

## Popular Support for Multi-Party Democracy in Tanzania: Why Is It Declining?

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### Abstract

*This article sets out to address one question: What accounts for the declining trend of support for multi-party democracy among the Tanzanian public? Analysis of citizens' perceptions indicates an increased level of dissatisfaction with government performance. Equally important is the pervasiveness of a dominant-party system in which despite the existence of a de jure multi-party competitive system, in reality, only one party has a chance to rule. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the nationalist party that led the struggle for independence and the sole party for over three decades, still maintains its predominance even amidst multi-party competitive elections. As citizens become disillusioned with the performance of CCM's government while opposition parties do not seem to offer an effective alternative, citizens' support for multi-party democracy may be at risk. This declining trend of popular support for democracy may begin to signal the fact that after more than a decade of democratic experiment in Africa, it is more likely that citizens' expectations of democracy now go far beyond just delivery of political goods. Other elements may prove to be equally important for the generation of popular support for democracy.*

### 1.0 Introduction

Since the country's return to multi-party political system in 1992 there have been puzzling trends concerning Tanzanians' support for democracy. At the wake of the third wave of democratization, when citizens in other African countries were marching on the streets to demand that their leaders embrace multi-party democracy, many Tanzanians remained sympathetic to one-party rule. In a 1991 national referendum on whether or not Tanzania should adopt a multi-party system, 77% of the respondents expressed their views that a one-party system should continue (Presidential Commission Report, 1991). The impetus for adopting a multi-party system came primarily from strategic calculations by incumbent leaders who felt that by embracing political reforms they could manipulate the pace and form of a political opening to ensure their continued stay in power (Hyden, 1999; Killian, 2001). Even two years after the inception of the multi-party system Tanzanians were less than enthusiastic about the introduction of competing political parties. More than half of the respondents (55%) in a 1994 survey expressed their support towards the previous one-party rule, and only 36% were in support of multi-party democracy (REDET Survey, 1994).


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As years went by, however, a majority of respondents came to support multi-party politics.<sup>1</sup> Popular support for democracy rose to 49.5% in 1996 and 51.4% in 1999 (Killian, 2005). In the 2003 REDET survey, popular support for democracy stood at 67.5%. Compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, according to the Afrobarometer, Tanzania's popular support for multi-party democracy in 2002 was indeed above the continent's average with 65% of the respondents saying that "democracy is preferable to any other kind of government" (Bratton and Cho, 2006: 17)

However, instead of maintaining a rising trend, popular support for democracy in Tanzania started to decline as indicated in 2006 and 2007 REDET surveys. As Figure 1 clearly shows, the percentage of the respondents who said that Tanzania had made the right decision to adopt a multi-party democracy declined from 67.5% in 2003 to 63.0% in 2006, and plunged further down to 54.0% in 2007.



One-party rule is attracting significant public support. In the 2007 survey, 41% of the respondents reported that it would be better for Tanzania to revert to the old one-party system. In the 2006 survey, only about 28% had this view. The 2005/06 Afrobarometer findings show that, "Tanzanians remain more sympathetic to single-party rule than all other Africans" (Bratton, 2007:101). The question then is: What accounts for the declining trend of support for multi-party democracy among the Tanzanian public?



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This article sets out to assess the extent of popular support for democracy in Tanzania for the period 2003-2007. Analysis of citizens' perceptions indicates an increased level of dissatisfaction with government performance. Equally important is the pervasiveness of a dominant party system in which despite the existence of a *de jure* multi-party competitive system, in reality only one party has the chance to rule. Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the nationalist party that led the struggle for independence and the sole party for over three decades, still maintains its predominance even amidst multi-party competitive elections. As citizens become disillusioned with the performance of CCM's government while opposition parties do not seem to offer an effective alternative, citizens' support for multi-party democracy may be at risk.

### **2.0 Data and Methods**

The analysis in the article uses both aggregate and survey data drawn from a series of surveys conducted by the Department of Political Science of the University of Dar es Salaam through its project called Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET). These surveys are commonly referred to as 'REDET surveys'. In order to put Tanzanian trends of popular support for democracy into a broader context, the article makes use of the Afrobarometer data.<sup>2</sup> REDET surveys usually cover all the 26 regions in the country including both Tanzania Mainland and Tanzania Zanzibar. The sample was randomly drawn using three-level multistage sampling. The levels include districts, villages/streets, and respondents. All the levels were randomly selected. Two villages (rural areas) or streets (urban areas) were randomly selected from each district. Also, in order to reflect the country's population distribution, 60% of the sampled villages/streets were drawn from a rural setting, and 40% from an urban setting. University students were the research assistants who had been trained on how to administer questionnaires. While in the field, these research assistants were closely supervised by their respective principal researchers.

In REDET surveys, public support for democracy is normally measured through one item that solicits respondents' views on whether they support a multi-party democracy (introduced in the country in 1992) or they would prefer the former single-party system. Despite the fact that the article makes comparisons between the REDET and Afrobarometer survey data, it is important to point out that the wording of questionnaire items in these two data sets was different. For the case of the Afrobarometer surveys, popular support for democracy is usually measured using several indicators. In this article, only one indicator was used for comparability and this was people's views on the statement that "democracy is preferable to any other kind of government" (Bratton and Cho, 2006:17) This indicator seemed similar to the REDET's measure of democracy.

### **3.0 Popular Support for Democracy Examined**

As democracy is seen to be in crisis not only in Africa but almost everywhere, public support seems to offer some hope for its renewal and for its subsequent consolidation (Ake, 2000:7). Indeed, Ake further argues that, after all, it is the ordinary people who have an objective interest in democratization (as opposed to elites) as they stand to benefit from a



more equitable redistribution of power. As long as democratization entails the redistribution of power at the expense of those who are in power, then incumbent elites have no keen interest or inclination to democratize (Ake, 2000:70-71.) Thus, for democracy to take root, people's demand for democracy is crucial. When citizens support democracy, they can defend the institutions of democracy when they become threatened.

While public support for democracy is recognized as important for democratic consolidation, there may be confusion over the type of democracy that different players support. Survey findings consistently show that Africans support democracy, not based on instrumental considerations, but largely due to its intrinsic value based and its hoped for delivery of freedoms and liberty (Bratton and Mates, 1999; Bratton and Cho, 2006). While this is true, the gradual decline of popular support for democracy may signal that after more than a decade of democratic experiments in Africa, citizens' expectations of democracy now go beyond just increased freedoms and liberty. Other elements may prove to be equally important for the generation of popular support for democracy. So far, the citizens' primary role in promoting democracy in Africa is largely through a minimalist 'Schumpeterian' act of voting in order to bring about a circulation of political elites through regular competitive elections. Yet, it is widely acknowledged that there is more to democracy than just voting and political rights. Rueschemeyer (2005:47) is correct in pointing out that democracy also "requires the continuing responsiveness of the government to the wishes of the citizens." On a similar note, Diamond and Morlino (2005:xii) argue that democracy is not just about content (liberty and political equality) and procedures (efficiency and fairness of the application of law) but also about results (responsiveness, i.e. satisfying citizen expectations of governance).

In this regard, empowerment of the people in terms of economic and social benefits is imperative. Given increasing poverty, misery and vulnerability, Africans expect democracy to deliver not only political freedoms but also economic commodities. In this case, even electoral competition amongst political parties is ultimately linked to concrete outcomes in making state institutions responsive to people's needs and wishes. The decline of popular democracy in Tanzania, therefore, is a reflection of the discrepancy between the delivery of political goods and socioeconomic gains, or as Ake would have put it, a discrepancy between democratic processes and democratic outcomes (Ake, 2000:30).

#### 4.0 Is Declining Support for Democracy Characteristic of a One-Party System?

Tanzanians' attitudes and orientation towards democracy should be understood in the context of the nature and workings of the Tanzanian party system. During single-party rule, the Tanzanian state was able to portray two contrasting sides to its citizens. While controlling the public political space on the one hand, the state party promoted national unity, civic peace, equity, social justice and constituency-based electoral competition on the other hand. The state was promoted as the paternalized unifier of more than 120 ethnic groups and as provider of social services (Stein, 1985). During his Presidency, Julius Nyerere used to remind Tanzanians that, "If we are asked by those with haughtiness and arrogance of great wealth, 'what are you, Tanzanians?' We can answer, not with arrogance but with great



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pride, we have unity and peace, things which cannot be bought with any amount of money" (Nyerere, 1987:3).<sup>3</sup> Also, as the provider of social services, the Tanzanian state was characterized as a 'Paternal Socialist State'. For instance, in minimizing social inequality, the income gap between high and low wages and salary earnings in the public sector was narrowed from the ratio of 50:1 at independence to 20:1 in 1967 then to about 9:1 in 1976 to 6:1 by 1981. With emphasis on equal access to education for all, primary school enrolment stood at 96% in 1978 (McHenry, 1994:76, 85). It is important to point out, however, that many of the successes in social welfare were seriously eroded by the crumbled economy of the 1980s.

Furthermore, in terms of electoral representation, Tanzania's single-party parliamentary elections that allowed intra-party competition also contributed in creating citizens' support towards the political system. By choosing their own leaders, voters felt politically competent. The influence of the voters' choice on elite circulation was high and even prominent politicians, front-benchers and long-standing back-benchers were voted out. Bratton and Van de Walle categorize Tanzania's single-party system as a 'competitive one-party system' in which "voters seem sufficiently attracted by the available choices to sustain genuine turnout figures at relatively high levels" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:80) At times, while the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the party could tamper with the lower level districts' ordering of candidates, the voters could still vote according to their preferences and ignore NEC's preferred candidates. In the 1960, 1965, 1970, 1980 and 1990 general elections, NEC made a total of 82 alterations of the districts' ordering (i.e. substituting candidates' positions, by transferring those at the bottom of the list to the top). Among these, the electorate rejected and voted out about 50% of NEC's favoured candidates (Mushi and Baregu, 1994:113). The electorates' influence in the political recruitment of their leaders brought what Hyden and Prewitt describe as "a feeling of confidence on the part of the people that they are in a position to question the performance of government officials" (Hyden and Prewitt, 1967:338)

Julius Nyerere's commitment to periodic elections also appealed to many of his followers. While addressing the last session of the 1970 National Assembly about the 1970 General Elections, Nyerere defended the necessity of holding periodic elections; he said:

*I know there are, even in Tanzania, some beliefs that periodic elections are dangerous.....This system [of not holding elections] has been proposed many times in Tanzania, although just for a few of our leaders, not all of them. It is said they [periodic elections] could destroy our unity. Indeed, I can assure you that I myself am aware that periodic elections do bring these dangers. Yet I am quite unable to see what we can put in their place. We have rejected the system whereby our leaders are chosen by their mothers.....Nor can we lead a country as if it were a church with the priests and bishops choosing and rejecting each other as leaders, without the believers having any chance to choose or to throw out their leaders (Nyerere, 1970:10).*

In addition to defending the institution of elections, Nyerere's stated intention in 1975 to retire and his subsequent retirement in 1985 made many Tanzanians proud of their type of a 'single-party democracy'. Despite requests from party members that he should continue to lead the country, Nyerere emphasized the need to change top leadership, thus:



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*The argument for changing the top leadership of our nation, which I put forward in 1975, is still valid. When one person has been the national president for a very long time, people begin to be afraid of change. They ask 'what will happen to the country without Mwalimu?' But I repeat, whether we like it or not, sooner or later change in leadership is inevitable. No one is immortal.<sup>4</sup>*

As a result, many Tanzanians tend to look at the past not with a deep sense of disappointment but rather with admiration. This may influence people to feel that substantively the existing multi-party democracy is not different from the old one-party system. At the same time as Tanzanians were exercising their electoral choice under a single-party state, they were subjected to a monolithic and highly centralized party system guided by the ideology of 'Ujamaa', Tanzania's version of socialism. Throughout the era of single-party rule, the ruling party extended its control over every section of the population, including local government councils, students' associations, women's groups, and almost every other independent societal organization. All civic organizations were either banned or incorporated into the party's structure. In so doing, locally-based participatory organizations were nearly completely squashed and individual groups hardly enjoyed independent organizational rights outside the state/party structures, which in turn deprived them of civic competence and organizational skills and knowledge.

While it is true that the multi-party political system introduced in 1992 has resulted in the emergence of multiple parties, yet, the degree of pluralism has not affected in significant ways the pervasiveness of the incumbent party in the day-to-day people's lives. The ruling party has an extensive apparatus starting from the lowest level called "ten-cell households" to the village, ward, division, district, regional and national level (which include the Central Committee, the National Executive Committee [NEC] and the National Conference). CCM has benefited a great deal from its nationalist pedigree being formed in 1977 out of the Tanganyika/Tanzania African Nation Union (TANU) and the Zanzibar - Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP). Unlike the opposition parties, CCM commands significant human and financial resources enabling it to successfully outcompete the newly established parties.

While there are 17 registered opposition parties in the country (see the date of the article), many of these are largely urban-based and therefore not widely known by Tanzanians. Indeed, more Tanzanians identify themselves as members of the incumbent party, CCM, while only a few identify themselves as members of opposition parties. Table 4 shows the findings of respondents' self-identification of their party affiliation in a series of REDET surveys. In the 1994 survey, the majority of the respondents in the sample (60%) said that they belonged to the ruling party, CCM, and only 3.5% of all respondents reported that they were members of opposition parties. Over one-third (36%) identified themselves as not belonging to any political party. As this was the early period of multi-party politics, it is possible that many of the respondents, who said they did not belong to any party, were in fact members or sympathizers of opposition parties.



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
**Table 1: Party Identification: Ruling Party vs Opposition Parties (%)**

Political Party	1994	1999	2001	2003	2004	2006	2007
11.1 CCM	60.4	60.0	60.0	63.3	69.5	68.3	68.7
Opposition	3.5	13.6	18.5	21.0	13.6	12.2	15.2
Not members	36.1	26.4	21.5	15.7	16.9	19.5	16.1

Source: REDET surveys

Although the number of the respondents identifying with the opposition increased from 3.5 to 15% in 2007, the ruling party's membership size (at least according to survey data) remained relatively constant between 1994 and 2001 and increased to about 69% in 2007. Even with the presence of multiple parties for over a decade and a half, CCM continues to dominate in terms of electoral support. In all three general elections of 1995, 2000 and 2005, CCM won over 80% of seats in the parliament while its share of parliamentary votes increased from 59.2% in 1995 to 69.9% in the 2005 elections (see Graph 2 below).


**Graph 2: Parliamentary Votes (%) for CCM vs. Opposition Parties**



On the part of the opposition parties, their share of parliamentary votes had been on the decline from 40.8% in 1995 to 30% in the 2005 elections; this was partly because of the unfavourable effects of the 'Winner-takes-all electoral system.'

Opposition parties secured only 12% of seats in the Union Parliament in 2005. The landslide victory of President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete in the 2005 elections solidified even further CCM's dominance over the Tanzanian political system (see Graph 3 below). Presidential candidates from opposition parties are finding it increasingly difficult to persuade the voters to be on their side.

Graph 3: Percentage of Votes for CCM vs. Presidential



While elections have been relatively free and fair in Tanzania Mainland, competitive elections in the semi-autonomous Zanzibar have been controversial, characterized by gross irregularities, fraud, violence and insecurity. All three multi-party elections (1995, 2000 and 2005) were followed by a political stalemate on the islands, with the major opposition party (CUF - Civic United Front) rejecting defeat, refusing to recognize the elected government, and challenging the electoral results. Even after the significant constitutional reforms introduced in 2001 following the signing of a reconciliation agreement between two contending parties, the political situation in Zanzibar remains fragile and uncertain. All this may have led some Tanzanians to feel that multi-party democracy has failed to resolve the long-time political conflict in Zanzibar (Killian, 2006, 2008).



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Moreover, despite CCM's significant electoral support, the percentage of respondents who say that they are 'satisfied' with the ruling party's performance is declining. As Table 2 indicates, whereas in the 2006 REDET survey 60% of the respondents reported that they were 'satisfied' with the CCM's performance in enhancing multi-party democracy, only 40.7% had the same view in 2007. Yet, this does not mean a 'bonus' to the opposition. As Table 2 indicates, compared to CCM's ratings, more respondents were saying they were 'not satisfied' with the overall performance of the opposition in strengthening a multi-party system. In the 2006 REDET survey, half of the respondents (51%) reported that they were 'not satisfied' with the opposition's overall performance as opposed to only 12% who said they were 'not satisfied' with the ruling party. In the 2007 survey, whereas about 39% of the respondents said that they were 'not satisfied' with the opposition, 23% of the respondents had similar views with regard to the ruling party. Although the gap seemed to be narrowing, the rate of respondents saying they were 'satisfied' with the opposition was rather low and remained relatively the same between 2006 and 2007. While Tanzanians were getting disillusioned with the performance of the ruling party, they did not seem to be particularly happy with the opposition's performance either.

Table 2: Evaluation of the Performance of the Ruling Party and the Opposition (2006-2007)


	Ruling Party (CCM)		Opposition Parties	
	2006	2007	2006	2007
Satisfied	60.1	40.7	18.2	19.0
Somehow satisfied	25.5	34.3	22.6	30.3
Not satisfied	12.0	23.3	51.2	38.7
Don't know	2.4	1.6	8.0	12.1
Total	100	100	100	100
	(1296)	(1294)	(1294)	(1275)

Source: REDET surveys

Thus, lack of expected benefits from a multi-party competitive democracy may be at the core of the declining support for democracy amongst Tanzanians. Increased public support towards the previous one-party rule may be attributed to the people's desire for the benefits of the past paternalist state. Indeed, according to the 2005/06 Afrobarometer comparative surveys, the rate of people's satisfaction with democracy, was the lowest in Tanzania compared to all other African countries. As Graph 4 indicates, the rate of people's satisfaction with democracy in Tanzania dropped from 63% in 2000 to a mere 37% in 2005 (Bratton and Cho, 2006:19). Whereas, overall the Afrobarometer findings showed that Africans were becoming dissatisfied with democracy, the sharp decline of Tanzanians' rate of satisfaction with democracy was indeed striking.



Graph 4: Satisfaction with democracy (Afrobarometer)



### 5.0 Declining Support for Democracy: A Sign of Public Disillusionment?

Since the shift towards market-liberal policies, Tanzania has made remarkable progress in terms of its macro-economic performance. The real GDP growth rate rose from 3.6% back in 1995 to 6.7% in 2005. The rate of inflation was reduced from two-digits in the 1980s to 5% in 2005 (Economic Surveys, 2006). Despite a rather impressive picture at the macro-level, the majority of Tanzanians, especially in the rural areas, are still living in poverty.<sup>5</sup> Macro-economic gains have yet to be translated into eradicating poverty for the majority of Tanzanians. The living situation is made worse with rising inflation, which rose from 6.7% in 2005 to 7.3% in 2006, largely due to 2005/06 severe drought affecting food production and hydro-electricity generation as well as increased oil prices (REPOA:2008). It is under this context that popular support for democracy is supposed to be generated and sustained.

Furthermore, Tanzanians seem to still prefer the state rather than the market in managing certain specific sectors. The 2002 REDET survey on peoples' opinion on privatization of public services and institutions highlights the way people evaluate the government's role in managing public resources. The respondents' support for the government's decision to privatize certain specific sectors seems to be low. These sectors include natural resources, education and the health sector. Table 3 presents the findings.



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**Table 3: Peoples' Perceptions on Privatization Policy by Sectors**

Satisfied with Privatization Policy	Privatization of Natural Resources	Privatization of Health Services	Privatization of Education
Satisfied	15.8	33.9	31.1
Somehow satisfied	8.2	10.9	9.4
Not satisfied	65.9	47.1	50.0
Other	10.1	8.1	9.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
	(595)	(595)	(596)

Source: REDET survey 2002

As Table 3 indicates, more than two-thirds of all the respondents (65%) said that they were not satisfied with the government policy to privatize the country's natural resources such as land and minerals. Similarly, 50% of the respondents reported that they were not satisfied with the decision to privatize education. Also, a significant segment of the respondents (47%) were not satisfied with the decision to privatize health services.

Indeed, the privatization in the mineral and energy sector has attracted public scrutiny largely due to the opinion that the majority of Tanzanians do not benefit from minerals, especially gold, in which two big multinational mining companies – the Canadian, Barrick, and the South African-based AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) – dominate production. Cases of corrupt practices and dubious mining and energy contracts have been on the rise over recent years. A joint study done by religious-based organizations and independent researchers found that Tanzania's government secures very little in terms of tax revenues from the gold sector, particularly due to unfair mining contracts, tax evasion and the demise of small-scale artisan miners (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). Also, according to UNCTAD's report, the mining sector employs only 0.2% of Tanzania's workforce (Curtis and Lissu, 2008:11).

Moreover, incidences of corruption have been numerous in various institutions of government. About 80% of the respondents in the ESRF/FACEIT survey said that they have encountered corruption directly or indirectly (ESRF/FECEIT, 2002). These incidences of corruption were reported to be highest in health services followed by police, business, licensing, the judiciary, tax authorities, education, and public utilities.

Comparing the 2004, 2006 and the 2007 REDET surveys, citizens' satisfaction with the government performance has declined. In the 2004 survey, about 70% of all respondents in Tanzania reported that they were 'satisfied' with the overall government performance. The number of respondents saying they were 'satisfied' dropped to 44% in 2007. Though still a minority, those who said they were 'not satisfied' almost doubled from 10.5% in 2004 to about 19% in 2007.




Table 4: Citizens' Evaluation of Government Performance

	2004 (Sept)	2006 (October)	2007 (October)
Satisfied	70.0	67.4	44.4
Somehow satisfied	17.7	22.7	35.0
Not satisfied	10.5	7.8	18.9
Don't know	1.9	2.1	2.0
Total	100 (1290)	100 (1095)	100 (1093)

Source: REDET surveys

As Graph 5 shows, a sizable percentage of the respondents were saying they were 'somehow satisfied', and it was this group whose number steadily increased from about 18% in 2004 to 35% in 2007.

Graph 5: Satisfaction with government performance



The declining level of people's satisfaction with the government performance coincided with the declining level of trust in the current President himself. President Jakaya Kikwete came to power in 2005 through competitive multi-party elections after securing an overwhelming victory of 80% of the votes. The REDET survey carried out just after 100 days after President Kikwete's administration took power in March 2006, asked respondents how much trust they placed in President Kikwete to bring about positive change in people's lives. An overwhelming 84% of



the respondents said that they had 'very much trust' in him. A year and half later in October 2007, the percent of those saying that they had 'very much trust' in the president dropped to 56%. Although President Kikwete still has over 50% public trust, the 28-point decline in about 20 months clearly indicates how disillusioned the citizens are over his presidency and his government. Indeed, compared to the rate of public trust in the president, the public trust levels were much lower for other senior government leaders including the Vice President (46%), Prime Minister (43%) and the cabinet as a whole (23.5%) (REDET survey, 2007)

## **6.0 Conclusion**

The findings in this article demonstrate that the declining rate of popular support for multi-party democracy in Tanzania is partly attributed by citizens' negative perceptions of the government performance. In addition, the pervasiveness of a dominant-party system in which the same party has been able to remain in power even amidst electoral competition may indicate a sign of continuity of the old-one party rule. Indeed, this is what makes Tanzania's trends on popular support for democracy distinctive from other sub-Saharan African countries. Increased public support towards the previous one-party rule may be attributed to the people's desires for the benefits of the past paternalist state. As citizens become disillusioned with the performance of CCM's government while opposition parties do not seem to offer an effective alternative, citizens' support for multi-party democracy may be at risk. In so doing, lack of expected benefits from a multi-party competitive democracy may be at the core of the declining support for democracy amongst Tanzanians. Thus, as the Government of Tanzania makes some efforts to secure civil and political liberties, and so are people's expectations for positive change in their living standards. It is the functioning of the balance between democratic processes and democratic outcomes that remains a challenge to Tanzania's civic peace and social cohesion.

## **Notes**

1. For survey findings on the periodic trends of popular support for democracy (1994-2003), see Killian (2005) *Who Supports Democracy in Tanzania and Why?*. *UTAFITI*, Vol.6, No.1, pp.131-146.
2. Afrobarometer includes a comparative series of public attitude surveys in African countries carried out by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana) and Michigan State University (MSU).
3. Nyerere's Address to the Opening of the CCM National Conference, 1987.
4. Nyerere's Speech at the National Conference of CCM in August 1985.
5. According to the UNDP Human Development Report (2006), Tanzania ranks 159<sup>th</sup> of 177 countries in Human Development Index.



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