union as soon as solid political institutions had been established.¹³

In military terms, Khartoum benefited immensely from Soviet support of the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict. After 1967, the Soviets, in fact, became the largest supplier of arms to Khartoum, and committed a substantial amount of military personnel. Khartoum, however, paid for the "aid" it received (£40 million) by exporting cotton to the Soviet Union. Egypt, Libya, East Germany and China were also said to be providing support of one kind or another. According to *Anya Nya* the principal military unit of the rebel movement:

11 The following lament tells of the frustration of Southerners about O.A.U. neglect:

*I mourn because
In our country, the Sudan
And the churches
Are burnt and devastated;
Because we, the Negroes of the Sudan are neglected
By all who call us brothers
By the black people of Africa;
They meet in the O.A.U. to discuss
They unite in Dar
To celebrate Negritude;
Why can't they unite to liberate us?
Perhaps because we are weak and poor?*

Grass Curtain, op. cit., p. 35.

12 *Al Ahran*, 8th November, 1970. Cited *ibid.*, p. 2, 8. Numeiry withdrew from the Tripoli Alliance because, says Colin Legum, "the proposed federation included a non-African state [Syria] and moved too rapidly towards political union", *Observer*, op. cit. Numeiry also hesitated because the Sudan did not as yet have "solid political institutions". Plans to join the federation have now been dropped.

13 "Sudan: Joining Federation?" *Africa*, No. 3 (December, 1971), p. 52.

The Soviet Government extracts compensation from the client state in the form of political support but, more tangibly, warm water naval bases—in this instance, Port Sudan and Suakin on the Red Sea—and air bases at Wadi Saidna and Juba. The latter base thrusts deep into East Africa, outflanking Ethiopia and Kenya and within easy bombing range of Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and much of Congo-Kinshasa, the site of an earlier Soviet-sponsored revolt against the Congolese Government of General Mobutu.¹⁴

Fear is also expressed in the West that the real aim of the Soviets was to control Western oil supply routes:

Without a shot being fired, Russia actually already controls the West's oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf and could halt them any time she wished. Russia only seems to be scared of the Chinese.¹⁵

Approximately 90 per cent of Japan's oil supplies and 60 per cent of Western Europe's come from this region.

The Southern Resistance Movement tried to intensify the scare caused by Soviet involvement and sought to turn it to their diplomatic advantage. The Soviets were accused of "callously raising the unofficial persecution of Black Africans in Soviet Union to the level of an unofficial campaign of genocide against the Black population of the Southern Sudan..." and of committing My Lai type atrocities.¹⁶ The Anya Nya attempted to exploit the race theme in the same way as did the Biafrans in the later stages of the Nigerian civil war. The Egyptians were described as white, "as white as Germans, South Africans or Russians", and were accused of bombing villages indiscriminately and "cutting off black women's breasts" in Central Equatoria. When reminded of the support given them by Rolf Steiner, the Anya Nya asserted that "he is the only white to have engaged in combat for our cause".¹⁷ It is worth noting that despite their cordial relations with Khartoum, the Chinese have often cited Russia's role in the South as evidence of Russian racial prejudice, and the Chinese appeared at one time to be making overtures to both parties in the conflict. Some Southern spokesmen, in fact, believed that their struggle would have gained greater legitimacy if China had come to their assistance. They feel that the association with white missionaries and mercenaries cost them much needed support in Africa and among socialistically inclined regimes and groups.

The attempt to exploit the race factor may have been aimed not only at guilty white consciences, but also at the members of the O.A.U. The Southerners emphasized that the Northerners are "Arabs first and Arabs last", and asserted that to have an Arab minority, whose forebears enslaved Africans, ruling over Black African minorities was no more legitimate than

14 *An Open Letter to Comrade Alexei Kosygin and Comrade Leonid Brezhnev*, Joseph Lagu for The Anya Nya Aegis Committee.

15 *The Evening Standard* (London), 11th March, 1971, cf. also "Russia Drives East of Suez", *Newsweek*, 18th January, 1971.

16 *Open Letter*, op. cit.

17 "Black Africa: White Mercenaries", *Anya Nya*, No. 1, March, 1971. The Anya Nya claim that they refused Steiner's help. "He then found employment with a small splinter fraction of the Southern Sudanese Resistance Movement. We are not responsible for his action." Steiner has been sentenced to twenty years in prison by Sudanese authorities.

having white settlers rule over Africans in the Southern part of the continent. It is worth noting that while some Southerners were striving for autonomy or equality, others like the Free Negroes' Organization believed that "it is necessary to seize control of *all* Sudan in the name of the Negro majority".¹⁸ It is interesting, however, that the Southerners did not find it difficult to accept or encourage support from Israelis or other whites. Presumably whites are racist only when they support the struggle of one's enemies.

Ethiopia

As in the Sudan, the conflict in Ethiopia has become an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, North-East Africa might well be considered the African Middle East. The secessionist movement in Ethiopia began in 1962 when the Eritrean National Assembly decided that Eritrea, which had until then been in a federal relationship with Ethiopia, should become an integral province of the Ethiopian Empire.¹⁹ In religious terms, the struggle between the Imperial Government and the Eritrean Liberation Front is the reverse of the situation in the Sudan and in a sense is a continuation of a conflict between ancient Coptic emperors and Islamic invaders.²⁰ Here, it is a Muslim minority which complains that it is being oppressed by Christians. Like the Southern Sudan, the population of Eritrea is not culturally homogeneous though estimates vary as to the size of the Muslim population. The Ethiopian Government claims that only 13.6 per cent is Muslim. In 1952, however, the British estimated that there were 514,000 Muslims as against 510,000 Christians. The E.L.F. claims that this majority has increased to a point where 60 per cent of the population is now Muslim. The E.L.F., which has its headquarters in Syria is divided as to what it wants from Ethiopia. Some elements demand that Eritrea be detached from Ethiopia and recognized as a separate nation. They claim that oil has been found in Eritrea, but that information about the find has been withheld because of an unwillingness to confirm that Eritrea is indeed viable or a nation state. Others simply want autonomy, "UN legality", or restructuring of the monarchist government of Haile Selassie. The Ethiopians on the other hand claim that the separate identity of Eritrea has long

18 *Grass Curtain*, op. cit., p. 32.

19 The Front claims that Eritrea was unilaterally annexed by Selassie who used bribes and threats to get the Assembly to abandon Eritrea's autonomy which was authorized in an agreement between Britain, Ethiopia and the United Nations. Cf. John Campbell, "Background to the Eritrean Conflict", *African Report* (May, 1971), p. 20.

20 Professor Ullendorff of the University of London agrees. "The eastern and western lowlands of Eritrea have for some centuries now been predominantly Muslim, but during 50 years of Italian rule, 11 years of British caretaker administration, and 10 years of Eritrean self-government within the Ethiopian federation, Muslims and Christians have lived in reasonable harmony—as indeed is the case in other parts of Ethiopia. It is only during the past seven or eight years, since the possibly ill-judged dismantling of the facade of federation that neighbouring governments (as well as some rather more distant) have striven to detach the Muslim lowlands and the Christian highlands from the Ethiopian Empire. In so doing they have been reviving claims and attacks of earlier centuries which the Emperor John IV (1872-89) had successfully and finally repulsed..." *Africa Digest* (April, 1971), p. 33.

since eroded and that in any event it had been an integral part of the Empire before it was occupied by the Italians in 1891.

Despite the massive involvement of the Ethiopian armed forces in the conflict (two-thirds of the army is said to be committed to the war) the 10,000 strong guerrilla force has been able to achieve notable gains.²¹ The guerrillas have destroyed major communications systems and successfully ambushed and killed the commander of the Ethiopian Second Division on 16th December, 1970. Alarmed by the growing strength of the E.L.F., the Central Government declared a state of emergency in most of Eritrea in December, 1970, and stepped up its aerial and ground attacks on guerrilla bases and civilian centres alike. Roads are closed between dusk and dawn.

The Ethiopian conflict involves more or less the same foreign parties which are operating in the Sudan with which Ethiopia shares 1,400 miles of border. The growing strength of the E.L.F. is in large part due to the money, training, weapons and sanctuaries which it receives from Syria, Libya, The People's Republic of Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Al Fatah. The Soviet Union, China and reportedly Cuba also supply the guerrillas with arms. It is worth noting that the Soviets maintain cordial relations with Addis Ababa. They have over 600 technicians in Ethiopia, provide scholarships for Ethiopians and helped to build the \$250-million refinery at Assab. For the Arabs and the Soviet Union, the stakes in Eritrea are quite high and integrally related to the conflict in the Sudan. The Arabs and the Soviets would like to be in a position to have monopoly control over all ports on the Red Sea littoral, but especially those which command the Southern entrance to that waterway. The Soviets already have free access to the Southern Yemeni port of Hodeida and use the island of Socotra for paratroop training.²² The stakes are equally high for the Ethiopians, Americans and the Israelis. Eritrea is Ethiopia's only access to the sea and 70 per cent of its exports flow through the ports of Massawa and Assab. Djibouti, through which the rest of its sea-borne traffic now flows and which is the terminus of the railway from Addis Ababa, is under French control and is being claimed by Somalia which has strong ties with both the Chinese and the Soviets.²³

The Americans are deeply concerned about the activities of the E.L.F. and its foreign backers. As Hugh Hanning writes:

21 Hard core support is said to be only about 1,500 to 2,000, Campbell, op. cit. Cf. also *Strategic Survey*, 1970, p. 52.

22 The Soviets, however, deny that they have taken over the former Royal Air Force base on Socotra. This charge, it is said, is a device to "distract attention from N.A.T.O. and British plans to isolate the people of the Arabian Peninsula from the U.S.S.R." *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21st January, 1971, in *The U.S.S.R. and the Third World*, Vol. I, No. 3 p. 130.

23 The Soviets recently cancelled a two million rouble debt which Somalia was due to repay this year under the terms of the 1961 trade agreement. Aid has recently been increased and other due debts have been rescheduled for a five-year period. China also has aid programmes in Somalia. Somalia, however, denies it is a Soviet or Chinese satellite. As Castagno notes, "given the excessive intrusions of foreign powers (both East and West) General Siad has warned that 'the nation will be ready' if foreign powers attempt to use force", "Somalia Goes Military", *Africa Report* (February, 1970), p. 27.

The situation invites Washington to be drawn into a second Vietnam... which it would not be easy to accept. The prospect of being caught in an anti-Arab posture is particularly unattractive especially as President Nixon is striving to avoid the same thing at the other end of the Red Sea.²⁴

The U.S. however had little choice but to oppose the E.L.F., since its military involvement with Ethiopia is quite substantial. Ethiopia receives the bulk of annual American military assistance to Africa. In 1970, the amount was \$12 million or almost two-thirds of the allocation, a major dividend for a country which spends about 31 per cent of its budget on security. Nearly half of the Africans trained in the U.S. under various military assistance programmes are Ethiopian. There are also about three to four thousand American military personnel in Ethiopia some of whom are detailed to train the 40,000 members of the Ethiopian army. American advisers help to instruct the Imperial Police Force and the Ethiopian Navy while American educators have been heavily involved in school programmes at all levels.²⁵ The U.S. also buys 70 per cent of Ethiopia's main export crop—coffee, and 40 per cent of its total exports. Twenty per cent of Ethiopia's imports come from the U.S. and, through T.W.A., the U.S. participates in the operation of Ethiopian Airways.

There is a great deal of reciprocity between the U.S. and the Ethiopian Government. "The Emperor uses Eritrea as a pawn. He lets the U.S. have free access to the Red Sea in exchange for full support, aid and protection of his repressive regime."²⁶ An important consideration, too, is the fact that the U.S. maintains a major military base in Eritrea (Kagaew) which contributes about \$4 to \$6 million to the Ethiopian economy.

The high altitude base is a primary relay and spy station for America's world-wide communications system and an air force base strategically located in relation to Africa and the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal... If [Eritrea] were independent, the Red Sea would be totally controlled by Arabs. As it is, Ethiopia is the only country in the area in which the U.S. has overflight, landing and port rights. It is an enclave which the U.S. does not want to lose in the Middle East struggle.²⁷

The U.S. has admitted that it has supplied bombs and ammunition used against the E.L.F. President Nixon has also agreed that an executive agreement signed in 1960 "reaffirming America's continuing interest in the security of Ethiopia and its opposition to any activities threatening the territorial integrity of Ethiopia is still in force".²⁸ Opponents of the Imperial Government, in fact, believe that it was the U.S. which helped the loyalists to crush the 1960 attempt to overthrow the Emperor. The evidence for this claim is

24 "Ethiopia's Unknown War", *Africa Digest* (April, 1971), p. 33.

25 The Peace Corps has been cut back from 600 volunteers in 1963 to less than 200 in 1971. Cf. Bruce Oudes "The Lion of Judah and the Lambs of Washington", *Africa Report* (May, 1971), p. 22.

26 "Ethiopia and the U.S.—Partners in Imperialism", African Research Group, *Africa and the World* (April, 1971), p. 14.

27 "Ethiopia and the U.S.", op. cit., p. 15

28 "The Lion of Judah", op. cit., p. 22.

not convincing, however. All that can be said is that American arms, available to both sides were used in the conflict.

The Israelis are also heavily involved in Ethiopia, and American and Israeli military personnel work closely together. The latter is responsible for training the Ethiopian commando force with which the security police fights the guerrillas. Israeli and American military experts also serve with Ethiopians in the field, and have helped to organize the port of Massawa. Israel quite naturally wishes to ensure that there is a friendly country with ports on the Red Sea and considers Ethiopia vital to her strategic needs. Without Eritrea, Israel could not easily overfly into Africa. Her involvement with Ethiopia, however, makes the latter a natural foe of the Arabs. It is worth noting that there are strong links between the E.L.F. and the Palestinian guerrilla movement.

Tanzania

Although there is at present no civil conflict in English-speaking East Africa comparable to those in the Sudan and Ethiopia, the region has known major upheavals which have led to foreign involvement. The most dramatic events have been the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar which led to Chinese and East German penetration of that island, and the army mutinies which took place in the same month in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The fact that the British had to be invited to restore order in the three countries was a matter of grave embarrassment, especially for Tanzania. The British were quickly replaced with an O.A.U. force consisting of Ethiopians and Nigerians and subsequently by West Germans, Canadians, Israelis and Chinese.

President Nyerere's acceptance of Chinese military aid provoked hostile responses in the West and in Africa, and fears were expressed that Tanzania would become the first major Chinese satellite in Africa. Nyerere, however, asserted that he was not afraid of the Chinese, and that he was merely taking the principle of non-alignment to its logical limits. "The maximum risk is that the army will revolt. My army revolted in January and it was not trained by the Chinese."²⁹ Nyerere was initially opposed to African states using scarce resources to maintain armies, but once he agreed that an army was needed, he deliberately sought to avoid any reliance on former colonial countries or big powers. Nyerere was well aware that in the second scramble, the threat to Africa would come not only from former colonial countries but from any state which had wealth and power, whether socialist or capitalist, but he was open-minded about China. As he told a rally in Peking:

We will never allow our friends to choose our enemies for us. We are told that China was "dangerous", that she was so clever that a few of her technicians could undermine our whole country [and that] we should, therefore, have nothing to do with her. We said and I say again: Nonsense... We shall see for ourselves what are China's intentions towards us.³⁰

29 *The Reporter* (Nairobi), 11th September, 1964, pp. 9-11.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 324.

Nyerere, however, warned that Tanzania's principles and its freedom to determine its own future were "not for sale".

One of the most dramatic developments in the relationship between China and Tanzania, and indeed China and Africa as a whole was the former's agreement to help finance and build the \$400-million railway which will link Zambia's copper mines with the port of Dar es Salaam. Until then China's credibility as a major source of foreign aid was not taken very seriously, and the prevailing view was that China talked loudly and militarily and stirred up political unrest but could not deliver much by way of material aid. A great deal of doubt and scepticism was expressed about China's sincerity and/or capability, but once the project was under way, the Western Press was full of alarms about China's hidden objectives in Tanzania. The 13,000 Chinese technicians working in Tanzania were said to be members of the Railway Engineering and Signal Corps of the People's Liberation Army, and Chinese army personnel in Tanzania was, therefore, assumed to be larger than the 10,000 Tanzania People's Defence Force. Chou En-Lai has, however, denied that China has ever sent any soldiers abroad. "We're against sending troops abroad."³¹

Whatever the truth of the matter, there is little doubt that the Chinese have now become the major military influence in Tanzania and the largest source of military equipment and training for its army and air force. China has now completed construction of a naval base in Dar es Salaam and has also been involved in training freedom fighters for the struggle in Southern Africa. Tanzania seems to have concluded that given her terrain and the type of struggle she may have to wage in the future, the Chinese would make better advisers than Canadians or any other Western small power whom she can trust. There are reports, which are denied in Dar es Salaam, that Tanzania and Zambia have entered into a joint defence agreement with China. The Chinese are said to be building weapons depots at twenty-mile intervals to be manned by Tanzanians and Zambians under Chinese officers.³²

Tanzania's neighbours are visibly worried by China's presence there, as are Western Governments, and President Amin may well have exacerbated this fear by his charge, so far unsubstantiated, that the Chinese were involved in guerrilla attacks on Uganda. Presidents Banda and Boigny have joined Vorster and others in claiming that "the peril that menaces Africa today is the yellow-tinted communism of Peking".³³ Boigny and Banda, in fact, believe that communism is a much greater threat to Africa than is apartheid, a view that is difficult to sustain unless by Africa is meant the conservative regimes which are in power throughout most of the continent and which feel endangered by the radical ideologies espoused by Peking. Fear has been expressed that China might try to stay in Tanzania and Zambia as advisers after the completion of the railway, and that Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda might

³¹ *Uganda Argus*, 30th July, 1971.

³² Cf. *Sunday News* (Dar es Salaam), 30th May, 1971, *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 20th June, 1971.

³³ Gilbert Comte, "Peking Shows its New African Look", *Africa Report* (March, 1971), p. 20.

feel constrained to tolerate their continued presence. While it is agreed in some quarters that Nyerere is careful of the Chinese, it is argued that the Chinese may prove to be wilier and more obdurate than he had bargained for. As Gilbert Comte writes:

Nyerere, himself a devout Catholic, has no desire to hand Tanzania over to dialectical Marxism, and he has forbidden the Chinese to engage in any ideological proselytizing. It is, however, worth remembering that at the beginning of his involvement with the Soviet Union, Nasser also professed a non-aligned socialism... Nevertheless, continued Egyptian military and economic weakness compelled him to give way more and more to Soviet "suggestions" in foreign policy. President Nyerere may, without wishing it, be taking such risks with Peking... it remains to be seen whether Tanzania's freedom of manoeuvre would survive an escalation of the action in Southern Africa.³⁴

Tanzanians and Zambians react strongly to criticisms that the Chinese have or are about to overrun their countries. As President Kaunda has decided, "we in Zambia... are not worried. We do not want to be involved in power politics. The Chinese brothers are our friends. I have not known China meddling in our politics".³⁵ But there is no mistaking the fact that the building of the railway is very much an act of power politics since it will decisively strengthen Zambia in its vital economic and political confrontation with Zimbabwe, South Africa and Malawi. Tanzania also denies that China has sinister aims, and, in fact, there was some apprehension that a rapprochement between Peking and Washington might reduce China's interest in Tanzania.³⁶ Both Tanzania and Zambia note that it was only after the West "let them down" by writing off the railway project that they turned to Peking. Like Egypt, they could not be expected to do nothing once the West had refused to support a project which they considered vital to their national interest. China's offer was, therefore, seen as a token of friendship and solidarity in the fight against racism and imperialism. Nyerere has also repeatedly pointed out that it is not the Chinese who teach in Tanzania's schools or meet its manpower deficiencies but Scandinavians, Canadians, Englishmen and even Americans.³⁷ And indeed, while some outsiders feel that Tanzania is a Chinese satellite, Tanzanian radicals complain of the pervasiveness of Western influences.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³⁵ *Hsinhua* (Peking), 29th June, 1971, cf. *Hsinhua, Selected News Items*, 5th July, 1971, p. 50. The leader of the Zambian opposition, Mr. Harry Nkumbula, opposed the involvement of China in Southern Africa. Nkumbula said that South Africa should be armed because she was facing a threat from China: "The Chinese were not in Zambia and Tanzania to help the two states but to further Chinese political gains in Africa... Zambia would be turned into a battlefield if there was war between China and South Africa", *East African Standard*, 20th July, 1971.

³⁶ Cf. *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 23rd July, 1971.

³⁷ Derek Bryceson of the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture, denies that the railway project is subversive. "This... railway is vitally important to the economic development of certain areas of Tanzania... and Zambia and there is nothing subversive about the railway as a railway... Experience of working with our Chinese friends has led us to believe... that their work has been strictly work and I myself have not seen any evidence of Chinese interference at all; very much the reverse", "Tanzam Railway. The view from Dar"; *Africa* (August, 1971), p. 50.

As Zambians and Tanzanians see it, the West wishes Zambia to remain economically dependent on Southern Africa rather than link up with the East African Community. If Zambia has to depend on the railway, power facilities and basic consumer supplies from Southern Africa, then it will be incapable of playing a militant role in the struggle against racism in Southern Africa. By agreeing to help build the railway, the Chinese have, therefore, struck a major blow in the war against Southern Africa.

But breaking with Southern Africa is a very expensive proposition for Zambia and there have been complaints by many people, including the former Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe, that the cost might be too high economically. As a recent survey of the Zambian economy observed:

Experience has clearly shown that markets outside Southern Africa are, for one reason or another, impractical as sources of supply for the quantities needed of a produce [maize] which is... vital to the maintenance of political peace. Southern Africa, if it continues having to come to the rescue of Zambia in this respect, could therefore bring pressure to bear which would vitiate much, if not all of the effort and diversification and could even make Tanzania an enormous white elephant.

Zambia has one of the highest cost structures in Africa,³⁸ and there is little doubt that the switching of markets, though ideologically attractive, will impose very heavy burdens on the consumer. There is a strong possibility that the railway might be a prime target for sabotage as conflict deepens in Southern Africa, and there is a growing feeling in some radical circles that some sort of defence agreement must be entered into between the Chinese and Tanzania and Zambia as a counterweight to the informal alliance which is seen to exist between the West and the racist regimes in South Africa. As Nyerere himself warned, the imperialists will try to strangle Tanzania and Zambia now that they have disposed of Obote. "If they come, they will come seriously, and we must be prepared for them."³⁹ Although the Tanzanian Government did not give much official credence to the report produced by the African Research Group that units of the American Army are being specially trained to take over and run the Government of Tanzania and other African countries if called in to do so, there must have been a great deal of concern about the thought of being considered a potential area for Vietnam-style "pacification" programmes.⁴⁰

Kenya

Kenya and Malawi have always been very perturbed about China's presence in Tanzania and what they consider to be her interference in their internal policies. In Kenya, China has been accused of circulating subversive literature and of supplying money and arms to dissident groups. Chou En-Lai's declara-

38 "Zambia Economic Survey", *African Development* (October, 1971), p. 39.

39 *Hsinhua, Selected News Items*, 5th July, 1971, cf. also "The Dar es Salaam Declaration", *The Nationalist*, 22nd February, 1971.

40 *The Standard*, 3rd June, 1971.

tion that "Africa was ripe for revolution" and his attack on "so-called federations" rigged by imperialists to serve their own interests also angered the Kenya Government. The Kenya Government believed that Chou was suggesting that people like Kenyatta, Obote and even Nyerere, who "talked out of both sides of their mouth about socialism", should be overthrown and replaced by "scientific socialists" like Odinga.

Russian officials in Kenya were also accused of supplying money and arms to the same elements and of using the Lumumba Institute (which they financed) as an instrument to train revolutionary cadres and to spread an ideology foreign to Sessional Paper No. 10 which defines Kenya's official ideology. Odinga was accused of being the major instrument of these plots, a charge which both the Chinese and Odinga strongly denied. According to a Chinese document, "The People's Front of East Africa":

The principle followed by the Government of the Chinese People's Republic in providing technical or material help to friendly emerging countries is that of equality and mutual benefit. China never regards aid as one-sided charity but always as mutual assistance, for it knows that the stronger the new emerging nations become, the stronger are the people's anti-imperialistic forces, and this in itself is a great help to China. Jaramogi has also been accused by the forces of reaction of not following the letter of African Socialism as enunciated in a recent treatise... Now, it is only a fool who can support the theories which go under the name of "African Socialism".⁴¹

Odinga admitted that he was prepared to accept money from anywhere provided he could get it without strings, and the former American Ambassador to Kenya, William Attwood, agrees that Odinga did not see himself as a communist or as a paid Chinese or Soviet agent.⁴² As far as Odinga was concerned, "no communist forces were actively plotting against Kenya. The external vested interests at play in Kenya were the result of the involvement of an increasing number of politicians in British, American and West German commerce and big business". Odinga noted that other Kenyan politicians were also receiving money and literature from Western countries to "create confusion among the people", and that high British and American Embassy officials made frequent calls on Kenyatta "to tell him they were his only friends". Kenya's non-alignment was a myth, Odinga charged. "Kenya was a capitalist country with military arrangements with Britain".⁴³

Attwood's account of politics in Kenya during this period provides us with a magnificent opportunity to understand the mechanics of cold war diplomacy in Africa. As Attwood sees it, "the struggle in Kenya was between the Kenyatta 'constructivists' and the Odinga 'dislocators'." In the end the Russians and the Chinese failed because they

suffered from their usual delusion that the Kenyans, like all colonized peoples, must hate their former British "oppressors" and would gladly welcome new allies in their struggle to liquidate the last vestiges of Western neo-colonialism...

41 *Reporter* (24th September, 1965), pp. 9-10.

42 Cf. William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks* (Harper and Row, 1967), esp. pp. 237-270. This book has been banned in Kenya.

43 *Not Yet Uhuru* (Heinemann, 1967), pp. 192, 286.

They put their money on a colourful but erratic leader of the wrong tribe with the expectation that he would some day, somehow come to power in an area where they wanted a foothold.⁴⁴

Attwood does not, however, perceive the British and the Americans in the same role as cold war agents even though on occasions he comes close to so doing. Kenyatta, he said, "welcomed co-operation with the West only so long as we supported what *he* wanted for Kenya".⁴⁵ The suggestion here is that since Kenya was being given only what Kenyatta wanted—whether it was teachers, budgetary support, or "police with some planes to increase mobility in case of a Zanzibar kind of uprising" in Nyanza (Odinga's home base which is four hours from Nairobi), the U.S. was not intervening in Kenya's domestic affairs. "While the Communist Forces played cold war games, we quietly went about our business of helping the Government cope with its problems, both economic and political."⁴⁶

Attwood, however, gave the game away when he agreed that *Uhuru* had not made much difference to the lives of the *wananchi*:

While Odinga's political power in Parliament, in the trade unions, and in the party—was being progressively snapped, the roots of his strength, grounded as they were in popular discontent, were still intact. . . . Thus, winning branch elections wouldn't matter in the long run if the people became disenchanted and turned against KANU. *Fortunately*, there were a good many things we and other *Western* countries could do to help the Government mitigate the discontent.⁴⁷

Now this is as clear a case of cold war diplomacy as one could hope to identify. Attwood and his staff saw themselves as adversaries to the Communists and even obligingly helped the Kenya Government to verify which Communist officials in Kenya were *bona fide* diplomats and journalists or merely "subversive" agents. The point is that the Americans, the Soviets and the Chinese saw themselves as helping Kenya rather than intervening in her domestic affairs. The main difference was that they disagreed as to which élites best represented the people. In 1969, the Kenya Government detained Odinga together with his colleagues in the Kenya People's Union mainly to gain time to consolidate Kikuyu ascendancy. Several Chinese, Soviet and Eastern European officials have been deported from Kenya and all publica-

44 *The Reds and the Blacks*, op. cit., p. 238. Arms were said to be found in the basement of Odinga's Ministry and in the Embassy of an East European country, Attwood, p. 246.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 239.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 249.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 257 (my italics). Another interesting example of neo-colonialism (i.e., new forms of lobbying with governments) is found in Attwood's remarks about Zanzibar. "A police state had come into being, and arms shipments were arriving regularly to supply Communist led militia. The British agreed with us that only the mainland governments could take the lead in counterizing the Zanzibar infection; they would talk to Kenyatta and Nyerere about it. I saw Kenyatta . . . but didn't bring up Zanzibar. There was no point in our sounding excitable about Communists as the Africans expected us to be. It was better to refer to Zanzibar as *their problem* . . .", p. 162.

tions of the Foreign Language Press in Peking have been banned.⁴⁸ Staffs of all Embassies in Kenya are required to obtain permission before going more than ten miles out of Nairobi but this restriction is only enforced with respect to non-Westerners.

There is little question that Kenya is important to British and American strategy in East Africa. As part of the Kenya independence agreement, Britain was given facilities for the "training" of British troops in Kenya, landing rights for British warplanes at Kenyan airfields, and the use of the port of Mombasa for the British Navy. It was under this agreement that troops were sent to Kenya during the Singapore conference on the eve of the Uganda coup.⁴⁹

France has also begun to show great interest in Kenya. Reportedly, France has entered into negotiations with Kenya to supply AMX-13 light tanks, aircraft and radar defence equipment similar to those being sold to South Africa. Dr. Mungai, the Kenya Foreign Minister, is said to have been told that if the arms deal is concluded, substantial amounts of French financial and technical assistance would follow.⁵⁰ The Israelis, too, are lavishing a great deal of attention on Kenya. In the words of Abba Eban, "there is a trustful co-operation between us. In the past ten years, about 1,000 Kenyans have been trained in Israel".⁵¹

Uganda

When Milton Obote was toppled from power on 25th January, 1971, instead of accusing Britain or the C.I.A., he heatedly charged that the whole thing had been masterminded by the Israelis. It is claimed that the latter provided espionage and moral backing when nerves began to fail as well as promises of assistance in the future. It is also asserted that "the Israel Air Force team rallied to General Amin in the crucial hours of the coup".⁵² Obote also claimed that Israel had acquired a military base in Uganda from which it planned to conduct its operations in the Sudan and perhaps launch an attack on Egypt's Southern flank in the event of another Middle East war. Those who accept the proposition that the Uganda coup was stage-managed by Israel argue that Israel wished to ensure the continuance of its presence in Uganda which it considered vital to its Sudanese strategy. Uganda's position at the source of the Nile

48 Recently, two refugees from Zimbabwe were jailed for five years in Kenya under this order. Cf. *Africa and the World* (May, 1971), p. 11. Odinga was released in October, 1971, and has since rejoined what he refers to as the "new" KANU.

49 For reports about the activities of 700 British troops in Kenya on the eve of the Uganda coup, cf. *The People* (Kampala), 19th January, 1971, *Sunday Express* (London), 17th January 1971. *The Express* suggests the reason was fear of what might happen to British citizens if there was trouble arising out of a decision to resume the sale of arms to South Africa. The Kenya Government said the troops were there as part of an arrangement which it has with Britain for joint military exercises, and constituted no threat to any African country.

50 "The Fiasco in Singapore", *Africa and the World* (4th February, 1971), p. 41.

51 *Daily Nation*, 29th May, 1971.

52 "Britain and Israel Roll Out the Red Carpet for Uganda's Military Leader", *Flamingo*, Vol. 6, No. 8, p. 6.

was also said to be of possible importance to Israel if the situation in the Middle East was ever altered in such a way as to threaten her national survival. It is to be noted that Obote was beginning to lean more towards Khartoum, and that he was becoming less tolerant of the activities of Sudanese rebels and Israeli officials whom he accused of assisting them. The fact that he handed over the notorious white mercenary, Rolf Steiner, to the Sudanese is further evidence of this shift in sympathy. It is also well known that the Israelis were about to be phased out of their roles as military and intelligence specialists in the Uganda Army and Air Force in favour of the Russians, and the claim is that they worked through Major Amin, the former Minister of Defence, Mr. Felix Onama, and others to undermine and finally overthrow Obote.⁵³ A similar fate had already befallen the Israelis in Tanzania where they had been involved in the hotel industry, in training the Police and in establishing the National Service scheme.

The fact that the Israelis were visibly delighted by the coup as were the British, and the noticeable closeness between the two countries and the new regime prior to March, 1972, was also seen as evidence of their complicity. There is also a strong feeling that at this time President Amin was attempting to get the Israelis and the British to guarantee the security of his regime. The Uganda Government, however, denies that there was any Uganda-Israel axis aimed at the Sudan. President Amin claims that whatever help he got from Israel was to be paid for in *cash*. He also argues that the coup was a spontaneous exercise by non-commissioned officers to prevent Obote from making the armed forces a preserve of his own Langi tribesmen and of the Acholi. The Israelis were involved with the Uganda armed services on Obote's invitation and had nothing to do with the coup. He insisted, "They are not interfering in Uganda's affairs".⁵⁴

Although Israel and Britain stood to achieve benefits from the coup, it does not, however, follow that they were instrumental in planning or executing it.⁵⁵ They might simply have taken advantage of a strategic and diplomatic

53 Some of President Amin's recent accusations about Israel's operations in Uganda have strengthened the suspicion that Israel masterminded the overthrow of Obote, cf. *The People*, April 4, 1972.

54 *Uganda Argus*, 9th October, 1971. *Jerusalem Post*, 9th September, 1971. In July, President Amin visited Israel to have consultations with top military officials. Increased supplies of modern arms from Israel were announced. Israeli military advisers were also working closely with the critical Malire mechanized battalion stationed near Kampala. Uganda opened an Embassy in Israel and President Amin invited the Israelis to "develop some of our dry land in Karamoja and make them green". Karamoja borders on the Sudan. *Uganda Argus*, 19th July, 1971. The Israelis surveyed the project and there were reports that the Israelis hoped to use Karamoja as a base from which to attack the Southern flank of the Arab World.

55 For an account of President Amin's welcome in Israel and Britain, cf. *Flamingo*, op. cit. According to the *Flamingo* report "the Israelis did not disguise their appreciation that one black African state was at least openly on their side..." The full turn out of the Government reflects the weight the Israeli Government attached to the Uganda leader's visit.

The British Government also lavished attention on President Amin. "As tangible expression of their regard, the British announced a £10-million aid programme for Uganda and undertook to examine the sensitive question of rescheduling debt repayments estimated at about £30 million although nothing was said about this publicly. With Ghana's debt problem still unresolved, Whitehall has to tread

windfall. To say that every coup in Africa is an indirect attack engineered by imperialists is to subscribe to a naive theory of African powerlessness and passivity. Moreover, Israel must have been aware that if it became known that it was involved in planning the overthrow of a popular pan-Africanist, its hopes of eliciting a more favourable image among the progressive élites of Africa would be set back. There was also a distinct possibility that the coup might have failed, and Israel might well have calculated that if it did, it would lose a great deal of the goodwill which it was seeking to cultivate in Africa as well as its "base" in Uganda. While there is a fair amount of circumstantial evidence implicating Israel with the Uganda coup, the only thing that might be said with some measure of assurance is that once the coup was launched, Israeli officers did whatever they could to ensure its success.

The preceding analyses provide the basis for an examination of some of the reasons why foreign powers become involved in intra-statal and inter-statal disputes of African countries. The basic reasons are strategic and economic as well as for purposes of prestige.

Strategic

Perhaps the most overriding reason for foreign involvement in East African politics is strategic. Israel, for example, considers Ethiopia, the Sudan and the East African littoral as a "second ring" of the Middle East theatre and would like to see friendly regimes in power which could provide her with diplomatic support in the conflict with the Arab world. Israel's technical aid programmes, the bulk of which goes to East Africa, have always had this political thrust. The Israelis are very concerned about the growing strength of anti-Israel feeling, especially among radical Africans, and the growing diplomatic support which the O.A.U. has been giving to the Arabs. Since the Six-Day War, Israel has lost its underdog status, and is increasingly being seen not only as an aggressor and an imperial power in the Middle East but as a partner and "running dog" of Western Imperialism in Africa.⁵⁶ Israel's investments in South Africa and her relationships with American military programmes in Africa have come under strong attack as has her refusal to withdraw from areas captured during the Six-Day War. Abba Eban's recent

warily... A British military and police training programme is also under way to (contain) acts of indiscipline which threaten to bring chaos to Uganda unless the rule of law and army discipline in the army is quickly restored... (President Amin) returned home confident that whatever the financial difficulties still to be resolved, Israel and Britain would back him to the hilt in securing the foundation of the Second Republic", p. 43, cf. also Colin Legum, *The Observer*, 25th July, 1971.

56 The tendency to see Israel as an aggressor in the Middle East antedates the 1967 war. The Charter which emerged out of the 1961 meeting of the Casablanca Group denounced Israel as "an instrument in the service of imperialism and neo-colonialism not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa and Asia", cf. Mazrui, "Moise Tshombe and the Arabs", op. cit., pp. 297-8. Abba Eban argues that African organizations pass unbalanced resolutions about the Middle East conflict about which they know little. The problem, he says, is not an "African problem", *Daily Nation*, 29th May, 1971.

tour of Africa and the offer of £10,000 (Israeli) to the O.A.U. Liberation Fund were palpable but relatively unsuccessful efforts at political bribery. The small and symbolic donation was rejected by liberation movements and was finally given to a U.N. refugee fund.

Some Israelis have begun to question the worthwhileness of Israel's aid to Africa, and have suggested that Israel's scarce resources might better be used to ameliorate some of her own pressing social problems. But so far, it has been adjudged necessary to continue with the various programmes on the assumption that incumbent political élites are not permanent fixtures and do not necessarily represent public opinion.⁵⁷ Moreover, many of the regimes that are openly critical of Israel, in fact, value Israel's technical aid highly, and are anxious to have more of it.⁵⁸ Many African states, in fact, urge Israel to ignore O.A.U. resolutions and carry on bilateral relationships with them. But, as Abba Eban declared, "these institutions and their resolutions have great psychological effect".⁵⁹

The U.S. and other Western countries also have strategic goals in Eastern Africa. The aim is to counterbalance the growing power of the Soviet Union and China in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Western powers are naturally anxious to protect their oil supply lines which the Soviets are accused of seeking to monopolize, and their bases in Ethiopia and Kenya which are considered pivotal states in Eastern Africa. France is also keen on maintaining a strategic presence in the area as her support of Tombalbaye in Chad indicates.

The tensions in Eastern Africa are closely linked to those in the Indian Ocean. Alec Douglas-Home has asserted that Simonstown is essential to N.A.T.O. and to deter militant communism from taking over the assets of the free world. He has rejected the suggestion, contained in the Lusaka Manifesto, that the Indian Ocean should be declared a nuclear free zone. He feels that the proposal has come too late and was directed at the wrong party since Britain had phased out its bases "while the Russians were reintroducing

57 At a meeting of senior aid and diplomatic personnel in Jerusalem held on 8th September, 1971, considerable opposition was voiced to Israel's aid programme in Africa. Abba Eban, however, urged Israelis to turn a deaf ear to those who wanted to see African states punished for their "betrayal". Abba Eban argued that it was "a matter of enlightened self-interest for Israel to offset its inescapable arithmetical inferiority in multilateral U.N. bodies by deepening and expanding the network of bilateral relationships in all continents... withholding assistance from those who deny Israel their votes at the U.N. would, therefore, be an act of further self-denial merely compounding this country's isolation", Abba Eban believed that Israel's £10 million aid programme did more than votes to wipe out the illusion that Israel could be "uprooted from the soil of the Middle East". Eban urged that East Africa be considered one of the priority areas for Israel's aid, *Jerusalem Post*, 9th September, 1971.

58 Kenneth Kaunda, for example, recently referred to an Israeli-assisted co-operative scheme as "the pride of the nation". "If this can be repeated in all other districts, we shall be home and dry in building a self-sufficient economy." The Israelis have also made technological breakthroughs in applying mechanized equipment to hard laterite soils and several West African countries are requesting assistance in these areas. *Daily Nation*, 9th October, 1971.

59 *Daily Nation*, 29th May, 1971.

a military presence and the potential of new bases". Home believes that the Soviets are seeking a monopoly of the strategic sea lanes in the Indian Ocean:

It was not that the United Kingdom anticipated attack by the Soviet Navy on British warships, but it is a fact of life well understood in Europe, although not yet by those who have not had close contact with Communism, that it is dangerous to allow Communists a monopoly in any area. They use it to close, one after another, the options of the free.⁶⁰

Home also noted that it was difficult to find alternatives to Simonstown because of resistance by some littoral states to the creation of new bases in the Ocean. His argument and that of other pro-Western spokesmen is that the Soviets are not concerned about maintaining the naval balance, but are seeking to change it.⁶¹ The Soviets agree, but do not accept the notion that they are threatening anyone:

The British aim is to intimidate the neutral states... by claiming there is a Soviet threat... to bring some of the countries into aggressive pro-Western alliances... Washington and London hope, as in the past, to be monopolists on the high seas. But a return to the past is out of the question. The Soviet Union is a mighty sea power.⁶²

Each side is arguing that the other is seeking a monopoly while it is in favour of balance, and the Soviets have the better of the argument. The British Government is less concerned about Soviet naval threats or the economic benefit to be had by selling arms to South Africa than it is to give legitimacy to South Africa where Britain has substantial economic interests. South Africa, too, seems less concerned about arms from Britain than in the symbolic value of the arms transfer. As Seretse Khama of Botswana notes, "South Africa does not want arms but a certificate of respectability and an enhanced role... in Western security arrangements and an escalation of commitment to the status quo".⁶³

60 "It was the Commonwealth that won", *Commonwealth* (April, 1971), p. 34. Approximately 15,000 ships pass around the Cape of Good Hope each year.

61 "One of the outstanding, and potentially dangerous, asymmetries in super-power relations lies in the fact that whilst the American Government is anxious to lower its profile in world affairs, the Kremlin seems motivated by an opposite purpose. In recent years it has heightened its profile and extended its influence in areas vital to Western interests, such as the Mediterranean. Its attention is now turning to the Indian Ocean. That this is happening when the United States is trying to limit its commitment and encourage greater self-help by its allies in Africa, Asia and Europe, carries the obvious danger that at some point a misreading of American intentions by the Soviet Union will result in the sort of direct confrontation which both are so anxious to avoid." *Overseas Review*, No. 61 (April, 1971). The *Review* is put out by the British Conservative Political Centre.

62 I. Bestuses, "Moscow Radio for Australia and Oceania" in *U.S.S.R. and the Third World*, op. cit., p. 97.

63 *Asia and Africa Review*, Vol. II, No. 2 (February, 1971), p. 5. It is interesting to note that Obote used the threat of an increase of Soviet and Chinese involvement in East Africa to discourage Britain from resuming arms sales to South Africa. The lesson of Suez had to be heeded, he warned, "There was a danger that history might repeat itself in the Indian Ocean and Africa". *Ibid.*, Obote seemed to be pleading with Britain not to make it difficult for him and his Mulungushi colleagues to contain Communism in Eastern Africa.

Economic

Strategic considerations are often linked to economic considerations, but the two are not always identical. The growing involvement of West Germany, Japan, France and Italy in East Africa appears to be more economic than strategic, and Italy's willingness to withdraw from the Cabora Bassa Scheme was due to the fact that in the long run she stood to lose more economically by remaining in it.⁶⁴ In the case of Britain, strategic considerations are as important as the purely economic ones. In fact, the former are considered essential to the preservation of the latter. But Britain's insistence on selling arms to South Africa may be costly in economic terms if some African states retaliate. Dr. Arikpo, the Foreign Minister of Nigeria has, in fact, warned that Nigeria might employ sanctions: "Breaking off economic ties, action against British oil companies, or actions against British corporations. . . Any or a combination of these might well be taken."⁶⁵ Zambia recently closed down twelve firms which traded with South Africa. Other states in East Africa might do the same though the Uganda coup might have led Heath to believe that he did not have to take Nyerere or Kaunda too seriously.

Israel's interest in Eastern Africa is economic as well as strategic. As Efrem Sigel notes:

East Africa holds "enormous possibilities" for the expansion of Israeli commerce. . . . The closing of the Suez Canal after the June, 1967, war has been of some help in promoting Israeli trade with countries like Uganda which find themselves more cut off from traditional sources of supply in Europe. But the Israelis are well aware that commercial contacts are only a small part of their activity in Africa. The thrust of Israeli policy is still political, and it is more important to Jerusalem to have friendly relations than to gain a few million dollars in exports.⁶⁶

Israel's total exports in 1970 amounted to \$781 million of which no less than \$415 went to Africa.

With respect to China and the Soviet Union and especially with the former, it could be argued that economic considerations are not paramount. Both the Chinese and the Soviets have, however, found valuable markets and sources of raw materials in the area, and the barter arrangements which often form part of these trade agreements at times yield valuable increments of foreign exchange for the socialist countries.⁶⁷ But as Doudou Thiam notes:

64 Peking brands Japan's economic activities in Africa as being "essentially a brutal colonial exploitation tantamount to a plundering of raw material", Dieter Burrack, "Politics and Development Policy in Africa". *Afrika*, No. 4 (1971).

65 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

66 "Israel and Africa", *Africa Report* (February, 1971), p. 8. Kenya receives the highest consignment of Israel's exports. In 1970, this was valued at \$3.6 million. The Israelis are involved in the hotel industry (El Al owns 24 per cent of the Nairobi Hilton) city planning, construction, the manufacture of chemicals, plastics and hydraulic equipment. Cf. *The Israel Economist*, August, 1971, p. VI.

67 The Vice-Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations noted that trade between the U.S.S.R. and Africa has increased 658 per cent between 1958 and 1970. Credits were repaid in the traditional goods of African countries, sometimes in local manufactures or in national currencies which were returned to

The U.S.S.R. nearly always uses the siddoor of commercial relations or technical and cultural assistance when attempting to gain a political or ideological hold over the countries which it is aiding. Trade and aid are used as instruments to dissolve political and ideological prejudices and barriers rather than as ends in themselves.⁶⁸

There is, however, growing evidence that both Peking and Moscow are now separating trade from politics. According to one report, China's trade with Pretoria reached a value of \$15 million in 1969 whereas the U.S.S.R., according to South African statistics exported goods worth \$500,000 to South Africa in the first months of 1969. Moscow even supplied the South African Army with auxiliary equipment such as instruments for electronic testing of appliances, spare-parts and explosives following the arms embargo of 1963.⁶⁹ Prior to 1970, Rhodesian chrome reaching the U.S.A. came via the U.S.S.R. China also buys large amounts of chrome from Rhodesia via Mozambique and Macao. Charges have also been made that the Chinese have their eyes on Zambia's copper.

Prestige

The search for prestige is an important dimension of great power rivalry in Africa. A "presence" in Africa is important as an index of power, prestige and national interest, and fluctuations in "presence" are a gauge of how well one is doing vis-à-vis one's competitors. Prestige may have a national dimension as well as an ideological one. While there is a strong element of national chauvinism and rivalry between the Soviet Union and China in their foreign policy towards Africa, there is also a strong sense of ideological rivalry. China, in fact, began its career in Africa by supporting groups with radical potential. While China still continues to support radical regimes and train guerrillas in Southern Africa, like the Soviets, they now find little difficulty reaching accommodations with pro-Western regimes such as Ethiopia and Israel. China's strategies are now more flexible and conventional and designed to widen its circle of friends and allies rather than to overthrow regimes. The thaw in American-Chinese relations will no doubt increase China's legitimacy in Africa, and it remains to be seen whether a Sino-American *detente* will lessen China's revolutionary ardour any further.

Just as strategic and economic considerations cannot always be easily separated in practice, so too prestige, both national and ideological, is often an extension of strategic and economic concerns. This linkage is more clearly seen in the policies of Western countries which have substantial economic and strategic interests in Africa than it is in countries like China or even the Soviet Union.

debtor countries in exchange for goods. "In this way, the developing countries are provided with stable markets for their output, and the Soviet Union acquires an additional source of supply to meet its economic and consumer requirements. Soviet . . . aid to developing countries thus benefits both sides. In no sense is it a matter of charity." *U.S.S.R. and the Third World*, op. cit., pp. 95-6.

68 *The Foreign Policy of African States* (Phoenix, 1963), p. 100.

69 Burrack, op. cit., p. 4.

Conclusion

The word "involvement" has been used in this essay in preference to the word "intervention" because it has become evident that "intervention" is very often a subjective concept. According to one recent study, "intervention is any organized activity on the part of one state which seeks to undermine, alter or replace the authority structure of another state".⁷⁰ These organized activities include support of dissident or separatist groups, providing bases or asylum or giving recognition to governments in exile. But most major powers deny that they intervene in the domestic affairs of small states.

Western countries have denied that there is any such phenomenon as neo-colonialism. The Soviet Union also insists that it gives aid without strings. Moscow's claim is that it is there as a shield to protect African countries from neo-colonial aggression and to help them on the road to self-reliant economic development. China, on the other hand, has expressed hostility to intervention by the great powers who "maltreat the weak while disputing world hegemony between them. We must break the myths which make people afraid of the great powers".⁷¹ As our analysis shows, however, foreign involvement in Eastern Africa is clearly tied up with a set of expectations and strategic needs, and the notion of aid without strings is not supportable by the evidence. Only China and Israel have been frank in acknowledging that they expect some sort of political reciprocity for their aid.

It is also not always clear what sort of activities can be classified as intervention. If China becomes involved in Tanzania on the invitation of the Government of Tanzania, is she intervening or responding to a normal request from a legal government? Is intervention by invitation any less an act of intervention? What if the invitation is made by "rebels" in exile rather than a government which seizes power in a coup? Is the intervention of the Russians in Czechoslovakia to avert a "counter-revolution" of the same order as sending American paratroops to "rescue" white civilians in the Congo or giving budgetary support to Kenya to avert a Zanzibari-type uprising? Is it legitimate for "progressive" African states to try to foment rebellion in African states that are considered clients of imperialism?⁷² Then, too, when

⁷⁰ Robert Matthews, "Domestic and Interstate Conflict in Africa", *International Journal* Vol. XXV, No. 3 (Summer, 1970), p. 463.

⁷¹ *Asia and Africa Review*, Vol. 10, No. 9, p. 7. The remarks are those of Chou En-Lai on French television.

⁷² There are numerous examples of African States intervening in the activities of other African states. Ghana, Togo, Ivory Coast aided rebels from one another's states. Tanzania has been accused of giving aid to Obote supporters. Libya gives aid to rebels in Chad and Ethiopia and Sudan gives aid to the E.L.F. in Ethiopia. The Tripoli pact countries (Libya, Egypt, the Sudan and Syria) specially allow one regime to come to the assistance of another even without being asked. It was this *entente* which provided the cover for Egypt and Libya to take steps to restore Numeiry to power after he was overthrown by the Communists in the Sudan in July, 1971. One of the rules of new Arab Federation (clause 6d) reads: "Should the Government of any member Republic be in a situation that would not permit it to ask the help of the Union (Federation) Government or should the security of the Union be threatened, the Union authorities concerned might interfere, without being asked to maintain order and to bring conditions back to normal" *cf.* "Sudan:

a state practises non-alignment officially, and rival élites try to play off one country against the other or groups in the same country against others, it becomes even more difficult to define when a response is interventionist. Answers to any of these questions will often depend on whether or not one concedes legitimacy to the ruling élite, on one's class, group or ideological needs or on what one assumes the primary motivation of the outside power to be. But since motivations are invariably mixed, the latter exercise is always difficult.

The remaining questions remain to be discussed—the extent to which great power rivalry constitutes a threat to world peace and the steps which Africans might take to limit foreign involvement in their affairs.

One of the striking things about the civil conflicts in Eastern Africa is the number of countries that are involved either in supplying arms, training troops, or providing advisers and financial and propaganda assistance. The probable explanation for this widespread interest in the region is that it is viewed as a crucial extension of two major theatres of conflict—the Middle East and Southern Africa. Whether or not the conflicts remain local or develop into major international crises, therefore, depend very much on what happens in these two primary conflict zones. In themselves, the conflicts do not seem to have the potential for escalation into major international crises. The Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, although seemingly a structural one in the sense that the E.L.F. is attempting to alter the boundaries of the Ethiopian political system, may well defuse itself when the Emperor dies. Haile Selassie's successors may well feel constrained to loosen Ethiopia's military relationship with the U.S. when the lease on Kagnev expires in 1978, and may also take up a much less anti-Arab posture. Ethiopia, like most East African countries, is anxious to have the Suez Canal reopened, since its closure increases freight costs by 40 per cent, and reduces the competitiveness of their goods in Europe and the U.S.A. The United States is also trying to change its image as an anti-Arab power, and might well encourage closer relations between Ethiopia and her Arab neighbours. Washington has already dropped hints that Kagnev is expendable, and has resisted some of Ethiopia's requests for further military aid.

It is worth noting that diplomatic relationships between Ethiopia and the Sudan improved markedly in 1971. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister visited Khartoum in March, 1971, and reports are that it was agreed that both countries would refrain from providing help to each other's rebels. In October, President Numeiry himself visited Addis Abada, and reconfirmed the *entente*. Although refusing to extradite E.L.F. guerrillas from the Sudan, Numeiry reportedly agreed to stop assisting the E.L.F. and to close its office in Khartoum in return for Ethiopia's agreement to stop assisting Sudanese Communists or the Anya Nya. Ethiopia also agreed to use its influence to discourage Israel from aiding and encouraging Sudanese secession. Southern

Behind the coups", *Africa*, No. 3 (1971), p. 61. The Brezhnev doctrine also claims for the Soviet Union the right to interfere in Eastern Europe to preserve Communist morality.

Sudanese militants, in fact, strongly believe that Israel agreed to the Emperor's request. They assert that Israel was embarrassed by revelations about its involvement during the trial of Steiner and was anxious to change its image as a country which actively supports secession in Africa (Israel was very pro-Biafra). Southern secessionists also believed that the U.S., Israel and the World Council of Churches were involved in a major diplomatic manoeuvre to woo the Sudan away from the Arab bloc, the Soviets and the Chinese. It was noted that weapons and financial assistance were drying up, and that under Israel's instigation, secessionist commanders were purged from the Anya Nya. Secessionists were convinced that all this had Israel's backing. According to this thesis, the agreement of 29th February, 1972, which ended the war by granting self-government to the South within a United Federal Sudan must have had the blessing of Israel and the World Council of Churches. Colonel Lagu, it was said, was heavily dependent on Israel and could not have agreed to negotiate without the latter's approval. Some secessionists have expressed determination to resist any agreement that falls short of secession but they admit that without money and weapons the struggle would be an uphill one. They believed, however, that the pressure from the Communists, the Madhists and other black dissidents in the North and East would bring down the Numeiry regime.

Initially Uganda's relationships with Sudan appeared to be quite fluid. In the early months after taking power President Amin was highly critical of Khartoum which he accused of "burning his Southern Sudanese brothers". On the other hand, President Amin was concerned about Khartoum's attempts to foment rebellion in Uganda and made numerous attempts to normalize relationships with Khartoum. A Ugandan Embassy in the Sudan was established and President Amin invited Khartoum to send a top level delegation to Uganda to ascertain for itself that no assistance was being given to the Anya Nya. He also promised to open the borders that were closed after the coup as well as to improve road communications to the Sudanese border.⁷³ Following the new friendship between Uganda and the Arab states, the end of the civil war in Sudan and the deterioration of the relations between Uganda and Israel, the border was reopened and relations with Sudan completely normalized.

Relations with Israel have degenerated from close friendship to extreme hostility if not enmity. Prior to his visit to Israel in June, 1971, it was announced in

73 Amin and Numeiry frequently exchanged verbal salvos. Numeiry accused Amin of being an agent of imperialism and zionism and urged Ugandans to overthrow Amin. Amin said that "there is no difference between the way the Sudanese Government treats black Africans and Christians and the way the South African whites treat Africans. Both are barbarous and aggressive. Refugees from Sudan are coming into (Uganda) in large numbers: some without an arm or with multiple injuries". Amin insisted that Uganda's involvement with the Southern Sudanese is purely humanitarian and he offered to pay the air fares of a Sudanese military reconnaissance mission and to put his Presidential helicopter at their disposal to ascertain that there are no Sudanese guerrillas operating from Uganda. "If I want to help the Southern Sudanese... I would have done so directly not through Israel." Amin, who is a Muslim, claimed then to be neutral on the Middle East issue. He has now come out firmly in support of the Arab cause. Cf. *Uganda Argus*, 21st and 22nd September, 1971, 9th October, 1971.

Kampala that "the President will discuss with the Israeli authorities the withdrawal of all Israeli technical staff that has been assisting the Ugandan Armed Forces for the last ten years".⁷⁴ This report was later denied by the President in Jerusalem, and may have been made purely for purposes of bargaining. Prior to their expulsion in April, 1972, the Israelis were ubiquitous in Uganda, and a Ugandan Embassy was established in Jerusalem. The "Uganda-Israeli axis", however, came under strong attack by Africans in the United Nations and elsewhere. Aware of this, President Amin asserted that it was not true that Uganda was in Israel's pocket, and he instructed the Uganda delegation to vote in support of the 1967 Security Council resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territory. President Amin declared (on 3rd December, 1971) that his foreign policy was based on "positive non-alignment" and that it did not fluctuate and waver according to the wishes or the demands of any country, big or small. Critics, however, believed that the President was merely trying to improve his image in Africa and that the Israelis fully appreciated his dilemma. Some Southern Sudanese also asserted that Uganda was also part of the strategy designed to encourage the Khartoum regime to strengthen its links with the West. Nevertheless, the Uganda-Libya communique during President Amin's visit to Tripoli in February which denounced Israeli aggression and reflected a complete Ugandan identity of views with the Arabs in their struggle with Israel, came as a surprise to most observers. Ever since, relations between the two countries have not been the same. On 23rd March, Amin expelled Israeli Army personnel in Uganda, the first in a series of measures which culminated in the expulsion of all the Israelis in Uganda from the country and the closure of the Israeli Embassy in Kampala.

The noticeable deterioration of the Sudan's economy and Moscow's reaction to Numeiry's persecution of Communists following the abortive coup in June, 1971, encouraged Sudan's turn to the West. Relations between the Sudan and the Soviet Union deteriorated sharply in July and Soviet and Bulgarian agents were accused of helping to mastermind the coup. The Soviet Chancellor in Khartoum was expelled and the Sudan recalled its consular officials from Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Although Russia expressed strong concern about the treatment of Communists and may have regretted that it gave its backing to Arab nationalism rather than to socialism, it seems to have concluded that its commitments in the struggle against Israel had to be honoured even if it meant that its fraternal obligations to Communist parties in the area had to be sacrificed.⁷⁵ The Soviets were also unwilling to see China

74 "Uganda Army in Trouble", *Africa*, (August, 1971), p. 23.

75 Moscow warned Khartoum that repression of Communists was bound to influence the close relations between the two countries. *Izvestia*, in fact, declared that extreme measures were "impermissible". Cf. *Argus*, 30th July, 1971. Many Soviet experts have already left the Sudan. Colonel Gaddafi of Libya urged Moscow to continue supplying arms to the Arabs even if local Communists are persecuted since the arms deals are strictly commercial. "The Russians do not give us any weapons as gifts. They sell them and we pay fully for them. If the Soviet Union allows its relationships with the Arab World to be affected by Arab reaction to local Communist activity, then it would be seriously harming its interests."

move in to fill any vacuum which their disengagement might produce. But given Numeiry's experiences with the Soviets and the deterioration of the economy, he clearly wants to broaden his dependence by relying more on China and the West. Following his return to power Numeiry sent a high level team to China to explore the possibility of having the Chinese send military advisers and technicians to replace the Russians. Numeiry is also trying to get the World Bank to finance a major irrigation scheme and to get Britain to lend £10 million to finance British exports to the Sudan.

Involvement on the part of the great powers and their allies in the internal conflicts in Eastern Africa has so far been restrained. Following upon the conflicts in Congo and Nigeria, there seems to be a tacit determination to prevent these conflicts from becoming major cockpits of great power strife. But neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is, as yet, prepared to stay out of the domestic conflicts of African states. To support one party or another in a civil conflict seems to be considered a "safe" way of mounting an indirect but limited attack on an antagonist. As *Strategic Survey* (1970) notes, "the superpowers, unable to resist nuclear tests of will, had to elaborate a code of rules for political competition short of military involvement. . . . Each was anxious to consolidate, rather than expand its own alliance system. Each was eager to contain the power and influence of China".⁷⁶ This judgement still seems to hold for 1971. Given the low profile which seems to typify the rivalry of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in Africa, the thaw in relations between the U.S. and China, and the determination of African states to maintain the existing nation state system, there seems little likelihood of any major international clash, at least not in traditional cold war terms.⁷⁷ But given the fluidity of politics in Africa and the fragility of African states and political coalitions, it is difficult to predict where critical conflicts will erupt or reappear, and what "accidents" (in the sense of policy decisions which have unintended consequences) might provoke serious confrontations between major powers.

But can anything be done to fulfil those early hopes that the continent would not be the object of a second scramble? A number of suggestions

Daily Nation, 26th August, 1971. Khartoum took a similar position: "We can get arms from any other country. We can do without Soviet arms. We are not ready to become a Soviet colony or . . . to take orders from international Communism . . . we pay for all the arms we receive and it was never charity. . . . Economic aid . . . does not exist." *Daily Nation*, 2nd August, 1971. The Sudan has also accused Russia of dumping its cotton on the world market.

76 *Strategic Survey*, 1970, op. cit. p. 1. As Nixon declared, one of America's major goals is that the [African] continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form", *Topic*, op. cit.

77 Robert Matthews asserts that "As long as African Governments remain weak . . . political violence is apt to be restricted to a series of swift *coups d'état* in which outside support is negligible. Foreign governments will probably avoid dealings with insurgents until they have established a strong position", *International Journal*, op. cit., p. 473. But the weakness and permeability of African states is very tempting to a foreign power which might wish to intervene to support a group more partial to its interests. Permeability might reduce changes of international confrontation but not of intervention. For a discussion of the weaknesses of African states, cf. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale, 1969), esp. Ch. I.

have, in fact, been given. They include (a) the creation of an all African High Command to police conflicts between and within African countries; (b) greater use of O.A.U. mediation facilities; (c) banning of all arms sales or gifts to African countries; (d) cutting those economic links to the West which encourage "protective" intervention; and (e) agreement by major powers to a non-intervention pact which would be policed by an international agency.

The first two solutions are popular with radical pan-African states such as Guinea and Tanzania and continue to have some attraction for elements in moderate states such as Nigeria.⁷⁸ But while the O.A.U. has had some success in mediating disputes such as that between Ethiopia and Somalia, its impact on other disputes such as that in Nigeria where the stakes were high, has been marginal. O.A.U. efforts are likely to be welcomed by incumbent élites but not by claimants for power. It is worth noting that the O.A.U. did not make any major effort to bring the warring parties in the Sudan together, and it is to be wondered whether the O.A.U. might not have attempted to trade off its support for the Arabs in the Middle East conflict in return for a gesture on the part of Khartoum towards the Southerners.

An all-African military command designed to maintain a *Pax Africana* would have the same built-in difficulties as the O.A.U. Actions which the High Command might wish to take will certainly not be approved by all African states, let alone the parties to the conflict. If the High Command has to take its instructions from a Defence Commission consisting of the Defence Ministers of forty states and can act only with the approval of the Government of the states in question, it will in most cases be paralysed. Not even in a contest with racist and offensive regimes in Southern Africa can one count on unity since there will always be Bandas, Boignys, Busias, Bongos and Bokassas in Africa. Moreover, there are logistical problems involved in mobilizing an all-African military force quickly which may prove difficult, though not impossible to overcome. In spite of these difficulties, however, some sort of all African peace-keeping military presence is clearly a goal towards which African energies ought to be directed in the near future. But its effectiveness might well be limited to inter-rather than intra-state disputes and to confrontations with the remaining colonial powers or minority racist regimes.

The idea of a non-intervention code enforced by an international agency is superficially attractive but there are major weaknesses. It may help in certain situations to keep the major powers from confronting each other militarily in Africa, but the code would be difficult to enforce with respect to arms supplies or indirect attacks through third parties.

The suggestion that the traffic in arms to Africa should be stopped, and that no further aid should be given to support military budgets is also

78 Senior Nigerian Army Officers were said to be keen on establishing an African High Command. The interest was said to have been due to the desire to justify Nigeria's high defence costs and a desire to justify the prolongation of military rule. Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Arikpo, however, opposed the notion as impractical and politically impossible. Cf. *Daily Nation*, 31st July, 1971. Also "The Case for an African Defence Organization", Jon Woronoff, *Africa Report* (June, 1971).

idealistic. It is true that without outside budgetary support, many African countries could not support their present levels of defence spending. Countries such as the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia commit a large proportion of their resources which are badly needed for development projects to armies and armaments. But even if aid is transferred from military to civil projects, states can still redirect their own resources into military channels if they consider it paramount to bolster their security services. And as Geoffrey Kemp notes, "despite a marked degree of correlation between high defence budgets, large armed forces and incidents of conflict, it cannot be argued that the arms cause or contribute to the conflict".⁷⁹ An increased supply of arms may exacerbate a conflict, but it could also shorten it if the increase is decisive.

Even if it were possible to get the large arms suppliers to agree to deny "sophisticated" and offensive arms to developing countries, there would still be problems in determining what exactly is an offensive weapon and in policing the activities of small suppliers. As Amelia Leiss observes: "A country that is determined to acquire arms regardless of the persuasion of its mentor has the option of many suppliers of many roughly comparable systems to which to turn. . . . It is increasingly a buyers' market."⁸⁰

The notion that disengagement from world economic systems is an effective way to curb interventionism on the part of foreign powers is quite prevalent in radical circles, particularly in Tanzania. The argument is that foreign aid and investment creates opportunities for access and leads to the establishment or strengthening of link groups which then provides pretexts and justifications for intervention. In the words of Okwudiba Nnoli: "Africanization of the linkage groups reduces the impact of external influences. . . . This is a genuine reason for the nationalization of expatriate enterprises in African states."⁸¹ Self-reliant economic development, then, is the key to the problem of foreign intervention. Development which relies on foreign initiative and capital ultimately leads to the intensification of domestic conflicts and economic retrogression.

This is an interesting formulation, but it, nevertheless, contains a number of basic weaknesses. It assumes, for example, that if Tanzania "disengages" from imperialism, imperialists will, therefore, cease to intervene (directly or indirectly) in Tanzania since they have no link groups to protect. But unless links are severed on a continental basis, and more or less at the same time, there is still the likelihood that foreign powers would seek to restore them in Tanzania to prevent the "infection" from spreading. This is precisely the situation in which Tanzania finds itself at the moment. We are thus back to

79 "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts", *International Conciliation*, No. 577 (March, 1970), p. 9.

80 "The Transfer of Conventional Arms to Less Developed Countries", *Arms Control and National Security*, Vol. I (1969), pp. 46-54.

81 "Some Implications of Contemporary World Politics for African Development", *The African Review*, Vol. I, No. 1 (March, 1971), p. 52. For a radical analysis of the role of link groups in Tanzania, cf. Shivji, *Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle (mimeo)*, paper presented to the Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December, 1970.

the argument of Nkrumah for continental unity. Nkrumah's argument was that if African states did not unite they would be picked off "one by one".

Some exponents of the disengagement theory limit it to capitalist states and call for greater linkages with the socialist bloc not only to accelerate socialist development, but to secure it. But as Cuba, the Sudan and Eastern Europe illustrate, reliance on the Soviet Union or China also gives rise to complaints about great power domination. African élites, like many in Eastern Europe, might well feel that rather than leading to economic retrogression and a loss of real freedom, competition among foreign countries of all ideological persuasions increases their options. As such they will always feel threatened if any one foreign power achieves a monopoly of influence. As the late Sylvanus Olympio once observed, "we have so much to ask for and so little to bargain with".⁸² Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect African states to cut links with either of the great economic systems when they are so dependent on these for markets for their primary and secondary products. The disengagement theory assumes that options which are available to large countries with a varied resource base (both human and physical) are equally open to small states with a skewed resource base.

Dr. Nnoli himself admits that self-reliance does not mean isolation. What he urges is a "diversification of dependence" and greater selectivity in sources of aid and investment. "Countries which have much more limited political interests in the international system should be the sources of the bulk of the aid to the African states. Only thus may the informal attack against African states which arises from access through foreign aid be minimized".⁸³ The problem, however, is to find states with limited political objectives which at the same time have the economic capacity and the will to deploy that capacity for the development of Africa, however that may be understood. Israel was once assumed to have limited objectives. It is now clear that states which feel themselves threatened may well become transformed into allies and instruments of states with more global objectives.

Given the weaknesses and ability of African states, one can expect no abatement of internal conflict in the near future whether of the leadership or structural variety. Given the proximity of the states in Eastern Africa to two major areas of international rivalry, one can also expect capitalist and socialist powers to continue to try to influence the outcomes of these conflicts whether invited or not. In such confrontations the Soviets and the Chinese will always appear to Westerners and Africans whose class interests are served by the Western link, to be the aggressors since the former do not want to maintain the post-colonial balance which favours the West, but to change it.⁸⁴ Most of the regimes which have been overthrown in the last few

82 Cf. Vernon Makay, *African Diplomacy* (Praeger, 1966), p. 17.

83 "Some Implications", op. cit., p. 65.

84 "In terms of the traditional concepts of what constitutes aggressive international behaviour, it can be argued that China is not an expansionist power. . . the Chinese. . . have demonstrated no territorial ambitions beyond its present borders [except] to peoples who were part of the former Chinese empire. . . Chinese military aid stops short of any attempt to conquer new colonies or to extend Chinese

years have been left leaning and constituted threats to the Western economic interests in Africa. The likelihood, therefore, is that the Western powers will do whatever they can to undermine Tanzania and Zambia, the only remaining "radical" states on the borders of Southern Africa.

After Uganda supported Britain on the issue of Southern Africa, Uganda-British relations reached an all-time low following the expulsion of 40,000 Asians holding British passports and the nationalization of seven British firms and 23 tea-estates between August and September, 1972. Close economic ties have now been established with the Arab world and mutual defence agreements have been entered into with Libya and Sudan. Given the feeling of insecurity which now prevails in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam, it would only be natural for greater reliance to be placed on the Chinese. The latter would have strong incentives to maintain the security of the railway and Chinese involvement might well function as a deterrent to Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia if they feel tempted to punish Zambia and Tanzania for giving assistance and sanctuary to guerrilla groups.⁸⁵ It is unlikely, however, that the Chinese will ever allow themselves to become involved militarily in operations so far away from their frontiers.

Finally, it is worth stressing that African élites have so far not allowed themselves to be bound to any one foreign power or group, and that they have changed alliances or emphasis in dependence when it suited them. African politics is a nightmare to game players in foreign chancelleries and defence establishments who expect consistency from client élites.

rule over new peoples." Franz Mitchael, "A Design for Aggression", *Problems of Communism* (January-April, 1971), p. 63. Peter Van Ness also argues that China is not expansionist in any traditional sense: "China, like virtually all major powers, seeks to influence the internal politics of other countries... by providing moral and often material support for... organizations... which are engaged in making revolution against established governments. However, Chinese policy... calls for revolutionaries to rely principally on their own efforts and resources to gain power... thinking conceives of... no proper role for Chinese foreign military forces abroad. To quote Lin Piao, revolution... in any country is the business of the masses... there is no other way." *Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary Self-Reliance*, *ibid.*, pp. 71-3.

85 Vorster recently declared that, "if terrorists came on to South African soil and attacked South Africans then South Africa had the right to follow them wherever they might go", *Daily Nation*, 6th October, 1971. Zambia has recently bought a Rapier ground-to-air missile system from Britain to improve her defence capability against Rhodesian, Portuguese and South African aircraft which trespass her airspace with impunity.

Africa, China and the United Nations

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There has been much speculation about Communist China's activities in Africa over the last decade, both with regard to its motives and its impact on the African countries themselves. At first, it was apparent that the Communist government actively supported African struggles for liberation or the overthrow of reactionary governments although, by the 1970s, policy changed as Peking began to seek friendly relations with radical, moderate, and conservative governments alike.¹ Changes have also occurred in the African stance toward Communist China; indeed, many African governments have extended diplomatic recognition to Peking and a number of African nations entered into "friendship treaties" with the Peking government.²

To some observers, Peking's activities on the African continent were motivated primarily by its desire to rally African votes behind the effort to seat Communist China in the U.N. In particular, China's recent policy of pursuing friendly relations with *all* African governments has been seen by many observers as a reflection of the fact that as many African votes as possible were needed for the U.N. effort. That such a policy could meet with success caused considerable alarm among Western diplomats, however, who speculated that, if Peking's efforts did produce favourable results in Africa, the large number of African votes in the U.N. could be decisive in reversing the trend of events in the long-standing China debate.

Such speculation was no longer necessary by 1971, with the historic General Assembly vote recognizing Communist China as the legitimate government of China. It is not immediately clear, however, whether African votes were a significant part of this change. What role did the African countries play in this historic decision and how did they view the China issue? What positions did they take on this persistent controversy? Was the increase in African representation in the U.N. crucial to the final, decisive vote? In order to assess the African role in the outcome of the long China debate, it is important to examine the positions taken by the African countries on this issue

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- Philippe Richer, *La Chine et le Tiers Monde, 1949-1969* (Paris: Payot, 1971), pp. 259-282, 296-303; Richard Lowenthal, "China"; Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Africa and the Communist World* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 143-203; W. A. C. Adie, "China, Russia and the Third World", *China Quarterly*, No. 11 (July-September, 1962), pp. 209-213; R. B. "China's Impact on Africa—A Summing Up", *Race*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (April, 1964), pp. 79-82; Gilbert Comte, "Peking Shows Its New African Look", *Africa Report* (March, 1971), p. 19
- For the countries which recognized the Peking government by 1970, see Sydney D. Bailey, *Chinese Representation in the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations* (Sussex, England: University of Sussex, 1970), ISIO Monographs, First Series, No. 1 pp. 32-33.