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Inclusive Green Growth and Shared Prosperity: Are they Basic Indictors for Tanzania to Attain an Upper Middle-Income Country? A Theoretical Review

Odass Bilame[*]

Abstract

This paper aims to show how inclusive green growth and shared prosperity could be sustained, and in a way enable Tanzania to achieve an upper middle-income country status. The big question in this regard is whether the kind of economic growth that Tanzania has been sustaining over the recent years, at least before the COVID-19 pandemic, has been associated with 'inclusive green growth' and with a 'shared prosperity' or otherwise. The main objective of this paper sought to shed light on the extent to which inclusive green growth and shared prosperity could be sustained and enable the country to attain an upper middle-income country status with traceable welfare effects for all Tanzanians. The methodology employed was a documentary review of various documents that address issues on inclusive green growth and shared prosperity. In particular, a review of publications by the World Bank occupied a central place. Key study results point out that the kind of growth agenda that Tanzania has pursued has neither addressed inclusive green growth nor shared prosperity. The development agenda has been addressing economic growth concerns at the expense of green growth concerns that acknowledge the role of natural capital growth and its important role in the welfare of future generations.

Keywords: *Tanzania, growth, middle income country, inclusive green growth, shared prosperity*

Introduction

The concept of 'inclusive green growth' acknowledges the trade-offs between growth, green, and inclusiveness; but stresses that in the overarching objective of social welfare there is room for synergies. Production growth that is environmentally and socially sustainable enhances the welfare most, as environmental degradation and increasing inequality reduce welfare (Economist, 2014). From a welfare-economics perspective, 'inclusive green growth' is nothing more than growth that improves the welfare of both current and future generations and that acknowledges the social costs and benefits (including environmental costs) of growth and its distributional implications in both the short- and the long-run (IPCC, 2014; Jetske & Ezra, 2015; Bilame, 2020). To this effect, the core meaning of the concept of 'inclusive green growth' can be simply stated as economic growth (growth of gross domestic product or GDP) that also achieves significant environmental protection and takes on board all major sectors of the economy that employ a large proportion of the active working population (Jetske & Ezra, 2015).

[*] University of Dodoma, Department of Economics: obilame@gmail.com

The questions of how sustainable growth could be stimulated, and how the benefits of growth should be divided between current and future generations are widely discussed in the economics literature, with many relevant lessons for inclusive green growth policy design (Sen, 1997; Jetske & Ezra, 2015). For example, the welfare theory points to the importance of well-functioning markets for welfare maximization, but also explains that for public good resources (including environmental goods and services), markets are less suitable, as property rights are difficult to assign and above all cannot be kept exclusive, which is a condition for a well-functioning market. For these types of goods, governments and other public bodies may allocate resources more efficiently if they manage to represent the interests of all stakeholders; and coordinate actions within, and between, stakeholder groups.

The main difference between 'growth' and 'green growth' is that the latter acknowledges the role of natural capital in growth and its important role in the welfare of future generations. As it has been noted, capital stocks are crucial for growth and development, and, for development to be sustainable, current generations should make sure that capital stocks are at least maintained (Dercon, 2012; Fitter, 2013).

Natural capital forms part of the capital stock of a country; so, the degradation of ecosystems, deforestation, and resource depletion reduces the welfare of future generations if resource rents are not reinvested in alternative capital stocks. When resource rents are reinvested in alternative capital stocks (e.g., human capital or other assets), future generations could inherit a similar amount of capital, and sustainable development would still be ensured (World Bank, 2013).

The shared prosperity goal of the World Bank Group is to increase per capita real household income or consumption of the bottom 40 percent of each country's population. Since the goal is country-specific, there is no explicit target set at the global level (World Bank, 2014). The tracking of shared prosperity can reinforce poverty reduction efforts in low- and lower-middle-income countries by bringing attention to those people not covered by social inclusion policies, but who might otherwise be left behind. Calculating progress in shared prosperity requires comparable income surveys for multiple years.

The main objective of this study is to shed light on inclusive green growth and shared prosperity, and assess the extent to which the two parameters are basic indicators for enabling Tanzania to attain an upper middle-income country status. Specifically, the study sought to assess the extent to which inclusive green growth and shared prosperity could accelerate the pace for Tanzania to attain the status of an upper middle-income country, and thus pose welfare effects to all Tanzanians. Also, this study sought to assess the extent to which growth and green growth are understood by the general public, and whether the compilation of the national income takes on board the aspect of green growth.

Methodological Issues

The methodology that was employed by this study was a documentary review of various documents that address issues on inclusive growth, inclusive green growth, and shared prosperity. In particular, a review of publications on Tanzania and elsewhere on the subject matter enriched materials for this paper. Most of the reviewed materials on inclusive green growth and shared prosperity emanated from the publications of the World Bank. Materials from all those publications were descriptively analysed with a view to shedding light on how Tanzania can attain inclusive green growth and shared prosperity and thus enable it to attain the status of an upper middle-income country.

Results from the Review

An Understanding of Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity

'Green growth' concerns the welfare of future generations, whereas 'inclusive green growth' is concerned with the welfare of current generations as well as an equitable distribution of welfare gains. It is important to note that there is a difference between equity and equality. Equity refers to initial conditions (e.g., all people are equal under the law), while equality refers to outcomes (everybody should earn the same). In the current neoliberal market ideology, the focus is mostly on equity, with equality being regarded as a political aim.

Piketty (2014) puts inequality back at the forefront of public and political debate. His empirical analyses indicate that income and wealth inequality reinforce each other, and result in a concentration of capital ownership in the hands of increasingly few. Furthermore, inequality may have repercussions for economic growth, because of unequal access to health care and schooling, resulting in skewed labour productivity. Indeed, recent literature suggests that economic growth rates tend to be higher in more equal countries, partly due to the impacts on education and health care (Ostry et al., 2014).

When addressing inclusive green growth, it is important to note that welfare gains are linked to the ownership of assets, such as capital and labour. The poor generally have fewer assets and are, thus, more exposed to the vagaries of life. Since most poor people lack access to insurance markets, they tend to choose low-risk economic activities, which most often are also characterized by low returns. Given their limited access to assets, the poor tend to benefit less from growth. This explains why interventions that aim to increase growth are not necessarily the same as interventions that are intended to alleviate poverty. Poverty alleviation requires attention to the distribution of rights and assets, while growth requires attention to the efficiency of resource use.

Since the poor may benefit from growth through employment, 'inclusive green growth' is often interpreted as the creation of jobs and employment (Ostrom, 1990). For the poorest of people, however, employment might not be an option, because they have only limited human capital: they are often uneducated and thus illiterate, or are sometimes not allowed to participate in labour markets at all, as may be the case for women in some parts of the world. Inclusiveness requires equal opportunities, which

implies that the interests of the marginalized are represented in decision-making, and that their rights are acknowledged and enforced. This calls for changes in the institutions that currently *exclude people, sectors, and countries from decision-making processes:* a process that seems to be slow and difficult (Jetske & Ezra, 2015; Piketty, 2014).

Again, many of the rules that make decision-making non-inclusive are informal and implicit (e.g., cultural convention), and they differ between countries and regions, making it difficult to reach a consensus about a fair distribution of assets and rights. Experiences with participatory and co-management approaches suggest that by opening up decision-making processes and supporting institution-building, conditions for inclusiveness can be created somewhat through good governance.

An issue of concern at this juncture is that 'green growth' is not automatically inclusive, and inclusive growth is not always green, and it is important to acknowledge that tensions between green growth and inclusiveness exist. The welfare of future generations may require limits to growth for the current generation, but without additional measures, this could especially impact the poor. Similarly, growth and inclusiveness do not necessarily go together, as distributional fairness often conflicts with efficient resource use. This has to be considered: that synergies between green growth and inclusiveness may not be possible and additional efforts are needed to balance trade-offs (Dercon, 2012).

Shared Prosperity

As mentioned earlier, calculating progress in shared prosperity requires comparable income surveys for multiple years. Another way to view the data on shared prosperity is to compare the performance of the bottom 40 percent with that of other parts of the income distribution (for example the top 60 percent of the population), or of the overall national performance. In addition to providing a means to compare the performance of shared prosperity across countries, this comparison also allows an assessment of the evolution of income inequality (Skoufias et al., 2014). For example, the bottom 40 percent in South Africa did better than average during the mid-1990s (suggesting not only that incomes at the bottom 40 grew, but also that there was some catching up). In contrast, by the 2000s income growth for the bottom 40 percent increase compared with the mid-1990s, but was significantly slower than average income growth; implying increased inequality (Marcio et al., 2015; Skoufias et al., 2014).

In what way do the characteristics of the bottom 40 percent of the population of a given country differ from those of the population as a whole (or the top 60 percent)? Shared prosperity is a relative concept, as income levels of the bottom 40 percent differ across countries. For example, the average household in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution in the United States would be among the richest 10 percent in Brazil (World Bank, 2014; Marcio et al., 2015). Similarly, the average household in the bottom 40 percent of Brazil's income distribution would be at approximately the 90th percentile of the income distribution in India. Both the average income and the

distribution of income within the bottom 40 percent vary greatly across countries. By contrast, in some of the upper middle-income countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia—for example, Chile and the Russian Federation—the large majority of individuals in the bottom 40 percent are in the group of the vulnerable: these are non-poor individuals with a high risk of falling back into poverty (Marcio et al., 2015). These observations highlight the great range of incomes and the different meanings that the bottom 40 percent constitute across the world.

Global Income and Wealth Inequality between Individuals and Countries

Two key common concepts are applied in measuring economic inequality at a country level: national income and national wealth. National income is the sum of all incomes received by individual residents in a given country over a year. Incomes take various forms and we typically distinguish two broad sources: incomes stemming from individuals' labour (e.g., wages or salaries); and incomes stemming from individuals' wealth (e.g., interest and dividends). National wealth is the sum of the value of all assets owned by individuals in a given country. It is stock resulting from capital accumulation (from savings, i.e., income that has not been consumed) and price effects (Chancel et al., 2022; Blanchard et al., 2021).

A straightforward way to describe the extent of global inequality is to focus on the shares of income captured by different groups of individuals in the distribution of income across the world. Chancel et al. (2022) presents statistics, as of 2021, that focus on the distribution of income or wealth across the global adult population of 5.1bn individuals, out of a world population of 7.8bn, when we include children. Thus, the statistics on income and wealth are equally split across married couples. The bottom 50% of the adult population, or the poorest half of the world population today, consists of 2.5bn individual adults. The middle 40% represents a population earning more than the bottom, 50% but less than the top 10%; and it is made up of 2bn individual adults (Table 1). The global top 10% represents one-tenth of the world population, i.e., 517m million individual adults. The global top 1% comprises the richest 51m individual adults. As can be deduced from Table 1, the global bottom 50% earns an average of 2,800 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP €) of income per adult per year. Income is measured after pension and employment benefits are received by individuals, before other taxes they pay and transfers they receive.

Table 1: The Distribution of the World National Income and Wealth, 2021: Purchasing Power Parity (PPP €)

	Average Annual Income per Adult	Income Threshold	Average Wealth per Adult	Wealth Threshold
Full population	16,700		72,900	
Bottom 50%	2,800		2,900	
Middle 40%	16,500	6,700	40,900	12,000
Top 10%	87,200	37,200	550,900	125,500
Top 1%	321,600	123,900	2,755,200	807,300
Top 0.1%	1,300, 800	446,000	14,133,400	3,333,700

Source: World Inequality Report Lab., 2022

Global income and wealth inequality between individuals have two components: inequality between countries and regions (i.e., average income differences between, say, Tanzanians and Germans); and inequality within countries (i.e., income differences between, say, rich and poor Tanzanians). It should be noted at this juncture that in the contemporary global economy, these two components of inequality are very substantial. Inequality within countries is at a historic high today, and inequality between countries remains particularly high despite the emerging world catching up somewhat over the past four decades (Blanchet et al., 2021).

The degree of inequality between world regions can best be presented by average incomes across world regions, expressed as a percentage of the global average income of €16,700 per year. In 2021, the average income in Sub-Saharan Africa was 0.3: i.e., 31% of the global average; while in South and Southeast Asia it was 0.5: i.e., 50% of the global average (Chancel et al. 2022). Latin America, East Asia, Russia, and Central Asia had an average income at or near the global average. In Europe, the ratio was more than twice the global average (215%), and in North America it was three times the global average (ibid.). This means that, on average, North Americans earn 6–10 times more than Sub-Saharan Africans, South and Southeast Asians; while East Asians earn half of what Europeans earn. Again, recall that these incomes are all expressed in Purchasing Power Parity, and not market exchange rates.

Table 2: Average Income and Wealth Across World Region, 2021

	Average Income Across World Regions (in percentage)	**Average Wealth Across World Regions (in percentage)**
Sub-Saharan Africa	31	17
South and South East Asia	50	40
Latin America	82	51
Russia and Central Asia	104	54
MENA	112	54
East Asia	117	142
Europe	215	230
North America	315	390

Source: World Inequality Report Lab. 2022

Turning to wealth inequalities between world regions, it appears that wealth disparities between rich and poor regions are greater than income disparities (Table 2). Poor regions are relatively poorer in terms of wealth: Sub-Saharan Africans, South and Southeast Asians and Latin Americans own just 20–50% of the global average (compared with 50%–100% for income) as shown in Table 2. It should be noted that for a given amount of capital, poor regions generate relatively more income than richer ones. It is sometimes argued that poor countries are poor because they use their capital resources inefficiently. This is incorrect: poor countries are relatively efficient in their use of capital, but have very little capital to start with (Alvaredo et al., 2018).

As can be deduced from Tables 1 and 2, richer countries and regions demonstrate economic growth that is associated with inclusivity and prosperity as indicated by the average incomes across world regions, expressed as a percentage of the global average income. The average income in Sub-Saharan Africa is 31% of the global average, which is the lowest of all regions. With respect to average wealth, the scenario is not good either for Sub-Saharan Africa: it ranks last with an average of 17%, lower than the average income. Tanzania falls under this category, and consequently, any economic growth initiatives should try to address the issues of inequalities among Tanzanians.

Inclusive Green Growth and Shared Prosperity: Where does Tanzania Stand?

Tanzania's Long-Term-Perspective Plan (LTPP) is an important vehicle for implementing the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (TDV 2025), which emphasizes the country's cherished goal of becoming a prosperous nation by attaining high economic growth through industrialization, and thereby eradicating poverty (URT, 2012; Bilame, 2017). Thus, Tanzania's LLTPP seeks to achieve economic growth that will enable Tanzania to attain a higher middle-income country (MIC) status by 2025.[1]

The path to realizing TDV 2025 targets is to be facilitated by opportunity-based planning implemented through a series of three five-year development plans, building on each other and making use of Tanzania's opportunities, and addressing the challenges. The socio-economic transformation is planned to be addressed through three strategic five-year development plans (FYDPs) (URT 2012): the First FYDP (2010–2015): *Unleashing the Growth Potential*; the Second FYDP (2015–2020): *Nurturing an Industrial Economy*; and the Third FYDP (2020/21–2025/26): *Realizing Competitiveness and Industrialization for Human Development*. The linkages between the three plans are crucial, with a view to attaining middle-income country status.

As of now, Tanzania is implementing the Third FYDP (2020/21–2025/26) with a broad-based strategic plan for *realizing competitiveness and industrialization for human development*. However, the three plans: the first, second, and third FYDPs are almost silent on 'inclusive green growth': the emphasis in all the documents is on the socio-economic transformation of Tanzania's economy that is spearheaded by a vibrant industrial sector.

In fact, issues of inclusiveness of green economic growth, along with sharing prosperity emanating from such inclusive economic growth, are not at all addressed by the documents. The question of concern is: *what if socioeconomic transformation is achieved at an expense of non-inclusive green growth and non-shared prosperity?*

[1]It should be noted at this juncture that on the 1st of July 2020 Tanzania was ranked by the World Bank as one among low middle income countries. To that effect, Tanzania should strive to attain a higher middle-income country (MIC) status by 2025.

Exploring the answer to this question implies nothing more than seeking for an economic growth that does not improve the welfare of both current and future generations. An economic growth that does not acknowledge the social costs and benefits (including environmental costs) of growth and its distributional implications in both the short- and the long-run cannot attain inclusive green growth and shared prosperity. Further to that, since it is not inclusive and green in nature, the core meaning of the concept of 'non-inclusive green growth' can be simply stated as economic growth that does not achieve significant environmental protection, and does not take on board all the major sectors of the economy.

Inclusive Green Growth and Shared Prosperity: What Should be Done for Tanzania to Achieved an Upper Middle-income Country Status?

As for Tanzania, what needs to be done to achieve the status of an upper middle-income country with noticeable inclusive green growth and shared prosperity calls for each and every Tanzanian to work hard, while taking into account all issues related to green growth. The government will have to play a leading role by creating awareness of what is meant by inclusive green growth and shared prosperity. To achieve and sustain inclusive green growth and shared prosperity, key issues that include—but are not limited to—the following will have to be put in place.

- *Accelerated economic growth, driven by greener industrial growth*

Indeed, a vibrant industrial sector is highly called for if Tanzania is to attain inclusive green growth and shared prosperity. A key issue in this regard is that any industrial policy will have to be reviewed to accommodate issues on green growth. Indeed, policies dealing with industrialization should be reviewed with a view to including issues on inclusive green growth and shared prosperity.

- *Economic growth that accounts for resource degradation/exploitation*

A country's economic bookkeeping consists of income and capital accounts. While income accounts produce the Gross National Product (GNP) figure, capital accounts track changes in wealth. For instance, as timber factories, textile mills, office buildings, and other artifacts become old and fall into disrepair, subtraction is made from the capital accounts to reflect their depreciation in value (Ekins, 2000). However, no similar subtraction is made for the deterioration of forests, soils, air quality, and other natural endowments. When trees are cut and sold as timbers, the revenue from such sales is counted as income and reflected in the GNP. Surprisingly, no deduction is made for the deterioration of the forest's destruction of a natural resource (asset). By not making a deduction of the costs imposed on the destruction of the natural resource (forest), this inflates the national income and wealth. A country with such inflated levels of GNP will be considered better-off than it really is; and will automatically be ranked higher on the economic performance scale (Davidson, 2000; Karpagam, 2001).

Failure to account properly for the destruction of natural resources that occurs in the process of national income-generation makes the GNP unrealistic. Under such

a scenario, where there are omissions of environmental destruction in the calculation of national income, this makes a country ecologically bankrupt even if its GNP may unrealistically be rising. The rising GNP of a country that is associated with environmental destruction can neither be termed *green growth* nor *inclusive growth*.

Competing demands for, and open access to, many of Tanzania's natural resources are causing the degradation of resources, and are limiting their ability to continue to provide goods and services. Demand for water is increasing faster than the available supply, with conflicts over water sources becoming increasingly common as a result. Tanzania's renewable per capita freshwater resources have declined from more than 3,000m^3 in the nineties, to around 1,600m^3 in 2014, which is less than 1,700m^3 per capita, the threshold below which a country is considered water-stressed by the United Nations (World Bank, 2017b). Poor land use and watershed management practices have led to the degradation of forests and watercourses, threatening the very natural resource base upon which Tanzania's economy and the poor depend on. Deforestation rates are among the highest in the world, with an estimated annual net loss of 483,859ha over the period 2002–2013 (URT, 2017). Tables 1 and 2 provide evidence for this assertion. The country's unique wildlife assets have experienced an unprecedented crisis due to poaching, overcrowding, and the associated degradation of biodiversity. Overfishing and uncontrolled small-scale fishing are threatening the sustainability of fisheries, the resource base that many poor fishing communities depend on for their livelihoods.

Table 3: Annual Net Loss of Forest Area in East Africa

Country	Forest Area ('000ha)		Average Annual Change Rate (%)		
	1990	*2015*	*1990–2000*	*2000–2010*	*2010–2015*
Kenya	4,724	4,413	-2.8	1.7	0.9
Malawi	3,896	3,147	-0.9	-0.1	-0.6
Mozambique	43,378	3,7940	-0.6	-0.6	-0.5
Tanzania	55,920	46,060	-0.7	-0.7	-0.8
Uganda	4,751	2,077	-2.0	-3.3	-5.5

Source: World Bank, 2019

Table 4: Annual Net Loss of Forest Area: Top Countries in the World Annual Forest Area Net Loss (2010–2015)

Country	Area ('000 ha)	Rate (%)
Brazil	984	0.2
Indonesia	684	0.7
Myanmar	546	1.8
Nigeria	410	5.0
Tanzania	372	0.8
Paraguay	325	2.0
Zimbabwe	312	2.1

Source: World Bank, 2019

The data that are shown in Tables 3 and 4 are just the tip of the iceberg. The situation on the ground has changed significantly since the data provided by the World Bank (2019) are older than seven years. All the same, the message is clear: that the rate of deforestation is alarming, and concerted efforts are called for with a view to addressing this challenge.

Based on the above discussion and data provided in Tables 3 and 4, along with data presented in Figure 1, one may ask some questions that call for serious thinking. Does Tanzania's economic growth reflect green growth? Is the economic growth inclusive? Does economic growth reflect shared prosperity? If the answers to these questions are negative, what should be done for Tanzania to attain inclusive green growth with shared prosperity? Can Tanzania attain an upper middle-income country status without inclusive growth and shared prosperity?



Figure 1: Trends of Various Land Cover in Tanzania, 1990–2010

Source: URT (2012a)

For Tanzania to attain an upper middle-income country status it needs an accelerated economic growth. However, for this growth to be sustainable, it should be a greener economic growth. A greener economic growth is likely to be inclusive since it takes into account the benefits of the present and future generations. Also, in a way, a greener economic growth is more likely to bring shared prosperity if the national cake is distributed equally. To this end, inclusive green economic growth takes into account environmental/natural resources destruction in the calculation of the national income with a view to avoiding ecological/biodiversity bankruptcy. It is possible for Tanzania to attain the status of an upper middle-income country without inclusive green growth and shared prosperity. However, such growth is likely to be attained at the expense of the

destruction of the environment/natural resources, for which no deduction of the cost to the environment is made. If the deduction of the cost imposed on the environment is not made, the upper middle-income country status that would be attained might not be realistic because it is likely to be overstated. To that effect, what is called for to attain a middle-income country status is for Tanzania to sustain an accelerated inclusive greener economic growth that takes into account a deduction of the cost imposed on the environment.

Conclusion

This paper has shed light on issues of inclusive green growth and shared prosperity, and whether the two parameters are prerequisites for Tanzania to attain the status of an upper middle-income country. Inclusive green growth is nothing more than growth that improves the welfare of both current and future generations, and which acknowledges the social costs and benefits of growth and its distributional implications in both the short- and the long-run. Shared prosperity requires well-being to be shared across individuals over time. It recognizes that the pursuit of well-being among the most vulnerable in the society is a key development objective.

It is possible for Tanzania to attain the status of an upper middle-income country without inclusive green growth and shared prosperity. Nevertheless, such growth is likely to be attained at the expense of environmental/natural resource destruction, for which no deduction of the cost to the natural resources is accounted. Tanzania should strive to attain the status of an upper middle-income country with inclusive greener growth that reflects shared prosperity.

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