The Government's Interventions and Anti-famine Campaigns and Kalyongo Movement in Singida Region (1962-1985)

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Abstract

This article examines the food policy and measures adopted by the government of Tanzania to enhance food security using the cassava crop in the post-colonial period in Singida District. The study uses archival materials extracted from the Tanzania National Archives from Dar es Salaam and Dodoma centres. It also uses information such as food policy, circulars, instructions and measures from Agriculture files found in the Singida Region's library. It also employs the data obtained through interviews from small-scale farmers and the general population as victims of food insecurity in the district. Secondary data are used for literature review. The paper uses political economy and social constructionism as guiding theories in analysing the state of food security in Singida District from 1962 to 1985. The paper shows that small-scale farmers were not passive in taking Government's orders for enhancing food security. In case of absence of modern food processing technologies and storage knowledge, small-scale farmers continued to rely on their long time-tested local knowledge of processing and storing foodstuffs to enhance their food security. However, the Government introduced modern knowledge and skills of processing cassava for food with the assumption that modern technologies and skills

were better than local ones. Despite the provision of modern education on processing cassava for food, the people of Singida District continued to blend both local and modern technologies on processing cassava for food in enhancing food security in the stated period.

Key Words: The Government's Interventions, Anti-famine Campaigns, Kalyongo Movement, Food Security, Singida District

1.0 Background

In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, sporadic famines and widespread food shortages occurred in different parts of the world.[102] Tanzania, like other African countries, faced severe famines in 1962/63, 1974/75, 1983/84 and numerous seasonal sporadic food shortages in the 1990s and 2000s due to precarious weather and low production among small-scale farmers. It adopted policies and measures to promote drought resistant crops as insulators of food insecurity as well as importation of foodstuffs from abroad.[103] Singida District, like in other districts in Tanzania which were prone to food insecurity in the post-colonial period,

[102]H. G. Bohle, et.al., (eds.), *Famine and Food Security in Africa and Asia: Indigenous Response and External Intervention to Avoid Hunger* (Bayreuth, Publisher, 1991). See also L. Bondestam, et. al., (eds.), *Hunger and Society, Vol. 2 (*New York: Ithaka, 1988) and G. Borgstrom, *The Hungry Planet: The Modern World at the Edge of Famine (*London: MacMillan, 1965).

[103]J. Boesen, K. J. Havnevik, J. Koponen and Rie Odgaard, (eds.), *Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival*, (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986). See also Gerald T. Runyoro, "Globalization and Food Security," in Tanzania in L. Msambichaka, N. E. Mwamba and O. J. Mashindano, (eds.*). Globalization and Challenges for Development in Tanzania*, (Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press, 2006), p. 380.

the government encouraged small-scale farmers to adopt new agricultural technologies such as the use of hybrid seeds, the use of fertilizers and better storage methods to enhance food security. However, small-scale farmers opposed the most significant measure to enhance food security, the use of cassava as a drought resistant crop in the District. This article uses the cassava crop in Singida District as a case study in an attempt to locate the position and reactions of small-scale farmers to the post-colonial government's food policy and measures amidst the interplay of domestic and foreign forces in enhancing food security in Tanzania at large.

2.0 Theoretical Framework

The global discussion on policies and measures to enhance food security has changed with the passage of time. It has been influenced by changing perceptions on food insecurity, the analyses of the underlying causes and the resulting policy approaches and objectives. Also, the reactions of small-scale farmers who are frequent victims of food insecurity to the policies and measures to enhance food security varied from time to time creating an impact on the historiography of food security.[104]

In this discussion, the response of small-scale farmers to policies and measures on enhancing food security has been contested among scholars. However, there are two dominant trends in scholarship on the issue. The first one is a political

[104]Gabriele Geier, *Food Security Policy in Africa between Disaster Relief and Structural Adjustment: Reflections on the Conception and Effectiveness of Policies: The Case of Tanzania*, (London: Franc Cass, 1995), p. 151.

economy approach[105] which perceives small-scale farmers in Africa as captured by capitalism and, therefore, victims of colonialism as manifested in food insecurity. The integration of small-scale farmers into the global food trade has incapacitated their coping strategies and exposed them to the use of imported food to rescue them from either famines or food shortages. Scholars[106] expose the historical-dialectical relationship in food trade between developed industrialized countries and developing countries as unfair. In the period from the 1960s to 1980s, the food relief issued by developed countries (as food donors) to developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America as emergency aid was motivated by political and economic interests which were related to exports, investments and the exploitation of raw materials. Food donors used food aid in form of grains and milk powder for providing a relief to victims of famines. Food aid for relief became a threat to the development of agriculture in developing countries as they created dependence among recipient countries mostly small-scale farmers.[107] For example, in the 1970s, the amount of imported foodstuffs from developed countries to Sub-Saharan

[105]Stephen Walter Orvis, *The Agrarian Question in Kenya,* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1997). See also Collin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

[106]Vilho Harle, (ed.), *The Political Economy of Food,* (Westmead: Saxon House, 1978). In this book various Political Economy scholars are Helena Tuomi, "Food Import and Neo-Colonialism," Peter Wallensteen, "Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food," Mervi Gustafsson, "The Development of International Food Aid", Lars Bondestam, "The Politics of Food of the Periphery" and Vilho Harle, "Three Dimensions of the World Food Problem" are best articles in articulating food insecurity in developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s.

[107]Edward Clay and Olav Stokke, (eds.), *Food Aid Reconsidered: Assessing the Impact on Third World Countries, (*London: Franc Cass, 1991).

African countries increased significantly. The table below shows that volume of imported food aid.

Table 1: Total world Cereal Food Aid Shipments and Cereal Food Aid shipments to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970/71-1989/90 (in Thousand Tons).

Year	Total world Cereals Food Aid	Cereal Food Aid to SSA	Cereals Food Aid to SSA as % of World Output
1970/71	12,357	545	4.4
1971/2	12,513	466	3.7
1972/3	9,964	461	4.6
1973/4	5,819	1,181	20.3
1974/5	8,399	936	11.1
1975/6	6,844	747	10.9
1976/7	9,042	860	9.5
1977/8	9,211	1,282	13.9
1978/9	9,500	1,171	12.3
1978/80	8,887	1,602	18.0
1980/1	8,942	2,399	26.8
1981/2	9,140	2,402	26.3
1982/3	9,238	2,545	27.5
1983/4	9,849	2,750	27.9
1984/5	12,511	4,992	39.9
1985/6	10,949	3,879	35.4
1986/7	12,579	3,307	26.3
1987/8	13,167	3,706	28.1
1988/9	9,757	Na	Na
1989/90	8,400	Na	Na

Source: FAO, Food Aid figures as adopted by Edward Clay and Olav Stokke, (eds.), *Food Aid Reconsidered: Assessing the*

*Impact on Third World Countries, (*London: Franc Cass, 1991), p. 12.

Sub-Saharan African countries paid the price of the aid as sovereign debts rose. The food donors perceived that neither governments of the developing countries nor small-scale farmers do not have their own effective means of coping with food insecurity. In the 1960s and 1970s, food aid and trade was attached to economic and ideological ties of the developed countries.[108] In the period, the food aid from developed countries helped to ease famine pangs in Ethiopia, the Sudan, Somalia, India and Chile.[109] As food aid fell short of needs and became tied to Cold War tensions during periods of drought in the 1980s, African countries imported more food from the industrialized countries to feed their hungry people. For example, from 1970/71 to 1987/88, Tanzania imported 1,902,000 tonnes of maize; 677,000 tonnes of rice and 782,000 tonnes of wheat. In the same period, it received 570,000 tonnes of maize, 353,000 tonnes of rice and 520,000 tonnes of wheat as food aid relief.[110] During the severe famine of 1973/74, poor people in Tanzania could not buy food at the market value. As a result, the Price Commission fixed food prices so that low-income people could buy food as well as subsidized the imported food and distributed some of it free to famine victims. However, as

[108]C. Bishop and D. Hilhorst, "From Food Aid to Food Security: The Case of the Safety Net Policy in Ethiopia: Disaster Studies," in Journal of Modern African Studies, 48, 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 185.
[109]L. Bondestam, "The Politics of Food on the Periphery," in V. Harle, (ed.), *Op. cit.*, p. 214.
[110]The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, *Marketing Development Bureau*, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1990), p.18.

the volume of imported food increased, it enlarged national debts. Furthermore, the domestic food self-sufficiency campaigns of the 1970s and 1980s did not succeed in eradicating food insecurity due to difficulties in transferring agricultural technology from the industrialized to the African countries and Cold War politics as well as local obstacles within individual countries. This failure led to growing food dependency in Africa in the 1980s.

The second trend in scholarship focuses on local agency theory which argues that small-scale farmers are not passive takers of government orders and subjects of global food trade and food aid from the World Food Programme and other food sources.[111] In the 1980s, scholars began to look at how small-scale farmers built their own capacities for enhancing food security and developed coping strategies in Africa. They also studied the response of small-scale farmers to the policies and measures for enhancing food security. In this regard, D. M. Anderson and D. H. Johnson challenged other Western historians, politicians and development experts, who in the post-colonial period continued to perceive food insecurity and other problems in a stereotypical fashion. For example, some scholars portrayed the Ethiopian small-scale farmers of the 1970s as "the conservative cultivator who over-farms his exhausted land, the reckless stock keeper who increases his stock unmindful of the consequences

[111]D. Rahmato, Peasant Survival Strategies in Ethiopia: Disasters, (Addis Ababa: Institute of Development Research, University of Addis Ababa, 1988)), p. 327. Scholars who support local agency are Juhani Koponen, James L. Giblin, Isaria N. Kimambo and others. Their ideas are found most in G. Maddox, J. Giblin and I. N. Kimambo, (eds.), *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*, (London: James Currey, 1996).

to the environment, …, the deplorable lack of understanding of true economic forces by indigenous governments and their callous indifference to the sufferings of their people."[112] This stereotypical perception continued to prevail in Africa throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

This western perception overlooked the ability of small-scale farmers in Africa to initiate efforts as well as their responses to the policies and measures in enhancing food security. Arguing based on local agency, I. N. Kimambo, shows that nationalist and Marxist historians of Tanzania were understandably preoccupied with the first quarter of the century of the country's post-colonial history, focusing on the impact of imperialism and capitalism on East Africa, while overlooking the initiatives taken by rural societies to transform themselves.[113] He emphasized examining local initiative taken by Africans in addressing their problems such as food security, diseases and environmental changes. African small-scale farmers were able to enhance food security using local strategies and food processing practices before they started relying on external sources of food during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Because of the continued colonial legacy, the tendency to regard post-colonial governments and

[112]D. H. Johnson and D. M. Anderson, (eds.), *The Ecology of Survival Case Studies from Northeast African History*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).

[113]J. Giblin and G. Maddox, "Environmental History and the Scholarly and Popular understanding of the Tanzanian Past" in G. Maddox, J. Giblin and I. N. Kimambo, (eds.), *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*, (London: James Currey, 1996), p.1. See also J. L. Giblin, The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840 – 1940, (Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press, 1992).

international agencies as managers of food crises prevailed in Africa. D. M. Anderson and D. H. Johnson challenged post-colonial Eurocentric views. They wrote "These Western stereotypical images ignored Africans' understanding of their ecological resources and their experiences in coping with famines."[114] The images distort the reality of the long history of people surviving famines in Ethiopia and elsewhere, using their local strategies.[115] As a result, there was a need for conducting more studies on how African small-scale farmers managed to enhance food security using their different ecological niches to build reciprocal relations and patronage for surviving famine and sporadic food shortages.

Local agency in dealing with food insecurity has examined the interaction between local people's historical innovations in coping strategies, practical experiences and ability to innovate food processing practices in enhancing food security in their local environment. This study using local agency demonstrate that small-scale farmers in Singida district actively involved in resisting the post-colonial agricultural policy and measures, which ignored local technology of processing cassava as food and, thus, enhancing food security. There was a continuation of colonial protests organized by small-scale farmers against government policy and measures which did not recognize local experiences and tested accumulated knowledge, practices and skills in handling food insecurity in the post-colonial period. The responses to the colonial policy and measures on

[114] D. H. Johnson and D. M. Anderson, *Loc. cit.,* p.1.
[115] *Ibid.*

enhancing food security ranged from resentments, complaints, protests, demonstrations, refusal and boycotts in implementing anti-famine measures such as cultivation of cassava, sweet potatoes, destocking, adoption of modern seeds and cultivation skills which seemed to ignore local experiences in coping with food insecurity in Singida and Tanzania at large. For example, throughout the 1950s, Luguru small-scale farmers in Matombo near Morogoro organized demonstrations and riots against the soil conservation scheme introduced in 1947. They said, "We don't want terraces, give us back our old ways."[116] These responses led to clashes between the small-scale farmers and the colonial government.

From the above discussion, it is evident that during the colonial period, colonial governments gave upper hand to interventions in form of agricultural policies and coping strategies than local knowledge and experiences of enhancing food security. As a result, small-scale farmers resisted colonial and post-colonial governments' policies in enhancing food security as they overlooked local experiences and long-time tested knowledge of enhancing food security. It is worth noting that small-scale farmers in Singida did not reject every policy and measures in enhancing food security. They preserved some of their local coping strategies which fostered food security such as food processing skills and practices, cattle and grain loaning systems while adopting new ones like entering the market economy as

[116]P. A. Maack, "We Don't Want Terraces, "A Protest and Identity under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme" in G. Maddox, J. Giblin and I. N. Kimambo, (eds.), *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania*, (London: James Currey, 1996), p. 152.

migrant labourers and growing cotton, groundnuts and castor oil seeds. Thus, this article uses two theories, political economy and local agency theory to guide analysis of the problem. The first theory complements the second. While the political economy theory guides the study in analysing historical-dialectical relations between independent African countries and developed countries in the global food trade, the local agency theory guides us in explaining how small-scale farmers are active in enhancing food security using their local knowledge, skills and practices and the logic of resisting some government's food and measures of enhancing food security in citing Singida District as a case study in developing countries like Tanzania.

3.0 Historical Trends of Struggles for Enhancing Food Security in Singida District

Singida District, with relatively low levels of rain ranging between 500mm and 800mm per annum and dominant sandy soils with a few areas with volcanic and loamy soils, has sporadically suffered from food insecurity during the post–colonial period. Since the colonial period, governments have formulated various policies and taken various measures to enhance food security. One of the policies was to encourage small-scale farmers to grow early maturing grain crops and root crops. One of the root crops which the post-colonial government emphasized that small-scale farmers should grow as insurance against famines was cassava. The other root crop was sweet potatoes. Agricultural records show that cassava (*manioc*) originated in South America. It was introduced in coastal Tanganyika by the Portuguese in the 17th century. Arab

traders spread it in the mainland since the 18th century through long distance trade caravans. Up to the 20th century, the crop was widely grown all over Tanganyika. It was considered to be the best insurance against famine during drought years.[117] Agricultural records continue to document that "cassava has locust resistant characteristics and may be left in store in the ground until required. In the past, it was planted under compulsion and was for many years most unpopular on that account with the cultivator and still it is grown in areas where maize thrives. As soon as legislation was relaxed, the growing of the crops ceased in many years but it was found that it formed the most useful foodstuff when rains failed and it has been taken on a voluntary basis. In the Colonial Southern and Western Provinces, "the crop formed a useful cash crop and thousands of tons of flour were shipped annually to Europe, as a substitute for barley in the pig and cattle rearing industry. Where protein-rich food such as legumes or fish is readily available, it can form the main starchy food. Dieticians maintain that cassava is the cause of much malnutrition amongst users. This is the case where the protein level is very low. Without it, there would have been many serious famines in the past during the years of drought."[118] Despite cassava's low level of protein, it remained one of the most reliable root crops in saving people from persistent localized food shortages during occasional famines occurring in Singida District and other parts of post-colonial Tanzania.

[117]TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida 1958-1982.
[118]*Ibid.*

Since the colonial period, colonial governments formulated various policies and took various measures to enhance food security in Singida District, Central Province of Tanganyika at large. In the 1910s, the Germans introduced new varieties of seeds of groundnuts and maize. They also bought millet and sorghum from Singida for feeding migrant workers in plantations and mines as well as workers in public works. Whenever a shortage of food occurred in Singida District, the German colonial government let local survival strategies prevail and imported wheat for the German community as well as rice and wheat for the Arab and Indian communities.[119] The British colonial rule made two bold attempts to address food insecurity in Singida District. The first was the decision of the Agriculture Department to develop acclimatization scheme in the district. In 1929, an agricultural school was established at Durumo village in Iramba experimenting the production of wheat, beans and new varieties of millet, maize and sorghum. The aim was to acclimatize these varieties of crops in semi-dry areas in Singida District which by then composed of Singida and Iramba divisions.[120] Throughout the 1930s, the acclimatization scheme went on with some success in maize, sorghum, millet, onions, beans, sugar cane, tomatoes and pawpaw trees.[121] However, the production of wheat and coffee was negligible due to unfavourable climate for the crop. The second bold measure was the development of irrigation schemes in the 1940s and

[119]German Annual Records, 1903-04.
[120]TNA, Tanganyika Territory, Singida District Annual Report for the Year 1929, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1930).
[121]Interview with Augustino Muna, 77 years, retired Agricultural Officer, at Mtinko village on 9th June 2003.

1950s through developing dams and haffirs in the district. However, as there were few wet areas and seasonal rivers the scheme was only successful in Mang'onyi, Wembere, Iambi, Itamuka, Ng'anguli, Urughu and Iguguno villages.[122] The two attempts went hand in hand with the introduction of root crops, new varieties of maize, millet, vegetables as well as sweet potatoes in wetlands and cassava in semi-dry areas. The two crops, namely, sweet potatoes and cassava were regarded as insulators against famines in the district.[123]

The post-colonial government in Tanzania continued with some colonial inherited strategies and methods of enhancing food security. Singida District too continued to use cassava and sweet potatoes with some improvement from what the colonial state left over. However, the debate on the strategies and methods of enhancing food security in rural areas falls into three historical trends. The first trend is the colonial intervention based on the assumption that small-scale farmers were incapable of innovating strategies of enhancing food security. They believed that African societies were self-enclosed, isolated, eating homogenous foodstuffs and lived in simple and small scale communities.[124] They were paddling between harsh climate that made food security impossible and lack of reliable strategies for surviving food insecurity. During

[122]TNA, Tanganyika Territory, Singida District Annual Report for the Year 1930s, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1930s). This was reported throughout the 1930s.
[123]Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Wildlife, Agriculture Division Singida Region, Ref No. A/MR/SR, Report on Development of Agriculture in Singida Region for December 1974.
[124]G. Maddox, J. L. Giblin and I. N. Kimambo, (eds.), *Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania,* (Dar es Salaam: Muki na Nyota, 1992), p. 2.

the late 1950s the colonial state introduced cookery, domestic science and nutrition studies for Africans in an effort to instill western hygienic knowledge, varieties of foodstuffs and food processing technologies in Tanganyika.

However, studies reveal that colonial society was not passive in taking colonial anti-famine orders without questioning their premises and rationale. People challenged the colonial methods of enhancing food security and soil conservation. For example, in 1955, an estimated 4,000 Waluguru inhabitants of the Uluguru Mountains of Morogoro District in Tanzania were called by their native chiefs and British rulers at Matombo area to discuss the growing resentment of the Waluguru with soil conservation measures introduced in 1947. They rioted by insulting their leaders and throwing stones and sticks to their leaders. The Uluguru Land Usage Scheme was initiated in 1947 to address depletion in soil fertility, deforestation and overpopulation. The Scheme was a part of wide colonial programme to address soil erosion in Tanganyika. Other programmes were located in Mbulu, Usukuma, Kondoa and Usambara. The Waluguru resisted the efforts to combat soil erosion because they believed they derived few benefits from their labour.[125] Their complaints against the scheme echoed their wider struggles against the growing impoverishment and domination of their society and united them in a common

[125]P. A. Maack, 'We Don't Want Terraces!' Protest and Identity under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme in G. Maddox, J. L. Giblin and I. N. Kimambo, (eds.), *Custodians of Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania,* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 1992), p. 133.

purpose.[126] Defiance, boycotts, strikes and resentments occurred in other societies such as the Iraqw against the Mbulu Land Scheme and the Sukuma who opposed the Sukuma Land Scheme. The two societies opposed cattle dipping. The spirit did not end in the colonial period, it continued after independence as small-scale farmers opposed policies that seemed to ignore or underestimate their local experiences, practices and strategies in addressing food insecurity and controlling environmental resources.

The second trend was the post-colonial period which was dominated by dependency theory. Helena Tuomi writes that under the colonial system food-grain included–had flowed from the colonies to Europe while the collapse of colonialism generally meant the end of food exports and the beginning of food importation to the former colonies."[127] Neo-colonial relations increased food the dependence of developing countries on imported food from the developed agricultural economies. Most African countries relied on importing foodstuffs from abroad to offset domestic deficits in an effort to feed their famine-stricken people in the 1960s and 1970s. It was during this period. Tanzania increased its dependence on imported maize, wheat and rice. For example, Tanzania purchased 1,051,010 tons of maize, 199,564 tons of rice and 261,131 tons of wheat from local sources between 1976 and 1985. It also imported 1,049,233 tons of maize, 420,363 tons of rice

[126]Ibid., p.153.
[127]Helena Tuomi, "Food Import and Neo-Colonialism, in Vilho Harle, (ed.), *The Political Economy of Food*, (Westmead: Saxon House, 1978), p. 136.

and 359,554 tons of wheat in the same period to offset domestic shortage.[128]

Most of the grains-maize, rice and wheat- were locally purchased by the National Milling Corporation (NMC) from small-scale farmers in regions with surplus harvests in Ruvuma, Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa and Arusha.[129] However, the production of wheat was done by the National Food Corporation (NAFCO) in its plantations at Basotu in Hanang' District in Arusha Region. Small-scale and commercial rice production took place in Mbeya, Iringa, Rukwa and Arusha Regions. Local production of rice and wheat fell far short of meeting local needs in the 1970s. Food shortages in the 1970s were due to a combination of world systemic agricultural and food trade regime worsened by catastrophes such as droughts and floods which African countries failed to respond to them accordingly. Africa experienced food problems ranging from localized food shortages to sporadic famines.

In post-colonial period, African governments embarked on different policies and strategies to enhance the food security. Tanzania launched *Siasa ni Kilimo* (Politics is agriculture) in 1972.[130] The government invested in the mechanization of agriculture in rural areas to boost productivity in an effort to reduce the importation of food. Ghana, in 1972, launched the

[128]The United Republic of Tanzania, *Tume Ya Mipango, Hali ya Uchumi wa Taifa katika 1976/77-1984/85*, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1985), Table G.26.
[129]The United Republic of Tanzania, *The Planning Commission, The State of Economy in1976/77-84/85*, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1985).
[130]J. Boesen, K. J. Havnevik, J. Koponen and R. Odhaard, (eds.), *Op. cit.*

Operation Feed Yourself while Nigeria launched Operation Feed the Nation in 1976 to overcome the importation of food from North America and Western Europe.[131] J. I. Dibua argues that the Operation Feed the Nation of 1976–1980 in Nigeria sought to boost local food production of maize and sorghum- in order to reduce food imports. Small-scale farmers were encouraged to cultivate any available plot of land.[132] However, in the 1980s many of such operations in African countries failed to enhance food security because they faced economic problems such as growing balance of payment deficit, lack of funds to invest in agriculture, growing foreign debts and poor weather that reduced the capacities of African states to maintain food security.[133]

While African countries tried to address food insecurity using local recourses, developed countries like the USA used the power of food to promote their economic and military interests in the world. In 1974, American Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz stated that food was a weapon as a reaction to OPEC which used oil as a political weapon in the Yom Kippur War. The USA discussed the possibility of using food as a tool against other states and to further the goals of the United States.[134] In this period, most of the studies on food security focused on

[131]J. I. Dibua, *Modernization and the Crisis in Africa: The Nigerian Experience*, (London: Aldershot, 2006).
[132]Ibid. Also, I. Nzimiro, *The Green Revolution in Nigeria or The Modernisation of Hunger*, (Oguta: Zim Pan African Publishers, 1985). I. Nzimiro discusses ways of understanding the nature and dynamics of the Nigerian food crisis and how the Nigerian government tried to overcome the problem in the 1980s).
[133]J. I. Dibua, op. cit.
[134]Peter Wallensteen, Scarce Goods as Political Weapons: The Case of Food, in "Food Import and Neo-Colonialism, in Vilho Harle, (ed.), op. cit., p.47.

showing the genesis of food insecurity by looking at historical-dialectical relations between the colonial powers and the colonies, neo-colonialism and its capacity to undermine food security of independent countries in Africa. Despite these local efforts, Africa continued to import food as the table below shows.

Table 2: Official Purchases of Major Food Crops, 1970- 1980 ('000 tonnes)

Year	Maize	Rice	Wheat	Sorghum and Millet	Cassava	Beans
1970	186	63	43	0	0	0
1971	43	46	57	0	0	0
1972	106	49	47	1	14	0
1973	74	40	28	4	19	0
1974	24	15	14	4	18	0
1975	91	12	25	5	17	0
1976	128	15	23	21	20	12
1977	213	36	35	70	37	31
1978	220	35	28	99	64	28
1979	162	31	27	38	44	34
1980	104	13	27	21	8	16

Source: J. Boesen, K. J. Havnevik, J. Koponen and R. Odhaard, (eds.), *Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival*, (Uppsala: Scandinavia Institute of African Studies, 1986.), p.117.

The third trend appeared in the 1990s which focused on the ability of small-scale farmers to withstand food problems, cope with food problems and develop survival strategies. Maddox, Giblin and Kimambo emphasized the rural initiatives and

innovations which small-scale farmers used to respond to various crises such as famines and diseases. Colonialism undermined local knowledge and their institutions such as patronage and exchange networks which people depended on to survive during food shortages.[135] The peoples' interaction with ecology and their social understanding of the ecological resources based on meeting their society's local and regional needs.

This article shows that despite the colonial interventions which destroyed and sometimes adjusted some local institutions, networks and local knowledge, small-scale farmers in post-colonial Tanzania continued to rely on their local methods of food production and processing practices despite the changes in colonial and global capitalist political and economic relations and contexts.

4.0 The Food Policy and Measures addressing Food Insecurity in the Post-Colonial Period

After suffering from the famine of 1962/63, the Singida district government renewed emphasis on people planting drought resistant crops focusing on root crops. In the early 1960s, small-scale farmers in the district had relaxed the planting of cassava because of resentment towards colonial anti-famine policy. Small-scale farmers produced less cassava due to bumper crop years in 1964-67 and the existence of other survival strategies such as local patronage. The relaxation was also due to local conception of root crops especially cassava as supplementary

[135]G. Maddox, J. L. Giblin and I.N. Kimambo, (eds.), *Op. cit*., p. 2.

foods.[136] The demand for cassava during the bumper crop years was small as the Nyaturu, Nyiramba and Nyiambi had two meals eaten at 9 am before young men went to look after the livestock in grazing areas and 7 pm after coming back from the grazing grounds. There was no breakfast in a real Western cultural sense for the rural population due to the nature of their economic activities which were crop cultivation and livestock keeping.[137]

An agricultural report revealed that in the mid-1960s, "cassava planting in Singida District is still very rudimentary and the importance of cassava as a famine relief food cannot be overemphasized. Expansion of the crop is therefore a MUST. The Government imported 10 tons of cassava cuttings."[138] Agricultural officers campaigned for small-scale farmers to intensify the planting of cassava and sweet potatoes in 1966. The regional administration together with the district's agricultural officers compelled small-scale farmers to plant more cassava as a crop that would give people relief during localized food shortages or famines. As a result, the regional government established regulations and by-laws to force small-scale farmers to grow cassava as a famine relief food. Small-scale farmers who did not comply with the by-laws were punished.[139] In 1969, agricultural officers inspected cassava

[136]Interview with Augustino Muna, *Op. cit*.
[137]Interview with Mzee Abdala Lali, 80Years at Ilongero village in 20th July 2002.
[138]TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida 1958-1982, M.D. Minja Officer-in-Charge, Agricultural Division, Singida, A letter from Agricultural Division, Box 34, Singida, 26.10.1964, Ref C/CAV to the Executive Officer Singida District Council, Box 81 Singida, Freedom from Hunger Committee Projects: Cassava Cuttings, p. 1.
[139]Interview with Hassan Ntui at Unyaghumpi Village on 20th August 2007.

farms and found the planted cassava acreages as indicated in the table below.

Table 3: Planted Cassava Acreages Singida District in 1968/69.

Area	Planted acreages	(Attended acreages)	Government Funded acreages	Private Fund acreages	Unattended acreages
Mgori	22	10	6	16	300
Ngimu	30	25	10	20	140
Singida	720	700	200	520	720
Sepuka	336	200	47	289	350
Mtipa	50	20	45	5	50
Ilongero	400	400	350	50	600
Merya	500	500	150	350	500
Mtinko	350	350	250	100	700
Misughaa	130	63	67	63	300
Mungaa	410	270	300	110	410
Puma	418	418	310	308	618
Ihanja	164	164	60	104	164
Ikungi	191	100	151	40	250
Issuna	10	9	10	-	30
Mang'onyi	21	21	-	-	21
Total	3,752	3,250	1,956	1,996	5,153

Source: TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida, 1958-1982.

In this inspection, it was reported that though in the past the regional government used a "substantial amount of money to bring cassava cuttings to the district, most of the farms were grown and thrived very much. Most of unattended farms were found in Singida Urban, Mtipa, Mtinko, Puma, Misughaa and Ngimu. Small-scale farmers used the unattended farms for grazing their livestock. The Regional Development Director

ordered all agricultural officers and field officers to ensure all farms were attended and maintained in a proper order for meeting anti-famine goals."[140] The government fined small-scale farmers who failed to observe the anti-famine by-laws. The convicted small-scale farmers were fined up to 200 Tanzanian shillings while some of them were imprisoned for three months.[141] On their appearance before Primary Courts, they accused small-scale farmers of defying growing and maintaining cassava farms in Mtinko, Ngimu, Merya and Ilongero wards. The farmers defended themselves by claiming that their wards have clay soil which is not suitable for growing cassava. Small-scale farmers in Puma defended themselves by saying that heavy rains of 1968/69 crop season had caused their usually semi-dry uplands to become wetter than in the previous years. It became suitable for growing sweet potatoes and sugar cane than cassava. Mgori and Misughaa located on the Great East African Rift Valley defended themselves by arguing that their salty soil was unsuitable for growth of cassava. The Primary Courts did not accept their defences. As a result, the Courts convicted them of violating the government's anti-famine by-laws.[142] The convicts complied with the anti-famine by-laws by growing bitter lyongo cassava in the 1969/70 crop season.

[140]Ref. No. A. 30/12/96: Cassava Farms, A latter from Acting Chief Executive Officer, Singida District Council, Box 81, Singida dated on 18th November 1969 to all Divisional Officers, Singida District Council.
[141]*Ibid.*
[142]*Ibid.*

Due to heavy rains of 1969/70 localised food shortages occurred in Singida Region which affected more the Singida District than Manyoni and Iramba districts. As result, in 1970, most of the victims of localized food shortages depended on the available bitter lyongo cassava for food. The victims ground the dried lyongo cassava copra as they had neither maize nor millet from their stores to mix with cassava to make it more palatable. Soon the victims began to complain that the cassava flour was poisonous as some people who ate its ugali- a stiff porridge- complained headaches and stomach-aches.[143] Steaming, roasting, frying and cooking in oils was used to make lyongo palatable. Following these complains, the Regional Government established an investigative committee to look into the problem. The Investigative Committee in its report revealed that some people in Mang'onyi village in Ikungi Division ate poisonous lyongo as they did not receive instructions from agricultural officers and nutritionists on how to process it before eating it as food.[144] It was further revealed that lyongo cassava caused two deaths in Mang'onyi village. Following this incident, Regional Commissioner ordered that "all lyongo bitter cassava must be uprooted in all villages in Singida District and be brought to the District Police Station at Singida town in order to be burnt. Agricultural officers and instructors must act upon this order immediately."[145] The order had two intentions. The first intention was to prevent more people from suffering

[143]Interview with Augustino Muna, *Op.cit.*

[144]C/CAV/6, Cassava, 1958-1982, A letter from Veterinary Centre Ikungi, Box 81 dated 16th February 1970 to Singida District Executive Officer.

[145]C/CAV/6, Cassava, 1958-1982, A letter titled Mihogo Aina ya Lyongo from Singida District Agricultural Coordinator to all Divisional Coordinators, 26th January, 1970.

headaches and stomachaches and possibly death. The second one was to ensure a total destruction of the bitter lyongo variety of cassava in Singida Region before replacing it with sweet varieties.

Immediately, divisional officers began to implement the Regional Commissioner's order. Small-scale farmers in various villages defied the order. Consequently, J. M. Kisuda, an Ihanja Divisional Officer wrote to the District Coordinator, that "I regret to inform you that your letter dated 29th January 1970 directed us that we must supervise the uprooting all bitter lyongo cassava. As now, small-scale farmers refused to uproot the cassava due to the following reasons. First, some of the small-scale farmers were tried and either fined or sentenced for imprisonment for failure to maintain their cassava farms. Second, other small-scale farmers say that they know how to prepare lyongo for food by soaking and making the dried cassava copra. Third, those small-scale farmers who were fined and imprisoned ask whether the Government will refund their fines or compensate them for imprisonment."[146] The similar letter carrying similar observations and complains came from Emanuel L. Msafiri, an agricultural officer In-Charge of Mungaa Division. The letter read "I inform you that the order that required us to uproot the bitter cassava type known as Lyongo and send it to Police Station at Singida has been refused by small-scale farmers on the reasons that if the Government is ready to refund or compensate some small-scale farmers who

[146]C/CAN/6, Cassava, 1958-1982, A letter titled Mihogo Aina ya Lyongo from Ihanja Divisional Officer to District Coordinator, Singida, dated 15th February 1970.

were imprisoned for failure to maintain the cassava farms. They would be ready for their lyongo to be uprooted immediately. Second, lyongo is good if is properly prepared by soaking, drying and grinding to make flour for food. Small-scale farmers agreed that they will teach each other on how to prepare lyongo instead of being consumed in a raw form."[147] Furthermore, one of the victims of famines demonstrated that in the past boys and girls were taught how to identify and separate poisonous and non-poisonous food such as mushrooms, wild fruits and insects. They were also taught through observation how to identify poisonous and non-poisonous cassava as well how to remove poisonous materials before preparing it as a meal.[148] This means that small-scale farmers were employing local knowledge and methods of processing cassava for making flour. This knowledge of processing cassava which involved peeling, drying and pounding it in mortar had been used by the people in Singida for over half a century.[149]

Despite defiance shown by the people, the government intensified uprooting the lyongo cassava in the district. As a result, the anti-uprooting movement grew in early January 1970. The Singida District Coordinator wrote a letter to the Regional Agricultural Director in 1970 stating that "last month all Divisional Officers in Singida District were ordered to ensure that all lyongo cassava trees had to be uprooted and fired. Soon

[147]A letter from Emmanuel L. Msafiri, Agricultural officer in-charge dated 22nd January 1970.
[148]Interview with Mzee Emmanuel Njiku at Mwau Village, Singida on 12th November 2001.
[149]*Ibid.*

after its implementation of the order began, reports received from divisional agricultural officers and field officers revealed that small-scale farmers defied the uprooting of the lyongo cassava giving several reasons. The first one was "our government brought lyongo to this region and forced small-scale farmers to plant it. Those who did not grow the lyongo cassava were either fined or imprisoned or received both punishments. Secondly, lyongo is more used for food in some areas like Ilongero, Mtinko and Kibaoni in Urban Singida without affecting the consumers. Third, nearly all cassava farms in this Singida District have the lyongo variety. Thus, uprooting lyongo is a greater loss and this will demoralize agricultural development spirit of our small-scale farmers. Third, small-scale farmers revealed that lyongo matured earlier than other varieties of cassava. Also, its bitterness prevents vermin and wild animals from eating and destroying it."[150] After receiving complaints from small-scale farmers, the District Crop Committee met on 4th of February 1970. It was informed that the uprooting exercise had started only in Ngimu and Sepuka Divisions in which only one acre each from these areas was uprooted. The uprooted lyongo cassava from Ngimu village was brought to Singida Police station. A few small-scale farmers in Ilongero Division uprooted their lyongo cassava. There were piles of uprooted lyongo cassava in Sepuka Division with nowhere to store it. It was further reported that "the cooperative farm in Sepuka Division has bitter lyongo than sweet varieties. There were 47 acres ready for being harvested

[150]A letter titled Mihogo ya Lyongo from District Coordinator's Office; Agricultural Division dated 26th February 1970 to Regional Agricultural Officer, Box 34, Singida, pp. 1-2.

and Small-scale farmers know how to prepare them before eating them as food."[151] Another report showing defiance came from R. Mkuki, the Ihanja Divisional Officer who wrote "I cooperated with agricultural officers to uproot the lyongo cassava but small-scale farmers refused to uproot them. They say that they would soak them into water and dry them for flour instead of boiling or cooking them raw like sweet potatoes. As people defied your order as the District Commissioner, please assist us."[152] Furthermore, the dietary report from nutritionists revealed that cassava was used as food as its roots which contain vitamin C may be used in various ways. The sweet varieties can be eaten raw but as prussic acid is present in the form of cyanogenetic glucosides, mainly in the rind, the root is first peeled. It cannot be kept fresh more than a day. If eaten without peeling, it will cause poisoning or at least headache.[153]

After the defiance reports from the divisions, the regional administration decided to adopt two measures. First, Regional Director of Agriculture ordered all divisional officers, agricultural officers and field instructors to stop the uprooting exercise.[154] Following the situation, the District Coordinator S. Musa wrote a letter to all Divisional Officers and Agricultural

[151]Ibid.

[152]R. Mkuki, Divisional Officer, 21st February 1970 to District Commissioner.

[153]TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida 1958-1982, M. D. Minja Officer-in-Charge, Agricultural Division, Singida, A letter from Agricultural Division, Box 34, Singida, 26.10.1964, Ref C/CAV to the Executive Officer Singida District Council, Box 81 Singida, Freedom from Hunger Committee Projects: Cassava Cuttings, p. 1.

[154]A letter titled Mihogo ya Lyongo from District Coordinator's Office; Agricultural Division dated 26th February 1970 to Regional Agricultural Officer, Box 34 Singida, pp. 1-2.

Officers that the order that had been issued to uproot and burn all lyongo cassava trees in all villages in the District as it was directed in the letter with reference number C/CAV dared 6th March 1970 had to be stopped.[155]

Small-scale farmers perceived the anti-famine by-laws were an extension of the colonial by-laws and heritage which were doomed to failure as small-scale farmers were treated as objects of history. Small-scale farmers wanted decolonization of anti-famine by-laws, strategies and supervision of the by-laws.[156] Small-scale farmers in the post-colonial period should not be looked at as a powerless and passive recipient of Government laws who cannot influence change or government's decisions. Small-scale farmers demonstrated that their majority was a tool to advocate their interests especially reforming anti-famine laws. Thus, the defiance was an effort of small-scale farmers to influence the government to adjust anti-famine by-laws to meet new demands of post-colonial small-scale farmers in rural areas.

The government officers viewed food self-sufficient policy as an important element in maintaining independence as a method to wage war against the national enemies- famine, diseases and poverty. Attaining food self-sufficiency was strategy to liberate Tanzania from neo-colonial influence where food was a tool to perpetuate the interests of agribusiness and western states.

[155]TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida 1958-1982, a letter titled Mihogo aina ya Lyongo from District Coordinator's Office, Box 26, Singida dated 20th March 1970 to all Divisional Officers.
[156]Interview with Salim Ngulu, 72 years at Makiungu Village on 14th September 2007.

Sufficient food was a way of making Tanzania's independence meaningful and preserving dignity and stability of the nation. Small-scale farmers defied the by-laws and regarded them as an extension of the colonial anti-famine by-laws and strategies. Boycott was a message that showed that small-scale farmers were neither an illiterate group in preparing cassava as food nor as passive implementers of anti-famine by-laws. Small-scale farmers rejected the notion that the government as a liberator of small-scale farmers from famine and government-centred model of anti-famine by-laws. Small-scale farmers wanted the by-laws to be understood in terms of consensus and progressive continuity instead of being source of conflict and bureaucratic orders.

After the order of stopping uprooting, the district government ordered that all agricultural officers, nutritionists and social community officers had to educate people better methods of preparing lyongo cassava before using it as food."[157] Following the report, the regional administration admitted that "some of the cassava cuttings brought here in Singida Region two years ago were of lyongo variety which is a bitter type. This problem occurred as agricultural field instructors were not involved in buying the cassava cuttings. The Regional Director of Agriculture ordered agricultural officers to visit all cassava farms to identify the bitter lyongo variety of cassava. After identifying the bitter lyongo cassava variety, education should

[157]TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida 1958-1982, a letter titled Mihogo aina ya Lyongo from District Coordinator's Office, Box 26, Singida dated 20th March 1970 to all Divisional Officers.

be provided to small-scale farmers on how to remove its poison before eating it."[158]

In the beginning, the government did not consider people's experience in employing local methods of preparing foodstuffs as insurance against famines. It also ignored involving small-scale farmers in deciding which variety of cassava was suitable in the area. The defiance was an expression of people's dissatisfaction on how the regional government coordinated and supervised the anti-famine policy as well as organized measures to enhance food security in the region without consulting them. Small-scale farmers also expressed their resentments against the legal measures which stood as a symbol of oppression since excessive force was used in uprooting the bitter cassava plants. The defiance was an expression against alienation as the local population was not involved in decision making. The officers ignored their local experiences in handling and preparing the bitter cassava variety as food. The defiance, according to small-scale farmers, was a victory over bureaucratic agricultural officers who ignored their accumulated and tested local knowledge on processing varieties of foodstuffs ranging from edible plants to root crops. During famines or localized food shortages since the pre-colonial period, people knew how to distinguish poisonous from non-poisonous foodstuffs. They knew how to extract poisonous materials from plants and animals before eating them. A good example was that parents demonstrated to their children how

[158]Ref. No. C/CAV a letter from Regional Director of Agriculture Singida, box 34, 27th August 1969 to the District Coordinators, Agriculture, Singida, Iramba and Manyoni.

to distinguish poisonous mushrooms from edible mushrooms.[159] Small-scale farmers wanted their local knowledge on food processing to be recognized amidst of modern scientific knowledge.

From this defiance and suggestions from small-scale farmers, it was decided that agricultural officers and nutritional officers in the district should work together to educate small-scale farmers about better methods of preparing lyongo cassava for food. Nutritional officers instructed people on two methods of preparing lyongo before eating it. The first method prepared lyongo for ugali. People should peel the lyongo cassava first and soak it in water for 7 to 12 days before pouring that water. The cassava should then be dried before it ground into flour for ugali. The second method was to cook raw bitter cassava. The agricultural officers and nutritionists instructed people to peel and cook lyongo cassava for a short time ranging from 20 to 30 minutes. Then people should pour the water which was used for cooking cassava in order to reduce the concentration of poisonous cyanide. After that, the cooked cassava should be soaked in clean water for 5 to 7 days. Then, people should pour off the water and cook it again. It was then ready for consumption as food.[160] Provision of knowledge on food processing showed the limitation of the campaigns to enhance food security which focused more on the production of foodstuffs and eliminating vermin and wild animals leaving

[159]Interview with Amina Salimu, 68 years at Mang'onyi Village on 19th July 2003.
[160]TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida 1958-1982, a letter titled Mihogo Aina ya Lyongo from District Coordinator's Office, Box 26, Singida dated 20th March 1970 to all Divisional Officers.

behind processing, storage and safe methods of consuming root crops especially the bitter cassava varieties. Furthermore, food technology was limited among small-scale farmers on how to preserve varieties of food for future use. New improved food technology was needed to improve local processing methods to make the dried cassava last longer. They also needed knowledge of how to use cassava in various products such as biscuits, local brew and mixed flour obtained by mixing cassava with maize, millet and wheat to reduce unpalatable taste of bitter cassava varieties such as lyongo.

Furthermore, nutritionists revealed that cassava is less nutritious than sweet potatoes. As a result, the district government decided to diversify sources of food by adding sweet potatoes and beans to provide people with protein, vitamins and other nutrients that were not found in cassava. The District Coordinator's office ordered all divisional officers to convince small-scale farmers to plant agreed acreages of cassava, sweet potatoes and beans. The Coordinator instructed the Divisional Officers that they had to work together with agricultural officers to buy cassava and sweet potato cuttings as well as bean seeds from nearby stations.[161] In the 1970s, the newly introduced varieties of sweet cassava provided small-scale farmers with a wider variety of strategies in their efforts against localized persistent food shortages or famines. In 1971, the agricultural officers inspected cassava farms and found the following conditions.

[161]Ibid.

Table 4: Acreages Grown in Singida District in 1970/71 Season

Division	Cassava	Sweet Potatoes	Beans
Singida	421	218	600
Sepuka	370	500	100
Mtipa	21	50	4
Ihanja	30	250	15
Puma	250	400	10
Ikungi	15	500	63
Issuna	20	80	8
Ilongero	380	242	645
Mtinko	400	340	33
Merya	300	490	41
Mgori	150	200	20
Ngimu	500	800	13
Mungaa	600	2900	31
Misughaa	80	130	29
Total	3,570	7,100	1,612

Source: TNA, File C/CAV/6 Cassava-AGR-Singida 1972.

The Government also emphasized more production of sweet potatoes and beans as relish. Cassava was planted in dry areas while sweet potatoes were cultivated on wet lands. One of informants said that apart from the bitter lyongo cassava variety, the government brought sweet varieties of cassava. One of them was locally called *kaeba*. Another one was known locally as *Asumani* which was white taking six months to mature. Sometimes the government dispensed cassava flour as

a famine relief food during difficult times.[162] The varieties of grown cassava helped small-scale farmers to survive famine in 1974/75 and extended localized food shortages in 1976/77 as well as 1983/84.

Beside the regional government emphasis on individual farms, it also encouraged villagers to grow cassava in Ujamaa village farms in the 1970s. In the 1970/71, the following villages managed to establish Ujamaa farms growing not only cassava but also sweet potatoes and beans in an effort to enhance food security in the district.

Table 5: Acreages Grown under Ujamaa Villages in Ilongero Division, 1970-1971

S/No	Village	Cassava	Sweet Potatoes	Beans
1	Mpambaa	10	10	50
2	Mdilu	30	50	50
3	Mangida	20	20	50
4	Makuro	20	20	44
5	Ngamu	10	20	30
6	Mudida	10	10	30
7	Total	100	130	244

Source: Singida C/CAV A Report by Agricultural Officer Hamisi Mpembee, 31st March 1970.

Villages maintained Ujamaa farms throughout the 1970s. They had threefold aims. First, individual households should be responsible to produce both staple foodstuffs and insurance

[162]Interview with Juma Msaghaa, 75 years at Lighwa Village on 11th October 2007.

food for their own consumption. Second, in case families exhausted their stock of both staple foodstuffs and insurance food, the village farms would serve the purpose. Third, as the government faced financial problems due to the oil crisis in 1973/74 and drought in 1974, the growing of cassava and other drought resistant root crops would save the nation from using its limited foreign reserves to import foodstuffs.

The best division in the production of cassava was Ilongero which was frequently hit hard by drought. It was agreed that villages with shortage of cassava would be served from these villages below with plenty of it. Agricultural officers put more efforts in these villages to develop demonstration farms before allowing individual small-scale farmers to take the cassava cuttings and plant them on their own household's farms. The table below shows these villages in Ilongero Division.

Table 6: The table shows the planted acres of cassava.

Village	**Planted acreages**
Msimihi	74
Ikhanoda	63
Unyarughe	54
Unyang'ombe	53
Mwamjee	13
Madamigha	18
Nkuhi A	42
Nkuhi B	32
Makhandi	22
Mwahango	43

Village	**Planted acreages**
Ilongero	7
Itamka	15
Mwayadi	25
Kinyeto	229
Total	**690**

Source: Singida C/CAV A Report by Agricultural Officer Hamisi Mpembee, 31st March 1970.

Thus, the frequent drought of the 1970s, rise in the price of food in the global food market, oil shock and other economic challenges which Tanzania faced like the collapse of the East African Community in 1978 and the Uganda-Tanzania War of 1978/79 which left Tanzania with adverse balance of payment problem and a lack of foreign currency the growing of cassava served as a proper insurance against famine in rural areas before the state could dispense relief foodstuffs in 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977.

5.0 Conclusion

This article has discussed various policies and measures taken in enhancing food security in Singida District in the post-colonial period. Though small-scale farmers treated the growing of cassava and sweet potatoes as a bad legacy of colonial anti-famine strategies, precarious weather featured with alternating excessive drought and heavy rains causing floods and ultimately affecting the production of grains such as millet, sorghum and maize which made the government to apply the legal mechanisms to revive the growing of root crops,

with special emphasis on cassava, as an insurance against sporadic famines and localized food shortages that frequently hit the district. In enforcing the by-laws to enhance food security, clashes occurred between co-existence of local and modern agricultural technologies on food processing. As a result, the government adopted participatory approach in production and processing of cassava in enhancing food security in the district.

Thus, the post-colonial policy and measures overlooked the long-time accumulated and tested knowledge and practices for processing food to enhance food security in their local areas. Cassava processing for food and its storage were one of the capabilities that was demonstrated by people as a coping strategy against food insecurity. The knowledge and practices of separating poisonous from non-poisonous foodstuffs such as cassava which were tested and practised during the pre-colonial and colonial periods, continued to survive during the post-colonial period. The small-scale farmers of Singida District demonstrated that the knowledge and practices were still worth for people to rely on for processing some poisonous foodstuffs in order to make them edible and thereby good in making people survive famines or chronic periods of food shortages. The only reliable knowledge for processing foodstuffs was the local one as the modern knowledge was not already imparted to small-scale farmers either through formal or informal channels.