

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION: THE IMPACT OF ISLAM ON SOME ASPECTS OF AFRICAN SOCIETIES*

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to examine the extent to which Islam has penetrated and influenced African societies. The emphasis is on Islamic practice rather than the process of Islamic expansion. To follow this approach is not to turn a deaf ear to Alpers's call for scholars to avoid "one of the annoying preoccupations" in "discussions of Islam in Africa", and it is hoped that this essay is not a mere addition to the "unwarranted concern over the 'orthodox' nature of African Islam".¹ The main concern here is to show where and to what extent Islamic influence has succeeded or failed to "conquer" some aspects of traditional life. It could probably be argued that in Africa "where ritual observance is the foundation of religious practice",² orthopraxy is more important than orthodoxy. In this respect it is important to note the adaptability of Islam and its general capacity to accommodate many aspects of the traditional way of life. But it is even more important and more relevant to go beyond that point and identify specific aspects of non-Islamic institutions and customs which facilitated the growth and expansion of Islamic influence among African societies, and those which acted as stumbling blocks. This exercise is important among other reasons, because Islam, probably more than many other religions, has wide social implications on its adherents. It carries with it a number of obligations and prohibitions,³ and it explicitly regulates most of the social and civil relationships between the adherent and his environment. Islam imposes on a people its own value system and general outlook towards life. Thus the penetration of Islam into a society is generally speaking equivalent to cultural conquest. But, as in many other cases, the victor is here forced to come to terms with the vanquished, and tolerate, or even promote the very "evils" which had motivated "aggression". Where Islam accommodates aspects of a traditional way of life, therefore, it could be asked whether such a state of affairs arises from weakness inherent in Islam, or whether it is due to the capacity of traditional forces to resist outside influences. In other words, the extent of

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“unorthodoxy” in Islam, itself being a product of cultural interaction, should not be seen as arising merely from Islam’s adaptability, but also and for the purpose of this essay more so, as a result of “stubbornness” and durability of the traditional cultures.

The discussion in this essay does not restrict itself to a particular period of time since Islam penetrated Africa at different times. While some parts of Africa, especially West Africa and the coastal towns of East Africa, have been under some influence of Islam for centuries, vast areas of the interior of East Africa have felt the influence of this powerful religion for only a few decades. It is thus more meaningful to examine the growth of Islamic influence wherever conversion has taken place regardless of a specific period. Trimmingham’s observations regarding the process of Islamisation might be relevant here. He identifies three stages through which the process proceeds: germination, crisis and gradual re-orientation.⁴ At the germination stage change is first felt deep in the individual’s consciousness, and then collective consciousness develops. As the seed “gradually forces the shock of crisis”,⁵ “a new attitude” develops “which in time profoundly modifies social and individual behaviour”.⁶ Furthermore, at the first stage, Islam seems to show no incompatibility with the continued observance of tribal religion. “There is no significant rejection of the old.”⁷ There is an apparently peaceful co-existence between the old and the new.

The second stage is characterised by deeper and more critical examination of the social implications of Islam in society. The community of believers⁸ more and more apply Islamic principles to day-to-day life. It is at this stage that a crisis is felt in society. Traditional values and institutions come under fire as Islamic principles come to affect a wider range of human relations. Even at the second stage when the adherents would like to be referred to as Muslims without qualification, their Islam is far from pure. Although the traditional rites “apparently decline and are neglected, they do not disappear but remain available to be resorted to in times of emergency or stress whilst outward conformity to Islam goes along with inner independence of thought and feeling”.⁹

It is only at the third stage that social behaviour and institutions are “fully Islamised”. According to Trimmingham, most Muslims in the interior of East Africa “have hardly gone beyond the first stage”. He has also identified some Yao and some coastal ethnic groups like the Segeju as having entered the second stage. Only the peoples of the islands and coastal towns are believed to have entered the third stage.

Trimingham’s model, useful as it might appear, has some serious weaknesses. Though it implies a direct correlation between the length of time and the level of purity of Islam, it cannot offer a clue regarding the minimum length of time required for any society to move from the first stage to the second, or from the second to the third. Nor does it offer a combination of factors which reduce the intervals between stages to the

UTAFITI minimum. Furthermore, the model assumes a constant forward movement. Indeed the process of Islamisation, like many other processes does not proceed in that way. It is subject to back-siding, insurmountable resistance and competition by other forces. Thus the process need not go through all the three stages. By observing the impact of Islam in West Africa during the past eight centuries or so, one comes to doubt strongly whether, in fact, social behaviour and institutions there will ever be "fully Islamised". True enough people will remain Muslims and probably resist the introduction of other religions with ferocity, but the quality of their Islam need not be "pure". What is important for the purpose of this essay is to identify traditional institutions and customs which have been quite susceptible, partially susceptible and most resistant to Islamic influence. The institutions and customs to be considered here include the family and marriage systems, inheritance, treatment of women, slavery and belief in the supernatural, all of which have, to some extent, been susceptible to Islamic influence and acted as assets in the process of proselytisation. Ancestral cults, tribal feelings and attitudes towards land appear to have been most resistant to Islamic influences.

MARRIAGE SYSTEMS

Marriage systems in different parts of Africa have facilitated the spread and growth of Islam. By and large Islamic law has very little disagreement with most African marriage systems. Polygamy, which is practised in most African societies for social and economic reasons, is permitted by Islamic law. Thus most converts at the early stages see no conflict between their traditional marriage systems and Islamic practice. While African societies allow unlimited polygamy, Islamic law permits a maximum of four wives, and, where slavery exists, as many concubines as one could conveniently afford to maintain. So as far as the number of wives allowed to a person was concerned, especially before the abolition of slavery,¹⁰ there was very little conflict between Islamic practice and traditional practices. The two sides seem to have seen the differences as matters of detail rather than of principle. This attitude influenced clerics in both East and West Africa to tolerate unlimited polygamy among Muslims. The accommodative nature of Islam here accounts partly for Islam's greater attraction of African following compared to Christianity.

The custom of paying bridewealth, which is an important aspect of marriage in most African societies, has been particularly resistant to Islamic influence. Among almost all African communities bridewealth is paid to the family of the bride and to the bride herself. This is very much like the payment of *mahr* in pre-Islamic Arabia. According to the *Shari'a*, however, the nuptial gift which the bridegroom pays is supposed to go to the bride herself and not to the legal guardian of the bride (the *wali*), even if such guardian is the bride's own parent. The bride has the option to share this

sudaq (gift) with her guardian or to use it all by herself. "And give women their dowries as a free gift, but if they of themselves be pleased to give up to you a portion of them, then eat it with enjoyment and with wholesome result."¹¹ This means after the adoption of Islam by an African society, bridewealth, like *mahr* in pre-Islamic Arabia, should change its nature, meaning and significance in order to be in tune with Islamic law.¹² Many African Muslim communities did not oppose the provisions of Islamic practice, nor did they drop their own traditional practices. They have instead adopted the provision of the *Shari'a* and mixed it with traditional customs. Significantly, even the long-Islamised Hausa and Nupe of Nigeria would pay many obligatory gifts to the bride's family in addition to *sudaq* as prescribed in the *Shari'a*.¹³ This practice is very similar to what takes place among the Pare, Shambaa and Bondei of Tanzania. Among the Mandinka of West Africa, another long-Islamised people, bridewealth is far in excess of what should be *sudaq* and goes to the bride's family.¹⁴ In West Africa the people who probably go nearest the requirements to the *Shari'a*, especially as regards the amount, are the Dyula. They pay a very low *sudaq*. Even here, however, the presents have to go to the bride's family. Among the urban Bondei and Digo, where Islamic influence is quite substantial, an attempt is made to magnify the impact of Islam on the traditional marriage systems without complete departure from tradition.¹⁵ The share of the bridewealth which goes specifically to the bride is generally called *mahari*, and it is normally assessed by the bride herself with or without the assistance of her guardian. The paying of this *mahari*, the Digo believe, is strictly in accordance with Islamic Law. But bridewealth among these people does not end there. There is the share which goes to the bride's mother which is commonly called *mkaja*. It is given as an expression of gratitude for the good work done in raising the daughter. Then among the rural Bondei and Digo where Islam has also been adopted for quite a long time, there is a portion of the bridewealth which goes to the bride's maternal uncle. This is called *kilemba*. Evidently both *mkaja* and *kilemba* are non-Islamic, yet people who appear and claim to be devout Muslims would not be prepared to drop them, apparently because these transactions strengthen family ties, especially the position of the bride's mother and maternal uncle among the Digo who are matrilineal.

Looking at the whole of Africa one is struck by the apparent "stubbornness of the custom of paying bridewealth. The reasons for this state of affairs are not easy to find. It would appear that the existence of *sudaq* in Islamic practice led African adherents to rationalise the existence of traditional bridewealth. Furthermore, African Muslims might see little or no rationale in the call to drop bridewealth since in the traditional customs bridewealth has no religious significance and, therefore, one could argue, it could not affect the religious or spiritual stand of Muslims. It could not threaten one's faith in the oneness of Allah. Whatever the case, the important thing to

UTAFITI note here is the fact that Islamic and traditional customs are capable of peaceful co-existence. This state of affairs could be seen as a manifestation of weakness of Islamic influence when coming into confrontation with well-established customs which carry with them utilitarian and emotional significance. Most men in African societies would not give their daughters into marriage without receiving at least a little bridewealth. Even a relatively rich man who does not at all need a daughter's bridewealth for comfortable living would normally ask a future son-in-law or his family to pay bride-wealth which is seen to symbolise the seriousness and commitment of the bridegroom, and to act as a binding factor between the bride's and the bridegroom's families. This attitude towards bridewealth is not onesided. Most young men in African communities would struggle to pay at least part of the bridewealth for their wives partly to prove their potential ability to act as heads of families. Thus the payment of bridewealth facilitates the maintenance of social equilibrium in the family and in society at large.

FAMILY TIES

Let us now examine the role of family ties in the spread and growth of Islamic influence. The family, both nuclear and extended, has to a large extent facilitated the spread of Islam in Africa, especially during the early days of conversion. Though at times people who adopted foreign religions were ostracised, in the majority of cases members of a family were committed to different beliefs without facing any violent division. This has been the case to the present day. The example of Kimweri the Great of Usambara is illustrative here. Being a custodian of traditional values and secrets, he utilised Islamic benefits without discarding his traditional religion. He, however, allowed his children to adopt Islam, apparently without fear of possible conflict and division in the family. Krapf, who visited him in 1848 and 1852, observed:

He has always Suahili about him who write his letters for him. He has two sons, also, who have become Mohammedans, and have learned to read and write. Their father threw no obstacle in their way when they resolved on abandoning heathenism. . . . We were visited by Bana Osman, a Mohammedan of Zanzibar, who fills the office of king's physician, chief-magician and court jester . . . (Such men) employ the opportunity thus afforded them to attempt the conversion of the ignorant heathen to Mohammedanism.¹⁶

The strength of family ties has facilitated the spread of Islam in another way. Since the *Shari'a* allows Muslim men to marry pagan women if there is intention to convert them to Islam, it has not been uncommon to see families whose members professed more than one belief. This feature was especially prevalent among the Dyula Muslims during the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Many of them, including clerics, married pagan women, but strong family ties prevented the possibility of disruption. In time many

converts were won in this way. First the wives followed their husbands, adopting Islam. Then the children born to the family became Muslims almost automatically. Many converts were won through this process. Small Muslim communities emerged and the propagation of Islam continued.¹⁷ This strategy, however, has its weaknesses. Sometimes conversion takes place at a very superficial level and no further progress is made. Professor I. Wilks has noted that many Dyula who married pagan women could not manage to Islamise their wives properly, or to give Islamic education to their children.¹⁸ Consequently serious backsliding took place, and there were even cases of complete reversion to traditional beliefs. The strength of family ties acted adversely against Islam.

INHERITANCE

The custom of inheritance is another aspect of family unity which influenced the success of Islam among African societies. Most of the traditional customs are very much in agreement with the provisions of the *Shari'a* regarding inheritance. In both cases inheritance is based on consanguinity, marriage and clientship,¹⁹ and many people share the belongings of the deceased person. "The Islamic system of inheritance operates to distribute wealth so that a large number of people may have a competence or, at least, a little, rather than that one or a few should have a large share and the rest nothing".²⁰ Thus at first sight Islamic practice appears to have almost no conflict with traditional customs. But there are a number of conflicting issues. While the *Shari'a* allows both male and female relations of the deceased person to inherit, most African traditional customs would not allow women to inherit from male relations. Thus daughters get almost nothing of what a father leaves. Although the *Shari'a* does not discriminate between the sexes, however, it seems to be in general agreement with many African customs in treating women as somewhat inferior to men, consequently deserving less of what is to go round. The Quran is explicit on this point. "With regard to your children God commandeth you to give the male the portion of two females".²¹

Even in this case, where Islamic practice leans towards African customs, most African societies, both in matrilineal and patrilineal societies, have failed to depart from their traditions completely. Where Islamic influence has been substantial enough females have been allowed to inherit from a deceased father, but there is modification. Anderson has observed among the Hausa, especially in Kano and Zaria emirates, that though females were allowed to inherit with the males according to the *Shari'a*, they were not allowed to inherit immovable goods, especially land and houses.²² This is a good example of Islamic law being forced to bend to non-Islamic customs in men-dominated societies. As far as property relations are concerned, a woman, who is supposed to marry at one stage, is seen as a

temporary member of her family. When she marries she is presumed to have joined another family where she meets or establishes her security.

According to the *Shari'a* an infidel cannot inherit from a believer, nor the other way round. Many African Muslims have found this almost unacceptable. Among the Bondei, Shambaa and Pare of Tanzania, for instance, it is traditionally obligatory for one of the living relations to inherit the property and family responsibility of the deceased person. Other relations, especially male, also get portions of what the deceased leaves behind. It is a grave crime against the family and clan to refuse to inherit from a deceased relative. On this issue Islamic law often gives way to the strength of family ties and traditional beliefs.

Widow inheritance is probably the aspect of inheritance which presents serious conflict between Islamic practice and traditional customs. According to the *Shari'a* the future of a widow, like that of divorcee, lies in her own hands.²³ Yet according to many African customs marriage is not regarded as being dissolved by death. In a way this attitude is a result of the bride-wealth paid. The bride-wealth changes the social and economic position of the bride.

She changes her family at marriage. Furthermore, while Islamic law regards marriage as a civil contract between two individuals, in most African customs marriage is to a very large extent regarded as a contract between two families. All this means is that at the death of a husband the brothers take care of the widow, and one of them, normally chosen by the widow herself, takes her as a wife to fulfil the obligation of raising up progeny of the deceased brother. There is no need for a formal marriage. The Quran is against this though it allows marriage with a deceased brother's wife if she does not break the law by giving somebody more than four wives. But Islamic influence on this issue has been small. African Muslims in many societies have retained widow inheritance despite the Quran's explicit prohibition. This they have done for both economic and social reasons. First, widow inheritance does not involve the payment of bride-wealth. It instead allows the maximum use of bride-wealth paid when the deceased person married. Second, the person who inherits the widow, it is believed, raises the productive capacity of his family. Lastly, he continues the lineage of the deceased brother, an issue normally treated with emotional involvement. Among the Mandinga of West Africa, for example, it is obligatory to inherit a brother's widow though Western law has strengthened Islamic law by giving women the right to refuse.²⁴ Even among the long-Islamised societies like the Fulbe of Futa Jalon and the Dyula, the custom persists. In Zanzibar and among the urban Digo the custom seems to have disappeared, or at least to be declining fast. The Digo, in the effort to show their great commitment to Islamic practice, would apparently allow a brother's widow to take a husband of her own choice. In theory it means the widow could choose even a person completely unrelated to the family of the deceased. But, it has been noted by a close

and careful observer, that behind the scene the deceased's brothers and relations exert pressure on the widow to remain in the family by choosing one of them as a husband.²⁵ After making up her mind, a formal marriage is performed by a cleric. In this way both the traditional and Islamic requirements are met simultaneously.

There is greater conformity with Islamic law in Zanzibar.²⁶ First of all a widow is allowed to inherit one-eighth of the net property of the deceased husband. This share is commonly called *thumni*. Secondly, a widow remains in a semi-solitary state for a period of three months before she can look for a husband. This period is called *idda* (Arabic). During *idda* the widow abstains from all kinds of entertainment especially sexual intercourse. (They say in Kiswahili *mjane hujistahi na hujinyima*.) During the course of this time it becomes evident whether she is pregnant by the deceased husband or not. In case she is pregnant, *idda* continues until she gives birth. Then she can marry a man of her choice. Here Islamic rules stress the rights of a deceased (or divorced) husband in his former partner's fertility, a practice which is likely to agree with customary requirements in many patrilineal systems of descent.²⁷ At this stage she does not even need a guardian (Kiswahili *wali*).

At this juncture one might ask why widow inheritance has so successfully resisted the pressure of Islamic influence. In addition to the reason advanced above in relation to general inheritance, it would appear that this custom persisted even among Muslims because it is of mutual advantage to the widow and the deceased's family. Most women in African societies attach great significance to their children. By getting married to a man completely unrelated to her former husband, she threatens the security of her children. This problem is especially serious if the widow has male children. Before she decides to move to another family she has to take into account a number of factors. Her children require proper care, which might not be available after "separation". In the case of male children they require guardians when they reach marrying age, but in some societies such guardianship might not be given if children grew away from paternal uncles.²⁸ These reasons, among others, would encourage a Muslim widow to remarry one of her brothers-in-law instead of "an outsider". To conform to Islamic practice the marriage is solemnised by a cleric.²⁹ A similar procedure is followed by some Christians, but the Church would not approve such marriages.

SUPERNATURAL POWERS

The basis of traditional African beliefs, especially the significance attached to divination and the supernatural have been of some advantage in the spread of Islamic influence. Most African societies live in surroundings where science and technology have not yet destroyed the superiority of magical powers. Fortunately for Islam, it has the concept of *baraka* or power to discharge blessings and good fortune. This power comes as a result

of holiness given by Allah to saints. With this kind of power, "the cleric is at one and the same time teacher-guide and medicine man".³⁰ So like the traditional medicine man (Kiswahili *mganga*), the Muslim cleric played a dual role. His presence among African societies, therefore, brought minimum "shock" to the converts at the early stage. It is partly for this reason that many Muslim clerics were invited to courts of "pagan" chiefs during the Dyula dispersion and proselytisation especially during the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The example of Kimweri the Great is also worth noting. Even in recent times clerics who were also medicine men have taken the place of traditional medicine men. The example of Nguvumali, epitomised in Ismail's illuminating poem,³¹ has attracted the attention of scholars the world over. Among the Mende of Sierra Leone, the cooperation between traditional medicine and Islamic magic has gone to the extent of Islamising some institutions. The Mori man, who is also a Muslim cleric, is the chief's adviser and, among others, the chief's protector. Traditionally this office was held by a "pagan" medicine man called "Bearer of the Chief's Life",³² but with the increasing influence of Islam the office was Islamised. The utility of the Muslim medicine men and the relevance of their skills and practice to the African way of life made them easily accepted among African societies.

One of the important tasks of the cleric/medicine men (Kiswahili *mwalmu*) is to prepare amulets. These are used widely in Africa. People wear them to protect themselves from evil and misfortune, to bring prosperity and success against enemies and evil forces. According to Trimmingham's observation among East African Muslims, the writing of charms is "the most called-for function of the *mwalmu*".³³ This practice is partly a result of the environment under which people live, where many things appear magical rather than logical because science has not affected people's lives in any fundamental way. The Quran is the basis of the power behind Islamic magic and it allows the use of charms in averting evil, provided only names of God and words and phrases from the Quran and other invocatory books are used. This Islamic practice has been seen by many African communities as supporting rather than opposing the use of "pagan" charms. There is no evidence of clear transfer from "pagan" to Islamic charms. A mixture of the two seems to be widespread. Indeed among East African Muslims Islamic magic is "everywhere secondary to the native *uganga* with which it does not seriously compete".³⁴ In his discussion of the significance of amulets among the Wolof of the Senegambia Gamble referred to a nineteenth century observer who commented:

...frequently these (amulets) contain a paper on which a religious teacher has written passages from the Koran, or a diagram from a book on Arabic mysticism, which is then enveloped in papers, glued down and covered with leather, but sometimes they enclose a piece of bone or wood, a powder or an animal claw.³⁵

It was this kind of mixing of "pagan" and Islamic amulets which led Trimmingham to make the following comment with reference to the Mende: "The use of the written papers and a new terminology is all that distinguishes them from pagan charms".³⁶ Even though, however, we cannot accept his misleading conclusion that before the nineteenth century Muslims in western Sudan "were not proselytizers of Islam but sellers of protective charms".³⁷

Though "pagan" belief in the power of the supernatural appears to have facilitated the spread of Islam, one of its aspects, ancestral cults, has shown remarkable resistance to Islamic influence. Ancestor worship has remained an important feature of the spiritual life of most African Muslims.³⁸ Ironically this feature seems to have been encouraged by Islam itself which has introduced its own spirits in the form of angels and *jinn*. "What is in conflict is certain forms of relationship to spirits, especially any form of cult which would conflict with the sovereignty of God."³⁹ As Malinowski has observed, ancestor worship, which involves sacrifice, divination and communication with ancestors, can endure the pressure of outside forces because it is the core of African beliefs. To him "the most important point about ancestor worship is the fact that it is connected with a type of social organisation—the family and the clan".⁴⁰ Even if ancestor worship is driven underground, Malinowski concluded, it will still survive, though in dread and fear.

ETHNIC IDENTITY

Another factor which presents appreciable resistance to Islamic influence in Africa is tribal feelings. As Schacht has observed, the family is the only group based on consanguinity or affinity which Islam recognizes. Tribal feelings are opposed to Islamic ethics. The solidarity of the believers should supersede that of the tribe.⁴¹ Yet in most African Muslim communities tribal feelings are often stronger than religious feelings. In Freetown, for example, the *Oje*, a Yoruba tribal organisation, binds Muslims, Christians and people belonging to neither of the two groups. Peterson has observed that as late as 1950 a Muslim Yoruba in Freetown would marry a Yoruba regardless of religious differences rather than a person from another ethnic group.⁴²

In conclusion a few observations can be made. First of all it is evident that some "pagan" institutions and customs appear to have been historically very susceptible to Islamic influence while others have shown great resistance. Second, even those institutions and customs which have been susceptible and which facilitated the spread of Islamic influence, have some aspects opposed to the provisions of the *Shari'a*. Third, Islamic influence has especially been opposed where it appeared to disrupt the social structure in a fundamental way. For example, the Yao of the southern interior of Eastern Africa have adopted Islam with enthusiasm, yet, to a very large extent, they have retained their matrilineal inheritance and matrilocal marriage contrary to the provisions of the *Shari'a*.⁴³ Finally, the influence of Islam appears to have been success-

UTAFITI ful in the outward aspects of life, for example, naming, marriage ceremonies, funerals, prayers, fasting, food habits, dress and a number of other gestures. The significance of these outward changes is a matter of controversy among the believers and scholars of Islamic practice. To many authorities outward gestures symbolise acceptance of Islam. They regard the inward development to be a matter of the individual convert and his God, Allah. Some authorities like Trimmingham, however, though they accept the view that "the outward changes are the most important" and that "Islam reaches the soul through these",⁴⁴ yet maintain that a community cannot be regarded as Muslim before individuals within it obtain self-assurance of belonging to the *umma* of God and Islam begins to disintegrate the old order.⁴⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. Alpers, E.A., "Towards a History of Expansion of Islam in East Africa: the Matrilineal Peoples of the Southern Interior", in Ranger, T.O. and Kimambo, I.N. (eds.) *The Historical Study of African Religion* (Heinemann, London, 1972), p. 1972.
2. *Ibid*, p. 173.
3. Quran Ch. V.
4. Trimmingham, J.S., *Islam in West Africa* (O.U.P. London, 1959) pp. 33-4; *Islam in East Africa* (O.U.P. London, 1964), p. 60.
5. Trimmingham, 1964, p. 60.
6. *Ibid*.
7. *Ibid*.
8. The fundamental factor binding them is their belief in the oneness of Allah, the God with no "partners", and in Muhammad as the "seal" of Prophets.
9. Trimmingham, 1964, p. 60.
10. According to Islamic law concubines can be claimed only from slave women.
11. Quran Ch. IV:4.
12. Cf. Schacht, J., *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (O.U.P. London, 1964), p. 161.
13. Trimmingham, 1959, p. 167.
14. *Ibid*, pp. 132-4.
15. Interview with Mr Hamisi Akiba, Dar es Salaam, 24.10.74.
16. Krapf, J.L. *Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours, during an Eighteen Years' Residence in East Africa* (London, 1860).
17. Trimmingham, 1959, pp. 132-4.
18. Personal communication.
19. Schacht, op. cit., p. 170.
20. Khan, M.Z., *Islam: Its meaning for modern man* (London, 1962), p. 153.
21. *Hughes' Dictionary of Islam* (London, 1885), p. 207. Also cf. Quran Ch. IV:11.
22. Anderson, J.N.D., *Islamic Law in Africa* (London, 1954), pp. 185-6.
23. Quran Ch. II: 226, 230, and 234.
24. Trimmingham, 1959, p. 170.
25. Interviews with Sheikh Mohammed Ali, Dar es Salaam, September, 1974.
26. Interview with Mr. M.B. Mkele, Dar es Salaam, 24.10.74.
27. Cf. Lewis, I.M. *Islam in Tropical Africa* (O.U.P. London, 1966), p. 56.
28. I am grateful to Dr. C.K. Omari for information on this point regarding the Pare.
29. I observed this recently among the Shambaa.
30. Trimmingham, 1959, p. 31.

31. Hasan bin Ismail, *The Medicine Man* (Edited and translated by Peter Lienhardt) (Oxford, 1968).
32. Little, K.L., *The Mende of Sierra Leone* (London, 1951), p. 273.
33. Trimingham, 1964, p. 123.
34. *Ibid*, p. 122.
35. Gamble, D.P., *The Wolof of Senegambia* (London, 1957), p. 71.
36. Trimingham, 1959, p. 144.
37. Trimingham, 1964, p. 142.
38. Gamble, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-2; Trimingham 1964, p. 115.
39. "Many Muslims affirmed without embarrassment that they practised ancestor propitiation".
39. Trimingham, 1964, p. 114.
40. Malinowski, B., *The Dynamics of Culture Change* (New Haven, 1965), p. 69.
41. Schacht, *op. cit.* p. 16.
42. Peterson, J., "The Sierra Leone Creole: A Reappraisal" in Fyfe, C. and Jones, E. (eds.) *Freetown Symposium* (London, 1968), p. 108.
43. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-70; Trimingham, 1964, pp. 47, 56, 62.
44. Trimingham, 1959, p. 39.
45. *Ibid*.