once "nationally oriented" Ibos to demand a high degree of autonomy and ultimately to secede.

These recent Nigerian events which culminated in the most severe manifestation of an identity crisis—civil war—have fortunately not been repeated elsewhere. In most cases African leadership has succeeded in coping with the identity problem, though in no case has it been altogether solved. Even in the beleaguered Congo territorial integrity has been maintained. And in Uganda the national leadership has so far successfully arrested a politics rooted in ethnicity by enhancing the power and authority of central and national institutions against the sub-nationalisms of the districts and former Kingdoms.[37] The successful resolution of the Somali-Kenya dispute which concerned Somali irredentism in north-eastern Kenya was a skilful act of international African diplomacy and bargaining among leaders of both nations. The achievement is especially remarkable when it is remembered that the conflict was fundamentally a clash of two nationalisms—a nationalism of a single people united by bonds of culture, language and religion, and a pluralistic nationalism which embraced many cultural groups in its search for a new civic order. The resolution of such a seemingly irreconcilable conflict was an achievement of African statecraft, as well as a recognition by Somali leaders that the continuation of the conflict which entail serious future economic costs of exclusion from the opportunity to participate in the East African Community. In choosing to negotiate an end to the conflict, the Somali leaders apparently placed utilitarian economic interests above the primary bonds of culture.

The task of African leadership is not to eliminate cultural diversity but rather to create an order in which ethnic and regional identities might coexist in harmony with national interests and needs as a new national whole emerges. Such an order must rest in the beginning upon an enlightened group of national leaders and ethnic spokesmen who are perceptive enough to know that while ethnic interests do exist and should be heard, in any confrontation between ethnicity and nationalism that cannot be accommodated the latter must be permitted to succeed. The interests of ethnic spokesmen may be brought into harmony with national needs either through bargaining and accommodation— a process characteristic of countries like Kenya—or inspirational leadership and moral appeal—an approach more characteristic of Tanzania. But in each case, a crisis of identity is prevented from emerging by the willingness and flexibility of both national and regional leaders to place the embryo nation before the interests of their own elementary group. The majority of new African states has so far benefited from having leaders who possess the will and ability to prevent an almost universal problem of identity from escalating into a crisis.

[37]For an excellent analysis of ethnicity in Uganda's politics see Nelson Kasfir, "The Decline of Cultural Subnationalism in Uganda", forthcoming in V. A. Olorunsola, *Cultural Nationalism in Africa.*

BUREAUCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

DAVID B. ABERNETHY*

I

To understand the African bureaucracy is to understand a great deal about African politics, for the ministries and parastatal bodies representing central government are the most powerful political institutions on the continent. This is due in large measure to the colonial legacy of "bureaucratic authoritarianism"[1]—a legacy with deeper historical roots and a more pervasive impact than the representative institutions whose formation colonial rulers like to stress as their chief contribution to African political development. The colonial bureaucracy not only administered the law but also formulated and interpreted it; in a word, the civil servant ruled. By imposing complex hierarchical structures modelled after those in the metropolitan country on societies that in most cases lacked these structures, the European rulers successfully extracted the financial and material resources they needed while maintaining, for several decades, their own version of law and order. In view of the power, prestige, security, and income of colonial administrative posts, it is hardly surprising that most Africans educated under the colonial system should desire something similar for themselves and a major goal of the nationalist movement was to fill public offices with local citizens. As Africans began to occupy posts once held by expatriates, they exerted pressure on government to pay them comparable salaries; thus the extraordinary inequalities built into the colonial salary structure were carried over into independence.[2] The ablest and best-educated of the post-

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[1]J. Coleman and C. Rosberg, eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley, Calif., 1964), p. 659.

[2]Inequalities are often greater than salary differentials alone suggest. In Nigeria, for instance, a senior official earning £2,500 a year in the early 1960's might pay £150 for a spacious, completely furnished house, whereas a subordinate earning under £700 was fortunate if he paid £240 for an unfurnished private flat. *Per capita* income in Nigeria is approximately £30. *Nigeria, Report of the Commission on the Review of Wages, Salaries, and Conditions of Service of the Junior Employees of the Federation and in Private Establishments, 1963-64* (Lagos, 1964), p. 56.

independence generation consequently continue to be attracted to civil service life. And those at the top of the hierarchy, who benefit most from inflated salary scales, are in a good position to protect their privileges.

To be sure, the transition to independence brings political control of bureaucratic decisions through the ministerial system, while the ruling party tries to influence recruitment into the administration and assumes a number of governmental functions. In several countries, moreover, control of regional and district administration is given to politically reliable individuals.[3] But it would be a mistake to view the bureaucrat as considerably less powerful and autonomous than he was in the colonial era. To begin with, political leaders find it a full-time occupation to maintain themselves in power and to forge the personal relationships with other politicians that hold a fragile state together; lacking time or interest in what government agencies are doing, ministers often allow their top civil servants to make important policy decisions.[4] Second, the decline of political parties in most African States[5]—a trend accentuated by the movement of top party personnel into ministries and parastatal bodies—means a relaxation of party control over the civil service. Even in cases where a mobilizing party is supposed to breathe life into a presumably immobile bureaucracy, it is quite possible for the latter to have a deadening effect on the former. Third, once the political kingdom has been won, public attention shifts to the economic kingdom. Rapid economic development becomes, in fact, the key political imperative for the leaders of a new state, who may have no other means of gaining legitimacy and integrating the country than to fulfil their pre-independence promises of higher living standards for all. The verbal and organizational skills of the politician may have sufficed to win independence, but for the more protracted and difficult task of economic transformation they must be complemented by the technical and organizational skills of the administrator. This is particularly true in socialist countries, where the public sector is assigned the leading role in stimulating growth and structural change. Whether government agencies can do what leaders feel they must do is of course an open question, but at least the bureaucracy's capacity to meet economic targets becomes the crucial factor in the success or failure of development plans. The planning process itself strengthens the bureaucracy, which alone has the technical expertise, access to classified material and negotiating experience with foreign donors to draw up a meaningful plan—to say nothing of its more obvious role in plan implementation.

A fourth reason for the importance of bureaucratic institutions in independent Africa relates to the political instability that seems endemic in

[3]See, for example, W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics in Tanzania* (Nairobi, 1967), pp. 95-135.

[4]For the Uganda case, see C. Leys, *Politicians and Policies* (Nairobi, 1967), p. 98.

[5]I. Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States", in J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, 1966), pp. 201-14.

much of the continent. It is not the place here to outline the external and domestic factors that have produced civil wars and military coups. Not to be overlooked, however, is the performance of government agencies, faced with mounting public demands for goods and services, on the one hand, and with a static or possibly declining technical capacity due to rapid absorption of poorly-trained local personnel, on the other.[6] Paradoxically, the failure of these agencies to satisfy new demands often results in a strengthening of the administrator *vis-a-vis* the politician. For the politician is a visible and vulnerable target for a disaffected public; having taken credit for the successes of his regime, he must be prepared to shoulder the blame for its failures. Even if the failures are due to bureaucratic mismanagement, it seldom occurs to the men leading a coup to throw the administrators out; it is rather the politicians who have to go so the nation can gain a new lease on life. With the entry of the military the top civil servants tend to become more powerful than ever; deferred to on many matters with which the colonels are unfamiliar, they combine in effect the roles of minister and of ministerial adviser. Nor is it stretching the point too far to construe a military takeover as itself the triumph of a bureaucracy whose specialty happens to be the use of force. The Weberian attributes of hierarchy, impersonality, and discipline are even more strongly emphasized in the military than in the civil service. In some ways the coups represent a reversion to a colonial style of rule; the admiration many African military men have for the former colonial ruler, and their distaste for politics as a legitimate human activity, are significant in this respect.[7]

II

Thus the era of independence, far from downgrading an institution that was crucial for maintaining colonial rule, actually reinforces its influence in the making of public policy. This conclusion can be misleading, however, for in practice the bureaucracy does not behave as a monolith. Indeed, some of the factors in the transition to independence that account for the continued influence of civil servants have also created serious internal problems which render the bureaucracy considerably less cohesive and effective than it might be. We may briefly consider three problem areas: racial, generational and functional.

African countries vary greatly in the speed with which an expatriate-dominated civil service is localized. Particularly in countries whose colonial rulers had no intention of preparing the people for self-rule, political independence is accompanied by continued administrative dependence, the top decision-making posts still being held by officials from the metropole whose

[6]Bureaucratic recruitment practices favouring citizens of one region over others can also have a politically destabilizing effect. For the Nigerian case, see D. B. Abernethy, *The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case* (Stanford, 1969), Chapter 11.

[7]See A. A. Afrifra, *The Ghana Coup, 24 February 1966* (London, 1966).

willingness to carry out ministerial orders is open to question.[8] The racial dimensions of the conflict which often results are reinforced by differences of age, temperament, and general political outlook.[9] Even where expatriates co-operate fully with the minister, they are normally suspect to African junior civil servants whose promotions are blocked by their continued presence. The delicate task for political leaders is to distinguish between reliable and unreliable expatriates, and then to balance the latters' contribution against the persuasive argument that a government cannot be truly free until it is staffed by its own nationals. Racial conflict within the bureaucracy normally declines after the first few years of independence, as local people are promoted while expatriates complete their contracts and are pensioned off.[10] Still, the potential for such conflict is present so long as ambitious development plans require outside personnel.

The more rapidly a bureaucracy solves the racial problem by localizing, the more severe the second problem, of generational conflict, is likely to be. The first African occupants of top bureaucratic posts experience rapid upward mobility as they fill the personnel vacuum created by departing expatriates, or new jobs created to meet the government's expanding responsibilities. This "independence generation" is relatively young and hence expects to remain influential for many years to come; it also contains few men with a university training, since educational opportunities were severely limited when this generation was growing up. The success of this group spurs those who are five or ten years younger to enter the bureaucracy in hopes of a similar career pattern. But the "post-independence generation" is blocked from rising to the top by the very generation it hopes to emulate. Its frustrations are only increased by the fact that, with increasing secondary and higher education facilities after independence, the members of the new generation are better educated than their elders.[11] There is a natural tendency for the young civil servant fresh from the university to regard many of his superiors as distinctly inferior in competence and cultural attainments, while the man at the top looks upon the new crop of graduates as inexperienced, arrogant, and cut off from any real contact with the people. Their career prospects at stake, both generations are tempted to spend an inordinate amount of time struggling for power within the bureaucracy, giving secondary attention to the duties they have been hired to perform. And delegation of

[8]For instance, at the time of its independence in 1960 there were almost 10,000 Belgians in the Congo's civil service; the top three ranks consisted of 4,462 Europeans and three Africans. C. Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton, 1965), p. 402.

[9]An example of conflict in Western Nigeria is given in Abernethy, *op. cit.*, Chapter 6.

[10]This transition is discussed in K. Younger, *The Public Service in the New States* (London, 1960); A. L. Adu, *The Civil Service in New African States* (London, 1965), pp. 109-28 and K. Post, *The New States of West Africa* (London, 1968, rev. ed.), pp. 146-48.

[11]The term "generation" may seem inappropriate here, but in situations of rapid change conflicts can occur between age groups separated by only a few years from each other. As David Apter noted of Ghana, "It must be remembered that a political generation . . . is very short. One finds new cadres appear in roughly five-year intervals." D. E. Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (New York, 1963), p. 363.

responsibility to subordinates, which normally increases the scope of a superior official's power, is not practised because the latter fears delegation will decrease his leverage over subordinates who are also, as it happens, his competitors.

A third set of problems concerns the rapidly changing functions of the bureaucracy. As already noted, self-government creates a new relationship with political authority through the ministerial system, and a shift in personnel; it also focuses greater attention on the developmental, as distinct from the law and order, tasks of government.[12] The politician's commitment to economic development means an increase in the size of the public service, particularly the parastatal bodies which are established to build up infrastructure, extend credit to the private sector and manage government enterprises.[13] It means an increased depth and breadth of territorial coverage: if TANU organizers are trying to reach the villages, so are agricultural extension and rural development workers. Clearly, technical skills have to be rapidly developed and deployed in agriculture, civil engineering, public health, and the like. Clearly, too, attitudinal changes are required; the bureaucrat must be less an autocrat, more a persuader, mentor, and behind the scenes organizer if he is to encourage local self-help efforts. Finally, a change in the pace of work is needed, and the administrator's vested interest in inertia frontally challenged.

Trying to attain any one of these multiple goals is difficult enough. What may not be so self-evident is the larger problem created by the simultaneity of the shift in goals. When the bureaucrat's performance is judged by several criteria that are unfamiliar, indistinctly defined, and even mutually conflicting, he is likely to be quite uncertain how to act. This uncertainty in turn reinforces the tendency to play the internal politics of bureaucracy in order to ensure promotion, rather than conscientiously to do one's job. Moreover, an organization that is expected to do everything will most likely end up doing nothing very well. African bureaucracies are currently suffering from an overload of functions; their capacity to do what is expected of them is not necessarily strengthened by adding to the load. A crucial question for countries wishing to strengthen the public sector of the economy is whether this long-run goal is best served by the short-run accretion of

[12]The difference in priorities between the new regime and its colonial predecessor is one of degree and not of kind. For it would hardly be fair to say that colonial administrations were not interested in development; otherwise the colonies would not pay for themselves, much less benefit the metropole. See R. Oliver and J. D. Fage, *A Short History of Africa* (London, 1962), pp. 196-205 and 216-225; also B. Niculescu, *Colonial Planning: A Comparative Study* (London, 1958). Moreover, the social and political strains inevitably accompanying independence, plus those created by economic development itself, increase the costs of maintaining law and order. African governments are not able to finance development by slashing expenditure on the army, police force, judiciary and general administration.

[13]For instance, public boards and corporations accounted for 2 per cent of Ghana's wage employment in 1953, 15 per cent in 1961. W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt and E. N. Omaboe, *A Study of Contemporary Ghana. Vol. I, The Economy of Ghana* (London, 1966), p. 125.

government responsibilities where the government apparatus appears unlikely to perform effectively.[14] In many cases, national leaders quite properly see no alternative to rapid public sector expansion, but this does not automatically mean that ultimate socialist goals have been brought closer to realization.

III

A picture emerges, then, of African bureaucracy as quite powerful relative to other institutions, yet operating well below its potential because of conflicts inherent in the transition to independence. In what follows we shall concentrate on the bureaucracy's role in rural development, broadly defined as an increased capacity of the traditional rural populace to produce, to consume goods and services, to co-operate for communal ends, and to participate in local and national decision making. In a sense rural development is the most important, and intractable, task facing independent African governments. The masses live in the rural areas, Africa being the world's least urbanized continent. Unless conditions there are improved, the younger generation will flee from the land to cities lacking the employment opportunities to absorb them productively, urban class conflict will increase and pressures will grow to spend scarce resources on cities that are already incomparably better off than the countryside. The legacy of colonialism is a dual economy, society, and polity. In each country a small "core" has been intensively developed and closely linked to the outside world, while the "residual" traditional sector has been neglected.[15] To reduce dependence on the vagaries of the international commodity market and the dubious generosity of neo-colonial powers, as well as to carry out structural changes that benefit the country as a whole, African leaders have to forge new links between the core and the residual sector. In other words, the economic and political transactions between the capital city and the bush have to become at least as significant as the transactions between the capital city and the outside world. A massive injection into the rural areas of funds, skills, equipment, and mobilizing energies is needed for this shift in transactions. And government ministries are essential in bringing it about. Wealthy private investors, domestic or foreign, are likely to seek profit by producing for the core or exporting natural resources; hence they cannot normally be relied on to encourage broadly based rural development, at least in its initial stages. A political party can be quite useful on the mobilization side, assuming that its leaders really want to change their society. But there is no substitute for the skills of the agricultural extension worker, the bridge repair crews from the Public Works Department, the government doctor or the adult literacy organizer. Their very indispensibility makes it all the more important to understand the special difficulties they face as government employees dealing with the rural populace.

[14]The problem is particularly acute for the parastatal bodies, which are often expected to accumulate capital by running at a profit, yet which are more likely to lose money because their relative freedom from civil service regulations exposes them to patronage pressures. For the expected contributions of state enterprise in the Ghana, Mali and Guinea development plans, see O. Forrest, *Financing Development Plans in West Africa* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 25-26. For actual performance, see D. Rimmer, "The Crisis in the Ghana Economy", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IV:1 (1966), pp. 17-32.

[15]See A. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago, 1966), pp. 131-34 for the notions of a core political system and a residual sector. A classic case of economic dualism is analyzed in R. E. Baldwin, *Economic Development and Export Growth; A Study of Northern Rhodesia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1966).

One difficulty is in maintaining the lines of vertical communication between the top and bottom of a given ministry. The effort to penetrate to the village means an enormous lengthening of communication lines, and increasing numbers of officials who are sent to the areas are most deficient in communication and transport facilities. Under these conditions the man in the field frequently fails to receive clear directives when and where he needs them, and these directives are unlikely to be sufficiently sensitive to the particular situation he faces. Equally serious, his experiences and findings are not readily transmitted upward. Feedback is absolutely necessary in the rural development field considering the almost inevitable failure of planners to take into account the full range of factors making for success or failure in rural projects.[16] The planners operate in an urban, bureaucratic *milieu*, hence one can assume that many of their assumptions about peasant behaviour will be faulty. The capacity of feedback information to correct these faults is limited by the dynamism of the central government as well as its physical distance from the man in the field. For a government determined to change the countryside may not be willing to admit the failure of a programme, or it may attribute failure to an unco-operative peasantry rather than to an unrealistic plan. The field worker may decide to play it safe and report what his superiors want to hear, with the result that feedback only reinforces initial errors of judgment at the top. One of the important tasks of the politician, under such conditions, is to provide an alternative channel of upward-flowing information about the actual effects of government policy.

A second problem is what might be called horizontal communication across ministry lines. The recruitment practices of the colonial era encouraged the insulation of the various functional departments from each other and there was scant incentive to co-ordinate departmental programmes when comprehensive planning was not considered necessary. The tradition of insulation has been passed on to the independence era, both from sheer inertia and from the obvious need to have distinct lines of command and specialized roles within each ministry if anything is to get done. As the concept of

[16]The pressure for quick, visible results also leads planners to rely on highly mechanized agriculture that is quite inappropriate to African soil and weather conditions. The quicker the feedback on the costly failures of capital-intensive settlement schemes the better. Unfortunately, the independence regimes seem to have learned little from the mistakes of the colonial era and seem destined to repeat them. For one colonial failure, see K. D. S. Baldwin, *The Niger Agricultural Project: An Experiment in African Development* (Oxford, 1957).

planning gains favour efforts are made to co-ordinate programmes at the central government level and a planning ministry or office emerges whose task is to create and maintain horizontal links among ministries. Ironically, the one thing that cannot be planned is the planning machinery itself — subject as it is to continuously changing pressures from ministries and national politicians who fear the planners' proclivities for power. At the local level it may be even more necessary to create these links. Total bureaucratic resources in relation to a given rural area are extremely limited, which suggests that the extension agent, community development worker, co-operative inspector, primary school teacher, public health officer and the like should be careful to avoid duplication of effort — or, more likely, a totally unrelated set of programmes. Although we know little about the volume and timing of inputs needed for self-sustained rural development, it is fairly clear that no one ministry can do the job; in fact, a "critical minimum" effort by several agencies acting in concert may be required. One option is to give special prominence to the community development worker as a mobilizer and co-ordinator of government effort. But this individual usually lacks the status of officials in the more technically-oriented ministries and his role is so broadly and vaguely defined that no one is quite sure when he is doing his job and when he is interfering with other officials. The community development worker often ends up with peripheral tasks and becomes the underling rather than the co-ordinator of the rest of the bureaucracy. The District Commissioner, *préfet*, or equivalent, who combines political with administrative responsibilities, is doubtless in the best position to ensure horizontal communication, mobilizing the government as well as the people for the tasks of rural development.

The two communications problems discussed above are internal to the bureaucracy. A third problem, which becomes increasingly relevant the further government penetrates the countryside, concerns the relationship between officials and the people. Many officials in the new African states quickly fall victim to an acute case of role conflict. On the one hand they are the agents of the central government at a time when government is trying to assert, even more strongly than in the colonial era, its right to collect taxes, allocate goods and services and regulate the behaviour of citizens. Where the centre takes its economic responsibilities seriously, its officials are likely to have quite definite ideas as to what the people should do. On the other hand, officials are urged to play down the authoritarian aspects of their role and to encourage greater local participation in decision-making. Their task is to institutionalize self-help by supporting, and if need be by creating from the top down, the local government structures and co-operatives that spur development from the bottom up. In one sense these two requirements are complementary, for if central authorities can divert local demands into local channels they can release their own resources

to work on long-run national needs. But in another, more obvious sense the requirements clash; the centre cannot rule effectively until it breaks down the autonomy and parochialism of local communities.[17] The conflict of bureaucratic roles is not resolved but may in fact be intensified in countries committed to a socialist path of development. For there is one line of thought — we may call it "macro-socialist"— that equates the extension of the public sector with popular rule and hence regards a large central bureaucracy as a means of liberating the people from capitalist exploitation. But there is also another, "micro-socialist" tradition that strives for equality and co-operation within relatively small communities. In this second view bureaucracy is an interference with popular rule, cumbersome and insensitive to local needs and the task of the "micro-socialist" is to insulate emerging socialist communities from it.[18] It is not clear how these conflicting images of the bureaucracy can be reconciled. The point, in any event, is that government officials are likely to behave inconsistently toward the public since the demands on them from above are often mutually incompatible.

The bureaucrat's ability to foster new values among the people is seriously limited by other factors. There may be, first of all, an inherent conflict between his social role and his message. Working as he is within a hierarchical, rather authoritarian structure, how can he convincingly urge the people to set up new communal structures that are egalitarian and non-authoritarian? One of the attractions of the bureaucracy is the security of tenure it offers, and yet government agents are continually asking the people to take risks — to move into a new village, to try new cash crops that might fail, to pool individual resources for collective ventures. The people must wonder at some point whether officials believe or even comprehend what they are preaching. Second, it is very difficult for the average official to overcome the status barrier between himself and the peasants, assuming for the moment that he wishes to do so. An acute African proverb has it that "I cannot hear what you are saying, for who you are is thundering in my ears". If this saying applied most clearly in the relationship between African peasant and European colonial administrator, it continues to apply when the European is replaced by an African who, in terms of income, dress, life style, and values is closer to the former colonial ruler than to the peasant himself. Basically, the civil servant belongs to a distinct class

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[17] Harumi Befu notes, "In the classical state the village claims the power that legitimately belongs to the state, whereas in the modern state the state claims the power that traditionally has belonged to the village". H. Befu, "The Political Relation of the Village to the State", *World Politics*, XIX:4 (July, 1967), p. 617.

[18] "Take bureaucracy . . . , wherever it exists in a large scale, there is always a breakdown of public and other services; consequently people's feelings and needs are not cared for; development is not tackled at the right pace and eventually the country suffers a standstill in progress." Editorial in *The Nationalist* (Dar es Salaam), 15 May, 1969.

— a fact that is not contravened by a government's commitment to keep the remainder of society classless.[19] That many peasants understand this aspect of class formation is clear from their energetic efforts to educate their children, so the next generation may have a chance to put on a white collar.

Yet another problem with propagating values among the people is that success in this kind of enterprise is very difficult to measure, and may be transient as well. A bureaucracy under pressure to produce quick results is tempted to emphasize activities that can be easily measured, such as meeting production targets. In a recent study of bureaucracy in Malaysia, Gayl Ness noted how agencies initially assigned the "cultural" goal of encouraging self-reliance and initiative among the peasantry quickly shifted to "pure output" goals of increasing the acreage settled, houses built, and crops harvested. As it turned out, the output goals could best be met if officials made the major decisions themselves, bypassing the lengthy process of consultation with the peasants and using contract rather than voluntary labour. Thus the goal shift actively discouraged the very values the agencies were supposed to foster.[20] Political leaders whose popular support is tenuous are also tempted to emphasize visible output achievements over the more intangible goal of a "spirit of co-operation". Development plans are revealing documents in this respect: often prefaced by statements of the leadership's cultural or value goals, the plans then concentrate on aspects of the development process, conceived in narrowly economic terms, that can be most readily quantified.

Thus the low-level bureaucrat's effectiveness with the public — and in particular the rural segment — is limited by the conflicting and changing demands made on him from above and by the gap between his whole life style and that of the ordinary people. When one adds to this the possibility of corrupt bureaucratic behaviour, the ambivalence of the popular response to the civil servant is understandable. A recent study of Indian public opinion on this matter noted, in words that probably apply to much of Africa, "a peculiar blend of respect for authority and impatience with authorities, of desire for administrative progress and frustration at administrative tactics and style, of realism as to how things get done and bitterness that one cannot get things done, of confidence in the system and cynical appraisal of the system".[21]

[19]Pre-independence nationalist pressures to abolish income inequalities between African and European civil servants, and post-independence demands to equalize income within the civil service by "topping up" the lower ranks, have only accentuated the income gap between the bureaucracy and the population as a whole. In Kenya, for instance, average earnings of African public employees rose 10.7 per cent a year between 1954 and 1964, compared to 9.2 per cent in private industry and commerce and 7.2 per cent in agriculture and forestry. Government of Kenya, *Development Plan 1966-70* (Nairobi, n.d.), p. 28.

[20]G. Ness, *Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1967), pp. 123-33; 223-26.

[21]S. J. Eldersveld *et. al.*, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy* (Glenview, Ill., 1968), p. 136. The study notes, however, that the public image of the community development (village level) worker, who practised a non-authoritarian approach, was more favourable than that of other officials.

IV

From the political leader's standpoint, the bureaucracy is important as an instrument for economic development and for tighter government control of the citizens' behaviour. These economic and political goals are of course intertwined: as national income grows more resources become available to government for penetration of the society, and an integrated and effectively administered polity is conducive in many ways to rapid growth. The immediate problem is how to finance the instrument that will realize these goals. The capital requirements for growth — not to mention structural transformation — are formidable indeed. So is the cost of civil servants' salaries and perquisites.[22] For the reasons indicated, salary scales are too high for the present state of the African economy, but it would be extremely risky for a political leader to make a frontal attack on them, for he would be threatening his country's most powerful interest group.[23] Bureaucrats are in the unique position of being able to protect their vested interests both on the input side of politics (by presenting demands through unions of public employees) and on the output side (by refusing to carry out government policies). In order, therefore, to avoid alienation in bureaucratic ranks (military as well as civilian), the leader normally has to accept the heavy cost of an instrument for growth that has become itself a heavy consumer of scarce resources.

Here the leader has two broad choices: he may turn to other countries for aid or extract more funds from the populace. We shall briefly examine the political and administrative implications of these options, recognizing that in practice leaders select some combination of the two. Foreign aid in the form of personnel, funds and equipment has certain advantages. It reduces the necessity to raise taxes on peasants and urban workers, which might create domestic unrest. It gives a "breathing spell" to overworked government institutions and builds up institutional capacity through in-service training programmes.[24] It can help a new government establish its legitimacy by funding highly visible projects (dams, ports, stadiums, factories, etc.) and even publicizing the symbols of the new state's sovereignty.[25] The

[22]R. Dumont estimates that personnel expenses absorb 60 per cent of Dahomey's domestic revenues. R. Dumont, *L'Afrique Noire est Mal Partie* (Paris, 1962), p. 63. Dahomey is, admittedly, an extreme case.

[23]As B. L. Jacobs notes of Uganda's administrative grade civil servants, "They will not accept even as a possibility the suggestion that when their output and pay are related to the national income they are in too favoured a position to be sustained by the State." B. L. Jacobs, "The State of the Uganda Civil Service Two Years After Independence", University of East Africa Social Science Conference (Kampala, 1965), p. 12. The military coups in Upper Volta and the Central African Republic were precipitated by a general strike of civil servants, called to protest drastic salary cuts proposed by political leaders.

[24]The bureaucracy is likely to be particularly weak in conducting feasibility studies on large capital projects. Foreign donors who conduct such studies and then finance the projects in question help relieve this "feasibility bottleneck".

[25]"Even so resolutely independent a country as Mali must go hat in hand once a year to persuade some country to fly its paratroops so that the mass drop can be the *pièce de résistance* of the Army Day parade." William Foltz, "Military Influences", in Vernon McKay, ed., *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1966), p. 80.

presence of foreigners is also useful in that they can be blamed for failures of policy and expelled when it suits the rulers' interests to replace them.

Foreign aid has certain disadvantages of which the African recipient is usually more aware than the foreign donor.[26] Basically, aid is a device for outside penetration into the new state, the donor wishing to influence the state's internal development strategy and its posture toward the outside world. Where the state is weak and small — as is the case with virtually all independent African countries — and where the major world powers have strong ideological and economic reasons for influencing non-aligned countries, the dangers of neo-colonialism in both its Western and Eastern varieties are only too real. Not only may the strings attached to aid undermine national sovereignty, but penetration can occur within the top levels of the bureaucracy itself and include the outside formulation of national development plans.[27] The planning exercise, which takes a great deal of the bureaucracy's time, may be carried out primarily to extract aid from the international environment; hence the desirability of a project for the foreign donor can become a more important issue than the suitability of the project for the country's development. Much foreign aid is in fact quite unsuitable. The donor's need for impressive-looking projects, to placate voters at home who are dubious about aid, reinforces the national politician's need for visible accomplishments to impress his own constituents. The result is an over-emphasis on capital-intensive projects (with unexpectedly high recurrent costs later on) and insufficient attention to on-going ministry programmes. The technology of the donor country is often unsuited to African conditions and may accentuate an already serious urban unemployment problem. It might be argued, in fact, that countries rich enough to offer aid have reached a stage of development at which their technology is too highly specialized to be relevant for poor countries. Finally, though the objective of foreign aid may be to increase a government's institutional capacity, its actual effect may be precisely the opposite: the hand-out becomes not a spur to reform but a convenient substitute for it.

Reliance on domestic resources to pay for government outlays has advantages and disadvantages that are in effect the reverse of those sketched above. Self-reliance forces prime attention to national goals and to the

[26] This is related to a more basic difference in perception between rich donor and poor recipient. "The rationalizations of the developed world concerning the politics of the underdeveloped world tend to exaggerate as evils the importance of internal factors (racial, cultural, political). On the contrary, the rationalizations of the underdeveloped world tend toward overestimation of external factors (colonialism, imperialism)." Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "Internal and External Politics of Underdeveloped Countries", in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill., 1966), p. 148.

[27] As Fred Riggs has noted, external assistance is usually directed at bureaucratic rather than political institutions. "Administration is regarded as a technical matter (technics) subject to foreign 'expert' advice, whereas politics is so closely linked with fundamental values and social mores (techniques) that aid would be construed as 'intervention'." F. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View", in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 125-26.

capacity of existing institutions to meet them. It poses the need for reform as a current question and not a postponable one. It minimizes not only the more obvious manifestations of neo-colonialism but also the dependency complex that is perhaps the most subtly insidious of colonial legacies. On the other hand, increased taxation of a population living not far above subsistence level poses obvious political problems and the costs of administering an effective tax policy would likely consume much of the additional revenue the state manages to collect. Perhaps the most politically and administratively feasible method of tax collection is to charge high import and export duties. But efforts to reduce dependence on the world market and to build up a domestic market will probably reduce the importance of this relatively painless device. One of the issues that cannot then be postponed is how much peasants and urban workers are prepared to pay, directly out of pocket, for the cost of government.

The unhappy option facing many African countries is thus continued dependence on external aid, with the attendant risks of neo-colonialism or considerable unrest among a heavily taxed populace. Although external penetration of the bureaucracy enables that bureaucracy to penetrate its own society at reasonably low short-run cost to the people, it raises serious questions about the meaning of political independence when administrative dependence is so considerable. The alternative of minimizing external aid limits in many ways the capacity of bureaucracy to penetrate its own society and is likely to reduce popular support for regimes that extract an increasing proportion of development expenditure from domestic sources. Whether there are ways of avoiding both of these alternatives, and of dealing with some of the other problems discussed earlier, will concern us in the final portion of this essay.

The hazards of generalization — and the risks of pretentiousness — can only increase when one shifts from analysis to prescription. Still, there are in my opinion certain policies that African governments might consider adopting in order to improve the bureaucracy's economic performance. It is assumed here that the public sector will be the chief agent of development because of the weakness or foreign domination of the private sector and the tendency of large-scale private investment to widen the income gap between the economy's modern core and the residual sector. It is also assumed, however, that government is just as capable of distorting development as are private entrepreneurs and perhaps even more capable of inhibiting it altogether. The task for socialists is to be fully aware of bureaucratic distortions and to counter them where possible.

Salaries and perquisites for civil servants are a serious drain on an African country's finances; the higher they are the less likely it is that the regime can avoid the choice between external dependence and internal unrest. While for quite practical reasons salaries cannot be drastically reduced at one time, they can at least be held constant and the salary

scales of new recruits reduced somewhat. Austerity would have to be practised by the politicians as well, otherwise cynicism and deep resentment would pervade the bureaucracy. Considerable paring is needed in such areas as basic car allowances and subsidized house rent. Greater vigilance would be required against corruption, which could be expected to rise as the real income of bureaucrats declined.

An overworked government can actually increase its development capacity by sharing responsibilities with local government bodies and private firms. The weaknesses of African local government are well known, but it is difficult to envisage increased popular participation in decision-making without viable, representative local institutions. Technical and audit officials from the central government might be seconded to local council staffs; if carefully supervised, foreign aid might itself be directed more toward council staff training programmes. Grant-in-aid formulae should be devised that raise a council's incentive to tax its own people, thereby diverting popular demands and frustrations from the centre. As for the private sector, experiments are needed on joint public-private companies that supply agricultural equipment and consumer goods to the rural areas. The government would hold majority shares in these companies but would also harness the energies of private entrepreneurs.

The role conflicts described earlier cannot and probably should not be entirely resolved, but at least the bureaucrat's relationships with the public can be clarified. Instead of expecting a low-level official simultaneously to implement the national plan and to encourage local expression of felt needs, the government might first ask the official, in his capacity as a central agent, to explain national development priorities and outline the kind of assistance government would be prepared to give if the local people decided they wanted roads, or boreholes, or other amenities. The official would then "change hats", his task being to elicit from the people their own priorities, chosen in light of the government incentives previously outlined to them. Once local decisions had been made, the official would revert to his original role as a central agent responsible for administering central programmes and grants-in-aid. This phasing of different roles might cause less public confusion than if they were performed at the same time.

Communication problems and generational tensions within the bureaucracy cannot easily be alleviated, but certain changes might help. Feedback can be encouraged by insistence that low-level officials detail the obstacles to programme implementation that they face as well as their own accomplishments. The planners in the capital city could spend several days on the sites of rural projects that failed, talking with peasants and officials to find out what went wrong. The promotion prospects of young graduates entering the civil service could depend quite explicitly on their willingness to spend a certain amount of time in the rural areas. Schools, universities, and in-service training programmes can spread awareness of the multi-

faceted nature of rural development, thus encouraging co-ordinated effort across ministry lines.

But bureaucracy is too important a subject to be left to the bureaucrats. The political party is needed not only to check administrative abuses of power but also, ironically, to increase the effectiveness of the administration in economic development. Feedback on government programmes can flow upward through party channels, and a population mobilized by the party is to contribute the labour that will complement the government's capital, skills, and equipment. Political education on the necessity and virtues of self-reliance is needed to counter the loss of support for a regime that normally accompanies the imposition of higher taxes. A politician assigned as commissioner in a region or district can unleash his bargaining and cajoling talents on the bureaucracy, insisting on a degree of co-ordinated effort that no ministry would propose on its own initiative. The inevitable tensions between party and bureaucracy in Africa should not blind us to the potential each has for strengthening the other and that both have for a joint attack on poverty.

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